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Abstract 
 
Confucian society is one of the major cultural and social systems of East Asia. There 
have been long-standing scholarly debates about whether Confucian societies can 
produce or maintain a democratic regime; and in more recent years discussion of why 
there are several Confucian societies that can democratise yet some of them cannot. In 
order to contribute to these debates, this thesis conducts an analysis of China, 
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea to explore and explain the following issues by 
comparative strategy: why have some Confucian societies democratised yet some of 
them have not? What is the role of traditional legacies from the pre-democratic 
dynasties and how does this political culture shape contemporary Confucian societies 
and their capacity to produce and sustain democratic politics? What is the role of 
economic and social modernisation in contemporary Confucian societies in the 
development of democracy? What role is played by ruling parties and leader’s 
attitudes and choices when they face claims for democracy from society? How do 
these three factors - legacies, modernisation and ruler’s choices - shape successful and 
unsuccessful cases of democratic change in East Asia? 
 
Evaluating these factors by comparative qualitative and quantitative strategy, this 
thesis concludes: the ruling parties and leaders strategies for democracy are quite 
different between successful and unsuccessful cases. In China and Singapore, the 
leadership can unite and deploy a pseudo-democracy to respond to democratic claims 
of society; yet in Taiwan and South Korea, non-democratic leaderships could not 
sustain their rule, and they even chose to cooperate with opponents for survival. 
Secondly, the traditional legacies that emerged from the pre-democratic imperial 
system are the elements to hinder development of democracy rather than 
Confucianism itself. In China and Singapore, these legacies are selectively chosen by 
leaders to serve their official ideologies, yet in Taiwan and South Korea, rulers could 
not sustain their ability to manipulate these legacies. Modernisation in China and 
Singapore is controlled officially so it serves and consolidates non-democratic rule; 
but in Taiwan and Singapore, the modernisation process was not totally controlled by 
non-democratic rulers and instead promoted democratisation in these societies. 
 
Comparing these factors, the attitude and unity of rulers seems the influential factor 
for this debate. If non-democratic rulers can remain united in their strategy, traditional 
legacies for serving non-democratic rule will be strengthened, and the effects of 
modernisation for democracy will continue to be limited. However, because the 
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younger generation demonstrates positive attitudes to democratic values and against 
traditional legacies, this situation could still change in the long run. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Topic of the Thesis 
In 1947 Sir Winston Churchill noted “Many forms of Government have been tried, 
and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is 
perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”. 
Democracy is not a perfect political system, but it is increasingly an accepted one,   
practised by a majority of the world’s population. Democracy is derived from 
demokratia, which can be separated into two words: demo and kratia, indicating one 
meaning: rule by the people (Held, 1996, p. 1). However, in academic terms, the 
definition for democracy has been controversial. There is not a united theory of 
democracy (Sartori, 1987, p.3), but rather an accepted principle of "power rests with 
the people" as the true meaning of democracy (Lee, Teng-Hui, 1995, p.5). Nowadays, 
democracy has become a universal word to define systems of government, not only 
for democracies but also many authoritarian states. Most non-democracies, such as 
North Korea and Congo use ‘democratic’ in their state name. The trend also affects 
East Asian countries, and nowadays more than half of them have democratised or are 
undergoing a process of democratisation. This indicates that rulers around the world, 
including rulers from non-democratic regimes, all employ the idea of ‘rule by the 
people’ to legitimise their ruling status.  
 
East Asia covers several cultures, and Confucian society is one of the major cultural 
and social systems, at one time covering a majority of the population in the region. 
Discussions and debates about whether a Confucian society can produce or maintain a 
democratic regime have continued for several decades. In more recent decades with 
the emergence of some successfully democratised societies in the region another 
debate has been conducted as to why some Confucian societies can democratise but 
some of them cannot. There is no the obvious conclusion in this debate because some 
Confucian societies have democratised, and continue to maintain a stable democratic 
regime for more than two decades; but other non-democratic rulers also sustain their 
rule in several Confucian societies, and there is no accepted evidence that their rule 
will be end in the short term.  
 
When considering the historical context of the debate on democracy in Confucian 
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societies we find many opinions. In the beginning, Confucian scholars tried to argue 
that the classic Confucian political system actually made the people the basis of 
legitimacy in the political system. Yet in the imperial period, the ruler controlled all 
political power in practice and tradition. In this way it was conceptualised that the 
ruler represented the legitimacy of the political system. Several Confucian scholars 
sought to correct this mistake. In late Ming Dynasty, Huang, Zongxi (黃宗羲) 
developed the concept of ‘People are the ultimate source of political authority’ in his 
Ming Yi Dai Fang Lu (明夷待訪錄). The King was chosen by the people to deal with 
public affairs in the state, and ministers were selected to share these affairs. However, 
this situation was incorrectly changed from the Qin Empire (秦朝), so that the King 
established the basis of sovereignty, and the people became the King’s property   
(Yu, 2000; see also Tu, 1998, p.121; F.K.Hsu, 2004a, p.248). In late Qing Empire, 
regardless of the faction of reform and constitutionalism, all leaders that supported 
revolution indicated that Huang’s view was the source of their thinking, including 
Liang Qichao (梁啟超) and Sun Yat-Sen (Yu, 2000). Liang’ s teacher, Kang You-wei 
(康有為) used the Confucian thinking to criticise the feudal and autocratic empire and 
indicated that the leaders’ right to rule had to be based on the people (Kang, You-wei, 
2011). He combined strands of western thought and traditional Chinese thought to 
construct his framework for adopting a democratic system and institutions. But his 
attempts failed because his work was viewed as seeking to overthrow the whole 
existing political system and offended most Confucian scholars’ interests (Tu, 1986, 
pp.13-14; Yu, 2000). Although political reform was eventually conducted, it also led 
to the collapse of the imperial system because the Confucian gentry stood against the 
Qing government (Gasster, 1980, pp.506-507) and undermined its authority. 
 
After the end of the imperial period, the debates on political change for China tended 
to reject the idea that Confucianism was compatible to democracy. Most scholars and 
overseas students suggested abandoning Confucianism and introducing the Western 
thoughts to replace it; because history had shown that the rule of Confucianism could 
only weaken the country, so to totally abandon it was the only way to save the country 
(Fairbank K & Goldman, 2006, pp.266-268; Gasster, 1980). The famous May Fourth 
scholars, such as Hu Shih (胡適), Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀), Li Dazhao (李大釗) and Lu 
Xun (魯迅), and students from universities promoted the New Culture Movement 
argued that Confucianism was not suitable for a modern society, and it was only a part 
of Chinese culture. They argued that this movement is an ‘Enlightenment’ movement 
in China to get rid of old traditions and lifestyle, since these sources hindered the 
willingness of society to accept western and modern institutions. They argued that the 
thought of Confucius tried to promote the feudal era’s political system, manner and 
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lifestyle, which were now outmoded. Science, democracy and new literatures were the 
essential measures to replace the old system (Fairbank K & Goldman, 2006, 
pp.266-268; Schwartz, 1983, pp.419-429). This is the first time Chinese modern 
scholars totally overthrew the ideas of Confucianism in a Confucian society.  In 
contrast to scholars of the late Qing Empire, they pointed out Confucianism is not 
capable of giving China a path to democracy and modernity.  
 
In recent decades, the debates on the relationship between Confucian society and 
democratic politics has revived and renewed divergent opinions. Lee Kwan Yew, the 
former Prime Minister of Singapore believed that Confucian culture in society is an 
important factor in Asian democracy, which can bring well-ordered democracy. It is 
because of this culture that Confucian societies should have a different kind of 
democracy (Zakaria, 1994; Bell, 2000). However, democracy in Lee’s mind is not the 
democracy as understood in scholarly definitions. On the other hand, some scholars 
argued the characteristics of Confucianism promoted a culture that would hinder 
democracy. Huntington believed that the Confucian heritage is a clear obstacle for 
Confucian societies to practice democracy (Huntington, 1991, p. 300-307; 1996, 
p.237). Bell et al (1995, pp. 163-167), Bell (2000, pp.219-234) and Zakaria, (1997, 
pp.27-29) also discussed illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy in East Asia,   
arguing that because this region does not have the traditions of Western states, abuses 
of civil liberties and rights, rule of man rather than rule of law, are likely to prevail . 
As for the freedom, equality and pluralism in western values, the western traditions, 
are not the prior concern here. According to their argument, Confucian culture should 
take the major responsibility for hindering the development of democracy.  
 
Nonetheless, another group of scholars emerged to argue that the above scholars may 
have made errors in their analysis. They indicate that scholars mentioned in the last 
section make use of the traditional legacies that emerged from the political system of 
pre-democratic dynasties in Confucian society, rather than Confucianism itself to 
discuss whether a Confucian society can produce or maintain democratic regimes (Tu, 
1998, pp.222-223; Fukuyama, 1995a; 1995b; Yu, 2000; Tu, 1999; Sen, 1999, 
pp.14-15). Confucianism as a system of political thought does not support autocratic 
regimes, and rulers should understand that their right to rule should be based on the 
people’s support. However, during the imperial dynasties, the dominant political class 
controlled the political agenda, and a number of legacies that are not compatible to 
democracy emerged in that period of time (Huang, 1981; 1987; 1993). As result, the 
people, who should be the source of legitimate rule, were not aware of their political 
status (Yu, 2000; Hsu, 1985; Mou, 2002). In order to correct this problem, the   
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important objective is to demonstrate how democracy can be the political system and 
Confucianism the spiritual essence so that they can co-exist within democratic 
Confucian societies (Bell, 2000, p.14; Chan, 1997, p.44-47; Tu, 2009, December 30). 
This also means clarifying the differences between Confucianism and ‘Kong Jia Dian 
(孔家店)’, which means a political system that uses Confucianism’s name to practise 
the autocratic rule (Yu & Bei, 2012, March 22).  
 
Kim Dae Jung (1994), the first democratic President of the Republic of Korea, also 
argued that Confucianism offers democratic traditions like the popular sovereignty of 
John Locke. He indicates that in the classic Confucian political system, 
people-orientation is the core of the system, and the ruler should practice government 
of benevolence to fulfil people’s needs. Kim also suggests that rule of law and 
measures such as the imperial examination, which offered equal opportunity for 
people to be government officers, impeachment of officers who censored mistakes 
from emperors and officers, and freedom of speech were also important 
characteristics in Confucian society, that point to some democratic traditions. In his 
opinion, Confucian societies even had democratic values earlier than European society. 
Furthermore, that several Confucian societies have democratised also offers vivid 
evidence that Confucian societies also can produce democratic regimes under modern 
conditions. Thus, the claim that Confucian culture does not need democracy can be 
viewed as evasive words designed to support regime authoritarianism; that along with 
offers of good government and high living standards seeks to gain people’s support 
for non-democratic rule (Ng, 1997, pp.21-22). The view that Confucian societies are 
not suitable for democracy is mostly given by authoritarian rulers rather than scholars, 
as Sen argues (Sen, 1999, p.15).  
 
The above debates reflect the fact that the relationship of Confucian society towards 
democracy remains highly contested, with scholars and politicians upholding 
opposing views as to whether these two are compatible or antagonistic. It can be 
found that some scholars indicate that the major problem is the nature of 
Confucianism because it encourages several negative concepts which can hinder the 
development of democracy. For this reason a Confucian culture should be replaced by 
a democratic culture, otherwise, only an illiberal democracy can emerge. On the other 
hand, some scholars indicate that the major problem is not Confucianism itself, but 
the traditional legacies that emerged from the history of Confucian dynasties, and the 
rulers – the political dominators - should take the responsibility for this issue. 
Modernisation also took an important role in these debates: in the late Qing Dynasty, 
the debates arose within the modernisation process, and even as new t ideas argued for 
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the need to replace the Confucian thinking during the May Fourth period. In the 
modern Confucian societies, the role of modernisation in shaping debates about the 
relationship between the past and the future is also vivid.  
 
Scholars have also debated the conditions for producing and maintaining a democratic 
regime. Scholars agree that the regime needs not only that the political elites commit 
themselves to creating and maintaining a democratic regime in the beginning 
(Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000; Linz, 1990), but that a solid democratic political 
culture is essential to support democratic consolidation so it is important to develop 
people’s democratic values (Gunther, Puhle & Nikiforos Diamandouros, 1995; 
Pridham, 2000; Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Shin, 1994). For these reasons, it is important 
to discuss both the rulers’ attitudes to political change and the factors that would 
shape the emerging political culture, such as traditional legacies and modernisation 
factors in Confucian societies. From that basis it should be possible to compare the 
democratic and non-democratic cases in East Asia to assess under what conditions a 
Confucian society can have a democratic regime, and why some of them have 
democratised by the present but some of them failed to change so far. This thesis will 
study this topic by exploring the following points:  
a. Why have some societies within the Confucian East Asian state system achieved a 
democratic regime but some of them have not?  
b. How do the choices and objectives of different political elites interact with the 
claims for democracy in contemporary Confucian society?  
c. What role does the multiple traditions and uses of Confucianism play in this 
varied pattern of democratic change?  
d. What is the role of socio-economic modernisation to democracy: does it act as a 
facilitator to assist democratic change as some theories suggest, or does it act to 
help consolidate authoritarian rule in some cases?  
 
1.2 Research Design 
In order to research the topic, this thesis will be divided into two parts : the first part is 
theoretical examination that discuses what scholars have said about Confucianism in 
politics; about how Confucian ideas have been used by rulers to shape a political 
culture for their societies; and how social-economic modernisation has re-shaped 
political values. The second part is a case studies analysis that tests the changes to 
values in four East Asian societies to see how traditional legacies and modern politics 
interact. The theoretical part will be used to construct a framework for analysis and 
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confirm certain hypotheses and research questions; the case studies part will be used 
to evaluate the hypotheses and answer the research questions. 
1.2.1 Theoretical Part 
The theoretical part will be divided into two chapters: political culture, and 
modernisation. 
 
In the political culture chapter, this thesis will discuss the essential conditions for 
producing a democratic regime and how traditional legacies survive in contemporary 
Confucian societies politically. It can be found that a transition to a democratic regime 
needs the major political players to agree to support such a change in the beginning, 
and also needs an emerging democratic political culture to support it. However, in this 
chapter, this thesis will demonstrate that in fact the traditional legacies still exist in 
contemporary Confucian societies and have some impact in politics. These legacies in 
the political aspect may help to consolidate the non-democratic ruler’s system, control 
the public space and limit different voices from the people, and constrain individuals 
will to promote collective interests. If these legacies are promoted by political 
dominators in politics, then the democratic political culture will not easily be 
constructed, and in the meantime, the non-democratic rule will be facilitated by these 
legacies. 
 
In the modernisation chapter, this thesis will point out the ambiguous effects of 
modernisation in Confucian societies. Modernisation theories have been taken to 
indicate that the traditional legacies will diminish under modernisation and the 
traditional society will totally change during the process of modernisation. An open 
and democratic-oriented society should emerge to replace the old one. However, the 
scholars suggest that in the East Asian countries, modernisation may not bring about 
the effect as the theories expect. Furthermore, this thesis will also briefly indicate that 
in Confucian societies, influences of modernisation changes upon democracy are 
variant. Modernisation in some Confucian societies may become the facilitator to 
maintain non-democratic rule, although modernisation might help some societies to 
democratise their regimes. Thus, the role of modernisation in Confucian societies and 
why it seems to push democratisation in some societies, yet also seems to facilitate 
sustaining non-democratic rule in others, is also an essential discussion. 
 
To summarise the preceding sections, the theoretical part of the thesis establishes 
three essential determinants of political change in East Asia: the rulers’ attitude to 
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democratic change, and the role of two major elements, traditional legacies and 
modernisation, which can shape change to the political culture and thus the public’s 
perception of, and decision for, democracy.  
1.2.2 Case Studies Part 
The cases studies part will analyse the hypotheses of this theses and compare the 
differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Regarding the definition 
of Confucian society, Bell (1995, p.18-20) gives three characteristics by which society 
can be viewed as Confucian. Firstly, behaviour: the public’s behaviour can be defined 
as Confucian in terms of values-orientation as based on the Confucian classics. 
Second, elite instrumentalisation: Confucianism is employed as an ideology by elites 
to facilitate their purposes. Third, values of the Confucianised society, so that people 
in Confucian society remain deeply influenced by a Confucian culture. Therefore, he 
indicates that China, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore (a Chinese majority society), 
Japan, Hong Kong and other Chinese majority societies can be viewed as Confucian 
societies (1995, p.20). 
 
Though there are a number of Confucian societies in East Asia, when selecting the 
cases in this thesis, two important characteristics have been considered: the length of 
time that Confucianism has been established in the society; and the manner in which 
the current regime was established. China and Korea are the Confucian societies 
which have experienced Confucianism for hundreds (even thousands) of years. The 
societies of these two states will be used as two of the cases in this thesis. The 
majority races in Singapore and Taiwan are ethnic Chinese, most of whom were from 
mainland China and effected by Confucian culture. After the Second World War, an 
ethnic Chinese dominated government with Confucian value-orientated leaders were 
established on these places. Confucianism, especially family-centric values are vivid 
in these two societies; and they will also be chosen as typical of Confucian societies. 
Other choices might be Japan, which was also affected by Confucianism; but Japan’s 
Confucianism is not similar to that of China and Korea. In Japan, the royal family 
may not be overthrown by the public or nobles; and it has its own traditions for 
arranging the relationship between emperors, nobles and the masses. Fukuyuma (1995, 
pp.26-27) suggests that Japanese Confucianism is suppressed because the emperor’s 
status is not like Chinese or other Confucian societies’ emperor. Meanwhile, 
family-centric values, the unit that may be applied against the state, may not be 
applied in Japanese society. Huntington (1996, p.45) also indicates that Japanese 
culture is a unique civilisation separated from Sinic civilisation, and this state has 
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fewer cultural connections with its neighbours (ibid. p.133). 
 
According to these scholarly discussions, this thesis will choose China, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan as the cases to be considered. China and Singapore are 
non-democratic societies, and South Korea and Taiwan are democratic societies. In 
the case studies part, this thesis will investigate comparatively: 
What is the ruler’s attitude to democracy in democratic and non-democratic societies, 
and why do some non-democratic rulers chose to democratise their regime?  
How do traditional legacies perform in these Confucian societies: do they continue to 
be used by non-democratic rulers for serving non-democratic government, and what 
happened in the new democratic states during the non-democratic period to ensure 
these legacies could not sustain non-democratic rule?  
What is the role of modernisation in democratic and non-democratic societies?  
 
The statistical analyses, which are based on data from the Asian Barometer Survey, 
will be operated to demonstrate people’s support for traditional legacies, to test 
whether traditional legacies and modernisation help non-democratic rulers or not, to 
examine whether traditional legacies and modernisation would help or hinder to 
develop democratic values, and finally what is the strength of democratic values 
among people in these societies. Through these analyses, political science 
explanations as to why some Confucian societies can produce and maintain a 
democratic society yet some of them cannot will be demonstrated.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Based on the examination of the topic introduced in the preceding section, there seem 
to be three major aspects to consider when evaluating the interaction of Confucian 
culture and democratic change in East Asia: the ruler’s attitudes; the strength and use 
of traditional legacies; and the extent of social, economic and educational 
modernisation. In order to evaluate the relative role of these aspects this thesis uses 
the following three hypotheses, that produce five research questions: 
 
H1: A democratic regime can be the political system in modern Confucian societies, 
yet rulers’ attitudes to democratic values and changes are decisive in these 
ruler-dominated societies for practicing democracy. 
 
Although there are fundamental differences between the classic Confucian political 
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system that is more people-oriented, and the imperial system that is more ruler-based, 
yet traditionally, these Confucian societies are ruler-dominated. Meanwhile, New 
Confucian scholars also indicate that the people are not aware of their right to take the 
dominant role in the political system. In the contemporary Confucian societies, 
democracy has become the consensus among Confucian societies, not only rulers in 
democratic Confucian societies but also non-democratic rulers all indicate that their 
regime is democratic. In the meantime, after the imperial period, there is a possibility 
for Confucian societies to implement democracy, and New Confucian scholars clearly 
suggest democracy should be the new political solution to replace the imperial 
political system and realise people-oriented politics as suggested in the classic 
Confucian political system. Thus, political leaders’ attitude is decisive for democracy. 
So, if political leaders cannot tolerate or support establishing a democratic 
government, democracy cannot emerge. This hypothesis produces the following 
research questions:  
 
Q1: How do rulers in contemporary Confucian societies respond to the trend of 
democracy? Why are some non-democratic rulers not able to sustain their rule by 
employing the traditional legacies? How do the nature of the regime, the nature of 
internal or international change (including the US role) affect the ability of rulers to 
control the political process and maintain their non-democratic rule? 
 
As the scholarly discussions argue, the ruler is the politically dominant force that has 
controlled the political system for centuries in Confucian societies. Democracy 
became the common consensus in the beginning of the last century among most 
Confucian societies, thus the ruler’s attitude to democracy is important for these 
societies to establish the democratic regime. This thesis will compare rulers’ attitude 
to democracy through the cases studies to asses why rulers in some societies chose to 
democratise yet some of them sustain a false democracy. In the meantime, there are 
several important factors that may affect rulers’ attitude to democracy: the nature of 
the regime, international and internal change are also important elements to affect the 
ability of rulers to control political life and manipulate modernisation factors. 
 
H2: The traditional legacies that some scholars see as hindering the development of 
democracy emerged from the political system of the pre-democratic dynasties rather 
than the Confucian political system, yet now they are still existing in modern 
Confucian society. But the roles of this traditional value system in shaping democratic 
emergence are variant and uncertain. In non-democratic societies, legacies are 
selectively chosen to sustain non-democratic regime; and in democratic societies 
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might not serve to be the obstacle for democracy. This thesis will discuss these ideas 
further in the political culture chapter to demonstrate what the original meaning in 
Confucian classics is, and how these legacies gradually formed into a ruling system of 
thought, and how they exist in the politics of contemporary Confucian societies. This 
hypothesis would seek to explore following research questions. 
 
Q2: What role do the traditional legacies play in this varied pattern of democratic 
change?  
 
During the pre-democratic dynasties period, several legacies emerged and were 
selectively manipulated by rulers to support their power. This phenomenon could also 
happen in the contemporary Confucian societies. Political culture is a political attitude 
that is formed over a period of time and becomes a collective memory in people’s 
mind, and people’s political actions will be driven by these memories that are saved in 
their mind (Almond & Bingham Powell, Jr., 1978; Almond & Verba, 1989). Thus, 
there is a powerful incentive for non-democratic rulers to exploit these legacies 
politically. The people will recognise and accept these legacies and may be persuaded 
to accept non-democratic values and politics. On the other hand, how did these 
legacies operate in democratising societies? How could non-democratic rulers during 
non-democratic period not successfully control these legacies to keep their rule, or 
what changed so these legacies could not be used to prolong the non-democratic 
period? In the case studies part, this thesis will compare the differences between 
democratic and non-democratic societies in these ways. 
 
Q3: Can rulers in non-democratic regimes use the traditional legacies to deepen 
support in people’s mind for non-democratic values? Are they successful in hindering 
the development of democratic values in contemporary Confucian societies? 
 
In order to assess whether the non-democratic rulers have an ability to manipulate 
these traditional legacies selectively, the thesis will use two waves of Asian Barometer 
Data to demonstrate the support rate of the people towards these legacies, and the 
trend change: do the traditional legacies that are promoted by rulers gain higher 
support from people over time? This part will be demonstrated in the case studies. 
Furthermore, the regression analysis is operated to analyse whether the independent 
variable would affect dependent variable (Wu & Tu, 2005, p.445). This thesis will 
operate this analysis to explore whether traditional legacies will negatively affect the 
development of democratic values and hinder the formation of democratic political 
culture in contemporary Confucian societies. 
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H3: Socio-economic modernisation is ambiguous in Confucian societies: it can be a 
tool to serve regime survival in non-democratic regime, yet it pushes democratisation 
in democratic regimes. 
 
Modernisation theories suggest that the modernisation process can bring total changes 
for traditional society because the traditional social structure is dissolved, people’s 
values are changed during the modernisation process and it is harder for rulers to 
control people’s values. However, all Confucian societies have ‘modernised’, during 
the modernisation process of rapid economic growth, emergence of middle class and 
public education, and other elements that could happen from this process have 
occurred; yet not all of the Confucian societies have met the expectations of 
modernisation theories that the more open society and values mean possibilities for a 
democratic regime. This thesis will address the major modernisation factors in 
Chapter 3 to indicate that economic development, middle class, and education are the 
important factors to observe modernisation’s role in Confucian societies; but also that 
the experiences in these societies reflect that there is an ambiguous condition of 
modernisation factors producing democratic politics. Thus, this thesis suspects that 
modernisation could help to consolidate the non-democratic regime in non-democratic 
societies, and in the contrast, it could also facilitate the democratisation as theories 
expect in democratic societies. This hypothesis would try to answer the following 
research question. 
 
Q4: What is the role of socio-economic modernisation for advancing or hindering 
democracy? Can it diminish the traditional legacies? Can the ruler’s control be used to 
limit the effects of modernisation or even turn modernisation to be the facilitator of 
their rule? How does modernisation work to help pushing democracy during the 
modernisation process and can political culture be controlled during this period? 
 
With this question, the thesis will explore modernisation’s role in Confucian societies 
in supporting change to political culture that favours democracy; or conversely 
modernisation could be the supporter to consolidate the non-democratic rule. This will 
be compared in the case studies. In the ruler-dominated Confucian societies, the ruler 
could use the achievements of modernisation to propagate and legitimate its rule. 
Since the ruler can control the modernisation agenda, so that under these situations, 
can modernisation still help to push democratisation, or it will turn to facilitate 
non-democratic rule? This thesis will discuss these issues in the case studies part, and 
also use regression models to test the role of modernisation in serving or not 
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non-democratic rule; and whether it can help to develop democratic values which can 
shape a democratic political culture. 
 
1.4 Research Outline 
This thesis will be presented in the following sections:  
 
The Introduction, this chapter, introduces the topic of this thesis, and then describes 
the research design, to establish that in order to discuss the topic, this thesis will be 
organised in two parts: the theoretical part and the case studies part. After that, the 
hypotheses and research questions will be introduced.  
 
The theoretical part includes Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, this thesis will 
firstly review the theories of political culture to demonstrate that the political culture 
is a long term accumulation of political socialisation, which will form individuals’ 
political attitude, and this attitude will affect their political decisions. Then the thesis 
will turn to discussion of the specific nature of the Confucian political culture arguing 
that it cannot be absolutely demonstrated that these societies failed to produce 
democratic regimes. This thesis will argue that the imperial system of Confucian 
societies was a ruler-oriented regime which sustained hierarchical politics, harmony 
ideals, group-orientation and guanxi; these are named the traditional legacies. This 
imperial system established that the ruler should be the political dominator to control 
the political system and its culture. Finally, this thesis will indicate that the traditional 
legacies which emerged from imperial period can still exist in the politics of 
contemporary Confucian societies, and that some of them are manipulated by rulers to 
consolidate their rule, and some of them are the result of politics in society. 
 
In Chapter 3, this thesis will review modernisation theories, and indicate that the 
modernisation theories involve total changes as traditional societies become modern 
ones. The social structure and people’s value will also shift in this period. There are 
three major factors to be considered: economic development, middle class emergence 
and public education. These three factors are indicated by several modernisation 
theorists as the major elements that could help a traditional society begin to push for a 
democratic regime, yet these effects may not apply in some cases of Confucian 
societies. Thus, a brief argument as to how modernisation may benefit non-democratic 
rule in Confucian societies would be introduced in the end part of this chapter.  
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After theoretical part, a summary for this part will be given to conclude this part and 
open the discussions for the case studies.  
 
At the beginning of the case studies part, Chapter 3, the methodology to be employed 
for the case studies will be demonstrated. After that, four Confucian societies, China, 
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
 
In Chapter 5 on China, this thesis will firstly indicate that the CPC authority practices 
a democracy with Chinese characteristics, yet that democracy is dominated by the 
CPC rulers. In China it can be found that several traditional legacies are manipulated 
by the CPC authority to construct their official ideology, and at the same time the 
modernisation factors are controlled by this authority to serve their rule. This thesis 
will indicate the existing political values and the trend for traditional legacies to test 
whether the CPC’s efforts are useful to sustain traditional values or not. Then this 
thesis will use multiple regressions to test: a) the relationship between traditional 
legacies and modernisation factors to understand whether modernisation can help to 
diminish traditional legacies, and b) to test the relationship between democratic values, 
traditional legacies and modernisation factors to evaluate whether traditional legacies 
or modernisation factors will hinder or help to develop democratic values as a basis 
for a democratic political culture. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate the existing 
frequency of and trend for democratic values.  
 
In Chapter 6, the Singapore style democracy which is constructed by the PAP 
authority will be introduced. Although this system can offer the people a regular 
election for checking the PAP government, yet overall the ‘democracy’ is dominated 
by the PAP authority. This thesis will then discuss how the PAP authority recruits the 
traditional legacies for serving their official ideology. At the same time, the 
achievements and policies of modernisation factors are used to support the PAP 
non-democratic rule. In the statistical analysis, this thesis will also follow the structure 
of Chapter 5: it firstly demonstrates the existing values and the trend for traditional 
legacies, and uses multiple regressions to test the relationship between traditional 
legacies and modernisation factors, the relationship between democratic values, 
traditional legacies and modernisation factors to test whether traditional legacies 
would hinder the development of democratic values, and whether modernisation 
factors would help to diminish traditional legacies and facilitate the development  of 
democratic values. Also the existing democratic values will be demonstrated.  
 
Chapter 7 will discuss the case of Taiwan. In the first part of this chapter, this thesis 
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will demonstrate how the KMT authority, an alien regime from mainland China, 
needed to face the indigenous elites and people’s resistance. This regime also needed 
to maintain an image of being democratic China and sought the US support, so that 
rulers had to tolerate some political opponents. Because the international situation 
changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War, the KMT rulers chose to liberalise 
politics and finally to democratise their regime to maintain the KMT’s survival in 
Taiwan. In the second section of this chapter, this thesis will demonstrate that 
although the KMT rulers tried to choose several traditional legacies to consolidate 
their rule, yet they eventually gave them up because the internal and international 
pressure made their efforts in vain. This authority could not control the modernisation 
process so they could not firmly sustain their non-democratic rule, so these factors, as 
theories expect, facilitated the emergence of a democratic regime. In the statistical 
section, this thesis will also demonstrate: the values of traditional legacies, and then 
test the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors. This thesis will try to assess which factors played the role of 
diminishing the obstacle of democratic values – the traditional legacies. Finally, the 
existing and trend of democratic values will be demonstrated.  
 
Chapter 8 will focus on South Korea. The first part of this chapter will indicate that 
South Korea was originally a democratic country when it was established. Thus, it is 
difficult for non-democratic rulers in South Korea to legitimise their non-democratic 
regime. The military junta finally made political concessions to their opponents and 
the people who demanded democracy. In the second section, this thesis will indicate 
that traditional legacies might not serve the military junta as they expected, and the 
modernisation factors actually helped to push the process of democratisation. In the 
statistical section, this section will follow the structure of Chapter 7; firstly to 
demonstrate the existing values of traditional legacies; then to test the relationship 
between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors to assess 
those factors that affect democratic values. After that, a regression will be operated to 
identify which elements can decrease the anti-democratic values factor of traditional 
legacies. Finally, the existing and trend of democratic values will be demonstrated.  
 
After these case studies, a summary for these cases will address the research questions 
the cases were supposed to address; then it will summarise the conclusions reached in 
the cases studies chapters; then indicate how the questions and hypotheses advanced. 
 
In Chapter 9, a conclusion of this thesis will be made by summarising the topic and 
conclusions for both theoretical and case studies parts. Then the hypotheses and 
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research questions will be answered. Finally, this thesis will point out the significance 
of the study for future research on East Asian democratic change. 
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Part 1: Theoretical Part 
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Chapter 2: Political Culture 
 
Political culture was discussed by Alexis de Tocqueville in the following statement: 
‘laws serve more to maintain the democratic republic in the United States than 
physical causes, and mores more than laws’ (de Tocqueville, 2010, p. 494). According 
to his definition, the word ’mores’ refers ‘not only to mores strictly speaking, which 
could be called habits of the heart, but to the different notions that men possess, to the 
diverse opinions that are current among them, and to the ensemble of ideas from 
which the habits of the mind are formed’ (de Tocqueville, 2010b, p. 466). Several 
scholars have developed these concepts. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues argued for the 
importance of political culture when they observed voting behaviour in the US 
presidential elections, and they found that social characteristics determine a person’s 
political preference (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944, p. 27). Therefore, the person’s social 
background is important as it not only decides the individual’s position in the social 
structure, but also affects what kind of political information this individual will 
receive.  
 
From 1950s to 1960s, research on political culture become an important factor in the 
study of modern politics, and was subsequently to become one of the major topics in 
democratic research. Empirical research that sought to demonstrate the consequences 
of political culture was also applied in these studies. For instance, Putnam, in an 
attempt to explain the different patterns of development in northern and southern Italy, 
finds that civil tradition is an important factor to explain why northern Italy performed 
better than the southern region when facing challenges or opportunities (1993, 
pp.121-148). Inglehart (1990; 1997) focuses on industrialised states and indicates that 
the political culture in these societies shifts from material to post-material, and people 
do not only focus on economic development, but on more social affairs. The Asian 
Barometer (the survey that focuses on the East Asian region) and literature that 
focuses on Confucian political culture indicate that negative influences from 
traditional values would hinder the practice of democracy (Chang & Chu, 2002; Park 
& Shin, 2004; Nathan, 2007; Shin, 2007; Chang & Chu, 2007). 
 
This chapter will firstly introduce the scholarly discussion of political culture, then 
focus on political culture in two sections. In the first section, this thesis will 
demonstrate scholarly discussions concerning political culture in Confucian societies 
and requirements for democratic regimes. This section will discuss: what are the basic 
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requirements for a society to support a democratic political system? A democratic 
political system cannot emerge or be maintained without a democratic political culture 
as the solid support of the people and the commitment of the elite to democratic 
values are essential factors. The commitment of elites is particularly important in the 
initial stage; the people’s support and a democratic political culture are also important. 
Nonetheless, scholarly examinations, including empirical evidence, also indicate there 
are legacies that may hinder or distort democracy in Confucian societies. 
 
The second section will then discuss the legacies that exist in Confucian society.  
This section should discuss the role of traditional legacies in the crucial transitional 
phase as modern politics emerges: which legacies discussed by scholars emerged from 
the imperial period and how did these traditional legacies continue to survive in 
Confucian societies and with what results? In particular, is it true that many of these 
legacies were incompatible with the emergence of democratic regimes in Confucian 
societies.  
 
 
2.1 The Political Culture Approach and its Significance for Modern East Asian 
Politics 
In the wake of the behaviourism revolution in political science in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Almond and Verba started the study of political culture in a systematic method. 
According to their research, political culture should be defined as: ‘When we speak of 
the political culture of society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the 
cognitions, feelings, and evaluations or its population’ (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.13). 
A more comprehensive concept of political culture was offered by Almond and 
Powell (1978, Chapter 2). They defined ‘political culture’ as a political attitude, belief 
and emotion in a period of time. This is formed by past experiences; so it is a 
long-term mental accumulation in terms of ‘political socialisation’ and is saved in the 
memories of the people in a nation and directs their political activities in the future. 
Therefore, it can be seen as a ‘distribution of patterns of orientation toward political 
objects among the member and the nation’ (Almond & Verba, 1989, pp. 12-14). 
Almond & Verba also indicated that political culture affects the ‘conduct of 
individuals in their political roles, the content of their political demands, and their 
responses to laws’, and it also shapes ‘the actions of individuals performing political 
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roles throughout the political system’ (Almond & Powell, 1978, p. 25). The systematic 
framework for political culture that focuses on orientation can be observed to fall into 
three categories – cognitive, affective and evolutional (Almond & Powell, 1978, pp. 
25-26; Almond & Verba, 1989, pp.13-14), and these categories are involved in an 
individual’s preferences. Lucian Pye offers similar points of definition for political 
culture: 
 
 
Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order 
and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions 
and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the 
political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the 
manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions 
of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a 
political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is 
rooted equally in public events and private experiences. 
 
Political culture is a recent term which seeks to make more explicit and 
systematic much of the understanding associated with such long-standing 
concepts as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political 
psychology, and the fundamental values of a people.       (Lucian Pye, 1968) 
 
Overall, these theorists indicate that political culture is a subjective orientation which 
is formed or accumulated by the political process (Pye, 1962, p.22; Pye & Verba, 
1965, p.7). To summarise the theory in this stage of its development, the political 
culture approach analysed the political system by discussing the relationship between 
political structure and individuals’ subjective attitude so that political culture is seen 
as a political attitude, belief and emotion for people with a community or nation in a 
period of time, and thus one way of explaining individuals political actions (Almond 
& Verba, 1963; Almond and Powell, 1978). Hu (1998a, p. 244) also follows this idea 
to indicate that an individual’s activity with respect to politics depends on his or her 
own orientation. 
 
The major contribution of Almond & Verba and Pye is that their concept of political 
culture ‘offers itself as an ideal token of and catalyst for behaviourism since it fulfils 
the two central aims of the approach: it can be defined so as to be measured 
quantitatively, and it marks the ultimate expansion of the territory of political science’ 
(Welch, 1993, p.4). It is also the first attempt to study the relationship between 
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political culture and democracy. However, the limitations of the pioneer operational 
research also led to several criticisms and points for further development.  
 
2.1.1 Problems of Empirical Evidence and Methods 
The criticism of early political culture approaches can be defined in terms of problems 
of evidence and problems of method. The first version of political culture research 
contains problems of case selection and cross-country culture comparison. On the 
basis of empirical evidence employed it was argued that the approach drew 
overwhelmingly on Anglo-Saxon democratic experiences rather than more diverse 
political systems and experiences, meaning that the case selection is biased towards 
the Western stable democracies. Almond and Verba’s research in 1963 used a survey 
method in five countries (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico) 
and there were approximately 1,000 participants in each case. The authors use the 
participant political culture, which likely exists in the US and the UK, to indicate that 
the more a country's political culture is based on the civic culture, the democratic 
system in that country is more stable (Almond & Verba, 1963). Even Almond himself 
agrees that the mixture of the US and especially the UK’s political culture is ‘near to 
the civic culture ideal’. So it is the civic culture, which the citizens understand as their 
ability to participate political affairs, that Almond and Verba are examining not 
democratic political culture as such (Rosemond, 2002, p.87-88).  
 
However, the problem of the comparison is the choice of cases will lead to the bias. 
For instance, this selection of cases has set up an inevitable result because this method 
will highlight the particular nature of Anglo-Saxon democracy (Brown, 1987, 
p.176-179; Pateman, 1980; Moor, 1996, p.52-55). The situation leads to an 
implication that the democratic system should follow the US or the UK style political 
system, and ignores other democracies. So the concept still lacked analytical precision 
and often became ‘a subjective, stereotypic description of a nation rather than an 
empirically measurable concept’ (Dalton, 2000, p.914). Lane also indicates that the 
framework is designed for its purpose, an operational plan to measure political culture, 
but both the cases selection and the framework are too simple for a ‘permanent 
solution’ (1992, p.363).  
 
Another problem for the method employed by Almond and Verba are the differences 
between respondents’ values in different cases (1963). According to their notes to the 
survey, it can be found the variation in responses to survey questions may generate 
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bias, which will devalue the accuracy of the survey. Verba (1980, p.398) accepted that 
there were three challenges in operationalising the cross country survey for political 
culture: language, understandings for the individual country’s culture and historical 
background. How to overcome the ‘problem of equivalence’ will be the issue for these 
survey methods (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.57). Rosemond (2002, p.90-91) 
summarises four problems in their methods. Firstly, respondents will disguise their 
opinions, and their understandings also may not comply with the meaning of the 
questions, which might cause the results of the survey to be distorted. Secondly, their 
research method may construct political orientations for respondents that may not be 
obvious before they accept to answer the questionnaire. Thirdly, the problem of 
functional equivalence, which indicates that although respondents will have the same 
answer for the same question, though they have the same answer actually they refer to 
a different meaning. Fourth, there is a bias in their samples, citing Kavanagh (1980) 
who argues that even in the UK’s case, most of samples are from urban England. 
 
More recently researchers have tried to explore the usefulness of political culture 
approaches to non-Western cases and correct the shortcomings mentioned above. 
Work such as that of Brown (2003) employed the political culture research in the case 
of Russia and indicated that although the political transformation in 1990s was not 
accompanied by the development of a significant democratic culture, yet it also 
seemed to prevent the country from going back to the personal dictatorship regime. 
Shi (2003); Chang & Chu (2002); Park & Shin (2004); Shin (1994; 2007); Chang & 
Chu (2007); Chang, Chu and Diamond (2012) also expanded research on political 
culture to East Asia countries. Their researches consider balancing samples from 
different background to avoid the errors. Nonetheless, problem of equivalence still 
will be an issue when researchers implement a cross-country survey. 
 
2.1.2 Contents of Political Culture 
Regarding the contents of political culture, there are problems making connections 
between the political system (macro) and individuals (micro) levels. Almond & Verba 
(1989, p.13) indicate ‘the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of 
patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the nation’. 
Almond & Verba particularly construct the civic culture by referencing the political 
system and individuals values. Especially when they introduce three types of political 
culture and the definition of civic culture in Chapter 1, they clearly indicate that ‘the 
civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political 
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structure are congruent’ (1989, p.30), and they also mention:  
 
We would like to suggest that this relationship between the attitudes and 
motivations of the discrete individuals who make up political systems and the 
character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically 
through the concepts of political culture that we have sketched out above. In 
other words, the connecting link between micro and macro politics is political 
culture.                                                 (1989, p.32) 
 
They also indicate that political culture can maintain or change the political system- it 
will affect the individuals’ attitude and behaviour, and then these attitudes and 
behaviours will shape the political system and help the system to be stable (1989, 
chapter 1; p.62-64).  
 
Almond and Verba’s research framework therefore tries to connect the relationship 
between individuals and political system, and argues that political culture is the 
intermediary for them. Nonetheless, they use only individuals’ attitude to infer the 
collective culture and ignore social-economic factors and this will cause the problem 
of the ‘individualistic fallacy’ (Vallier, 1973, p.345). There is a gap between 
measuring individuals’ psychological responses that forms a collective political 
culture and proving a connection to the political system.  
 
Fuchs (2007, p.172-175) gives a wide-ranging scholarly discussion of this issue, 
calling it an aggregation problem. According to his paper, scholars, such as Scheuch, 
Pye, Kasse, Reisinger and Seligson, all indicate the false use of individuals’ 
micro-level attitudes to transfer assumptions to a macro-level culture (p.173). He also 
notes that several scholars indicate ‘individuals have beliefs, values and attitudes but 
they do not have values’ (p.173, cited from Elkins and Simeon 1979, p.129), and that 
there is no theoretical rationale to link micro and macro levels (p.173, cited from 
Reisinger, 1995, p.339). Held (2006, p.167) also indicates that political culturalists 
research did not successfully explain the relationship between ‘political orientation of 
social classes and, cutting across these, of men and women, which their own data 
revealed’. Held also noted that even in their data, political culture cannot offer a clear 
relationship from the variables they use to support the relationship between political 
system and individuals. Pateman (1971, 1980) and Dogan & Pelassy (1990) indicate 
that there should be a variable to connect political system and political culture 
providing an explanatory link between them, and they argue socialisation should be 
considered this explanatory variable.  
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Although the issue still exists, and the survey method also continued to be important 
for political culture research, Fuchs offers a solution for the issue. He indicates that 
although this issue has not been overcome, he offers a solution that ‘the data of 
individual attitudes are collected through representative random samples. This 
aggregation implies that each individual receives an equal amount of weight in the 
whole data set’, ‘The distribution of the equally weighted attitudes of the citizens can 
also influence on the dependent variable of political culture’ (Fuchs, 2007, p.173). 
 
Recent researches in the political culture field do not only focus on the political 
system and individuals; and these studies do not consider it as a stable factor which is 
influenced by individuals. Both inputs and outputs to political culture have been 
diversified, giving regard to effects from the historical experiences, social-economic 
background and social contexts. For instance, in East Asia, Chang & Chu (2002) and 
Chu, Chang & Huang (2004) have focussed on interactions between traditional 
culture’s effect and individuals’ values in modernising societies. Wang, Zhengxu 
(2010a; 2010b) emphasises how social-economic development will gradually affect 
individuals’ values to democracy. These researchers’ studies also cover both 
democracies and non-democracies. 
 
Meanwhile, there are also stable democracy and political culture issues. Almond and 
Verba (1963) indicate that according to their observation, there are two major paths to 
develop the civic culture. One is that culture will develop gradually without crisis or 
external pressure, and the second is that the new attitudes and values do not replace 
the old attitudes and values, but combine with them (1963, chap. 8). They also 
indicate that individuals’ political beliefs and participation are major elements to 
maintain a stable democratic system, and they indicate in the US, the people are active 
participants and the UK’s citizens are also active but they are more likely to have a 
subjective culture. However, these two countries can reach a balance to maintain the 
stable democracy. To them, a mixture of subjective and participant political culture 
like the US and the UK is the ‘best sort of political culture for a stable democratic 
system’ (Rosemond 2002, p.87). On the other hand, the factors in the other three 
counties may lead to instabilities in their democracy because their original 
non-favourable beliefs have not changed. The democracy will be stable when the 
political belief and participation can meet the democratic system, ‘institutions are 
largely derived from a culture base’ (Rosemond, 2002, p.91).  
 
However, this conclusion faces challenges because the political belief and 
~ 36 ~ 
 
participation may change, yet the people continue to support the existing regime even 
if the culture shifts. The arguments of Almond and Verba also cannot explain the role 
of changes in the stable environment, and what the relationship between change and 
stable environment is (see Girvin, 1989). Meanwhile, other factors also can contribute 
to stable democracy. Lijphart’s ‘Consociational Democracy’ also indicates that 
‘consensual behaviour among political elites with appropriate institutional support 
could ensure the effective governance of societies that were divided on religious, 
ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic line’ (Rosemond, 2002, p.88 , 
see also Lijphart, 1999).  
 
Some scholars try to use other approaches more comprehensive in theoretical 
explanation. Wildavsky (1987, pp. 4-5) used political preference to explain political 
culture, which means that preferences are endogenous rather than exogenous. He 
suggests that shared values and social relations indicate togetherness and, when 
people make choices, they also make cultural choices. The political culture shifts 
because, when cultural factors cannot be fulfilled in the existing society, people will 
evaluate their original choices from their original preferences, and then a positive or 
negative evaluation will appear. Therefore, people shape the culture during the 
‘decision making process’; they can strengthen, modify or reject the ‘existing power 
relationship’.  
 
Inglehart (1990; 1997) further expanded the range of case-studies and surveyed 
European, North American, Eastern Europe, South America and Asia countries. This 
research found that stable democratic countries held three cultural characteristics: a 
high level of interpersonal trust, a high level of life satisfaction, and a lack of support 
for revolution. This approach on seeks to more closely explore and explain the 
relationship between individual’s personal characteristics of political culture and 
stable democracy. Inglehart’s research also indicates that to create a democratic 
political culture will need a long time because the cultural shift between individuals 
and the political system may need one or more generations (see also Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). 
 
To sum up, it can be found that scholars’ efforts are trying to locate and explain 
different explanations for culture shifts, yet most of them still conclude that political 
culture is continuous but also shifts slowly.  
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2.1.3 Summary 
To sum up for this section, political culture research became operational from the time 
of Almond & Verba’s introduction of the new research programme. Although their 
political culture approach faced criticism from different parts of academic society, yet 
their research still opened a broader field new concepts and methodologies in political 
science. The definition of political culture still has not reached a common academic 
consensus (see Gibbins, 1989, p.13), it can be agreed that political culture should be 
considered the individual’s psychological attitudes (Lane, 1992, p.381). As such 
‘political culture donated an integrated constellation of ideas about not just 
government but about political life as a whole, from the meaning of social existence, 
to social priorities, to actual polices’. Lane further argues that political culture would 
connect political cultural values to political attitudes, then to individual political 
behaviour, social choices, political policies and institutions to form a cultural cycle 
(1992, p.381). Individuals’ psychological attitudes have been considered to explore 
political culture, and the trend of this culture should be studied   in the social context 
of a society (see also Dogan & Pelassy, 1990).  
 
Confucian societies originally do not have a clear democratic tradition, but a bias 
towards the traditional legacies because of the historical background, socialisation 
process and the political system’s effects. For Confucian societies, to adopt 
democratic values would be considered a revolutionary change for the existing system. 
In the rest of this chapter, this thesis will introduce arguments about the conditions 
that allow for the emergence or maintenance of democracy. It will then demonstrate 
how traditional legacies form historical experiences and how they may survive into 
modern society so that there can be a gap between the existing culture and the 
conditions for democracy. The next chapter will try to introduce modernisation as a 
factor for further discussing and explaining the change in Confucian societies and the 
possibility to practice democracy in these societies. 
 
2.2 Requirements for Democratic Regimes and Academic Discussion of Political 
Culture in Confucian Society 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
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are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and 
to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, …  
                (U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, 2011)  
 
This description is now presented as a fundamental statement of democratic principles. 
To discuss how to make a democratic regime survive, this thesis would discuss how 
democracy can survive in the short term and in the long term. Although this claim 
does not have consensus in academic work (Schneider, 1995, p.219), it will be argued 
a democratic political culture is needed for maintaining the stable democratic regime 
in the long term. 
 
A democratic regime may be viewed as a mechanism for dealing with the relationship 
between people and government (the leadership) (Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, 
pp.262-267). The essential element of a democratic regime is that qualified people in 
the system need to be aware that they are the decision makers for their own benefit; 
everyone’s opinion must be viewed as affecting the making of laws, policies and rules 
(Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, pp.262-267). If the people always depend on their 
rulers, then they would remain at a child-like stage in terms of public policies (Dahl, 
1989, chap. 7). The will of the people is the decisive factor for a democratic regime 
(Held, 1995, pp.145-153; 1996, pp.262-267; Dahl, 1989, chap. 7). Therefore, elites 
and people’s decisions are decisive. In the beginning, the elites’ decision would be 
particularly important; this involves a negative concept of democratic consolidation, 
but, to make democracy survive in the long run, then a positive concept which 
indicates how people should develop democratic values is important (Schedler, 2001; 
Pridham, 2000, p.20).1  
 
Historical experience indicates that parties or elites who stand against democracy are 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Schedler who uses ‘where we stand’ and ‘where we aim to reach’ to evaluate 
democratic consolidation into positive and negative categories. The aim for positive category is to 
completing and deepening democracy. As for the negative category, it is to prevent eroding or 
collapsing of democracy. Pridham also divided democratic consolidation into two categories: negative 
and positive. Negative consolidation is to decrease power or impact from groups or individuals who do 
not support democratic regime and eliminate legacies of the transformation process. Positive 
consolidation ‘refers to a long-term change’. It is related to the attitude from the elite and people, both 
of them should develop democratic values. It is to creative a political culture to build up a 
‘system-support’ environment. 
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a key element in the failure of democracy (Huntington, 1997, pp.57-58). Therefore, 
the negative conceptions focus on preventing collapse or erosion for a democratic 
regime; the most important is that major political actors should follow the rules of the 
democratic regime and argue that the democratic regime can exist in the short-term 
(Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000, p.20). The standard for this conception is various. 
Some scholars indicate that the consolidation in this definition should pass a turnover 
test. For example, the highest administrative position should be elected and 
party-changed in the election (Power & Gasiorowski, 1997, p.130-148), or the highest 
executive position and parliament members should be constituted by election. Two 
competitive parties should exist and the original government should step down at least 
once (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p.178). Some scholars focus on how people and 
the elite should follow the rules of a democratic regime. For instance, the 
two-turnover test from Huntington is to prove that political elite and people can 
follow the rules of democratic regime (Huntington, 1991, p.266-267). When the 
democratic regime faces challenges, rulers in the democratic regime can be changed 
rather than changing the democratic regime itself. Linz also indicates that 
consolidation refers to the fact that the major political elites, parties or organisations 
must understand that democracy cannot be replaced by any other procedure. No one 
can ban the decision makers from the democratic election. Democracy must be 
viewed as ‘the only game in town’ (1990, pp. 156-158). 
 
The turnover test or party-change for the highest position of the state or parliament 
involves the establishment of a democratic regime. However, the establishment of a 
democratic regime and its institutions does not mean that people in the country would 
firmly support the democratic regime. As the last paragraph argued, it requires a 
guarantee from major political players to confirm that the democratic regime is the 
only form of governance in the country. Furthermore, the positive concepts related to 
the new political culture and political values, which can support the democratic 
regime, will be discussed. It is the long-term change of political attitude.  
 
Democratic consolidation, which refers to the long-term survival of a democratic 
regime, needs a strong democratic political culture to support it (Gunther, Puhle & 
Diamandouros, 1995, pp.17-18; Pridham, 2000, p.20; Inglehart, 1990, 1997).2 The 
                                                     
2 Gunther, Puhle & Diamandouros argue that if people’s attitude cannot firmly support democratic 
regime, then the regime is not consolidated. People need to be re-politically-socialised to establish 
democratic values. If this procedure cannot be completed, then people’s attitude (mass attitude) can 
easily be changed due to ‘political circumstances’. Pridham also argues that democratic consolidation 
is much wider and deeper than the transition stage. Not only can it construct democratic institutions, 
but also people (mass) need to develop democratic values. See also Inglehart’s research. which 
indicates the importance for developing democratic values to consolidate the democratic regime. 
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long-term political attitude change involves a change in the political culture (Inglehart, 
1990; 1997). Therefore, to consider whether a democratic regime can reach 
consolidation, or move towards consolidation, people’s attitude to the democratic 
regime is the major indicator that needs to be considered (Shin, 1994, pp.153-154). 
People’s support for democracy can be considered in two categories: support for 
democracy as a principle and support for democracy in practice (Park, Chu and Chang, 
2010, October, pp.1-2).  
 
The satisfaction of the electorate with a democratic regime does not refer to support 
for a democratic regime in principle (Evans & Whitefield, 1995, pp.488-489). If the 
reason that people support the democratic regime is because the democratic regime 
can offer them a better life than before, rather than the fact that they really believe in 
democracy as the only solution for the political system, then the democratic regime 
may collapse when it faces economic or political challenges (Diamond, 1999, p.169). 
On the other hand, if people are loyal to the democratic regime, then the democratic 
regime can survive when facing challenges (Diamond, 1999, p.169). The first case 
can be viewed as instrumental legitimacy, and the second as intrinsic legitimacy. A 
country could be consolidated when the people confer intrinsic legitimacy, that is, the 
loyalty to democratic regime. If people confer only instrumental legitimacy, then the 
democratic regime may collapse when facing challenges. 
 
Linz and Stepan conclude that the way to ensure the survival of a democratic regime 
can be divided into three aspects: behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional. In the 
first, no actors in the country would try to overthrow the democratic regime or secede 
from the state by violence. The second part indicates that the majority in the state 
would believe that democratic governance and laws are the ‘appropriate’ solution for 
the country. The anti-democratic force is weak or ‘isolated by pro-democratic forces’. 
The final one indicates that official or non-official forces would wish to obey the laws 
of a new democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996b, pp.5-6).  
 
According to this research, how to make a democracy survive rests on how to make 
people support a democratic regime unconditionally. The most important thing is to 
develop a democratic political culture.  
 
Dahl (1997) indicates that democratic consolidation needs a strong democratic culture 
to provide appropriate emotional support and cognition to support the democratic 
                                                                                                                                                        
Inglehart asks to bring people back in to maintain the long term stable democratic regime, especially 
see 1997, chapter 6 
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process. If a country’s political system does not have a sound democratic political 
culture to support it, the democratic regime may be replaced by an authoritarian one, 
when the country faces crisis. In contrast, if the democratic regime performs well in 
the crisis, then people’s confidence in democracy would be strengthened. He also 
indicates that the members in the system have to be convinced that democratic regime 
is the most suitable regime for the society, even in the face of deep economic crisis, or 
when dissatisfied with the incumbent leaders. 
 
Inglehart suggests that culture is a common value of the attitude and knowledge 
system in society, and it can be transferred from one generation to the next. He uses 
life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for revolutionary change as his 
variables for measuring culture. He indicates that interpersonal trust is the prerequisite 
condition to organise a group, while forming a group is the condition for whether 
democratic rules can be followed. Life satisfaction can represent a different culture in 
each country, rather than a short-term economic condition. Support for revolutionary 
change or gradual change involves people being willing to negotiate or vote to reach 
the object or not. Inglehart (1990) find culture does affect the stability and 
development of democracy. Furthermore, further cases prove the importance of 
political culture in the maintenance of a stable democratic regime (Inglehart, 1997). 
He indicates that the value change for individuals and society as a whole cannot be 
completed in a short time. Instead of that, it needs the long term to accumulate value 
change (Inglehart, 1990; 1997).  
 
To summarise: for an emerging democratic regime, elites’ attitudes are important in 
the initial stage, as this would help a non-democratic regime to transfer to a 
democratic one. However, a democratic political culture is necessary after the initial 
stage, and a strong democratic political culture is essential to maintain a democratic 
regime.  
 
In this context it must be noted that the culture in East Asia is often considered 
incompatible with democratic values as discussed in the preceding sections. ‘Culture 
is destiny’, the argument suggested by Lee Kwan Yew, is used to indicate that the 
political culture derived from traditional values dominates the political development 
of a country (Zakaria, 1994), and that each country should find ‘its own democracy’ 
which is capable of withstanding its own challenges, but this ‘Eastern democracy’ is 
not necessarily the same as ‘Western democracy’. Instead of creating an ambiguous 
space for culture and democracy, some scholars indicate that Confucianism is an 
obstacle for Confucian society to follow democratic values, and the way for these 
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countries to practise democracy is to reject the tradition of Confucian values; then 
democracy will be able to emerge. Huntington, an eminent western scholar, argued 
that Confucianism would create obstacles for Confucian societies to practise 
democracy because of the Confucian heritage that stresses  ‘authority, order, 
hierarchy, and the supremacy of the collectivity over the individual’ (Huntington, 
1996, p.237). He also argued that Confucian societies do not have a ‘tradition of 
rights’ to act against the state, and those individual rights were offered by the state. 
Harmony and group orientation are encouraged. As for ‘conflict of ideas, groups, and 
parties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate’ (Huntington, 1991, pp. 300-301). In 
Korea: 
 
People did not think of themselves as citizens with rights to exercise and 
responsibilities to perform, but they tend to look up to the top for direction and 
for favours in order to survive … negotiation and compromise are not recognised 
as a social norm, but as selling out. Confucian scholars never used the word 
compromise. They had to maintain their purity of conscience….  
            (Huntington, 1991, p.303)  
 
Taiwan and South Korea practise democracy because these two states have only 
‘un-Confucian fashions’. 3 
 
These phenomena led to Confucian society’s lacking the traditions necessary to 
oppose authority. On the other hand, a harmonious society, which discourages 
conflicts and diverse opinions, but supports coherence and maintenance of social 
order, limits the space of civil society and cannot tolerate the opposite party or group 
defying authority. Therefore, even though Confucian countries might begin the 
process of democratisation, the democracy that would be established would not be a 
liberal democracy, but a democracy with an illiberal political culture: the democracy 
will not demonstrate a western style democracy, but a democracy with authoritarian 
traditions (Ling & Shih, 1998, p.63).  
 
This situation can be found in several of the literature sources. Bell et al. (1995, pp. 
163-167) also indicate that there are three characteristics in East Asia’s illiberal 
societies. First, there is a non-neutral and interventional-orientation of state 
                                                     
3 In Taiwan, he argued it was because KMT retreated to Taiwan, and KMT leaders could not ‘uphold 
the posture of arrogance associated with traditional Confucian notions of authority’. As for South 
Korea, a vast educated middle class in urban areas, and Catholic and Christian groups helped to 
diminish the legacies (Huntington, 1991, pp. 302-304). This thesis does not agree with his explanation 
in Taiwan, and will discuss this in a case study. 
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institutions. This thesis has indicated that personal autonomy should be respected in a 
democratic regime, but in East Asia, rulers prefer to maintain a stable regime; 
therefore, intervention in people’s life is necessary. The government tends to offer 
shared values and objectives; harmony, balance and consensus are strongly 
encouraged in order to have a well-ordered, developed and coherent society. Elections 
in these societies are not seen as an opportunity for party change, but as support for 
the current authority. Therefore, the ‘Loyal Opposition’ cannot appear. Second, the 
rationalistic and legalistic technocracy manages the developing state as a corporate 
enterprise. In East Asia, rational and law-abiding technical bureaucracies are used to 
manipulate law and state resources to fulfil the state’s objectives. Therefore, laws 
become the facilitator for defending the state bureaucracies’ mechanism to complete 
their goals, rather than protection for the people’s rights of political participation and 
their basic human rights. Third, there is only the managed public space and civil 
society, rather than an open and a critical one. Civil society in East Asia lacks the kind 
of historical experience to oppose the state, which exists in western countries. 
Therefore, rulers in East Asia are used to manipulating society, and groups within it, 
and limit the society and civil space to the boundary set by rulers.  
 
Bell (2000, pp.219-234) uses a discussion between Mr Demo and Lee Kwan-Yew to 
demonstrate that the core concern of ‘democracy’ is different between western and 
Confucian societies. Western states focus more on personal autonomy, equality, 
pluralism, and people’s civil and political rights; but Confucian societies place the 
emphasis on how to establish a prosperous and well-ordered society to ensure that the 
people’s needs can be fulfilled. This thesis could suggest that this idea is from the 
Minben thinking of Mencius, which stressed the ruler’s responsibilities to take care of 
the people. Legacies from Confucian societies may also hinder the practice of 
democracy. O'Donnell (1993;4 1996, pp.35-36), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 
pp.21-23), Chu (1996, pp.74-75)5 and Schedler (1998, p.98)6 suggest that when 
discussing democratisation in the third wave democracies, the legacies from the 
authoritarian regime cannot be ignored. Particularism and clientism would work to 
consolidate the democratic regime and interest associations, central and local 
governments, and parties who served authoritarian leaders would try to maintain 
                                                     
4 He suggests that some new democracies lack horizontal accountability, especially in post-communist 
states and Latin American states; he calls these democracies ‘delegative democracies’. He indicates that 
although the new democracies have democratised, in the non-urban areas, personalistic and sultanistic 
situations continue to exist, which erode the new democracies. 
5 He indicates the after democratisation in Taiwan, several legacies from the KMT authoritarian period 
remained, such as the president’s particular power, neutrality of military and security services, and 
money politics. These are the unfinished tasks of the new democracy. 
6 He indicates that ‘tutelary powers’, ‘reserved domains’, and ‘major discriminations’ which would 
affect free election should be cancelled. 
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particular rights. This situation would also apply in Confucian societies, and will be 
demonstrated in this chapter. 
 
Empirical evidence also suggests that Confucian traditions would be an obstacle. 
Yu-Tzung Chang (2000) analysed whether Confucian values would be an obstacle in 
Taiwan and found that, although the authoritarian values from Confucianism may 
bring negative effects to democratisation in Taiwan, modernisation, higher education 
and alternation of generations would retard this effect and develop democratic values. 
Chang and Chu see ‘emphasis of social classes (authoritarianism), emphasis of social 
harmony (avoiding conflicts), community first (pursuing aggregate interest), and 
anti-pluralism (preferring social cohesion)’ as the traditional values and found these 
would hinder the practice of democracy (2007, p.19). Park & Shin examined a 
number of political values to determine whether they would be obstacles to 
democracy in South Korea: 
  
[S]ocial hierarchy (deference to authority), social harmony (aversion to 
conflict), group primacy (pursuit of collective welfare), and anti-pluralism 
(preference of social unity) as social values and the family-state (benevolent 
paternalistic rule), the moral state (the moralistic and perfectionist role of the 
state), and anti-adversarial politics (the concentration of governing powers). 
                   (2004, pp.17-19) 
 
They found that people who support these values would be more likely to support 
authoritarianism and be opposed to democracy (Park & Shin, 2004, pp.17-19). Chang, 
Chu, and Tsai (2005) follow Park and Shin (2004)’s indicators to analyse three 
Confucian societies (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and also suggest that 
modernisation and a higher level of education would help to develop democratic 
consciousness in Confucian societies and ease the negative effect from Confucian 
values. Shin even suggests that ‘There is no doubt that Confucian values and regime 
experience are not only the most pervasive but also the most powerful influences on 
subjective democratisation among East Asians’ (2007, p.27). 
 
To summarise the above discussion, some scholars find the existence of traditional 
legacies in Confucianism and that these may present a phenomenon in Confucian 
societies so that is cultural factor sustains an anti-democracy environment. Therefore 
in the next sections, this thesis will discuss the origin of traditional legacies and how 
they survived into modern Confucian societies. 
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2.3 Emergence of Legacies from the Imperial Political System 
2.3.1 Debate of Legitimacy: Good or Evil Human Nature 
Two important arguments were found in the classic Confucian political system: a 
moral meritocratic hierarchy of the political system, and that the people ultimately 
would serve as the basis for legitimacy of the political system. However, this changed 
in the imperial period. The change came about because of the debate about human 
nature between Mencius and Xun Zi. 
 
Mencius paid more attention to human beings than Confucius did. Mencius indicated 
that the Mandate of Heaven refers to the virtue of humans. People should focus on 
moral training of the self. The process of being human should involve trying to 
explore and develop human nature, and maintaining the best aspects of human nature 
with morality. To achieve this process, human beings must restrain the physical senses 
of animalistic desire. Mencius focused his political legitimacy on the people. He 
argued that kings should practise benevolent governance, and the people would then 
follow them. Otherwise, kings would lose the Mandate of Heaven, which refers to the 
support of the people. Xun Zi (荀子) suggested concepts different from those of 
Mencius. Xun Zi suggested that, from his observation, human nature is evil. He 
argued that it was important for a ruler to act as a sage, to teach and lead the people to 
conceal their evil side and explore their good side; otherwise, the evil side of human 
nature would present itself. 
 
Mencius argued that that there is a good human nature, for the following reasons: 
firstly, human beings and animals are different from each other. Mencius said, ‘That 
whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small’ (Legge, 1861a, p.201) – 
meaning that human beings, like animals, have instincts and material desires. 
However, there are two opposing facets to the nature of human beings: one is driven 
by sensual desire to meet the animal instinct, which is not different from other animals. 
The other is a mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others (Legge, 1861a, 
pp.77-80). Because humans have the ability to act differently from animals, they 
should restrain the negative aspects of their nature, such as material desire, with virtue, 
to become completely human (Tu, 1993, p.4). Furthermore, because of the goodness 
of human nature, Mencius did not particularly focus on the rulers’ responsibility for 
educating people toward virtue. To Mencius, Minben thought, which indicates that the 
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rulers’ legitimacy is from the people, could aptly reflect the goodness of human 
nature.  
 
In contrast to Mencius, Xun Zi observed from his experience that the nature of human 
beings is evil rather than good. Xun Zi argued that the nature of human beings is to 
favour material desires. If desire could not be constrained, then violence and disorder 
would be rife among the people (Tu, 1993, p.4). He argued that goodness shown is the 
result of education. Therefore, education towards virtue is needed to modify the 
people’s behaviour from evil to good. Because of the evil of human nature, Xun Zi 
indicated that it is incorrect to see the legitimacy of power as belonging to the people. 
If politics depends on the people, the politics in the country would only reflect chaos, 
which is precisely why people need a sage with virtue to lead and teach them virtue. 
In this circumstance, Xun Zi argued that legitimacy should belong to the sage – the 
ruler who can practise the rule of virtue. Xun Zi’s argument is sometimes perceived to 
be similar to that of the legalists (法家); it was accepted by the Emperor Wu in the 
Han Dynasty, and especially in the work of Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) and his Tian 
Ren Gan Ying (天人感應) theory. 
2.3.2 A Theoretical Framework for the Imperial Political System 
During the Emperor Wu period, the empire had been united, and the economy began 
to develop. Dong considered that the state needed a unifying philosophy for the 
empire (Bell & Hahm, 2003, p.25), so he offered a revised theoretical framework 
from the Confucian political system.  
 
Confucian scholars and other faction scholars before the Han Dynasty found that 
abnormal changes of the moon and stars are natural occurrences, rather than signs 
from heaven. Every phenomenon worked independently by its nature rather than by 
being affected by other elements. Dong Zhongshu’s theory indicates that these 
changes should be viewed as heaven's performance, and these performances may be 
considered good or bad forces in relation to human beings. The connection between 
human beings and heaven, especially monarchy and heaven was strongly emphasised. 
Heaven would reveal some phenomenon in response to the monarch’s behaviour, in 
order to express heaven’s praise or criticism. 
 
Dong used the text from Shoo King, ‘Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as 
my people hear’ (Legge, 1861c, p.292) to point out that human behaviour, especially 
the behaviour of the monarch was connected to heaven. If the monarch acts in 
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accordance with heaven’s will and Confucian teachings, then heaven would 
demonstrate a positive phenomenon in response to the monarch’s good actions. On the 
other hand, if the monarch failed to follow heaven’s urging, then disasters would 
appear to warn the monarch (Department of Philosophy, NTU, 2011; Tu, 1993, 
pp.22-237). He also accepted Xun Zi’s idea, which indicates that the monarch should 
use his power to teach people to be good (Department of Philosophy, NTU, 2011). 
 
Dong’s efforts fundamentally changed contemporary political thought from the classic 
Confucian political system, which urged rulers to emphasise the people’s needs. 
Instead, Dong’s theory asked the monarchy to follow heaven’s will rather than the 
people’s will (see Huang 1981, pp.46-47).8 Further, his theory facilitated Emperor 
Wu’s wish to establish a suitable ideology, using the slogan ‘promotion of 
Confucianism to the disparagement of all other schools’. The centralised ruling 
framework established by Dong and Emperor Wu included the following: ‘Confucian 
self-restraint, mutual deference, humanistic sensitivity, kinship cohesion, and devotion 
to rituals which adopted a comprehensive code of behaviour for the bureaucrats’, 
Minben from Mencius, and reliance on a strict law to ‘discipline to governed 
remained intact’ (Huang, 1997, p. 43).9 Furthermore, Soong and Ming’s Confucian 
scholars did not only develop their method of self-development in ethics, but they also 
consolidated the emperor’s ruling authority. They surrendered their positions as 
Confucian scholars to submit themselves to the emperor. They viewed the emperor 
and the centralised government and the empire as a facilitator to protect the welfare of 
the people, because the people were only a passive actor in the system (see Fairbank 
& Goldman, 2006, pp.96-97; Fairbank, 1978, p.22). Submission to emperors led to 
conditional and limited government that could not be correctly implemented.10  
 
In this new framework, the imperial government was constrained in two ways: 
ceremonial procedure (禮) and personnel affairs (Huang, 1981, p.3).  
 
Ceremonial Procedure (a mixture of Confucian rules, ancient traditions and ancestors’ 
teachings), was a rule to restrain, but also to offer legitimacy to, the ruler (Bell & 
Hahm, 2003, p.7). Actors in the institution who disobeyed the rule would be punished, 
                                                     
7 Although Tu expresses the positive side to this revision by arguing it can make the monarch more 
careful about his actions, he also indicates that the final arbiter of human worth is heaven, in Tung’s 
theory. It is not coherent with classic Confucian political design (p.22). 
8 Hung indicates that the monarch should be reminded that this ceremonial procedure consolidates the 
monarchy’s highest authority, and also proves that he still needs to follow heaven’s orders and 
Confucian moral rules (pp.46-47).  
9 This did not reflect Confucian ideas, but the ideas of legalists. 
10 As this thesis argued, the emperors still had constraints, but they had the power to oppose these or 
ignore them if they wished. 
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even the rulers. In the modern view, Ceremonial Procedure is similar to a constitution 
in a modern country. Monarch, ministers and people should act according to 
ceremonial procedure, and the monarch and minister should be the model from which 
the people should learn (Huang, 1981, pp.3-4, pp.43-44). Confucian scholars 
administered the Ceremonial Procedure and asked the whole monarchy and the 
bureaucratic system to follow rules of procedure to manage the country (Huang, 1981, 
pp. 204-205). 
 
Under the procedure, the monarch had the ruling legitimacy through complicated 
ceremonies. If any monarch offended ceremonial procedure within the scope of 
Confucian teachings and imperial traditions, then conflicts would appear that would 
jeopardise the empire. Moreover, the monarch was to make the final decisions for 
state affairs and act as the perfect model of virtue for people and ministers to follow. 
The role of ministers was to help emperors to rule the country, by offering suggestions 
on state affairs in the court or representing emperors in local governments. A 
monarch’s order was essentially considered just and unchallengeable (Huang, 1981, 
p.3), yet ministers still had the power to challenge the monarch (Weber, 1968, p.128). 
A monarch needed ministers’ assistance to maintain routine state affairs, as most of 
the information of the state was gained from ministers in the court and in local 
government. The importance of ministers offered them opportunities to limit the 
power of emperors. The emperor understood that the choices were from the zòu zhé 
(奏折); therefore, as an appropriate ruler, he should make a decision from these zòu 
zhé. Otherwise, it might be necessary to oppose the ministers in the court. Meanwhile, 
ministers would check the actions and decisions of the emperor. If ministers argued 
that the emperor’s actions could not satisfy Ceremonial Procedure, ministers would 
stand against the emperor and challenge his decisions (Hu, 1997, p.356).  
 
Personnel affairs refer to interactions between officers in the imperial court. Ministers, 
as well as central and local officers in the bureaucratic system, would need to 
cooperate; harmony between officers was the most important thing. If ministers and 
officers could not support a policy, then the policy would not succeed (Huang, 1981, 
p.50). The monarch also needed ministers and officers to manage the country. It was 
not possible for the monarch to cooperate with the people directly to control the 
country; ministers and officers who had their own responsibilities in state affairs 
would fulfil these roles. However, as the imperial court could not give orders to 
bureaucrats individually, a rough principle was essential, and issues and problems 
could be solved if bureaucrats at the central and local level could work and unite for a 
common purpose (Huang, 1981, pp.52-53). The monarch was the essential source of 
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unity for the bureaucrats, ‘if the bureaucrats in the capital did not even see the 
emperor for months, it would be difficult for them to believe that he still had 
everything under his firm control’ (Huang, 1981, p. 53). Bureaucrats were the leaders 
in their own areas of responsibility, and they were also like the head of a family. Their 
job was to maintain harmony to prove their administrative ability; any arguments 
from ‘restless spirits of nature or of man’ were not allowed (Weber, 1968, p.132; see 
also Huang, 1981, pp.57-59).Harmony was controlled by officers who would maintain 
the balance of the empire. The emperor and bureaucrats should also maintain a 
balance; if any one of them failed to operate appropriately, then the government 
would be involved in trouble (Huang, 1981, chap. 2). Ministers were generally 
divided into several factions. Emperors who could not resolve conflict, or manage 
these ministers, might also suffer a collapse of the empire.  
 
2.3.3 Mechanisms for Controlling the Imperial system 
‘Rule by law’ and ‘rule by man’ are the first mechanisms for a ruler to lead people. 
According to the historical contexts, most Chinese dynasties established a code to rule 
the country. All subjects in the empire should obey the code; a criminal judicial 
system was established to maintain the social order. This included the death penalty 
that should be confirmed by the ministers in the imperial court and signed by the 
emperor.  
 
It seems that Confucian society also established a similar judicial system, yet the law 
was used to regulate people rather than to offer a fair legal system; it was designed to 
regulate everyone except the emperor and part of his family (see Huang, 1992, pp.23- 
30, where he clearly indicates that the emperor is the final judge on all matters). 
Meanwhile, the standard for the legal system was judged by morality as interpreted by 
the emperor or bureaucrats (Huang, 1981; 1992, pp.23, 30, 40-41). To bureaucrats, the 
legal system might demonstrate different results, depending on the emperor’s decision. 
While the emperor might follow the state laws to deal with ministers who offended 
against the laws or against Confucian teachings, a minister might change the 
emperor’s decision if he, the minister, were able to demonstrate his virtue, or actually 
presented an acceptable excuse (Huang, 1981, Chap. 2; 1992, p.23).  
 
To the people, bureaucrats’ ‘moral standard’ became the administrative and judicial 
measure in their area of jurisdiction (Huang, 1981; 1992; 1997). Confucian values that 
focused on family-centred and interpersonal relationships also diminished the 
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possibility of the rule of law when these values were put into practice (Huang, 1997, 
pp.58-59), and strengthened the conditions for the ‘rule of man’. Confucian officers in 
their local areas judged disputes, conflicts and crimes that offended against 
‘Confucian teachings’ or the law (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.104-105; Fairbank, 
1978, p.22). The purpose of these officers was to maintain harmony and social 
solidarity in their jurisdiction (Bell & Hahm, 2003, p.18; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, 
pp.183-184), and bureaucrats should use their abilities to achieve that purpose.  
 
Imperial examination (科舉) was the channel for the flow of talent. The recruitment 
of talented people was a primary topic of interest to Chinese emperors. The system 
assured an equal opportunity for commoners to raise their social status (Weber, 1968, 
p.116). Social mobility was assured under the system (Weber, 1968, pp.116-117). On 
the other hand, whether or not the imperial examination system is qualified as a 
democratic institution is ambiguous. From the time that this system was established, 
Four Books and Five Classics (四書五經) became the official texts for scholars to 
study in the sphere of Confucian culture. However, the criticisms of the system – 
arguing that the system is a tool for emperors to control their empire – address two 
points. Firstly, if anyone wanted to enter the bureaucratic system, the only way11 was 
to study these texts to pass the examination; the system only accepted the Confucian 
texts on these terms. As a result, scholars were focused only on the texts and the 
people recruited were those with a good knowledge of traditional literature, rather 
than those with the ability to manage the country (Weber, 1968, p.125; Fairbank & 
Goldman, 2006, pp.100-101). Secondly, it was argued that the system benefited 
emperors so that they could manipulate society, because, through the system, the 
emperors could focus on the principles they needed to educate their people (Weber, 
1968, pp.118-119) Furthermore, only a few powerful local families could easily pass 
the examination, because they had more educational resources (Fairbank & Goldman, 
2006, pp.93-95).  
 
To summarise, from Han to Soong and Ming, Confucian scholars successfully revised 
Confucian teachings to serve the rulers. In the meantime, they also established a 
Confucian-based empire. This imperial political system did not look like the ideal 
type that was demonstrated in the previous period. Moral meritocratic leadership is 
not genuinely applied in this system. The monarch acted as a model of virtue, 
responsible for ruling the country.12 Bureaucrats dominated the government and 
                                                     
11 From the Qing Dynasty, imperial examination was not the only way; commoners could pay money 
to buy a title or become an officer.  
12 Weber (1968, p.132) also indicates that emperors in Confucian society were ‘the high priests of 
literary arts’ to guide bureaucrats. 
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‘helped’ the emperor to rule the country. The emperors’ authority was the highest 
authority, and was constructed on the Ceremonial Procedure (Huang, 1981, pp.46-47). 
The monarch and bureaucrats needed to work together to follow the Ceremonial 
Procedure in the court and take pains to ensure that the empire could fulfil the 
requirement for people to reach the basic standard of Mencius’ Minben rules. 
Otherwise, the populace would overthrow the inappropriate government.13 During this 
period, traditional legacies, such as hierarchical politics were consolidated, harmony, 
group-orientation, and guanxi (connections) appeared and strengthened.  
 
2.4 Traditional Legacies and their persistence into the Modern Era 
When discussing the imperial political system in the preceding section, we found that 
an empire based on a hierarchy system existed in several Confucian societies for 
thousands of years. This situation has created a hierarchical politics tradition, which 
would ask people to obey and follow rulers. Meanwhile, people were not aware of 
their actual political status as described in classic Confucian teaching. 
 
In this system, harmony was important, not only between emperors and bureaucrats, 
but also among bureaucrats and the people. The last section had indicated that, in the 
court, bureaucrats needed to maintain a harmonious balance to avoid conflicts; the 
stability of the empire was the priority for them. As for bureaucrats and people in 
local authorities, bureaucrats would try to govern the area for which they were 
responsible through harmony and the exercise of personal judgment. It was also a 
demonstration of their personal ethics. Confucian gentry would support a harmonious 
local authority, because they would consider it as a manifestation of Confucianism 
(Weber, 1968, pp.148-150).  
 
Although knowing how to manifest Confucianism and maintain a harmonious society 
were important, the way in which these issues were dealt with was based on personal 
rather than institutional considerations. In the meantime, there was no united and 
centralised authority to explain Confucianism;14 different Confucian scholars would 
form into factions (see Kim, 2002). Meanwhile, Confucian scholars who passed the 
imperial examination in the same year or from the same provinces would help each 
other in the court. Among the populace, personal relationships – as a core element of 
                                                     
13 People would overthrow an unsatisfactory government, but these revolutions would not destroy the 
government type itself. After the revolution, the new dynasty still constituted the same government 
type. 
14 But Weber argued that government has the right to do so (1968, pp.152-153). 
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Confucianism – were also strongly encouraged. Guanxi was developed at the official 
level and in civil society.  
 
Observations from the imperial period and empirical research show how hierarchical 
politics, harmony, guanxi and group-orientation are the Confucian values, or 
traditional values, that hinder democracy. This section will discuss these four 
traditional legacies in Confucian societies by following methods to demonstrate why 
and how they continue to exist, or even deepen in Confucian societies. Firstly, this 
section will discuss Confucian teachings (norms) in Confucian classics to clarify its 
conceptualisation, yet norms may not form the legacies. Second, this thesis will 
discuss the practical applications in the imperial period and modern Confucian society 
to demonstrate how these legacies were formed, promoted and deepened politically in 
modern Confucian societies. 
2.4.1 Hierarchical politics 
Hierarchical politics that favours rulers and weakens the populace is one of the 
traditional legacies in Confucian society, as has been demonstrated in the previous 
sections. This legacy has a long history, deeply rooted in people’s mind. Classic 
Confucian texts offer a conceptualised framework for hierarchical politics with moral 
meritocratic leadership and Minben. Regarding the leadership, the leader must be 
well-educated (Legge, 1861b, p.208), must devote himself to the highest morality 
(Legge, 1861b, p.161), should take care of his own personal relationships first, and 
then he should take care of the people (Legge, 1861b, p.156; Tu, 1993, p.19). He must 
also remember that his duty is to satisfy the wishes of the people and their basic needs, 
rather than take care of his own interests (Legge, 1861a, p.176; Legge, 1861a, p. 359). 
Otherwise, people have the right to overthrow the ruler. In essence, this was also a 
hierarchy political system, which emphasised the ruler’s responsibility rather than the 
people’s rights.  
 
Confucian teachings, in effect, reject the general population as decision makers for 
state affairs. In Confucian teaching, ruler and people are at different levels and have 
different responsibilities. As regards rulers, Confucius claimed that there are only a 
few people able to rule. Only the literati (君子) who are ‘humane, wise, and brave’, 
well-educated and have ‘certain inborn qualities and a level of culture, education, and 
constant effort that are beyond the capability of the majority of the common people’ 
are qualified to rule (Shuan, 2003, p.44). And it is said of the leader: ‘He who 
exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, 
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which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it’ (為政以德, 譬如北辰, 居其所
而眾星共之) (Legge, 1861b, p.9). Mencius also argued: 
 
Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who 
labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are 
governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who 
govern others are supported by them, This is a principle universally recognised’ 
(或勞心, 或勞力. 勞心者治人, 勞力者治於人, 治於人者食人, 治人者食於
人, 天下之通義也)                          (Legge, 1861a, pp.125-126).  
 
Therefore, it is clear that everyone should fulfil his/her duties on behalf of his/ her 
social ranking, the ruler should govern, and the people should support the rulers. 
Because most people were not educated, when a ruler implemented policies, they 
should simply follow: ‘The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they 
may not be made to understand it’ (民可使由之, 不可使知之) (Legge, 1861b, p.75). 
Confucianism also indicates that the priority of a government is the relationship 
between rulers and ruled.  
 
The imperial period is the developing and consolidating period for hierarchical 
politics. Confucian scholars who served the emperors constructed a despotic 
monarchy system. The emperor was the highest authority in the system (Weber, 1968, 
p.132), and Confucian bureaucrats were responsible for helping emperors and 
explaining Confucianism; they could add or revise the original meaning to serve the 
monarch if it was needed (Huang, 1981; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.96-97). 
Confucian scholars who served rulers used these Confucian teachings to create a 
Patriarchal – Patrimonial political system. At the state level, the emperor was at the 
centre in the empire, ministers surrounded the emperor. In the empire, the government 
was the centre and thousands of farming villages and families surrounded and 
followed the government’s orders (Fairbank & Goldman, pp.96-97). In the villages or 
family, the elder or chief of the family was the centre, surrounded by family members 
(Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.101-107). The person higher in rank might have 
responsibility to take care of the one lower in rank, to earn their support and effort, 
while the lower should follow instructions from the higher ranked.  
 
In order to control the system, there is also a recruiting and assessment system. Weber 
(1968, pp.107-169) views Confucianism as a religion similar to the Catholic Church. 
In his opinion, Confucian scholars formed a process to select the priests (Weber, 1968, 
pp.115-118; 1961, pp.422-425; see also Furth, 1983, pp.354-371). Confucian scholars 
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in the past learned Confucian teachings from childhood. Confucian scholars ran 
schools to train children by means of the Confucian texts. The students learned these 
texts, which were edited by the state’s Confucian scholars, and passed the 
examination held by the imperial court and Confucian bureaucrats. During this period, 
candidates for the bureaucracy must follow the official Confucian textbooks and 
strictly obey the orders of the state. If they failed to follow these regulations, they 
might lose the qualification to take the exam and also might lose the titles which they 
had won in the previous examination.15 Although these candidates might pass the 
national stage imperial examination and became officers, it was not the end of 
supervision by the Confucian government. Yushi (the administrative supervision 
officer) would ‘watch’ and impeach officers in the court, dependent on whether they 
were qualified in the Confucian regulations (Weber, 1968, pp.132-133).  
 
After the end of the imperial period in Confucian societies, the highest authority in the 
institution, the emperor, disappeared. This opening needed to be filled. In the 
meantime, Confucianism also lost its position as the only ideology in Confucian 
societies (Hsu, 1985; 2004a; 2004b; Yu, 1992; Tu, 1993; 2002a; Hahm, 2004). The 
political system in Confucian countries lost both the ruler and its core philosophy. 
Confucian texts and the history of Confucian societies indicate the ethos of 
hierarchical politics was very deep. Not only rulers, but also the people, were 
accustomed to accepting the concept, and hierarchical politics had been embedded in 
the minds of both people and rulers. Although the imperial political system collapsed 
in 1911, new hierarchical politics emerged to replace the imperial political system in 
Confucian societies by various types of non-democratic regimes. These new 
hierarchical non-democratic regimes continuously strengthened this legacy in 
Confucian societies. This thesis will focus on how these regimes were to and 
consolidate and even develop these legacies under modern political conditions.  
 
China 
 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) won the civil war by claiming to establish a 
democratic regime in China (see CPC leadership’s speeches in Shantou University 
Press, 1999). However, regimes in China still maintained a series of hierarchy 
political systems from totalitarian regime,16 post totalitarian regime,17 to Party as a 
                                                     
15 Imperial examination was not simply a one-stage examination. It was divided into several stages: the 
township stage, provincial stage and national stage. The candidate who passed the national stage 
examination would have qualification to be an officer at the imperial court.  
16 A totalitarian regime generally covers six elements in scholarly texts: a single ideology, only mass 
political parties, political police, strict control of mass media, a bureaucratic economy, and monopoly 
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Supervisor of the State.18 
 
The CPC claimed to end KMT one-party rule in Jiefang Daily (解放日報, the official 
newspaper of CPC, a propaganda tool that was used to publicise CPC’s policies and 
opinions) on 28th October 1941, stating that the key to the implementation of 
democratic politics at that time was to end one-party rule (Shantou University Press, 
1999, p.304). Further, the CPC’s purpose CPC in opposing KMT dictatorship was to 
establish a democratic government, rather than establishing a CPC one-party 
dictatorship (Shantou University Press, 1999, p.292). Mao Zedong also mentioned 
establishing an interim central government formed by representatives from KMT, 
CPC, CDL and Non-partisan people. This interim government would issue the 
democratic policy agenda, hold free elections for representatives of the National 
Assembly and form the formal democratic government (Mao, 1945). In order to carry 
out its promise, CPC assembled ‘The Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference’ (CPPCC), with other parties, not long before they won the civil war. 
However, CPC’s democracy is based on the Democratic Centralism government 
system that asks party institutions and party members to follow the party’s leadership, 
                                                                                                                                                        
of military force (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1965, pp.120-145). Linz & Stepan (1996b, p.40) also indicate 
that, in this type of regime, ‘almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism’ has been 
eliminated. It also ‘has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive 
mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great 
unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and non-elites alike’. 
17 Post-totalitarianism, in the definition of Linz & Stepan (1996b, pp.42-51), is different in the 
following respects. For leaders, the post-totalitarian regime has some constraints in the beginning, and 
would tolerate criticism from civil society later. As for pluralism, the post-totalitarian regime has an 
important and complex play of institutional pluralism, and also normally has a significant degree of 
social pluralism; it is even possible that oppositional organisations would appear. But the original party 
still stands as the only legal part. The party is still restricted to the revolutionary style. However, the 
leadership in the post-totalitarian regime is more bureaucratic and state technocratic than charismatic; 
leaders are from the party organisations. Although the original ideology still exists, it has faced 
challenges from society and actual practice. Finally, mobilisation would not as intensive and extensive 
as in a totalitarian regime (see also Linz, 2000, pp.245-261). The bureaucrats and state technocrats 
would not consider mobilising the public unless the regime faces serious crisis. Yu-Shan Wu (2007) 
indicated that China from 1979 to the present is more like a Post-Totalitarian Capitalist Developmental 
State, which combines the characteristics of Post-Totalitarianism from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, with characteristics of a Capitalist Developmental State from East Asian states. The original 
ideology has lost its dominant status in politics, and become symbolic. Bureaucracy rather than 
charismatic leaders now dominate politics. The party itself becomes conservative rather than mobilised 
and revolutionary. 
18 CPC decided to separate the party organisations from the state, which means party organisations will 
only be party organisations, and state institutions will only be state institutions. Zhao Ziyang’s speech 
at the 13th National Congress in 1987 indicated that the key political reform is the separation of the 
party and government (Dang Zheng Fen Kai, 党政分开). His report clearly indicated that party’s 
mission is to become the political leader – to formulate political principles and political direction, make 
important decisions and recommend staff for state institutions. The party’s method of conducting state 
affairs is to lead the state in order to legitimise the party’s views. He indicated that the objectives for 
state institutions and party organisations are different. Party organisation is responsible for mobilising 
the masses to put the party’s policies and directions into practice. State institutions are responsible for 
carrying out and legitimising these policies. 
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and for the sake of the state.19 The core principle is that the state should be under the 
leadership of the Communist Party of China; statements of this principle can be found 
in the Constitution of PRC and speeches of the leadership (see NPC, 2004; Hu, 2007, 
p.2; Jiang, 2001; Wen, 2009).  
 
Singapore 
 
The leaders of Singapore have clearly indicated that Singapore does not seek a 
Western-style democracy, and instead, a hierarchy guided regime was established. 
This regime includes both democratic and authoritarian characteristics, and is called 
Hybrid Regime (Diamond, 2002, p.23).20 Democracy for the Singapore government 
refers to democratic accountability, a long-term orientation, and social justice (Ng, 
1997, pp.19-21; Kausikan, 1997, pp. 26-28). As former Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong (吳作棟) argues:  
 
This is why, in Singapore, government acts more like a trustee. As a custodian of 
the people's welfare, it exercises independent judgment on what is in the 
long-term economic interests of the people and acts on that basis. Government 
policy is not dictated by opinion polls or referenda. This has sometimes meant 
overriding populist pressures for ‘easier’ economic policies. Indeed, 
implementing the right policies has on occasion meant administering bitter 
medicine to overcome economic challenges. The trustee model of democracy 
that Singapore has subscribed to enabled it to pursue the tough policies necessary 
for economic development. Indeed, the concept of government as trustee went 
hand in hand with democratic accountability. Because the government has acted 
as an honest and competent trustee of the people, we have been returned to 
power in every general election since self-government in 1959. With a 
comfortable majority and a strong mandate, we have been able to take a 
long-term view in addressing our economic problems.  
(Kausikan, 1997, pp. 27-28) 
                                                     
19 The principles of Democratic Centralism of the CPC can be found in Mao’s speech (Mao, 1945, p.2) 
and People.com.cn (2011, November 6); Encyclopaedia of CPC History (2011). 
20 Larry Diamond (2002, pp.22-32) discusses hybrid regimes in terms of competitive authoritarian and 
electoral authoritarian types. Both of these types of regime have a controlled election, which limits the 
opponents’ development, but the competitive authoritarian type would have a clear opponent in the 
parliament. Since Singapore has a constitution and fair elections (although the electoral system benefits 
the People’s Action Party), some scholars may argue that Singapore is a democratic country. However, 
this ‘democratic regime’ may be an ‘electoral authoritarian regime’, which is a defective form of 
democracy, a pseudo-democracy –in Linz’s definition, a ‘democratic façade [that] covers authoritarian 
rules’ (Linz, 2000, pp.33-34). Now it can be argued that Singapore ‘was’ an electoral authoritarian 
regime but after the general election in 2011, it may transform to a competitive authoritarian type. 
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The Singapore government’s goal for the people is clear: the government should offer 
a good government to protect people, and gives individuals in the state opportunities 
to develop themselves, to raise children and to offer children a better life than their 
parents (Bell, 2000, p.186). Further, this government has the best ministers and civil 
servants to support them (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.664-665). People in Singapore may not 
agree with the government’s decisions, but they will finally understand that the 
government’s policies are correct (Bell, 2000, pp.229-230). Lee also indicates that the 
opponents are the people who are trying to break the existing Singapore society, 
which may lead Singapore to follow the incorrect way (Bell, 2000, pp.273-275).  
 
Taiwan 
 
Like the CPC, Chiang Kai-shek used Democratic Centralism to re-shape the KMT 
party system after 1949, and this party also led the state. Chiang Kai-shek used this 
system to manipulate not only the party but also every important aspect in the society 
(Tsang, 1999, p.5). At the central government level, the leaders in the party have four 
positions: state leader, party leader, government actual leader, and military and 
security section’s actual leader (Chu, 1992). In the local area, KMT nominated faction 
leaders to be the KMT candidates, and used resources to win the election (Chu, 1996; 
Lin, 1999). After the collapse of the authoritarian period, this legacy is weakening 
among the people, but still exists in KMT and the bureaucratic system of the 
Taiwanese government. Taiwan in the democratic period is establishing stronger and 
more pluralistic civil society to confront the government. Notwithstanding the 
Taiwan-China relationship or food safety issues, various civil organisations or parties 
would oppose official decisions. 
 
South Korea 
 
Through non-democratic leadership, South Korea maintained the legacy by personal 
or military dictatorship21 for approximately 40 years. In South Korea, Syngman Rhee, 
                                                     
21 An authoritarian regime can be described in four categories: has broad economic and social 
pluralism, but without political pluralism; normally does not normally have an ideology; would govern 
by a well-established elite group, such as a military force; does not mobilise people, except on some 
special occasion (Linz & Stepan, 1996b, pp.44-45; Linz, 2000, pp.184-208, he uses 
Bureaucratic-Military Authoritarian Regime). This regime is one of the popular regimes for a country 
after a colonization period, monarchy period or even an end of a democratic regime. These phenomena 
can be found in Asia, Africa and Latin America; most countries turn to a military authoritarian after the 
last regime collapse. As for the military regime, this regime is one ‘in which military officers are major 
or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. Thus in a military 
regime the armed forces may exercise political power either directly or indirectly by controlling 
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the first president of South Korea, started his personal dictatorship during his 
presidency with US military support and national security laws. Rhee lost power after 
the April Revolution in 1960. Park Chung-hee led the military coup in 1961 and 
established a military authoritarian regime. This regime was in power from the 1960s 
to the late 1980s and maintained its legitimacy by rapid economic development. South 
Korea, as has been mentioned in this chapter, started its process of democratisation 
from the late 1980s. Although the ruling class at that time faced protests from the 
people, democratisation was still effected by the ruler himself, to decrease the damage 
of the incumbent authority. In democratised South Korea, like Taiwan, people are 
establishing a strong civil society to demonstrate their preferences in public policy 
and oppose unpopular government measures. For instance, President Lee Myung-bak 
faced major protest riots in Seoul when he decided to open American beef imports to 
South Korea. 
 
 
Preliminary Summary: Strong authority and weak civil society 
 
In the beginning of this chapter, this thesis indicated that the political culture arises 
from the political socialisation process of the people, and it is also a part of the 
historical memory of a nation. When reviewing the historical and existing regimes, 
most of them were/are hierarchy. Therefore, it is not surprising that people tend to 
look up to the top for direction and for favours (Huntington, 1991, p.303).  
 
It can be seen that hierarchical politics has existed in all Confucian societies for a long 
time, and this legacy cannot offer people the concepts of political equality and people 
sovereignty. The public are not aware that they have the power in the state that 
facilitates the ruler’s control and forbids pluralistic opinions. Andreas Schedler (1998, 
pp.98-99) explains this problem further. He argues that in Western democratic 
countries, the development process is state building, then legal domestication of the 
state, and finally democratic domestication of the state. However, the sequence in 
most third wave democratic countries is contrary to that in the west. In these countries, 
state reform and judicial reform should be implemented to solve these problems. 
O’Donnell also suggests that the popularity of particularism and a strong but 
challengeable executive authority, which a lack of checks and balances, would lead to 
the following problems. He indicates that because of the formal and informal 
regulations that co-exist in a regime, it will form a ‘delegative’ democracy that lacks 
horizontal accountability (O'Donnell, 1993; 1996, pp.35-36; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 
                                                                                                                                                        
civilian leaders’ (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007,p.146, the first sentence is from Nordlinger, 1977, p.2). 
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1986, pp.21-23). Yun-Han Chu (1996) also uses Taiwan as a case to argue the 
importance of removing legacies from past authoritarian regimes. In these 
circumstances, to ease this process, hierarchical politics is essential for democracy. 
2.4.2 Guanxi (關係): Connections and Factions 
Guanxi, interpersonal connections, is frequently used to discuss Confucian capitalism 
in Chinese society (see, for instance, Kao, 1993; Rozman, 2002; Crawford, 2000). 
Scholars use this cultural factor to analyse how guanxi (the connections) affects 
business activities in Confucian societies. Samuel Huntington (1997, p. 229) also 
suggested that rapid economic growth in Sinic civilisation is because of the cultural 
effects, especially the ‘bamboo network’. 
 
Guanxi is given many similar definitions from different scholars (can see Tsui, Farh, 
& Xin, 2000, pp.225-227). These definitions indicate that guanxi represents 
interpersonal connections, or the social connections of individuals. This thesis will 
discuss how guanxi is a major cultural element, affecting democracy in Confucian 
society.  
 
Regarding concept conceptualisation in classic Confucian teachings, Confucius said 
‘The superior man is dignified, but does not wrangle. He is sociable, but not a partisan’ 
(Legge, 1861b, p.164). According to Confucian teachings, it can be found that 
Confucius agreed that the literati should maintain social connections but disagreed 
that they should form a specific party. However, Confucianism also demands the 
formation of the family-based society that supported the Confucian societies for 
thousands of years. Guanxi became an inevitable cultural element in Confucian 
societies.  
 
In the imperial period, guanxi did not exist only in families, but also affected the 
political arena. Weber (1968, p.59-60, pp.117-118) and Huang (1981; 1997) argued 
that the bureaucratic system can be divided into several factions in different ways. 
Weber also suggests that, according to the locations of the Confucian teachings, this 
system was divided into three factions: a northern ‘conservative’ faction, a midland 
‘progressive’ faction and a southern ‘radical’ faction. However, they would unite 
against anyone who asked to reform the system. Huang argued, on the other hand, that 
the emperor would tolerate these factions as long as they would not be a threat to his 
ruling status.  
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However, the tolerance of factions does not mean that the emperor would allow a 
‘party’, an active and influential faction in politics, because this activity would be 
considered dangerous or could lead to the overthrow of the court. Although the 
Confucian imperial court was strong, centralised and bureaucratised, and it might not 
be possible to form a legitimised party at the court, yet there were still several cases of 
this happening in the imperial period (Kim, 2002, p.73). In China, there was party 
conflict in the Hang, Tang, Soong and Ming dynasties and one of the reasons that 
these dynasties collapsed was because of serious partisan conflict. Sang Jun Kim 
(2002, p.75) argues that in Choson (Korea) there were also hundreds of years of 
partisan conflict.  
 
Kim (2002, pp.73-77) argues that Confucian parties emerged because of the 
arguments about Confucian teachings. He found that if the ‘Confucian Moralpolitik 
became hegemonic’, then the ‘groups or individuals’ would start to fight against each 
other to become the ‘moral paragons’ (Kim, 2002, p.73). Therefore, the conflicts 
between these parties were different from the western style. There was no tolerance, 
because each party wanted to be the orthodox one that held the power to explain 
Confucian teachings. In this circumstance, each party tried to ‘brand [the] opposite 
one as evil’ (Kim, 2002, p.74). Besides the conflict concerning orthodoxy, the parties 
might organise through guanxi. Huang (1981) also indicates that cronyism happened 
in these parties, because people in the party would be familiar with each other.  
 
Huang (1981) and Kim (2002, p.74) both suggest that in this conflict, the ruler was an 
arbiter, who punished the loser and awarded the winner. Huang gives an example in 
the Ming Dynasty, describing the period when the part of the first minister, Zhang 
Juzheng, occupied important positions in the court, and his policies were followed by 
the empire; even the emperor would respect him. However, after he died, the situation 
was completely reversed. His familiar colleagues, and students and officers in his 
faction, lost their original positions. Guanxi (connections) brought together ministers 
from similar backgrounds, or who held similar opinions on Confucian teachings, to 
create parties that opposed each other. Some led to the collapse of the empire, 
especially in the Soong and the Ming dynasties.  
 
The following paragraphs will demonstrate how guanxi survives in modern societies 
and it can be found that most demonstrate this in political factions. 
 
China 
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In China, political factions are not encouraged but are very much alive. DW News 
produced a series of reports on the political factions in the CPC in 2011. According to 
the report, these emerged from struggles during the KMT period. At that time, the 
CPC could not form a united central authority; therefore, factions emerged in different 
provinces, but they were eliminated when the CPC gathered in Yan-An (延安). As for 
the Mao dictatorship, Mao also eliminated Lin Biao’s faction in the army. The major  
factions in the CPC now are: The Princeling (太子党)22, Tuanpai (团派), and 
Shanghai faction (上海帮) (DW News, 2011a, October, 24; 2011b, October, 24; 2011c, 
October, 24; 2011d, October, 24; 2011e, October, 24; See also Dotson, Zhuo and 
Taffer (2012), the report to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
which also indicates that three major factions, Shanghai Clique, CCYL Faction and 
Princelings, control China’s central government in turn). These three factions are 
based on the sources of individuals’ bureaucratic career. 
 
The Princeling group in China now is a strong faction in the CPC, which controls 
many resources. When Deng Xiaoping started economic reform in the 1980s, sons 
and daughters of CPC leaders become the main actors to take over the resources that 
were released from the state. These people have good political and commercial 
connections to accumulate personal wealth. With regard to the incumbent institution, 
the core of the CPC cannot absorb the ordinary civilian elite. Only those who already 
occupy an advantageous position to start their official career and also those who are 
constantly promoted by the party have a chance of reaching high office in the CPC. 
This privilege is belongs to only two categories: one is the student leaders who have 
entered the China Youth League (CYL) Central Committee and become Tuanpai, and 
the other is members of the Crown Prince Party. Tuanpai is now the incumbent ruling 
faction, because Hu Jintao is from this faction, as are approximately one third of 
central level officers (DW News, 2011c, October, 24). The Jiang faction is essentially 
a Shanghai faction, loyal to Jiang Zemin.  
 
 
Singapore 
 
In modern Confucian societies, guanxi is strongly forbidden by the Singapore 
leadership. However, because of the challenges of Singapore from its reluctant 
independence(Lee KY, 2011, p.3-9), Singapore leaders try to make Singapore a 
success; therefore it can be found these politicians from the founding state have a 
                                                     
22 This faction covers children of revolutionary elders; children of second and third generation leaders; 
children of incumbent leaders; children of parents in state enterprises and children of financial 
executives (DW News, 2011b, October, 24). 
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sense of mission to make Singapore a success. In this circumstance, this state only 
allows ‘the best elites in the People’s Action Party’ to serve in the civil service (Bell, 
2000, pp.177-181; Lee KY, 2011, pp.664-995). The former Prime Minister Lee Kwan 
Yew is considered to be a traditional Confucian ruler. In his construction of patriarchal 
politics in Singapore, leaders have a responsibility to take care of the people and act 
as a virtuous model (Neher, 1994, p.954). Singapore founders and their successors 
suggest that this state has elections in order to ask for the people’s trust, and when 
people choose the People’s Action Party and the leadership, it does mean that people 
trust, and are willing to give power to, the party to serve Singapore (Bell, 2000, 
pp.179-182; see especially p.182). The government, in return, is to offer a prosperous 
and just society for people to enjoy their life. Only the best and most incorrupt people 
can be chosen and survive in the Singapore government. It can be concluded that the 
government is a revised classic Confucian political system: the people do not 
overthrow the government through revolution, but by election. However, the strong 
guidance of the life of the populace interferes with election campaigning and could 
hinder opponents’ activities and the legal actions of those who criticise the 
government leaders, especially Lee himself. In consequence, this prevents Singapore 
from reaching the standard of a democratic regime. 
 
Taiwan 
 
KMT set up several methods to maintain the top down alliance between KMT and 
local factions. First, the faction’s leadership was limited in the local elections, and 
KMT also limited horizontal connections between factions (Chen, 1996, pp.176-177). 
Second, local factions were nominated in rotation, and new factions supported or sent 
new candidates to local authorities, in order to win the largest number of seats in the 
SNTV elections. KMT used a ‘flexible nomination policy’, which nominated a few 
candidates and gave some space for ‘local party friends’ (Chu, 1996, p.77; Lin, 1999, 
p.168). Third, KMT also assigned a responsibility zone to the nominees for 
‘vote-cultivation’. This responsibility zone was based on each nominee’s social 
network, from which it would be easy for them to mobilise voters (Lin, 1999, 
pp.170-171). Finally, KMT asked their loyal party supporters to vote for the specific 
nominee. Most of these loyal party supporters (which can also be called ‘iron votes’) 
were the ‘mainlanders, veterans, military personnel, government employees and 
school teachers, which continued to receive benefits from the KMT or had strong 
linkage to the party’ (Lin, 1999, p.172). Meanwhile, vote buying, violence from local 
candidates, farmer’s and fisher’s associations23 and local factions were also popular 
                                                     
23 Local farmers’ associations and fishers’ associations are also controlled by KMT in the long term. 
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activities in local KMT factions (Chu, 1996, p.77). These pro-KMT votes still play 
important roles in Taiwanese elections. In the business arena, national commercial and 
industrial associations, and important entrepreneurs, were members of the Central 
Committee of KMT. After the democratisation period, the patron-client system still 
exists between the KMT and local factions, and could hinder the development of 
democracy. Even though the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency 
for eight years, the relationship between local factions and KMT still cannot be 
dissolved.  
 
South Korea 
 
In South Korea, Hahm (2008, pp.132-133) also confirms that the relationships within 
local areas can be the sources of factions. Politicians can gain more votes from their 
home county. For instance, Roh Tae-woo in Gyeongsangbuk-do (경상북도), Kim 
Young-sam in Gyeongsangnam-do (경상남도), Kim Jong-pil in Chungcheong 
(충청도) and Kim Dae-jung in Jeolla (전라도) can win most support, and when these 
politicians unite, then the union can win the election. Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam 
and Kim Jong-pil united against Kim Dae-jung in 1992 and won the presidential 
election (Kuo, 2010, p.12). Shih Chung-Shan (2011, pp.133-134) also indicates that 
supporters of the parties of South Korea can be divided into West and East. The East 
area is the Saenuri Party base and the Democratic Party gains most votes in the West. 
Seoul and its surrounding area is the major region to compete for votes. The Saenuri 
Party was founded by Park Chung-hee and Roh Tae-woo succeeded, even though Roh 
or Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil are from the east of South Korea. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the Saenuri Party can win a majority in the East. Kim Young-sam led 
the Democratic Party, and his hometown is in the west, therefore his party can win 
more votes in the west. It can be seen that guanxi in South Korea is more like a 
geo-political structure,  
 
To summarise, guanxi has existed in Confucian societies for more than a thousand 
years. It would be an obstacle to democracy if cronyism were widespread in the 
political arena. In China, political factions who rely on guanxi are well established in 
the Communist Party, and cronyism that would expel people from other factions can 
be found in Chinese society. A particularly striking recent example of factional 
conflict can be seen in the case of Bo Xilai (Guthrie, 2012, March 16). In Singapore, 
although guanxi is highly prohibited by government, nonetheless, the People’s Action 
                                                                                                                                                        
These associations help the party controlling local resources and guanxi. The KMT nominated the 
leadership of these associations and helped them to maintain their positions. 
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Party is the largest faction in Singapore and dominates Singaporean politics. In 
democratic societies, the KMT also establishes closed guanxi with local factions and 
enterprises to facilitate the KMT’s candidates in elections, and in South Korea, 
factions can be found in different locations. Therefore, guanxi is a negative factor that 
could hinder the development of democracy in non-democratic Confucian societies, 
but also distorts democracy in democratic Confucian societies.  
2.4.3 Harmony and Group-orientation 
Harmony and group-orientation are legacies from the imperial period, and now 
become useful tools for non-democratic rulers to control people. Non-democratic 
leaderships in Confucian societies built up an official ideology and educated people to 
follow them. Meanwhile, these leaders used nationalism to strengthen the legacy of 
group-orientation. Therefore, in order to maintain a stable society and state unity, a 
harmonious society is needed. Nonetheless, in democratic Confucian societies, 
harmony cannot be reached because of the open and pluralistic civil society that has 
developed.  
 
In carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your 
evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation 
between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The 
grass must bend, when the wind blows across it (子為政, 焉用殺, 子欲善而民
善矣. 君子之德, 風也, 小人之德, 草也, 草尚之風必偃)  
   (Legge, 1861b, pp.122-123; Legge, 1861a, p.114)  
 
This description from Confucian classics demonstrate the core concept of harmony: 
when dealing with conflicts, violence is not the first option, virtue is the key to 
solving them. Harmony is an important value in Confucian teachings, which guides 
Confucian society to maintain a conflict-free relationship (Chen, 2002, p.4). 
According to Confucius, individuals cannot withdraw the society; therefore, it is 
important for individuals to maintain proper interpersonal relationships. Meanwhile, 
as this thesis has argued before, Confucius suggested an individual’s actions should be 
appropriate to his position and encourages other individuals who stood in his/her 
position to fulfil his/her duty. If everyone can deal with their interpersonal 
relationships appropriately, then unnecessary conflicts and disorder in society can be 
prevented. Therefore, everyone should respect and fulfil the social duties of their own 
social status for a harmonious society. Chen (2002, pp.5-9) also indicated that the 
concept of harmony can be found in most Chinese philosophies; equilibrium is the 
~ 65 ~ 
 
core of this concept. Harmony asks people to work together as wheels on two sides of 
the axis. In order to achieve this, people should practise self-restraint and 
self-discipline. Harmony also asks people to focus on their particular relationships, 
which would also help to decrease conflict in society. Harmony, a core value in 
Confucian teachings represents an ideal state in Chinese society (Chen, 2002, p.12).  
 
As for group-orientation, it is taken from family-centred values. Confucianism argues 
that if a person can properly deal with his/her own human relationships, then it would 
be possible for he/she to reach the level of sage, and this idea can be found in Mencius’ 
words: ‘By the sage, the human relations are perfectly exhibited (聖人, 人倫之至也)’ 
(Legge, 1861a, p.168). Furthermore, personal relationships should be established in 
the family unit, and then extended to others. 
 
The core concept for this human relationship asks individuals to consider not only 
himself/herself but also related people surrounding him/her, and this is the way to 
become a sage. Therefore, the concept for group orientation is formed in Confucian 
societies. Bell (1995, pp.20-24) also indicates three characteristics about 
family-centred values in Confucian classics. Firstly, family is the first and the most 
important school of virtue;24 particularly the female in Confucian society would be 
encouraged to hold this idea. Second, proper behaviour in the family is not only a 
daily ethical practice but also reflects respect of politics. Third, family obligations 
should be more important than any other obligations.  
 
In the imperial period, the concept of harmony operated in the bureaucratic system in 
two areas. Firstly, an officer in his own jurisdiction should use his sense of morality to 
lead people to follow him in this. Law is the last resort for correct people’s incorrect 
activities. Secondly, this phenomenon can also be seen in the local officer’s report to 
the imperial court. In Chinese dynasties, the ruling class was not concerned about 
numeric data;25 most of them were barely numerate. Officers also did not ask for the 
facts. In order to maintain the system of centralisation of authority in the Chinese 
empire, the solution was to establish a ‘perfect method’ and standardise it. 
Bureaucrats at all levels should follow this standard. If any bureaucrats faced 
difficulties in practice, then they were required to solve the difficulties by themselves. 
If the difficulties could not be solved – or the method of solution damaged the 
                                                     
24 See also Shuan (2003, p.44), who argues that Confucianism asks people to learn to be a human by 
moral and intellectual character through interactions with other people throughout his/her life in 
different relationships. 
25 Weber (1968, p.125) indicated that there was no training of calculation in schools. The training only 
existed among merchants.   
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empire’s reputation or interests – then the sacrifice of individuals for the state was 
necessary to protect the group (see also Huang, 1981, chap. 2; 1992, p.23; 1997, 
pp.58-59; Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp.104-105, pp.183-184). In this circumstance, 
bureaucrats would choose not to report the problem, and it would grow larger and 
larger. When the problem was too big to solve, it would ruin the foundations of the 
empire, and then a revolution would emerge. This problem was like a loop –when a 
dynasty was overthrown by civil revolution and a new dynasty was established – yet 
this problem of harmony would reoccur in the new one. As for group orientation, 
family-centred values would not disappear in Confucian societies. 
 
Peace and order sanctioned dynastic rule. They were to be achieved by the 
central power of a dynasty which sat on top of its territorial bureaucratic 
administration and beneath this level maintained local control through the loyalty 
of the lineage structure and gentry leadership. Such loyalty was the product of 
Confucianism; China's traditional polity can be understood only in Confucian 
terms.                                         (Fairbank, 1978, p.22)  
 
Nowadays, harmony and group-orientation are emphasised for establishing coherent 
values in Confucian society by non-democratic leaderships. Harmonious society and 
group orientation have become significant values that are highly promoted by the 
non-democratic authorities of China and Singapore.  
 
China 
 
In China, the concept of harmonious society has entered into official documents in the 
past ten years. In order to maintain a stable society, decrease conflict or protests, and 
relieve internal pressure from the people, the policy of establishing a harmonious 
society has become one of the most important policies in China. 
 
In order to fulfil this object, the CPC maintains a strong central government, 
manipulates the media and internet, and makes connections between party and state to 
create the idea that love of China refers to love of the party. As for political culture, 
the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilisation of the CPC (中
央精神文明建设指导委员会, directly led by a member of the Politburo Standing 
Committee of the CPC) is responsible for educating people to follow CPC policies 
and official ideology to build up a harmonious society. ‘Love China’ education is 
promoted, CPC and China is ‘one integrity with both sides’, ‘For the leadership, and 
in public opinion, the unity of the country is all-important’ (House of Lords, 2010, 
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point 9). 
 
In 1987, Zhao Ziyang mentioned that stability and unity are the prerequisites for 
establishing democratic politics. Socialism should have a high standard of democracy 
and in the legal system, and a completely stable social environment. In the initial 
stages, because of many factors that could lead to instability, it is particularly 
important to maintain stability and unity, although experience has demonstrated that 
this is not an easy task. He also mentioned that conflicting views among the people 
should be dealt with correctly (Zhao, 1987, p.1). The CPC asks that the party and 
people of all races should unite to overcome difficulties and march towards socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.  
 
Hu Jintao has also delivered speeches to the CPC meetings that all place emphasis on 
harmonious society. He argues that building a socialist harmonious society is our 
party well-off society and creating a new situation in the socialist cause with Chinese 
characteristics reflects the fundamental interests and common aspirations of the broad 
mass of the people. To promote the history of the development process for socialist 
material civilisation, political civilisation and spiritual civilisation, a solid job of 
building a socialist harmonious society work needs to be done (Hu, 2005, February 
19). Wen Jiabao also mentioned the idea of harmony in an annual government 
working report in 2010. To the CPC, increasing harmonious factors and reducing 
disharmonious factors as much as they can provides an important guarantee to achieve 
the long-term development goals of China (Xinhuanet, 2006, September 26). 
Harmonious culture would decrease the divisions and confrontation of values that 
arise from the unequal distribution of benefits among different groups. In the 
meantime, it would establish one cultural idea for the whole society to obey, and 
realise the collective identity in spirit of Chinese culture (Xie Xiaorong, 2007, 
September 30, article in CPC theories).  
 
Chinese authority is desirous of a stable society, without conflict, to avoid potential 
challenges against CPC authority. Nationalism, which binds the CPC and China 
together, is encouraged to avoid people overthrowing the CPC’s authority, because 
this attempt could lead to unstable situation to China. Instead of the resolution of 
conflict by the people themselves, the official announcement argues that the CPC and 
the state will deal with conflicts within society. Meanwhile, the people should also 
work to maintain a harmonious society and cease conflicts, and together support the 
interests of the state this concept can be seen in the speeches of the CPC leaders. 
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Singapore 
 
Singapore is a newly-independent state that is composed of different ethnic groups. 
This country does not have a long history as a united Singaporean nation. Meanwhile, 
it has already been mentioned that Singapore became independent reluctantly, and the 
Singapore leadership need to make Singapore a success. Therefore, they set up a clear 
objective: the Singapore government should establish a prosperous society, but people 
should follow the government’s directions to ensure that the best people should be in a 
position to organise the best policy for Singapore. This objective covers two important 
categories: patriotism and harmony.  
 
The Singapore leaders endeavour to build the nation, and this has avoided ethnic 
conflict in Singapore since 1965 (Bell, 2000, p.254). Singapore’s government teaches 
people to put national interests and community interests ahead of individual interests, 
and that nation and community should help an individual’s development (see Tan, 
2001, September 21, the descriptions of five values; National Heritage Board, 
Singapore, 2009). To Singapore’s leadership, they indicate that ‘Singaporeans have 
little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society 
take precedence over that of the individual suit them better than the individualism of 
America’ (Bell, 2000, p.256).  
 
Harmony is another important issue in Singapore, where leaders believe that, because 
of the effects of Confucian values, a duty-based society has naturally emerged. 
Compared with the western ‘right-based society’, this society has less selfishness and 
conflict, and more consensus and harmony (Ghai, 1998, pp.29-30). Singapore’s 
leaders suggest that, if Singapore is not affected by western culture in the next 
decades, official values will teach people to consider the welfare of the group, such as 
family, community and the state, rather than the rights of the individual. To summarise, 
Lee highlights the accomplishment of Singapore and makes a brief conclusion that 
states: an impetus to Singapore's success is that most people put the interests of the 
community higher than the importance of personal interests, and this is the basic 
concept of Confucian ideology.  
 
Taiwan  
 
During the non-democratic period, the KMT authority at one time focused on 
group-orientation for nation building, yet harmony was not promoted politically. As 
an alien regime, the KMT government attempted to establish a base in Taiwan to 
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expel communists from mainland China; thus, the KMT’s actions were part of a 
Chinese nation-building process rather than an ideological development (Lin, 1998, 
pp.131-134). For instance, the KMT authority controlled Taiwan by pragmatic 
measures – such as constraining local factions, establishing party-commercial ties, 
building a security service and strictly limiting public space – rather than by a 
systematic official ideology. Meanwhile, instead of establishing a solid official 
ideology, the KMT authority needed to use democracy as a slogan to enhance the 
authoritarian regime (Tsang, 1999, p.7).  
 
However, after the democratisation period, neither a harmonious society nor Chinese 
nation-building success could be found. Because of the open public space and 
competition among parties, it is hard to reach consensus, in Taiwanese society, on 
whether the nation is Chinese or Taiwanese, although most Taiwanese call themselves 
Taiwanese.26 In contrast with the authoritarian period, public groups in Taiwan may 
ask for re-union or oppose the communists, various public groups are developed for 
different public policies from the democratisation period, and this phenomenon 
reflects the fact that civil society in Taiwan is more pluralist and autonomous (Chang, 
2000, pp.118-120).  
 
This thesis uses two waves’ data from the Asian Barometer Survey to demonstrate 
group orientation in Taiwan. Both waves use the following questions: 
 
For the sake of the national community/society, the individual should be prepared to 
sacrifice 
 
For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26 See Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan 
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm. The data shows that, up until 
June 2011, 54.6% people in Taiwan called themselves Taiwanese, 39.0% argue they are both Taiwanese 
and Chinese, and 4.1% indicate they are Chinese. 
 
~ 70 ~ 
 
Table 3.1Group-orientation and Taiwanese opinion 
 
Family 
  
 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Strongly agree 13.7  13.1  
Somewhat agree 72.5  75.5  
Somewhat disagree 13.1  10.6  
Strongly disagree 0.7  0.8  
   
Nation 
  
 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Strongly agree 6.6  4.9  
Somewhat agree 58.0  51.4  
Somewhat disagree 32.4  40.0  
Strongly disagree 2.9  3.7  
Source：1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey（Wave One） 
       2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey（Wave Two） 
 
Table 3.1 demonstrates the results of the group orientation survey in Taiwan. The 
results suggest that group orientation in Taiwan is considered to be centred more on 
the family than on the state, unlike the situation that the non-democratic form of 
leadership in China or Singapore tend to establish. However, this legacy still exists in 
people’s mind. 
 
To summarise, this thesis may indicate that the concept of harmony does not broadly 
exist in Taiwanese society, and even group orientation is more a family-centred value, 
rather than the loyalty to the nation. 
 
South Korea 
 
Unlike in China and Singapore, where the leadership tried to establish a common 
ideology to diminish the opponent’s voice, and unlike in China, Singapore and Taiwan 
that need to confront the issues of a multi-racial society, South Korea is more focused 
on establishing concepts for educating people to build up a Korean identity. Harmony 
is a kind of life-style, rather than a politically promoted element in modern society, as 
it exists in the Korean’s life. 
 
Harmony is viewed as an interpersonal courtesy (Zhang, 2011). Zhang indicates that it 
~ 71 ~ 
 
is a tradition from Zhuxi’s theory and was developed in Korea’s Confucian society. 
This concept of harmony was also highly promoted by official scholars in the Choson 
Dynasty. Therefore harmony ‘in personal relationships is a dominant force in a 
Korean’s life’ (K4E Editor, 2012). Kima & Park (2003) also indicate that ‘harmony in 
the workplace’ is one of the major contributors to rapid economic growth in South 
Korea. 
 
With regard to group orientation, Korea has been affected by surrounding countries, 
such as China and Japan, for hundreds of years. From the Choson Dynasty, Korean 
was influenced by Chinese Confucian culture. Then the country faced Japanese 
colonial education from 1910 to 1945, and now it is influenced by western culture 
(Yim, 2002, pp.38-39). Therefore, the South Korea government introduces Korean 
national education to develop group orientation at the national level. It can be found 
that, during the last few decades, South Koreans have been used to making a stand in 
defence of their country’s interests, whether in an anti-American movement during the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement (Oh, 1999) or against Ractopamine American 
beef in 2008. Nonetheless, these movements might not be considered to be in 
opposition to democracy. 
 
In summary, two legacies of Confucianism that were mentioned in this sub-section – 
harmony and group orientation – have their own original ethical functions in classic 
Confucian teachings. Yet when these concepts were operated in practice, the ethical 
functions disappeared and the only legacies that remained were those that constrain 
the rights of the individual, in order to achieve the collective interest. This result is not 
capable of supporting democratic political culture but facilitates non-democratic 
leaderships to control the state in non-democratic societies, yet these legacies might 
demonstrate a different effect in other democratic societies.  
2.4.4 Section Summary 
Four traditional legacies – hierarchical politics, guanxi, harmony, and group 
orientation – are introduced in this section. It can be found that these four legacies are 
substantially anti-democratic in character and also below the standards of classic 
Confucian teaching. Hierarchical politics would encourage people to allow political 
leaders to maintain dominant status and manipulate the political agenda. People in this 
situation cannot have broad access to different ways of thinking, in order to form a 
new political culture, and the political status quo cannot be changed. Thus, a 
democratic political culture cannot emerge. Guanxi, harmony, and group orientation 
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are obstacles to the consolidation of democratic culture. Guanxi encourages cronyism, 
harmony, and group-orientation advocates a single opinion and personal sacrifice for 
the collective interest in a society, which would allow non-democratic leaderships to 
control public opinion with ease. Meanwhile, non-democratic leadership would 
strongly support the concepts of harmony and group orientation in order to establish a 
coherent value in society and to avoid potential opponents. If political culture in 
Confucian societies tends to support these legacies, democratic political culture would 
not easily emerge or even consolidate. However, non-democratic leadership would 
strongly encourage these legacies because they are an original part of a political 
culture instilled in the minds of the people; it is not costly to deepen these legacies in 
the public’s mind and they can also facilitate non-democratic rule. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The concept of political culture involves evaluating the relationship between 
collective long-term political experience and the preference of individuals. Regarding 
the emergence of a democratic regime in Confucian societies, the leaderships’ attitude 
is important at the initial stage, and then the people’s firm support of democracy 
would help to develop a strong democratic political culture. However, in Confucian 
societies, the traditional legacies that emerged from the imperial period continue to 
survive in different ways in Confucian societies. Hierarchical politics facilitates 
control of the political agenda and leads people to remain in disadvantageous 
situations in the political system. Thus, it is difficult for democratic political culture 
within Confucian societies to emerge. Three other legacies also encourage 
anti-democratic values that become obstacles to democracy. These traditional legacies 
have a long-term accumulation in the political culture of Confucian society, and have 
become a collective memory for rulers and the people. 
 
Although traditional legacies are incapable of bringing about democracy, the potential 
for democratic regimes to emerge in non-democratic countries has been indicated in 
de Tocqueville’s books. He argued that ‘The mores and laws of the Americans are not 
the only ones that can be suitable for democratic peoples; but the Americans have 
shown that we must not despair of regulating democracy with the help of laws and 
mores’ (Alexis de Tocqueville, 2010b, p.504). Meanwhile, at the beginning of this 
chapter, it was said that political culture could change when people consider that it is 
not compatible with the needs of the existing society. A democratic regime needs a 
strong democratic political culture to support it. Therefore, a value-shift in Confucian 
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society would become necessary. Modernisation, which could diminish traditional 
values and help to establish a democratic regime, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Modernisation 
 
This thesis discussed political culture in Confucian societies, and the shift of political 
culture involved in changes to the existing society. People would seek a new political 
culture for accommodating to change. Yu-Shan Wu (1998, p.444) indicates that recent 
democratic theories can be divided into two categories. One of them is focused on 
prerequisites for change, and another is focused on the process of change. In Wu’s 
opinion, the first one emphasises macro political-social factors. The other indicates 
that political change cannot be explained by economic, cultural or political conditions. 
Instead, political change should be regarded in terms of the interactions of actors and 
the sequence of events. Modernisation is one of the most powerful and influential of 
these democratic theories. 
 
Modernisation is a concept that covers not only economic aspects but also covers 
political, social and mental aspects. Modernisation is acknowledged as an active 
process that makes a country or a society adjusts itself to face challenges and adopt 
new conditions and values. This phenomenon began in Europe in the 17th to 18th 
century, followed by the North American countries in the mid-19th century and Asian 
countries in the 20th century. With the wave of modernisation, the countries that 
follow this wave begin a rapid development period. These experiences became the 
early empirical cases for scholars to develop the theoretical framework. Then the 
framework was amended to adapt to the conditions of other non-western countries.  
 
Modernisation is considered to be a revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, 
phased, homogenising, irreversible process, which covers ‘industrialization, 
urbanization, social mobilization, differentiation, secularization, media expansion, 
increasing literacy, education, and expansion of political participation’ (Huntington, 
1968, p.32;  1971, pp.288-289). It can be argued that it leads to the erosion of 
traditionalism (see Inglehart, 1997, pp.73-74). Modernisation can also be seen as not 
only a change in the model of production or of institutions, but also a change in the 
behaviour of human beings. Regarding Confucian societies, these societies started 
processes of modernisation in different ways and at different times. However, 
modernisation in these societies demonstrates different phenomena.  
 
The modernisation paradigm from scholars of modernisation indicates that social and 
economic development will bring about political openness and democratisation, 
~ 75 ~ 
 
because these developments will bring the internal need for democratisation (Wu, 
1998, p.443). Modernisation is a choice for Confucian societies to ‘catch up’ with the 
developed countries. In the meantime, the institutional and cultural change to 
modernisation will transform existing traditional thinking and institutions. 
Modernisation is more involved with the change of the traditional society to a modern 
society; when discussing the prerequisites of democratisation, modernisation and 
wealth are argued as important conditions (Huntington, 1984, p.199). Furthermore, 
the consequences of modernisation – economic development and the emergence of the 
middle class – are possible elements for helping to establish a democratic regime (see 
Lipset, 1959; 1960). Meanwhile, popularised education arising from modernisation is 
also an essential prerequisite for democracy. Lipset indicates that although there may 
not enough evidence to argue that higher levels of education would be an advantage 
for democracy, yet popularised education is essential for a country to practise a 
democratic regime (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2006). However, the effects of 
these factors for democracy may be controversial, because there are still some modern 
Confucian societies that do not perform as the theories would predict. However, there 
are theorists of culture shifts who argue that modernisation will create a positive 
environment for individuals to develop democratic values, and this will advance the 
democratisation in a society (Inglehart, 1990; 1997, Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel 
& Inglehart, 2008). Generational differences will be an important factor for observing 
such changes. 
 
This chapter will focus on how modernisation and its three consequences the middle 
class, economic growth, education, and age could help to reshape traditional legacies 
and help develop democracy. These issues will be discussed in the following sequence. 
Modernisation theories will be reviewed, to begin with. The theories indicate that 
modernisation is a total change that transforms society from a traditional to a modern 
one, and because of a series of changes, traditional political values will be diminished 
and replaced by open and democratic values. The rise of a middle class, economic 
development and education are three important factors of modernisation that could 
help to develop a democratic regime. However, this thesis would indicate that the 
middle class in East Asian societies may tend to support stability, and economic 
development would help to maintain a stable democratic regime. As for education, it 
also needs popularised education and a neutral education system to support it. 
Meanwhile, modernisation and its effects would help to break traditional norms and 
lead people to become more skilful and to seek democracy, but these will not directly 
bring democracy. Then this thesis will briefly discuss these three factors in modern 
Confucian society, to determine the differences between democratic and 
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non-democratic Confucian societies.. 
 
3.1 Modernisation Theories 
Early modernisation is based on experiences from the 17th–19th centuries in Western 
Europe and North America. Scholars used these experiences to develop their theories 
to support the developing countries. A standard and process were designed to 
implement in these countries. What these scholars want to achieve is to replace the 
‘traditional societies’ in developing countries by ‘modern societies’ that reflect the 
western experience.  
3.1.1 Early Modernisation Theory 
Modernisation theories arose from the 1950s. These theories were first suggested by 
an economist, Simon S. Kuznets, and his committee for research on development in 
developing countries. In the meantime, scholars, such as Talcott Parsons, Gabriel A. 
Almond, James S. Coleman, Seymour M. Lipset and Walt Rustow, also developed the 
theory in 1950s and 1960s. The theories they contributed created the foundation for 
modernisation theory. From the Hakone conference, which was held in Japan, a series 
of characteristics for modernisation emerged. 27  It is suggested that these 
characteristics are the essential conditions for a modern society. During this period, 
different scholars offered their own standards for modernisation. Modernisation 
theory was popular in the academic community for explaining development in 
developing countries, among scholars such as Lipset (1959, 1960),28 Lerner (1958) 
                                                     
27 The works of different authors reflect different opinions about the standards. Koschmann, J. Victor 
(2003, pp.231-232) indicates 9 points as following: ‘1. A comparatively high degree of urbanization; 2. 
Widespread literacy; 3. Comparatively high per capita income; 4. Extensive geographical and social 
mobility; 5. Relatively high degree of commercialization and industrialization within the economy; 6. 
An extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media; 7. Widespread participation and 
involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic processes; 8. A relatively 
highly organised bureaucratic form of government with widespread involvement by members of the 
society; 9. An increasingly rational and secular orientation of the individual to his environment based 
on the growth of scientific knowledge’. However, John W. Hall’s points (1965, p.19) were 
acknowledged and used in the conference: ‘1. A comparatively high concentration of population in 
cities and the increasingly urban-centeredness of the total society; 2. A relatively high degree of use of 
inanimate energy, the widespread circulation of commodities, and the growth of service facilities; 3. 
Extensive spatial interaction of members of a society and the widespread participation of such members 
in economic and political affairs; 4. Widespread literacy accompanied by the spread of secular, and 
increasingly scientific, orientation of the individual to his environment; 5. An extensive and penetrative 
network of mass communication; 6. The existence of large-scale social institutions such as government, 
business, industry and the increasingly bureaucratic organization of such institutions; 7. Increased 
unification of large bodies of population under one control (nations) and the growing interaction of 
such units (international relations)’. 
28 He uses average wealth, degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, and level of education as an 
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and Levy (1966). With regard to the views of Rostow (1960), Rustow & Ward (1964, 
pp.6-7),29 Hall (1965), Levy (1966), and Lerner (1958)30, modernisation can be 
discussed in relation to the following factors: 
 
Economic factors: scholars focus on industrialisation and the capability of using 
non-manpower resources. They argued that the difference between traditional 
societies and modern societies is that traditional society refers to an agricultural 
society in which people used resources from nature. On the other hand, people in 
modern society not only focus on natural resources, but also use industrial products 
and develop non-agricultural industries. 
 
Political factors: a highly secular, specialised, functional and differentiated type of 
government is needed. In this government, the decision-making process should be 
secular and rational, and should be according to the rule of law rather than traditional 
rules. People in this society have to participate, broadly and actively, in political 
affairs. 
 
Social Structure: these scholars suggested a highly differentiated society. Each 
division in the society is highly specialised but also highly interdependent. Social 
mobility is high and the population is concentrated in cities. Role and position in 
society is based on individual ability and performance. A bureaucratic system 
generally exists, and is developed. In contrast with traditional societies, family 
functions in modern societies are limited and narrowed.  
 
Cultural and Individual factors: modern societies are more focused on the values of 
                                                                                                                                                        
index and suggests that democratic countries have higher figures for these indices. 
29 They have eight important points. ‘1. A highly differentiated and functionally specific system of 
governmental organization; 2. A high degree of integration within this governmental structure; 3. The 
prevalence of rational and secular procedures for the making of political decisions; 4. The large volume, 
wide range, and high efficacy of its political and administrative decisions; 5. A widespread and 
effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, and national identity of the state; 6. 
Widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the 
decision-making aspects thereof; 7. The allocation of political roles by achievement rather than 
ascription; and 8. Judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and 
impersonal system of law’. 
30 He uses Turkey and the Arab world as case studies to discuss modernisation in traditional societies. 
He indicates that modernisation is a trend, and traditional societies are changing. Mass media is the 
mobility multiplier, which means people do not need to travel by them but can understand different 
experiences (p.53), and people would respond to these experiences by seeing (p.54). Furthermore, 
modernisation is involved in a change of social institutions and people, urbanisation that changes 
people’s attitudes (p.61), literacy that would encourage people’s participation, and media participation 
that also would raise participation in all aspects of society (p.62). He also indicates three kinds of 
people: the traditional man, who would tend to refuse change; transitional man, who demonstrates 
various situations; and modern man, who participates in society, ‘literate, urban and high empathisers’ 
(pp.70-72). 
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rationalism, liberalism, efficiency and personal abilities. People will have more 
rational attitudes in confronting issues, and will have more motivation to participate in 
public affairs.  
 
To conclude, modernisation involves a change in industrialisation, urbanisation, 
education, literacy rate, wealth, social modernisation (Huntington, 1997, p.76), and 
this modern society is ‘characterised by rationalised authority, differentiated structure, 
mass participation, and a consequent capacity to accomplish a broad range of goals’ 
(Huntington, 1971, p.288). Huntington (1971, pp.286-287) also indicates the 
differences between traditional and modern society. He cited Sutton’s opinion that 
listed several differences between industrial society and agricultural society to argue 
the differences between the modern and the traditional. He also used Levy and 
Rustow’s definition to argue that modernisation refers to a change to men. He argued 
‘traditional men are passive and acquiescent, who expect continuity in nature and 
society’. They do not believe in ‘the capacity of man to change or control’. Modern 
society, in his opinion, includes not only institutional change, but also a behavioural 
change in human beings. However, early modernisation theories that were based on 
observation from western developed states led to the following criticisms.  
 
The first criticism addresses the point that nearly every scholar focuses on the 
question of traditional society versus modern society, and then compares the 
differences. Levy may be the first scholar who offers a systematic analysis for these 
two types of society. Levy (1966) tried to compare differences between modern and 
traditional societies and listed 8 points. His points covered professional economic, 
political and educational institutions; highly professional but interdependent 
institutions; state power is centralised but not autocratic; universal ethics rather than 
control and decision-making by the family; well-developed markets and bureaucratic 
system. Family should be small and have fewer functions. In his two volumes 
Modernisation and the Structure of Societies, he suggests a theoretical division into 
the structure of relatively modernised societies and the structure of relatively 
non-modernised societies. Several important characteristics are mentioned in these 
books.  
 
Modernised society uses non-biological sources and non-manpower tools; on the 
other hand, non-modernised society tends to use manpower and animal-based tools. 
Levy also uses the concepts of Specialisation of social units, self-sufficiency, ethics, 
the combination of centralisation and decentralisation, relationships, generalised 
media of exchange and markets to distinguish these two types of society. In relatively 
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modernised societies, social units are more functional, and have their own functions. 
They are less self-sufficient, and people must rely on each other. As for ethics, there 
will be a universalistic system of ethics rather than a particular relationship between 
people. Concerning centralisation and decentralisation, it will be easier to form a 
centralised government, but Levy refers to the United States and the USSR to argue 
that centralisation is an essential process of modernisation. However, the case of the 
US proves that centralisation does not necessarily lead to authoritarianism (p.56). On 
the other hand, democratisation would also arise in the process of modernisation. As 
to the relationship aspect, a modernised society places emphasis on rationality, 
universalism, functional specificity, and emotional neutrality or avoidance (p.62). 
There will be a clear relationship between people, everyone has his/her rights and 
responsibilities, and there will be less hierarchy in a modern society.  
 
Regarding the media of exchange and markets, modern society has highly generalised 
media of exchange and highly developed markets (p.67), the information is open, and 
the market order is established. In a non-modernised society, specialisation is low, 
although it can offer some religious education and entertainment organisations, which 
have higher differentiation and specialisation in China and Japan. Merchants units are 
often a family enterprise. Non-modern society is highly self-sufficient. Family is the 
core unit to fulfil this, and it also offers socialization, training and education to 
individuals for his/her lifetime. Family is controlled by elders, and, within the family, 
individuals learn an adult role (pp.96-97). Furthermore, rulers would not try to 
centralise the government because the self-sufficient unit is family rather than the 
state (p. 96). Predominantly particularistic ethics are also strong; decisions are based 
on family considerations, which are the major determinant of all their decisions 
(97-98). It is similar to a kinship-dominated society. Therefore, in terms of 
relationships, non-modern society is based on tradition and particularism, on close and 
distant interpersonal relationships. People in this society would be responsible for 
others rather than themselves. There may be a comparatively isolated market and 
media channel. 
 
However, it was too simplistic to divide and explain traditional and modern societies 
in these terms. Early modernisation theories divided modern and traditional societies 
into two end of a political spectrum. In these theories, traditional society was 
described as a backward and uncivilised society.  
 
Secondly, early modernisation theories ‘assumed that all societies approached 
modernity through the same recognizable stages’ (Kerr, 2009). These theories indicate 
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a single development model that can be used in cross-cultural societies, races and 
sovereignties.  
 
Rostow (1960, pp.4-16) indicates a sequence of modernisation: the traditional society 
(the society controlled by landlords and long-run fatalism; although there would be a 
central government, but the political centre is in the local authority); the preconditions 
for take-off (central government is established, new concepts, education and financial 
system exist; he argues that Britain is the state that is qualified to this stage); the 
take-off (traditional concepts that do not favour economic development diminish, 
production is raised because of new technologies, new industries expand rapidly, and 
‘the new class of entrepreneurs expands; and it directs the enlarging flows of 
investment in the private sector’); the drive to maturity (10%-20% national income 
used for investment, new technologies improve, ‘a relatively narrow complex of 
industry and technology has extended its range into more refined and technologically 
often more complex processes’, which led to new industries developing rapidly); and 
the age of high mass-consumption (‘the leading sectors shift towards durable 
consumers' goods and services’, social welfare appears in this state).  
 
Most scholars of modernisation introduce the essential points of the experiences and 
characteristics of modernisation in western countries and try to extend this to other 
countries. This method ignores each country’s specific characteristics and may lead to 
failure. Historical experiences in non-western countries have demonstrated the 
phenomena of failure. Tu (2000, p.261-264) suggested that modernisation reflects 
western enlightenment values. However, societies in East Asia, especially the 
Confucian states, develop their own East Asian type of modernisation. 
 
Third, modernisation theory ascribed to a ‘liberal universalism’ that was subsequently 
challenged by the argument that non-western societies would find their own route to 
modernity (Kerr, 2009). Because the major theorists were from the western countries, 
therefore, the design of these theories and the empirical experiences are from the 
western development experiences. As a result, the assumptions of early modernisation 
theory were that ‘liberal, democratic capitalism was synonymous with modernity’ 
(Kerr, 2009). Theorists such as Lipset (1959, 1960, chap. 2) uses western countries as 
an example to indicate that for capitalist economic development, Protestant values of 
individual responsibility help democratic values to emerge. Fukuyama (1992, 
p.242-243) suggests that the successful democratic countries in Asia adopt a western 
style of development and liberal democracy concepts to diminish the influence of 
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their traditional legacies.31 Most scholars assume modern, western society is the 
model for traditional societies to follow. In the meantime, because of these 
assumptions, such theories have failed to consider the individual countries’ conditions 
and traditions, in the process of changing from a traditional to a modern society. These 
consequences of early modernisation theories were criticised by scholars of 
dependency theories and world-systems theory. Theotonio Dos Santos indicates a 
dependent situation between developed states and developing states. He argues that 
the dependent is  
 
a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the 
development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. 
The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between 
these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the 
dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the 
dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can 
have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.  
(1970, p. 231) 
 
Dependent theory indicates that western societies are the metropolis and 
non-modernised societies are satellites, which are strictly controlled by the metropolis. 
The reason for the satellites’ failure is the capture of control and resources capture by 
the west. Alejandro Portes (1976, pp.56-59) confirmed the theory and indicates that, 
although income in developing countries increased, the trend was with developed 
countries and the gap between developed and developing countries also increased. 
 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1980; 1989) takes a historical approach to suggest a 
world system, instead of using states as his units. He uses the Core area, the 
Semi-Periphery area, the Periphery area, and External areas to explain his system. The 
Core area is the northwest Europe states, which had strong central government, a 
bureaucratic system, militia, homogenised population, diversification of economic 
activities that dominated international trade, and local bourgeoisie. The 
Semi-Periphery area in southern France and Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy was 
exploited by the Core area, but also exploited the Periphery area. The states in the 
                                                     
31 He indicates two possible options. One is to continue to ‘absorb western ideas of universal and 
reciprocal recognition leading to the further spread of formal liberal democracy. Another is to convince 
them that their success was due more to their own than to borrowed cultures. If economic growth in 
America and Europe falters relative to that in the Far East, if Western societies continue to experience 
the progressive breakdown of basic social institutions like the family, and if they themselves treat Asia 
with distrust or hostility, then a systematic illiberal and non-democratic alternative combining 
technocratic economic rationalism with paternalistic authoritarianism may gain ground in the Far East’.  
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Periphery area in Eastern Europe and Latin America lacked strong central government 
or were controlled by the Core states, and were exploited by the Core states. The 
External area is outside these previous areas, and each state maintains its own 
economic system. Wallerstein’s world system is dynamic but consolidated; states 
could change their own membership in this system, and with the development of 
industries and as more regions, such as Africa and Asia in 19th century, move from the 
External area to the Periphery area, this affects the status of the original states in the 
system. Nonetheless, no matter what states move, the system would still exist, and the 
relationship between Core, the Semi-Periphery, the Periphery, and External Areas 
would also continue to operate. 
 
In summary, these theorists reflect the fact that linear development is not always 
correct; there could be a dynamic development route for modernisation. Meanwhile, 
each country would have its own conditions that need to be addressed. Thus, the early 
modernisation development models, which were developed from the experiences of 
western states, cannot necessarily be used in non-western countries because the 
internal and external environment in each country could be different. To western states, 
modernisation for them is indigenous, but when theorists collect the experiences of 
western states and apply them to other states, to those states, modernisation is 
exogenous; in fact, those states may lack the conditions of western states, and these 
shortcomings in early theories have led to the criticisms. Dependent theorists and 
Wallerstein’s observation also show that early modernisation theory would ignore the 
fact that developed states would consider their interests in advance, and this would 
result in developing countries being exploited by developed states. 
3.1.2 Later Modernisation Theory 
According to the modernisation theories in the last section, it might be puzzling for 
leaders in countries with a non-western culture to determine how to both modernise 
the country and preserve its culture. Leaders in non-western countries may accept the 
need to modernise, yet they may also be concerned how to maintain the characteristics 
and traditions of the original culture.  
 
In order to resolve this, debates for non-western countries to adopt modernisation are 
discussed. Fukuyama (1992) points out that modernisation emphasises the need for 
change of economic and social structure. A democratic government is needed in an 
industrialised society. He suggests that modernisation needs modern technologies, 
which would lead to a change of economic structure. He indicates that the market 
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economy is the optimal economic system in the transition, and the development of a 
market economy will raise incomes. This will result to social and cultural change, 
which will change the traditional culture and encourage demand and pressure for 
political participation. When the tipping point of the need for democracy is crossed, 
society will move forward to a democratic system. In his opinion, a western path will 
still be fulfilled after all (see especially chap. 22). 
 
Huntington (1996, pp.72-78), on the other hand, indicates that three possible routes 
will be applied when non-western countries face westernisation or modernisation. The 
first is refusal, such as China and Japan in the early 19th century and some Islamists; 
however, this route is not possible nowadays because of the interactions between 
countries. The second is to accept both westernisation and modernisation. In his 
opinion, the third one is to accept modernisation but reject westernisation. Huntington 
indicated that western countries have their own particular characteristics, such as 
religions, languages, cultural legacies, rule of law, diversity in society (western 
countries have not been, historically, united as a whole ). Modernisation does not 
equal Westernisation. He also suggested a model that argues that modernisation would 
result in the strengthening of the economic, military and political aspects of society, 
and the crisis for sense of identity and alienation would also apply, due to the collapse 
of traditional society. However, when modernisation continues, the original culture 
will revive. Iran, Singapore, Taiwan and China are the examples for this.  
 
Huntington’s opinion explained the difference between westernisation and 
modernisation. The development route might be similar to the route experienced by 
western countries; nonetheless, it does not mean that non-western countries ought to 
accept the values of the west.  
 
Apart from the arguments concerning westernisation and modernisation, scholars of 
modernisation also amended their theories in the following ways. 
 
Tradition and modernity are no longer considered as concepts representing consistent 
homogeneous societies. Instead, both traditional and modern societies contain 
different elements. Modern theories no longer see tradition and modernity as positions 
that are polar opposites, but consider that they can coexist and complement each other. 
Traditional factors might have a role in promoting modernisation, and there may also 
be a continuous process to amend or complement the shortcomings in traditional 
society to satisfy modern requirements. 
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Modern theories do not insist on the linear development model; nor that the way in 
which western countries developed in the past should necessarily be adopted by 
non-western countries. Thus, theories do not only apply the theoretical models from 
western countries’ experiences to analyse non-western countries’ development process. 
Instead of a linear model, a diversity model is suggested, which places more emphasis 
on analysis of specific historical facts rather than a library-based theoretical 
framework. The theories also consider internal factors and external environment 
rather than limiting focus to the internal factors.  
 
Furthermore, current modernisation theories do not focus narrowly on functional and 
evolution issues. They do not focus on how non-western countries upgrade 
themselves to reach a differentiated type society, nor their abilities to adopt the 
western experience of modernisation. These theories contain more phenomena from 
non-western countries for analysis.  
 
It can be found that modernisation involves radical changes for a traditional society to 
transform to a modern one. These changes would lead traditional Confucian societies 
to be more secular, differential, diverse and open. Because of the increasing literacy 
and education level, and expansion of mass media, information cannot be blocked by 
the leadership, and people’s values would change during the modernisation process. 
Political participation in modern societies would also change the existing political 
structure. These phenomena could help a democratic regime to emerge. This thesis 
will discuss three points further: middle class, economic growth and education. Lipset 
(1959, 1960, chap. 2) indicates that, in his case studies, the middle class and economic 
development arising from modernisation would help to bring about a democratic 
regime. Limitation of education fundamentally led to the continuance of traditional 
legacies because only a few people, who received a Confucian education, could 
participate in politics and government, which limited the possibility of new ideas and 
democracy. This thesis will discuss these three points in the next section. 
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3.2 Middle Class, Economic Development, Education and Democratic Regime: 
Theoretical Considerations 
3.2.1 Bourgeoisie (Middle class) and the Democratic regime 
The last paragraph has mentioned that modernisation scholars, who argue that  
modernisation will assist a state to ‘emerge’ or ‘maintain’ a democratic regime, 
suggest that, because economic development will enlarge the wealth in the society, 
this will also increase the size of the bourgeoisie. The middle class emerges in modern 
society with industrialisation and economic development. This class is comparatively 
economically independent. It became the majority in the 19th century in the West, and 
started to ask for more political power from the ruling class. Workers and capitalists 
devote themselves to political reform to protect and gain their interests. Therefore, the 
middle class from them in the west can become the ‘motivation’ to establish a 
democratic government. Lipset (1959, pp.83-85; 1960, chap. 2) suggests that 
industrialisation in modern societies creates a substantial working class. This will 
change the original social structure and result in an increase in the middle class. This 
middle class are educated, with moderate political attitudes that can soften conflicts 
between sharp, radical groups or bridge the gap between the upper class and lower 
class. They also support moderate and democratic parties. Barrington Moore (1966, 
p.414) introduced three kinds of paths to modern society; one of them shows that the 
bourgeoisie plays an essential role in the emergence of a democratic regime. Richard 
Lowenthal (1983, pp.192-193) also indicates that, even in communist countries, when 
reform starts, ideology will not return to the original one, but, instead, the needs of 
economic and technology development and industrialisation will push the country 
towards modernisation. Therefore, communist countries will still transfer their regime 
to a liberal and democratic regime.  
 
Huntington (1991, pp.66-67) also indicates that the educated middle class will 
enhance the development of democracy in some situations. He suggests that in the 
beginning, when the middle class are still few in society, they may support an 
authoritarian regime because they see they might lose their existing advantages. 
However, when economic development continues, the middle class will be more 
confident in supporting a democratic regime. In the meantime, this class will try to 
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enhance their prosperity by election in a democracy. Hsiao & Koo (1997) suggest that 
economic development in Taiwan and South Korea produced a sizeable middle class 
that became stronger and dissatisfied with the ruling status of the original 
authoritarian regime and started to demand more political freedom and participation. 
They were firmly against the authoritarian regime during the liberalisation period, and 
were led by the elite of the middle class to push for democratisation. 
 
The middle class may hold an essential role, as a result of economic development, in 
developing democratic regimes in Western protestant states. However, Wu (1998, 
p.446-448) indicates that the middle class is absent in communist countries because, 
in communist countries, all tools belong to the state rather than private individuals. 
Thus, there is no actual middle class. The Soviet Union implemented several 
‘Five-Year Plans for the National Economy of the Soviet Union’ to push the Soviet 
Union and East Europe towards modernisation, rather than the market economy, 
private property, and the western economic style.32 Therefore, Wu suggests that, 
according to the case of the Eastern European countries, modernisation theories may 
need to stop citing the middle class as the only motivation for democracy. As for 
western cases, Huntington (1968, p.88) indicated that if the traditional political system 
could accept the need for political participation of the middle class, then this class 
would support the system; otherwise, the middle class would oppose the traditional 
political system. Huntington also indicates that the middle class would be loyal to 
non-democratic regimes if these regimes could offer them political space and respond 
to their political demands (Huntington, 1968, pp.185-190). 
 
Furthermore, the middle class may not always benefit from the development of 
democracy. In the Europe and Latin America, economic growth gradually balances the 
power of classes, thus the middle class and working class become newly 
self-organised political participants, yet middle class is not the solid supporter to 
democracy, on the other hand, the mutual working class is consistently most 
pro-democracy (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992). In East Asia, the attitude of the middle 
class is various. In China, the Chinese government and the CPC have declared the 
intention to establish a ‘well-off society’ (Zhang Dejiang, 2010, October 25, Wen 
Jiabao, 2010, March 8). The middle class in China would choose to maintain a stable 
government rather than overthrowing the existing government. Hsiao and Koo (1997, 
pp.312-334) also argue that the middle class took a firm stand against the 
authoritarian regime during the liberalisation process, especially the active 
                                                     
32 This thesis argues that the modernisation in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may not necessarily 
satisfy the characteristics of modernisation. Communist countries focused on heavy industry to 
improve economic development, but ignored other aspects of modernisation. 
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participants from university and unions. However, in South Korea, the middle class 
became less firmly opposed to the authoritarian regime firm status during the 
democratisation process, because they sought a stable society, and were dissatisfied 
with the rising conflicts of democratic movements. The middle class in Hong Kong 
gained some political power in the UK colony period, which meant that the middle 
class did not need to face the pressure from the lower class and also gained 
advantages from the government. Therefore, the middle class in Hong Kong does not 
necessarily support democratisation because this class considers that democratisation 
will damage political stability and affect the stable economic development (Ng, 1998, 
p.13;33 Ma, 2008, pp.160-16434).  
3.2.2 Economic Development and the Democratic Regime 
It has been shown that, if a non-democratic regime does not maintain stable economic 
development, and even drops to economic recession, then it would be more likely to 
collapse (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995, pp.32-36). 35 However, whether economic 
development would help to bring about a democratic regime may not necessarily 
apply universally. The issue falls on whether economic development can give rise to a 
democratic regime, or maintain a democratic regime.  
 
‘The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ 
(Lipset, 1959, p.75). Higher economic development will enhance the level of 
education, the literacy rate and the prevalence of mass media to assist in spreading 
democratic values. Economic development will also provide wealth to people and this 
will bring greater political tolerance and avoid political conflict. It is most important 
that economic development accompanies the rise in the level of education, changes 
attitudes to political affairs and produces a substantial bourgeoisie. This increasing 
bourgeoisie, with wealth, will hold important positions in the state to limit the 
government’s power and demonstrate moderate political characteristics (Lipset, 1959, 
pp.75-84). 
 
Lipset (1960, p.45-76) considers European, English and Latin American states to 
explore relations between economic development and democracy. He took the 
concepts of stable democracy, unstable democracy, unstable autocracy and stable 
                                                     
33 She indicates that people in the business sector would oppose democracy. 
34 He indicates that the situation has changed, yet the democratic movements are suppressed by the 
Chinese government.  
35 According to their data for 29 democratic transition cases, 22 of them demonstrate economic 
recession, and 7 of them maintained economic development, see Haggard & Kaufman (1995, p.34, 
GDP table). 
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autocracy, and then used average wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation and education 
level as indices for his analyses. He found higher wealth related to a higher standard 
of democracy, higher urbanisation also correlates with higher democracy, and a higher 
education level also brings higher chance of democracy. On the other hand, low 
economic development would bring broad dissatisfaction among the people, and 
democracy would be hard to establish because of political radicalism, and even if a 
democratic regime is established, it would easily be destroyed by political radicalism. 
In order to maintain social stability, dictatorship, military rule, authoritarian or 
one-party authoritarian regimes would appear. Therefore, economic development is 
essential to practise democracy. At that time, he argued that economic development is 
a condition of democracy. 
 
Lipset (1959, 1960) is the first scholar who used empirical evidence to indicate that 
economic development and wealth in a state will help a democratic regime to emerge 
in that state, because economic development brings a higher literacy rate, a higher 
education level and mass media; wealth eases political conflict. He separated the 
countries into stable and unstable democratic and non-democratic regimes, then 
analysed by his economic index and found a strong connection between stable 
democracies and the degree of economic development. He also found that economic 
development will help to improve the educational level and popularised education, 
which broadens the people’s views on political issues and enhances belief in 
democracy, leading individuals to support the implementation of democracy.  
 
However, empirical evidence suggests that economic development may not 
necessarily result in a democratic regime. Research suggests that economic 
development may indeed have a positive relation with democracy; however, the 
relation is to maintain the democratic regime rather than to result in a democratic 
regime (Muller, 1995; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski, et al,, 1996, p.40-42; 
Przeworski et al., 2000, Chapter 2). Chang, Chang, and Chu (2008, June) even 
indicate that economic development provides legitimacy to these authoritarian 
regimes, and also offers these regimes power to ‘justify their limits on civil and 
political rights’ (p.21). 
 
Five thousand US dollars GNP per capita would be a threshold for an authoritarian 
regime to democratise to a democratic regime, according to Lipset, Seong, & Torres 
(1993, pp.158-165). Przeworski et al, (1996, pp.40-42) indicate that the threshold for 
establishing a democratic regime is between 1000 to 6000 USD; if people’s income is 
fewer than 1000 USD, then the democracy is fragile, and if the income is over 6000 
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(6055) USD, than the democracy would continue indefinitely. The faster the economic 
growth, the more the possibility that the democratic regime will survive, and a poor 
democratic regime is weak when facing an economic crisis that may destroy it. 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p.165) again suggest that, when the average income is 
over 6050 USD, the democratic regime would survive. Huntington (1997, pp.55-56) 
argues that the threshold of 1000 USD relates to whether there will be a military coup 
in a state; when GDP rises to 2000-3000, the coup would not easily succeed. If GDP 
per capita is over 3000 USD, the coup would be unlike to succeed. 
 
Larry Diamond (2011, p.18, pp.21-22) examines the reasons for the collapse of new 
democracies after 2000 and finds that income is one if the main factors which led to 
the collapse. It is about maintaining democracy rather than the emergence of 
democracy. Chu, Chang, & Hu (2003, p.23) suggest that people’s attachment to 
democracy from modernisation and political liberalisation may not mean the 
detachment from authoritarianism. Research from Chang & Chu (2002, p.28) and 
Chang & Chu (2007, pp.20-21) also indicates that modernisation and democratisation 
would encourage individuals in East Asia to learn new ways of living, in opposition to 
the traditional values, and this then changes individuals’ value-orientation. These 
changes will come from individuals, and then develop to a macro level change. 
Therefore, modernisation would help to develop personal new experience and 
strengthen the knowledge about democracy, but not directly lead to democracy.  
 
3.2.3 Education and the Democratic Regime 
Increasing literacy and education are important results of modernisation that enable 
people to read and understand information by themselves, rather than through a third 
party’s explanation. Education in a classic Confucian society is limited to a few 
people, and the fundamental result is that only a few people become leaders in 
government, and this would lead to the continuance of traditional legacies; few people 
are qualified to rule, and this would lead to top-down politics. Furthermore, as chapter 
2 discussed, Confucianism became the state-serving knowledge and the subject for 
imperial examination; only those who studied Confucian classics could pass the exam 
and became an officer of state, further supporting the concepts of guanxi and harmony. 
Because these officer were from state-support Confucian  
 
The rise of modern education is also important for Confucian societies to achieve 
democracy, because of two important changes it brings. 
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Firstly, it will provide education to more people and the content could be more neutral, 
which would avoid unnecessary or traditional information. School is the place to 
preserve knowledge and pass to the new generation (see Dewey, 1930). However, 
traditional Confucian societies only have schools for preserving and teaching 
Confucian classics, and regarding the Confucian classics, Confucius indicated that 
only a few people were qualified to receive education and the best of them could 
become civil servants (see Weber, 1968, pp.107-108; Weber, 1961, p.416; Hahm, 
2004, p.99; Legge, 1861b, p.208). The Confucian classics also asked people to stay 
and fulfil the duties of their role; anyone not qualified to be amongst the educated 
should remain in his/her role and manage their own duty well. (In this regard, see 
Legge (1861b, p.77), which was also mentioned in Chapter 2: ‘He who is not in any 
particular office has nothing to do with plans for the administration of its duties’). 
Education in modern society cannot be restricted to a few people. A mass and normal 
education system should be established in modern society. Schools should provide a 
simplified environment and:  
 
By selecting the best for its exclusive use, it strives to reinforce the power of this 
best. As a society becomes more enlightened, it realises that it is responsible not 
to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but only such as 
make for a better future society. The school is its chief agency for the 
accomplishment of this end.                (Dewey, 1930, pp.23-24)  
 
Secondly, based on a mass and more neutral school environment, modern education 
will make a person more skilful in considering and gathering information, rather than 
accepting it only from the official channel. Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2006) 
indicate two important correlations between democracy and education. Firstly, they 
suggest education will raise the possibility and ability for people to oppose a 
non-democratic regime. They find that when the education level rose in Europe during 
17th-19th centuries, revolt and uprising also increased.36 Secondly, they indicate that 
the size of the power for opposition to a non-democratic regime demonstrated a 
positive correlation with the rise in the education level,37 such as the US revolution 
                                                     
36 They indicate that ‘Education also seems linked to the ability of democracies to defend themselves 
from dictatorial coups. Popular uprisings during the less educated periods were almost invariably 
followed by dictatorial takeovers.  The educated supporters of democracy tried but failed to resist the 
dictators. As nations became more educated, they also became more successful at defending democracy’ 
(Glaeser et al., 2006, p.30) 
37 They argue that: ‘In less educated times and places, coups are generally small affairs including only 
small cadres of nobles or army officers. As education grows, effective uprisings (like the American 
Revolution) became larger. Eventually, large swaths of society were included in attempts to overthrow 
a regime. Even the Nazi takeover in Germany, which eventually led to a dictatorship, succeeded only 
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and even Nazi Germany. Shi (2004, p.3; p.4) and Chang & Chu (2007, p.9) also 
indicate that expansion of formal education would help to transform the original 
social structure and offer more possibility for political participation. Shi, Tianjian’s 
empirical findings also indicated that education is statistically significant in China, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, when exploring relationship between education and political 
participation, and the effect in China is higher than in Taiwan and Hong Kong (2004, 
p.62) 
 
More empirical evidence also supports this idea. Chang & Chu (2007, p.15, p.29) 
demonstrate that in East Asian countries, only 25.44% people without formal 
education can speak about the concept of liberal democracy. The percentage rises to 
36.31% when people receive primary education but do not complete it. However, 
when people complete primary education, percentages fluctuate between 49.11% and 
59.96%. The highest percentage is for people who complete undergraduate education 
rather than postgraduate. However, percentages for people who attend university, 
whether they complete or not, are 5% slightly higher than people who only finish high 
school education. However, Nathan & Chen (2004, p.5 & p.25) indicates that years of 
education is highly correlated to both democratic and traditional values in China, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Their empirical research suggests that people who have more 
years of formal education e would be more likely to accept democratic values and 
reject traditional values. On the other hand, people who have fewer formal education 
years would give less support to democratic values and have more attachment to 
traditional values. Thus, it may be assumed that in some cases in this thesis, people 
with a higher education level could be more supportive of democracy. 
3.2.4 Summary 
To summarise the discussions in last two sections, it can be found that modernisation 
is a process that covers economic, political, cultural, and social aspects of society. The 
transformation process may not necessarily follow the western steps. Instead of that, 
the conditions in an individual country ought to be applied to the modernisation 
process. These addenda make modernisation theories more applicable to non-western 
countries. Modernisation of a country does not only change the mode of production, 
but also changes lifestyles, information channels and government type. Most 
important is the fact that the original ideas and values would also be changed, because 
people would find the original values cannot satisfy the new modern society, and this 
                                                                                                                                                        
after the Nazis had built a broad coalition, including students and other educated Germans’ (Glaeser et 
al., 2006, p.31) 
~ 92 ~ 
 
situation would lead to a shift in the existing political culture. Economic development 
and the emergence of the middle class would help people to be more skilful in seeking 
a democratic regime, but these factors are not guaranteed to regain legitimacy from 
the leadership. A neutral and popularised education system would also help the 
development of democracy because people will have more ability to oppose 
non-democratic leaders. 
 
3.3 Modernisation and Democracy in Modern Confucian Societies: Empirical 
Observations 
This thesis has demonstrated three major elements in modernisation that can change 
traditional and closed society to an open and modern society. This section will briefly 
combine the theories and facts in four modern Confucian societies to examine the 
difference between democratic and non-democratic Confucian societies in order to 
discuss the reason why some societies can follow the prediction of modernisation 
theories to become democratic, but some of them can resist the results of 
modernisation.  
 
According to modernisation theory in the first section of this chapter, a democratic 
country is very likely to be formed during the process of modernisation because, 
besides economic development, the rise of the middle class, popularisation of 
education with a neutral educational environment, openness of the media and 
information will train and provide skills and information for people to oppose a 
non-democratic regime. Furthermore, the condition of an individual country should be 
considered; western experiences may not be applicable in other countries. 
 
However, the previous section points out that the effects of modernisation may not 
necessarily lead to democracy. Regarding economic growth, GNP threshold could 
apply in some states, but Singapore is an exception. Values will change during 
economic growth, which would transform traditional political culture, yet academic 
writings suggest that economic growth would help people to be more willing and 
skilful to ask for democracy, but it will not automatically result in democracy. The 
interactions between leadership and people are a key element for an emerging 
democracy. Emergence of middle class is also a result of modernisation and this class 
(modern, educated, autonomous and rational) would be a power to moderate conflicts 
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in society and oppose non-democratic regimes, to expand their space of political 
participation. Nonetheless, the middle class’s attitudes are still ambiguous because 
they still consider their own interests. Huntington (1968, p.88, pp.185-190) also 
mentioned the key element for the middle class in choosing to support or oppose an 
existing non-democratic regime is whether this regime can include them or not. 
Meanwhile, if a traditional political system can include the middle class in its power 
structure, the pressure can be eased temporarily. As for education, a neutral 
environment and popular education should be provided in modern society to help 
people to be more thoughtful and have the ability to gain more information rather than 
receiving only official information. Yet whether a neutral environment can be 
established is a question for the section on education.  
 
This section will discuss four societies in three factors: economic growth, middle class 
and education, to examine briefly the reason why some Confucian societies cannot 
democratise during the process of modernisation, but some of them do democratise. 
The non-democratic societies will be discussed first, and will then be followed by 
democratic societies. It can be found in non-democratic societies, economic growth 
would give two possible results: regime stability and democratisation. In 
non-democratic societies, a new interaction is created between leadership and people. 
Non-democratic leadership would claim essential conditions for the existing 
achievements of economic development, to ask people to continue to support and 
maintain these conditions. Thus, if a non-democratic government can satisfy people’s 
needs, the people could choose to support it. China and Singapore governments are 
working to create an environment to diminish people’s demands for democracy by 
claiming that the country is stable. As for the middle class, as Huntington argued, 
China and Singapore offer channels and benefits to buy off the middle class to 
decrease their political demands. The neutral educational environment does not exist 
in non-democratic societies; instead of that, education becomes official ideology 
propaganda to educate people from pupils to adults. On the other hand, in democratic 
societies, an official ideology was not established because non-democratic leaderships 
in Taiwan and South Korea focused more on nationalism and described their regime 
as a democratic one to both oppose a Communist regime and to gain support from the 
United States.  
3.3.1 Economic Development and Democracy 
China 
 
~ 94 ~ 
 
Yu-Shan Wu (1998) uses modernisation theory and regime stability to analyse the 
correlation between economic development and democracy in China. He argues that 
modernisation theory refers to a long-term change in political culture that comes with 
economic development in a society. However, regime stability theories in China can 
combine with traditional ideas that asked only that the ruler should take care of the 
people’s material life, to consolidate their rule (Wu, 1998, p.451). If the Communist 
party failed to satisfy people’s expectations for material life, people would overthrow 
the authoritarian communist government and seek for democracy. 
 
Therefore, the economic development would continuously offer legitimacy for the 
CPC authority to control China because the Chinese people would be satisfied with 
this condition. Wu’s opinion is useful to explain China’s situation because the people 
in China do not have many democratic experiences,38 and traditional Minben thought 
also made most people convinced that the mission of the government is to take care of 
their life. This situation can also be found in the CPC’s policies. 
 
After approximately two decades of political movement and Cultural Revolution, 
Deng Xiaoping declared ‘Reform and Opening’ policies in 1978 to start economic 
reform in Communist China. These policies, which are completely different from 
Mao’s self-sufficiency policies, were suggested and implemented for China to recover 
and to re-establish stability after the Cultural Revolution. The methods were clear: 
economic development and building up a harmonious society. The CPC authority is 
still trying to maintain an acceptable speed for economic development, and is also 
convincing people in China that only the CPC has the ability to maintain existing 
economic achievements and social stability. 
 
Singapore 
 
Unlike China, which still struggles in degree of economic development, Singapore is 
one of the developed countries and has maintained a high economic growth rate in 
most years for last four decades (see CIA, 2012). However, high economic growth 
and economic development does not bring democratisation to Singapore because the 
Singapore leadership redefine the democracy in Singapore’s style and indicate that 
economic growth is based on these conditions.  
 
Singapore is a place without resources but it has a good location for commercial 
                                                     
38 From 1912 until Yuan Shikai revived the monarchy, there was a short but unstable democratic 
regime and elections during that time. 
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activities. Therefore, the Singaporean leadership has designed strategies of economic 
development to promote economic growth in Singapore and gain success in the past 
four decades. Singaporean leaders decide the essential conditions for economic 
development and point to a clean, anti-corruption and a well-managed government to 
promote order and stability initially (Lee, KY, 1992, November 18). However, when 
economic development reaches a level that a group of professional and skilful 
managers and engineers has emerged, the leadership in government will need to take a 
step to open up more political space for them, because they are rational and 
well-educated (Lee, KY, 1991, July 2, pp.559-560). Because of cultural factors, 
Singapore needs to organise in a western way, rather than practising western-style 
democracy. The core problem in East Asia is that western democracy contains an 
important element: a common value that enables people with different ideas to 
cooperate. Therefore, the basic mission for government is to organise a good 
government to ensure that citizens can live in a prosperous, well-ordered and stable 
society, to have a well-organised social welfare system, education system, appropriate 
freedom (which can have individual freedom but cannot invade others’ freedom), high 
moral standards, infrastructures and continuous economic growth rather than 
following the western way (Lee, KY, 1992, November 20).  
 
Lee Kwan Yew indicates that without the US’s pressure and support, Taiwan and 
South Korea cannot develop to be the western style modernisation mode: economic 
growth leads to democracy (Lee, KY, 1991, July 2, p.561).  
 
Taiwan 
 
Taiwan’s economic growth was dominated by two factors: the government’s strategy 
and US aid. Initially, the KMT authority controlled most resources and established 
state-owned companies to be the distributors of resources and rule makers (Tsang, 
1999; Rigger, 1999). Thus, the KMT authority became the economic strategies maker 
to shape the economic development process (Chu, 1994, pp.115-121). Bureaucrats in 
the Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan are in charge 
of regulating economic development strategies. In order to oppose Communist China, 
the US also offered financial aid to helping Taiwan to become a stable anti-communist 
base (Wade, 2004, pp.83-84). Meanwhile, the market of Taiwan cannot be closed to 
the democratic camp. 
 
Looking at the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan’s economic development 
can be divided into several stages; several important industries were developed, such 
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as high technology industries and petrochemical industries. These developing 
industries led to two new political participants: entrepreneurs of industries, and the 
newly middle class from technical and professional workers. In order to face this 
change, just like China and Singapore which opened more political space for new 
political participants, the KMT opened seats on KMT’s standing committee for 
leaders of important state and private enterprises, federation of industries, general 
chambers of commerce and the National Association of Industry and Commerce. 
During the 1980s, influential commercial leaders could affect government’s policies. 
The government economic bureaucrats’ dominant status was weakening. Meanwhile, 
in order to respond to stronger political claims from opponents, the KMT and 
enterprises supported each other in elections, and this further results in KMT being 
unable to control the state strictly.  
 
It can be found that, in Taiwan, because of the US factor, the new participants from 
the process of economic development, the mutual needs of KMT (funds for election) 
and newly developed enterprises (enterprises’ profits), economic growth 
fundamentally weakened the KMT’s power to control the state. Government cannot 
fully control strategies of economic development and independent enterprises (Wade, 
1988; 2004), and these enterprises may support opponents, if the KMT cannot satisfy 
their interests. As for the emergence of the middle class, it will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
South Korea 
 
Like Taiwan, South Korea was in the democratic camp during the cold war period. To 
be a close ally with the US, open economic policies are practised. However, unlike 
China, Singapore and Taiwan which have a strong party to lead and control economic 
development strategies over a long period, to establish a solid political-economic tie, 
in South Korea, the Park, Chun-Hee government was the government which could 
strictly control the economic agenda and built up the political-commercial coalition. 
 
The rapid economic growth in South Korea emerged from Park’s presidency. Like the 
KMT in Taiwan, he also established an institution that was responsible for strategies 
of economic development. Park’s government was a resources distributor – it 
controlled resources and used them to cooperate with big family enterprises (Moon, 
1994, pp.143-144; Robinson, 2007, p.132). Government itself did not control 
state-owned companies, as the KMT did.  
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During the 1970s to 1980s, the middle class also developed from the rapid economic 
growth, with two stages industrialisation. Meanwhile, leaders of large enterprises also 
claimed political power from the government, as in Taiwan. These two situations both 
affected the power of an authoritarian regime because the regime needed to face both 
political needs.  
 
In summary, the differences between non-democratic and democratic Confucian 
societies lie in the ways in which the level of economic development is raised initially, 
in response to the argument of some scholars – that wealth is a condition for 
democracy. However, Singapore’s case indicates that if political leaders can offer 
explanations for economic growth, which convinces the people that economic growth 
in that country need not follow only the western way, but should consider conditions 
for Singapore, then people may not choose democracy. Another important factor also 
cannot be ignored: the influence of the US. It can be seen that Taiwan and South 
Korea were allies in the democratic camp in cold war period. Thus, these two 
societies needed US aid and cooperated with the West. Although a non-democratic 
regime and its economic bureaucrats dominated the strategies of economic 
development, yet the leaders in these two societies could not hold a hard line position 
in relation to the political agenda; they needed to cooperate with the developing 
commercial elite. When a non-democratic regime cannot reform before demands, like 
Singapore, this type of regime would face challenges from civil society.  
3.3.2 Middle Class and Democracy 
This thesis has discussed the theory that the emergence of the middle class would help 
to establish a democratic regime. However, if an existing non-democratic regime can 
adopt the middle class into the existing regime, then the middle class may choose to 
be loyal to the regime.  
 
China 
 
Report of the House of Lords suggests China as a GDP growth factory: 
 
with an average economic growth rate of some 10% per year since 1978. China 
had lifted some 300 million people from poverty, created a successful middle 
class mainly in the coastal areas and been ‘incredibly successful’ in terms of 
wealth creation.                                (House of Lords, 2010) 
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The communist party is trying to institutionalise the channel for the process to hand 
over ruling power in the Central Politburo, to reduce internal pressure from the CPC. 
In the meantime, rapid economic development, ‘love China’ education,39which leads 
to nationalism and strict control of mass media and the internet, also decrease outside 
pressure. These measures may help the Communist China to lessen the need to 
democratise. This thesis will discuss this part further in the case chapters. 
 
Lu, Xueyi and his team from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
published a research report on the contemporary Chinese social classes (Dangdai 
Zhongguo Shehui Jieceng Jiegou Yanjiu Baogao,当代中国社会阶层结构研究报告) 
in January 2002. This report clearly indicates that private-owned enterprises have 
developed to become one of the most important social classes in China, with 
approximately four million people in 2000. Private enterprises in China can be 
divided into three types. The first are developed from individuals and family owned 
businesses, the second are privatised public enterprises, and the third are private 
technology enterprises. The report argues that the middle class in the second type has 
participated in politics, and others have formed political requirements, and these 
people are generally not interested in politics, but will express their needs on suitable 
occasions (Lu, 2002). In order to respond to the emergence of the middle class and 
their political demands, Jiang Zemin offers ‘Three Representatives’40 and declared 
that people in private technology companies, foreign-funded enterprises, people who 
are self-employed, and private entrepreneurs will be allowed to join the CPC (Jiang, 
2001). These measures open political space for the middle class to become involved 
in the existing political system and also ease the pressure of claims for political 
participation.  
 
Singapore 
 
The previous section mentioned Lee’s argument to deal with the political demands of 
the emergent middle class. Lee indicates that a more open political environment that 
can satisfy these people is needed. Lee’s consideration is the same as what the CPC is 
doing and Huntington’s observation from western history (see Huntington, 1968). 
Meanwhile, this thesis has described the Singapore leadership’s argument as a series 
of conditions for achieving economic growth. It can be seen that they use 
                                                     
39 This situation can be found in students’ textbooks. For instance, textbooks for junior high school 
students from the People’s Education Press, the biggest textbook provider, which belongs to the 
Ministry of Education, only describe the historical view constructed by the CPC.  
40 The contents of three representatives cover economic, cultural and political aspects. They are 
‘Represents advanced social productive forces’; ‘Represents the progressive course of China's 
advanced culture’; ‘Represents the fundamental interests of the majority’ (Jiang, Zemin, 2001). 
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father-to-children concepts to formulate their strategies for developing Singapore, and 
‘it is important to emphasise, however, that the customary values that modified 
development in the Pacific Asia have been largely reinvented for the ideological 
purpose of channelling popular energy to collectively achievable economic targets’ 
(David Martin Jones, 1998, p.149). 
 
The middle class in Singapore are a majority (Tamura, 2003, pp.186-187), but 
demands for democracy may be diminished in two ways, as mentioned above: offer 
political space and promote successful experiences in order to be able to request that 
the middle class do not change the existing political system. Rodan, (2008) also 
mentioned part of these ideas, but he analysed them in detail. The results indicate that 
the PAP and the Singapore state actually merge together by reshaping the party 
structure, passing strict laws, dominating developing strategies and offering reform 
before it is claimed by opponents. Thus, the PAP and Singapore can together respond 
effectively to pressures, accommodate political demands and claim these to be their 
policies for reform. Firstly, because of the successful experiences and government 
propaganda, the middle class may worry that change in Singapore could lead to an 
uncertain situation for Singapore’s future and their own interests (David Martin Jones, 
1998; Tamura, 2003). Secondly, social welfare policies to middle class, such as public 
housing, can both increase support to the People’s Action Party and diminish 
opposing voices (Tamura, 2003, pp.191-192). In the meantime, the Singapore 
government also established a law that offers direct nomination seats for the middle 
class (Tamura, p.193).  
 
Taiwan 
 
Taiwan’s middle class emerged quickly with industrialisation and economic 
development during the 1960s to 1980s. Because Taiwan was an ally in the 
democratic camp during the cold war period, western style capitalism, in which 
people can earn their own fortune, was practised from the early stages of KMT rule. 
Thus, because of the accumulation of an individual’s fortune, individuals would have 
more ability to participate in politics (Li, Yu-Tan, 2006, p.104).  
 
Tieh-Chih Chang (2011) indicates that the middle class were only approximately 
20%–40% of the overall population in the mid-1980s, and most of them were 
educated. These people had both a strong concept of a Taiwanese nation and 
democratic values; they tended to support the opposition, which asked for democracy 
to rise against the KMT, tended to support the concept of a Chinese nation and was 
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the ally of commercial enterprises. The power of the opposition also increased sharply 
during the 1970s to 1980s; it finally formed an opposition party and won a large 
amount of seats in local and national level councils, and as county magistrates, to 
oppose the authoritarian regime. 
 
However, both Chang (2011) and Lin (1998) indicate that the middle class’ attitude to 
democracy is ambiguous because the middle class who serve in the civil service, 
military service, state-owned companies and companies, who are allies of, or have 
benefited from, the KMT, would tend to support the KMT’s authoritarian regime. This 
phenomenon still exists in a democratised Taiwan: the middle class in the above 
services and companies would tend to support the KMT, and others may choose to 
support non-KMT parties in elections.  
 
South Korea 
 
Like Taiwan, South Korea was a state that practised liberal capitalism from the late 
1940s. Industrialisation in South Korea was implemented rapidly in Park’s, presidency. 
He announced his intention to establish a wealthy and self-reliant state, and he tried to 
establish South Korea as a company (Oh, 1999, p.55; Kihl, 2005, p.71). The middle 
class was also developed during this period (Oh, 1999).  
 
Huntington (1991, pp.67-68) indicated that the middle class is the major element 
which organised movements and preserved democratic values to rise against 
authoritarian regimes in South Korea. Protestant ministers and Catholic Cardinals, 
professors from Korea University, opposition parties, ‘students, workers, peasants, 
urban service industry employees’ stood for ‘down with the military authoritarian 
regime and up with a democratic government’ (Kim, 2002, pp.95-96). In order to 
maintain regime stability, Park’s successors, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo also 
chose to cooperate with the middle class (Moon, 1994). Finally, efforts from the 
middle class drove democratisation in South Korea.  
 
The middle class in South Korea is more satisfied with theoretical prediction, which 
indicates that the middle class would be a major actor to further the process of 
democratisation. Although Inglehart (1990; 1997) indicates that democracy will not 
come automatically (it needs interaction between leadership and people), the middle 
class in South Korea would be a successful case for seeking democracy. 
 
To summarise this section, the middle class in four societies demonstrate different 
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attitudes to democracy. With regard to China and Singapore, non-democratic leaders, 
just as theoretical prediction, are opening more political space to absorb the middle 
class into the existing regime. In the meantime, leaders place emphasis on 
propagandising social stability to claim middle class support. As for democratic 
societies, it can be found that non-democratic leaders originally tended to cooperate 
with the leaders of enterprises to organise a political-commercial alliance. The 
educated middle class, who were not part of the existing regime at that time, chose to 
oppose non-democratic regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. In Taiwan, the 
indigenous middle class tended to support Tangwai, the opposition who supported 
Taiwanese nation building and made a claim for democracy. In South Korea, the 
middle class preserved democratic values and stood against the military authoritarian 
regime. Another point for observation is whether the type of regime is intrinsic. It can 
be found in Taiwan, the boundary of the middle class supporting KMT authority was 
clear: the indigenous middle class would oppose the KMT, but the non-indigenous 
middle class, whose ancestors retreated with the KMT to Taiwan, would support KMT 
authority. In South Korea, because this country was established and initial leadership 
was installed by the US, the ruling class of South Korea and the US would help 
mutually to maintain the status of the non-democratic leadership and the interests of 
the US in South Korea. However, since the middle class in South Korea favoured 
neither the non-democratic leadership nor the support they received from the US, this 
US-installed regime faced challenges from the middle class until the democratisation 
period. 
3.3.3 Education and Democracy 
Previous sections have mentioned that a neutral and popularised education system in 
modern society is necessary to promote democracy. However, although Confucian 
societies perform well to popularise education, yet education authorities in these 
societies, just like other Asian countries, are creating/created ‘loyal and efficient 
citizens’. In particular, Confucian societies are processing/processed nation-building 
values, students are trained to obey and understand their duty for national 
development (see Jones, 1998, p.151), although four Confucian societies promoted 
nation-building education. However, the difference between democratic and 
non-democratic societies in education for democracy is that the democratic societies, 
Taiwan and South Korea, allies of the democratic camp and highly influenced by the 
US, also promoted anti-communism and some democratic values in the content of 
education provided. As for China and Singapore, both of them can only promote their 
official ideology to consolidate their non-democratic regimes.  
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China 
 
Although modern education indicates that the school should offer a neutral 
environment for people, yet the Chinese government establishes a series on Patriotic 
Education from primary school onwards (Zhao, 1998; Wang, 2008). For instance, the 
BBC reported that ‘Chinese children are being told that the first lesson they must 
learn this school year is ‘love your country’ (Bristow, 2009, September 1). However, 
this ‘love China’ education is also highly involved in CPC’s ideology, which is 
anti-democratic, and this education is indistinguishable from the Chinese state and the 
Communist Party ,because China is a party-led state (Zhao, 1998, p.290). 
 
The CPC indicates that the correct route for developing an intellectual should be, 
fundamentally, under the guidance of Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. Intellectuals 
should be taught to love the country, be loyal to the people, and put motherland and 
the nation’s interests ahead of their own. Thus, it is very important for the CPC to 
stress patriotism and party ideology education in party ideology to prevent incoherent 
thought among young intellectuals In particular, they would wish to avoid some of 
these intellectuals incorrectly suggesting that the idea of freedom and democracy from 
western capitalist countries would be suitable for replacing the socialists in China 
(Jiang, 1990, May 3). Jiang argues:  
 
We should conduct education on Chinese modern and contemporary history and 
national conditions to pupils (even to the kids in kindergarten), middle school 
students and to the university students. The education should go from the easy to 
the difficult, and should be persistent. 
(Wang, 2008, p.788.  
Wang translated it from Jiang Zemin’s letter to the Minister of Education). 
 
Jiang’s speech also becomes the official education policy, carried out by Ministry of 
Education and Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization of 
the CPC (mentioned in Chapter 2, directly led by member of the Politburo Standing 
Committee of the CPC). The major contents of the guidelines for education describe 
how the party led the country to success (Zhao, 1998, p.293). Modern education in 
China becomes a party-propaganda facilitator to instil party ideology. For instance, in 
order to respond to conflicts between Hong Kong citizens and mainland citizens, 
members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
suggested that emphasis should be placed on Patriotic Education in Hong Kong for 
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the younger generation, and the People’s Liberation Army in Hong Kong should be 
involved in this (see CPC’s official news, China.huanqiu.com, 2012, March 6). 
 
However, higher education could train people to be more thoughtful and more skilful 
in gaining information, rather than accepting only official texts. The report of the 
House of Lords indicates that ‘…there were groups of well-placed intellectuals in 
China thinking about democracy in the way it was understood in the West. 7,000 to 
8,000 people had signed a “Charter 08” document calling on China to reform in terms 
of liberal, multi-party democracy’ (House of Lords, 2010, key issues point 7). Higher 
education could help the Chinese to change their way of thinking, rather than 
following official slogans. 
 
Singapore 
 
In contrast to the CPC’s direct control of party theory and propaganda in the state’s 
education objectives, the Singapore government has employed National Education to 
promote positive narratives about the People’s Action Party’s successes. The objects 
of National Education of Singapore are:  
 
by fostering a sense of identity, pride and self-respect as Singaporeans; by 
knowing the Singapore story - how Singapore succeeded against the odds to 
become a nation; by understanding Singapore's unique challenges, constraints 
and vulnerabilities, which make us different from other countries; and by 
instilling the core values of our way of life, and the will to prevail, that ensures 
our continued success and well-being. (Ministry of Education, Singapore, 2011)  
 
It can be found that the original design still does not provide what Lee Kwan Yew and 
his colleagues argue for: Singapore is a multi-racial country, and in order to avoid 
racial conflict, the Singapore government tries to build up a Singaporean nation (Lee, 
KY, 2011). Thus, the government should take the responsibility to educate 
Singaporean pupils to build up a Singaporean nation and a suitable ideology that can 
help Singaporean society unite. 
 
However, a Singaporean blogger indicates that the National Education (NE) is only 
the ‘government propaganda’, which suggests that the original purposes of NE cannot 
be fulfilled. Meanwhile, the contents of Singaporean’s successful stories focus on the 
People’s Action Party and founders of Singapore’s policies and contributions 
(Guanyinmiao, 2011, May 13). Raymond & Sim (2007, pp.18-19) also indicate that 
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Singapore promotes an official ideology in education which emphasises shared values 
(officially published in 1991 by the Singapore government), national identity and 
cohesion, as against western individualism and promoting communitarianism. This 
official ideology is, in effect, suggested by Lee Kwan Yew and his colleagues, and 
they indicate that Singapore needs democracy with Singaporean needs rather than 
practicing the western democracy (see Zakaria, 1994; Bell, 2000, chap. 3 and 4; Lee 
KY, 2011).  
 
Different from the conceptualised ideology for serving the ruling party in the 
education system, the education authorities in Taiwan and South Korea focused on 
anti-communism and some democratic education around the authoritarian period, 
because these two societies were supported by the democratic camp, and they were 
examples to set against the communists. After that period, education for democracy 
was introduced in the education system.  
 
Taiwan 
 
In order to face the challenges of the communist party, the KMT authority strongly 
promoted the Three Principles of the People in education. However, the proportions of 
these three doctrines were not the same. Because Taiwan was a Japanese colony until 
1945, KMT took control of the island for just four years, until 1949. Yet, as the KMT 
had lost the civil war in mainland China, Taiwan was the last base for them to survive. 
The KMT soon promoted nationalism, part of the three principles to establish the 
concept of the Chinese nation in Taiwan (Lin, 1998, pp.131-134).  
 
However, as an example of democratic country to oppose Communist China, the 
Three Principles of the People also contain the ideas of democracy (Lin, 1998, Tsang, 
1999). Even famous scholars, such as Hsu, F.-K (1985, 2004b) and Hu Shih, 
published articles to promote democratic values. Thus, civil education, which contains 
nationalism and the Three Principles of the People, was part of compulsory education 
for students.  
 
After democratisation, from the late 1990s, the Three Principles of the People 
education was abolished, and textbooks that contained Taiwanese nation-building, 
democratic values and civil rights were introduced to students.  
 
South Korea 
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Like Taiwan, education in South Korea is highly focused on anti-Communist 
materials. Nationalism education was promoted in the late 1940s to 1970s. During this 
time, freedom of speech was not encouraged, but democracy was conceptualised as 
anti-communism and pro-Americanism (Kang, 2002, p.319 cites Kang, M. K, 1984). 
During this period, both nationalism and anti-personal dictatorship political 
movements emerged (Oh, 1999).  
 
This democratic education faced challenges during the military authoritarian rule 
period in the 1970s. Park Chung-Hee’s military government forbade political protests 
by students and teachers, and textbooks had been reviewed during this time (Kang, 
Soon-Won, 2002, pp.319-320). After Park’s death, Kang indicates that more varied 
texts were introduced in the 1980s. Because the US was involved in helping 
supressing the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, which was led by Chun 
Doo-Hwan, anti-American and anti-authoritarian concepts emerged on campus (Oh, 
John Kie-Chiang, 1999, pp.83-89). From 1993, civil education, which contains 
concepts of democracy and human rights, has been introduced in schools (Kang, 2002, 
pp.320-321, pp.324-325).  
 
In summary, non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies all practice 
popularised education; nonetheless, contents of education are different. Again, the US 
factor played an important role in content of the education syllabus. Taiwan and South 
Korea were in the democratic camp in the cold war period. Thus, democracy is part of 
the contents of the textbooks for students, to develop democratic values.  
 
 
3.4 Post-modernisation and Culture Shift Theories 
The relationship between economic development and open political systems remains a 
subject of debate among scholars, some arguing that successful economic 
development can delay change and others arguing that it must ultimately promote it. 
Previous sections of this thesis argued that modernisation factors, such as economic 
development and popularised education, offer opportunities for people to increase 
their civic awareness, and the emergences could also become catalysts for 
democratisation (Huntington, 1991). The thesis also indicates that these factors might 
not help to democratise a regime. Thus, modernisation and several important 
indicators might not be solid factors to diminish traditional values and promote 
democratisation.  
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In order to fill the gap between modernisation processes and democracy, culture shift 
theorists use modernisation as an intermediary to indicate that modernisation would 
help people to fulfil their needs initially. After the modernisation period and as they 
enter the post-modernisation period, people will start to consider not only economic 
issues but also various other factors, especially human development issues, and they 
will be more confident in self-expression. In this period, democracy will become an 
important issue (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  
 
The theory covers three major points: economic development, value change within the 
population; and change in the political system.  
 
Considering the economic perspective, economic development offers the people 
social-economic resources and raises their ability to make choices freely. Inglehart 
uses Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as the basis to develop the theory: he indicates that 
there is also a hierarchy for those things that people seek. Individuals will seek to 
meet their basic needs in the beginning, with materials for basic life standards. After 
this period, the objective will change to other non-material aspects (Inglehart, 1990, 
1997). As this chapter indicated, modernisation will combine a systematic change to 
traditional society. In the early stages, people and the government would place more 
emphasis on survival issues (Inglehart, 1997, chap. 1). During this period, people will 
be more tolerant of the non-democratic government as they will be more focused on 
economic development, security, order and economic needs. If the government can 
achieve satisfactory economic growth and security, the people might not oppose the 
government. However, when people’s quality of life and education, and the 
government’s operational efficiency, improve with the process of modernisation, other 
effects of modernisation will gradually appear and civil society will also develop. 
During this time, the needs for civil rights and individual rights will increase 
(Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  
 
The political system also gradually changes during the modernisation process. As 
indicated earlier in this chapter, modernisation involves a complete change of 
traditional society. The government is organised so that its functions are highly 
differentiated, and political structures are highly integrated (Rustow & Ward, 1964). 
Thus, the original traditional political system will be modernised, and the modern 
system will focus more on political rights and civil rights. People will have more 
power and a wider range of choices in the new political system.  
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However, economic development and political system change cannot automatically 
offer a democratic society. Instead, these changes offer an environment for people to 
gradually change their values. Meanwhile, with regard to political culture, the people 
will develop values that emphasise freedom of expression and freedom of choice, and 
that would lead to a shift in the existing culture.  
 
Inglehart uses two hypotheses, and traditional–rational and survival–self-expression 
factors, as variables to test the hypotheses. The two hypotheses are the scarcity 
hypothesis and the socialisation hypothesis (Inglehart, 1990, p.56; 1997, p.33). The 
scarcity hypothesis suggests that an individual’s needs have value priorities; as the 
needs hierarchy is based on its social-economic environment, the individual will 
consider what is most deficient, and will try to remedy the deficiency as a high 
priority. This hypothesis is based on Maslow’s needs hierarchy theory, which uses 
historical evidence to indicate that people will seek to fulfil physiological (material) 
needs, such as safety and food, and then non-physiological needs, such as ‘esteem, 
self-expression, and aesthetic satisfaction’ (Inglehart, 1997, p.33). As for the second 
hypothesis, it argues that an individual’s values are affected by early socialisation. 
When the value hierarchy is formed, it will develop resistance, and will not easily 
change even when a person faces a different social-economic environment. Both of 
these hypotheses indicate that economic development will bring a generation with 
more focus on economic issues, and the next generation might emphasise 
post-modernisation values. However, the individual’s values, or the culture of the 
society, are shaped over a long time, rather than a short time.  
 
The theory separates modernisation into two stages. In the first, it is a competition 
between rational and traditional ideas. Industrialisation transforms a traditional and 
non-secular society into a modern and secular one. In this period, scientific 
development will reduce people’s dependency on nature, and religious effects 
decrease. Meanwhile, industrialisation makes individuals more disciplined to fit into 
the modern social structure, and people in this stage will be more likely to support the 
promotion of economic development. Thus, in this period, rational modernised society 
is not enough to support democracy.  
 
In the second stage, the post-modernisation period, the society has accumulated an 
amount of wealth; thus, the people do not need to focus only on survival and 
economic issues. Furthermore, the professional class emerge strongly, the spread of 
education provide greater opportunities for self-expression, and the people will focus 
more on personal and political freedom (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Questions of 
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survival and self-expression were used to test the hypotheses and it was found that in 
low-income countries, the people will be more inclined to support survival values, yet 
in high-income countries, the people will place greater emphasis on self-expression 
Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  
 
The theorists indicate that ‘self-expression’ is the most important element to explain a 
country’s democratic standards (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, chap.11). The changes in 
social-economic development and the political system, from traditional to modernised, 
offer more power and political space to the people. Meanwhile, people would seek for 
more political rights, and the people will be more ‘secular, tolerant, and trusting, and 
place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and the quality of life’ 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.46). Furthermore:  
 
Self-expression values and rising emphasis on freedom of choice emerge as 
increasingly favourable existential conditions that allow the universal desire for 
autonomy to take priority. Rising emphasis on human choice has immensely 
important consequences, generating pressures for female empowerment, more 
responsive elites, effective civil and political liberties, and democratic 
institutions.                             (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.47) 
 
Based on these ideas, the theory indicates that the people’s needs for materials or 
economic development will become peripheral because the basic needs for life have 
been fulfilled, and people ‘feel safe enough to trust others, and self-reliance, creativity, 
and initiative take high priority’ (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.259). However, during 
the modernisation process, the environment will be changed, and the people will 
develop new values; thus, the need for democracy and civil rights will be more 
important than economic needs. Moreover, because the people do not need to focus on 
economic needs, they will be more active and be able to participate more in political 
and social activities. These new political needs from people, such as political rights 
and civil rights, will emerge as new demands to the existing political system, and 
force it to move toward a democratic system.  
 
 
Generational Differences 
 
The above discussion indicates that those who grow up in different social-economic 
conditions will differ from each other because they accept a different process of 
socialisation. Inglehart indicates that the post-materialists and materialists would act 
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differently because they live at different security levels (see Inglehart 1997, p.77, 215, 
332-333). The older generation will give greater support to economic and survival 
values (and this cannot be changed easily), yet the younger generation will be more 
likely to support post-modernisation values, which are more attached to democracy. 
Because the elder generation will pass away, and will be replaced by the new 
generation, the generation shift will happen that leads to a culture shift in a society 
(Inglehart 1997, p.33-36; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Thus, 
the younger generation could be more democratic than their elders, if the society is 
modernised and its economic development is successful. 
 
Summary 
 
In general, Inglehart offers a clear conclusion from his empirical research in 43 
industrialised societies (1997, p.215, pp.330-331). He indicates that modernisation 
may not result in democratisation, but is ‘conducive’ to democracy because the 
economic development involved in the process of modernisation would bring cultural 
change. Modernisation breaks the traditional norms and restraints and brings 
secular-rational values to the society (see Inglehart, 1990, pp.430-432; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003, pp.153-154). During economic development, the younger generation 
would be concerned about their rights more than their life requirements, and the 
people would ‘tend to give an increasingly high priority to autonomy and 
self-expression’ in the long term. This results in a higher cost in terms of suppression 
for the government. In short, economic development would tend to make people 
support democracy and ‘more skilful at getting it’ (Inglehart, 1997, p.215, 330; see 
also Inglehart, 1990, p.429; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p.154). Economic growth 
would only bring more possibilities for democracy to survive, but it does not result in 
democracy automatically (Inglehart, 1997, p.215; see also Fukuyama, 1992, 
pp.xiv-xv). Democracy is a reflection of ‘underlying social changes and specific 
historical events and leaders’; through the process, the authoritarian leaders give up 
power in response to the demands of the masses to regain legitimacy (Inglehart, 1997, 
p.179). Huntington also indicates that the leaders’ actions would be more important 
than economic or social conditions (1991, p.108); although rapid economic growth 
would benefit democratisation, the political actors’ interactions are the decisive 
element to democracy (Huntington, 1991, p.70-72).   
 
To conclude, the theory indicates that: 
 
Economic development is conducive to cultural changes that make democracy 
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increasingly probable…. Democracy … depends on deep-rooted orientations 
among the people themselves. These orientations motivate them to press for 
freedom, effective civil and political rights, and genuinely responsive 
government – and to exert continual vigilance to ensure that the governing elites 
remain responsive to them.  
  (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.300) 
 
Meanwhile, the generation factor needs to be analysed and considered together with 
the modernisation factors in case study chapters. 
3.5 Traditional Legacies and Modernisation 
This thesis has indicated four traditional legacies in Confucian societies: hierarchical 
politics, guanxi, harmony and group-orientation. All these legacies are conceptualised 
and developed from Confucian classics and the imperial period. In contrast, 
modernisation is a re-socialisation process that would diminish traditional legacies 
and traditions in traditional society and force it to change to a modern one. Regarding 
the modernisation theories, an industrial, secularised, professional, differential and 
popularised educational system will be established in a modern society. Meanwhile, 
openness for mass media and broad political participation will help to promote 
democracy.  
 
However, western experiences are not the only example of modernisation; this chapter 
has indicated that an individual country’s situation ought to be considered. This thesis 
indicates that there is also a space for non-democratic countries to argue that there are 
different developing routes for western and non-western societies. In Confucian 
societies, a bargain between traditional legacies and modernisation can be found in the 
following aspects, and non-democratic leaderships are using the space to establish 
their own examples of modernisation. 
 
Firstly, modernisation can facilitate promoting tradition legacies for consolidating 
non-democratic regimes in these non-democratic Confucian societies. 
Non-democratic leaders emphasise the building of official ideology and successful 
stories to propagandise how non-democratic regimes can benefit people, especially 
non-democratic societies that enjoy social stability and rapid economic growth. A 
modern popularised education system becomes a tool to promote harmony and 
group-orientation. Collective interests should be considered ahead of individual’s 
interests, and nationalism is the safety valve to ask for people’s loyalty to an existing 
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regime. All of these are part of official ideology promoted by China and Singapore. 
 
Second, hierarchical politics continues in non-democratic modern societies, but there 
will be limited openness in the political aspect. As the previous section indicates, in 
China and Singapore, governments propagandise how they led their countries to 
success. In China, the CPC has clearly indicated that modernisation is led and planned 
by the party; there is no other experienced and powerful authority that would be able 
to lead China since the liberation revolution of 1949. Only the CPC has ability to 
maintain social stability and continue to ensure the existing achievements of economic 
development. According to the past 30 years open and reform policies, only the CPC 
has the ability to lead this country and continue to move forward. Because the CPC is 
the only superpower in China, combining official ideology with popularised education 
for harmony and group-orientation, people will choose to support the CPC authority. 
Thus, in China, modernisation actually helps the CPC to consolidate their rule. As for 
Singapore, the leadership indicates that, according to Singapore’s experience for 
gaining success, a strong top-down politics is needed to maintain order and stability at 
the start. Government propaganda and stories of success legitimise and strengthen the 
power of the leadership over the people. 
 
However, both China and Singapore need to respond to the emergence of the middle 
class and the change in people’s values during the process of modernisation. The 
educated middle class, increasing in numbers during the modernisation process, will 
not easily be convinced by official propaganda. Thus, non-democratic regimes need to 
open more political space for these new political participants.  
 
Third, international effects and the nature of regime become major supports for 
democracy in democratic Confucian societies. The US was the major ally with Taiwan 
and South Korea against communist China and Korea, and it also influenced authority 
in Taiwan and South Korea to take a moderate position in relation to political 
opponents and promote democratic values. On the other hand, because the KMT is an 
outside regime for Taiwan, and South Korea was established by the US’s aid (and the 
initial leadership was arranged by the US), people in these two societies would tend to 
stand on the opposite side to non-democratic regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. As 
this chapter indicates, indigenous elites and the middle class in Taiwan would support 
Tangwai for democracy and the Taiwanese nation; the middle class in South Korea 
would choose to oppose authoritarian leaders and their supporter, the US.  
 
In summary, leaderships in China and Singapore control education and use it to 
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facilitate propagandising official ideology and the leadership’s stories of success from 
rapid economic growth. On the other hand, they also try to buy off middle class by 
opening more political spaces. Tan and Wang (2007) also indicate a similar result in 
their empirical research. They found that in non-democratic East Asian societies, 
support for democracy is hard to increase because the government controls the ‘public 
discourse’. However, the younger generation would have stronger democratic values, 
and modernisation helps values shift from traditional to democratic.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
The content of this chapter focuses on modernisation in the following aspects. 
According to theoretical discussions, there is no doubt that modernisation would 
re-shape the political culture in a traditional society. Since early modernisation 
theories were based on experiences of western countries, they were criticised because 
these experiences may not apply in non-western countries. Nonetheless, later 
modernisation theories have adopted an approach involving more case studies. 
Whether they are early or late theories, modernisation should include not only 
industrialisation, rationalised or differentiated authority, professional structures and 
broad education, but also include mass participation, open information and the media. 
This process involves a total change to a traditional society, which would encourage 
people to give up traditional values and adopt new ones to satisfy the demands of the 
modern society.  
 
Economic development, a new middle class, and neutral and popularised education 
are three characteristics that would help to develop a democratic country. However, 
the middle class may not be democrats in East Asian countries. In East Asian 
countries, the education is popularised but not neutral. As for whether economic 
development could lead to democracy or maintain democracy, the result has also been 
discussed in this chapter: economic development would help people to be more skilful 
in asking for democracy, but it would not directly lead to democracy. To establish a 
democratic regime needs interaction between political actors. Non-democratic leaders 
realise the importance of controlling the modernisation agenda and education contents 
are essential to protect their regime. They would control economic development to 
build up a loyal middle class and people who consider that their daily basic needs 
have been fulfilled. Official ideology (that could change in different stages) should be 
highly promoted and combined with traditional legacies to deepen their force in the 
minds of the populace. Further, connections of country and ruling party should be 
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established to make people believe that this country needs this ruling party; otherwise, 
the country would collapse. 
 
Although economic development, the emergent middle class and public education 
might be not be consistently pro-democracy factors (and could be manipulated by 
rulers), yet these factors could help to create an environment for generational culture 
shift. The results of generational culture shift would be a more solid support in 
establishing democracy, since the younger generation, as culture shift theorists 
indicate, would be more attached to democratic values than the older generation. Thus, 
in the long term, democratic culture could emerge in the minds of the younger 
generation and lead to demands for democratic change. 
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Part 1 Conclusions 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, three hypotheses and four research questions are 
introduced to solve the question of whether or not a Confucian society can produce or 
maintain a democratic regime, and why, when facing the long-term disappearance of 
democracy, some Confucian societies succeeded but some of them failed. These 
hypotheses and research questions focus on three aspects. Firstly, whether 
Confucianism itself or traditional legacies should take major responsibility for 
hindering the development of democracy, and what is the ruler’s attitude in the face of 
claims for democracy; secondly, what is the role of traditional legacies during the 
political change to democracy; and thirdly, what is the role of modernisation, and 
whether modernisation can help or hinder the development of democracy.  
 
In the second chapter, this thesis indicates that political culture is a political attitude at 
a certain time, and this is shaped by a long-term accumulation of socialisation and 
collective memory in a nation. Moreover, it will influence people’s political activities 
in the future. Regarding the emergence of a democratic regime, it can be viewed in 
two stages. In the short term, a democratic regime may need major players to support 
the political system to democratise a non-democratic regime Nonetheless, a solid 
democratic political culture is needed to sustain a democratic regime in the long run. 
Reviewing the historical background, people in most Confucian societies did not have 
democratic experiences, and their long-term experience of politics was dominated by 
the political system of the Confucian imperial period over thousands of years. Thus, 
the political culture in these societies is still affected by four traditional legacies from 
the Confucian imperial period: hierarchical politics, guanxi, harmony, and 
group-orientation.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that these legacies have their definitions in Confucian 
classics, and emerged from the imperial period. After Confucianism withdrew from 
the political arena, these legacies continue to exist through non-democratic 
leaderships. Hierarchical politics enable non-democratic rulers to continue to control 
the political agenda without strong opposing opinions; guanxi, which could lead to 
cronyism; and harmony and group-orientation, which could help non-democratic 
rulers to construct official ideology, and facilitate nationalism, social stability, and the 
sacrifice of personal interest to further the collective interest, sustaining 
non-democratic regimes in Confucian societies.  
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Modernisation is presented as a revolutionary process to a traditional society that 
would change economic, political and social aspects of the society. It is involved in a 
value change and covers at least industrialisation, urbanisation, expansion of political 
participation, popularised education, secularisation and openness of mass media in a 
society. Originally, modernisation theories are based on experiences from western 
protestant countries, and scholars indicate that non-western countries should follow 
these routes. However, these concepts were revised later, so that the change to 
modernisation should include the situation and conditions of the individual country. 
According to modernisation theories, an open political environment should be created, 
and a democratic regime could be established.  
 
Lipset indicates that economic growth, the emergence of a middle class and education 
are major factors that could help to establish a democratic regime. Nonetheless, 
according to scholarly arguments, economic growth would help a democratic regime 
to survive, but it may not necessarily lead to democracy. The middle class would 
consider their own interests; if a traditional regime can satisfy their political needs and 
interests, the middle class may choose to support the original regime. Education needs 
certain conditions; a popularised education with a neutral environment is essential. 
And the most important of all, modernisation would only make people more skilful in 
their claims for democracy; interactions between rulers and people, especially the 
actions of the ruler, would dominate whether modernisation led to democracy or not. 
 
In modern Confucian societies, rulers’ actions, the US factor and whether the regime 
is indigenous become three factors that can affect modernisation in these societies. In 
non-democratic societies, economic growth may not lead to democratisation as 
modernisation theories have indicated; it could result in regime stability, because 
intrinsic demands for democracy cannot be permitted by the rulers. Meanwhile, in 
order to ease the political requirements of the middle class, non-democratic rulers 
release more political space in order to gain support. Moreover, party-ideology and 
patriotic education are promoted by rulers to construct an official ideology to make 
people believe that the existing regime is the optimal choice for the current situation. 
In democratic regimes, Taiwan and South Korea faced challenges from indigenous 
elites because the KMT regime was an outsider and the leaders of South Korea was 
installed or supported by the US. In the meantime, as a member of the democratic 
camp, these two regimes could not maintain a hard-line position to the people. In 
terms of economic growth, it created a group of entrepreneurs who would share power 
with non-democratic rulers, and these rulers could only follow pro-western economic 
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policies. As for the middle class in modernisation, this class became a major power 
for demanding democracy in South Korea, and in Taiwan. Ideologically, the middle 
class stood to support opponents who asked to establish a democratic regime. The 
education system was not neutral, but in order to go against Communist China and 
Korea, Taiwan and South Korea practised nation-building, anti-communist education, 
and democratic values that were introduced because both of them were members of 
the democratic camp during the Cold War period.  
 
As well as the discussions and findings above, the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 1 
are re-confirmed in these theoretical chapters.  
 
At the beginning of each of the case studies, the ruler’s attitude will be demonstrated 
to examine their argument of whether democracy should be practised or not, and 
whether they are affected by any international factors. In the second section, this 
thesis will discuss how traditional legacies and modernisation factors are/were treated 
for or against democracy; the regime type and the US factors will also be discussed. 
In the third section, this thesis will use the Asian Barometer Survey data to analyse the 
trend of people’s support for traditional legacies and democratic values for 
discovering whether these factors are affected by measures from the second section. 
After that, regressions for analysing what kind of people would support or oppose 
traditional legacies and democratic values will be demonstrated. And finally a 
conclusion will be made. In the next part, this thesis expects to find that: 
 
1. Leaderships in non-democratic Confucian societies create a pseudo democracy in 
response to people’s claim for democracy. In democratic societies, leaderships 
could tolerate opponents who make a claim for democracy and democratic values 
cannot be forbidden, because it is also considered official propaganda. 
2. Traditional legacies are selectively emphasised by non-democratic leaders to build 
up an official ideology and maintain social stability. However, in democratic 
societies, these legacies are diminishing. 
3. Non-democratic rulers use modernisation as a tool to serve and protect the regime, 
and the purpose of modernisation also serves to protect their regime. In 
democratic regimes, the results of modernisation drive democratisation because 
non-democratic rulers did not have ability to continue to dominate the 
modernisation process. 
4. Effect of regime nature, the US factor, and internal and international factors in 
Taiwan and South Korea’s cases. 
5. Political culture in non-democratic societies is dominated by measures taken by 
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rulers; the traditional legacies which are strongly promoted by leaderships will be 
high, whereas democratic values are low. On the other hand, in democratic 
societies, the overall trend for democratic values is increasing, and support for 
traditional legacies is diminishing. 
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Part 2: Case Studies 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Methods for Cases Studies 
 
‘Democratisation studies’, which focus on the global spread, pace, and process of 
democratisation, is one of the important topics in comparative politics (Landman, 
2008, p.186). The research of this thesis falls within the scope of this discipline and 
focuses on why some Confucian societies can democratise while others cannot, and 
asks whether Confucianism or its legacies is the obstacle in scholarly texts. The 
present research indicates that, although Confucianism itself should not be labelled as 
being a major obstacle to democracy, traditional legacies, which were derived from 
Confucianism and which remain entrenched in people’s minds, work to shape a 
disadvantageous political culture for democracy.  Although one might expect that 
modernisation would diminish these traditional legacies, non-democratic leaders have 
managed to use elements of modernisation to consolidate their rule.  
4.1 Methodology 
Methodology can be viewed as a recipe which describes the reason why this recipe 
should be used in this research (Clough & Nutbrown, 2007, p.23), and it is a principle 
which guides one to choose research methods (Burnham, Gilland, Grant & 
Layton-Henry, 2004, p.4). This thesis is the result of a democratisation study that 
belongs to comparative politics; thus, it necessitated a comparative methodology. 
 
There are three strategies for researchers to compare countries: global selection, few 
countries selection, and single country study (Landman, 2008; Burnham, et al., 2004, 
pp.75-78).41 The chosen strategy should be based on how many suitable cases can be 
selected in the research (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.75). A large number comparison can 
be viewed as ‘variable-oriented’, focusing on ‘general dimensions of macro-social 
variation’ and analysing the relationship between variables with a global view for 
‘stronger inferences and theory-building’ (Landman, 2008, pp.53-54, pp.63-64). 
Because of its extensive observation, however, large number comparison also faces 
disadvantages in data collection and statics technology. Case studies of Confucian 
societies are not suitable for this strategy, because the number of Confucian societies 
is limited and regional, rather than large in number and global. Furthermore, a single 
country study may not be accurately considered as a comparative study, and may also 
                                                     
41 They use large-n and small-n to represent large number and few countries 
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be criticised as ‘theoretical’ and ‘interpretative’ or ‘configurative-idiographic’ 
(Landman, 2008, p.86, citing Lijphart, 1971, p.691 and Eckstein, 1975, p.96). 
However, a single country study can contribute to the development of new 
classifications or types (Landman, 2008, pp.86-87). This strategy could not be applied 
to the present regional research, because the aim of the study is to determine whether 
Confucian culture is an obstacle to democracy and why in some cases democracy has 
succeeded, and in others failed. 
 
Since this thesis adopted the few countries selection strategy, then an adequate design 
is needed to examine the three hypotheses and five research questions. In comparative 
research, two major designs are available: one is the ‘most similar’ system design, and 
another is the ‘most different’ systems design (Landman, 2008, p.70; Burnham, et al., 
2004, pp.62-68).  
 
The ‘most different’ systems design (MDSD) ‘compares countries that do not share 
any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two 
of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome’ (Landman, 2008, 
p.70). It focuses on similar characteristics in countries with different backgrounds to 
explain a specific political outcome (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.63). This design is used 
on cross-regional studies (Landman, 2008, pp.72-75). The ‘most similar’ systems 
design (MSSD) ‘seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common 
features in an effort to neutralise some differences while highlighting others’ 
(Landman, 2008, p.70). This design is relevant when countries have similar 
backgrounds, yet several important factors differ and lead to different political 
outcomes (Landman, 2008, p.70; Burnham, et al., 2004, p.63). It is applied 
particularly to area studies (Landman, 2008, p.71). Countries in the same region with 
similar cultural and historical backgrounds may form a specific geographic area. The 
system selected is designed to control the similar and common characteristics and 
then identify different characteristics that could lead to different political outcomes 
(Landman, 2008, pp.70-71). The difference between these two designs is in the 
selection of cases. 
 
Regarding these two designs, MSSD is the appropriate design for this research for two 
reasons. Firstly, Confucian societies are located in the same region and share similar 
cultural backgrounds, and therefore they fall within the definition of MSSD. Secondly, 
one of the purposes of this thesis is to answer why some Confucian societies 
democratised but some others failed to do so, and MSSD is also designed for 
accommodating these background factors and is useful for comparing differences in 
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explanatory factors.  
 
According to the hypotheses, the explanatory factors that this thesis focuses on are the 
leaderships’ choice of democracy (leaderships’ choice) and political cultures, which 
are shaped by traditional legacies and modernisation. This thesis will compare these 
two factors to figure out why some Confucian societies can democratise, while others 
can sustain non-democratic rule. 
 
In regard to the leaderships’ attitude to democracy, a democracy needs both the ruler 
and the people’s agreement in both the short-term and long-term (Huntington, 1997; 
Schedler, 2001; Pridham, 2000; Linz, 1990, pp.156-158). The elites’ choice of 
democracy or non-democracy and interaction between the elites and people are key 
elements for the emergence of democracy (Inglehart, 1997, p.215, p.330; 1990, p.429; 
Huntington, 1991, pp.70-72). This thesis assumes that the leaderships’ attitudes to 
democracy are different in democratic and non-democratic societies. In 
non-democratic cases, leaders create a pseudo-democracy to avoid the pressure of 
claiming democracy. However, in democratic societies, internal challenges, political 
facts and a clear communist enemy in the non-democratic period forced leaders to 
take pragmatic and efficient methods to respond to challenges; thus, leaders 
demonstrated tolerant attitudes towards opponents.  
 
As for political culture, democratic regimes require a strong democratic political 
culture to support them (Gunther, Puhle, & Diamandouros, 1995; Pridham, 2000; 
Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Diamond, 1999). Traditional legacies, which were derived from 
Confucianism during the imperial period, exist in Confucian societies and are a threat 
to democracy. It would seem that modernisation could diminish these traditional 
legacies to re-shape a political culture that is more consistent with democracy. 
However, non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies demonstrate different 
phenomena that also result in different political outcomes. In non-democratic societies, 
traditional legacies are partly chosen by non-democratic rulers to build up the official 
ideology, and modernisation factors are used as facilitators to help them sustain their 
rule. In these cases, the leadership tries to strengthen traditional legacies and 
manipulate modernisation to create an anti-democracy and support a pseudo- 
democracy within the political culture in order to sustain their rule. However, in 
democratic societies, international factors and digressive control of power for political 
agendas has meant that leaders cannot manipulate modernisation, as has been done in 
non-democratic societies. This result helps to establish a more open political 
environment for democracy and decreases support for traditional legacies. Democratic 
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values are increasing in those societies that could construct a democratic political 
culture to support their democratic regime. Political culture is a long-term 
socialisation process and an accumulation of political thought among the people; 
therefore, individual attitudes to democracy must be considered (Shin, 1994). The 
Asian Barometer Survey Data will be applied to estimate political culture in this 
context. 
 
Comparisons of these explanatory factors will lead to different political outcomes of 
political cultures in non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies. The reasons 
behind these variations will be discussed and advice for non-democratic countries will 
also be made. 
 
4.2 Research Methods 
Research methods are an intrinsic part of research that will lead to research findings 
(Clough & Nutbrown, 2007, p.28; Burnham, et al., 2004, p.1). Considering the 
requirements of this thesis, both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to 
examine hypotheses. The selected methods are documentary and archival analysis, 
and data from large-scale surveys for descriptive statistics, regressions and other 
statistical models.  
4.2.1 Documentary and Archival Analysis 
The resources for documentary and archival analysis can be divided into primary, 
second and tertiary sources. Primary sources are evidence of the event or the result of 
the event; secondary sources are the items that are related to the event or are produced 
just after the event; and tertiary sources are ‘materials written afterward to reconstruct 
the event’ (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.165, citing Lichtman & French, 1978, p.18). 
Researchers can use these sources to construct a theoretical framework and 
understand the concepts of the event. This research will use several documents and 
archives, which could be primary, secondary or tertiary sources, for analysis. 
 
 
In order to understand the real picture of the Confucian political system, this thesis 
has used Confucian Classics to explain the actual framework of the fundamental 
system. In theoretical chapters, these classics also provide useful information to 
distinguish whether Confucianism or its legacies lead to a negative environment for 
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democracy. In case studies, Confucian Classics will also be used to demonstrate how 
non-democratic leaders try to use the name of Confucianism to practise 
non-democratic rule. 
 
Official documents and records are the primary sources that directly provide the 
government’s official decisions and thinking about a given event. Through these 
official documents and records, the construction of a pseudo-democracy, the 
promotion of official ideology and the leaderships’ attitude and policies, the decision 
to strengthen traditional legacies, and the use of modernisation as a facilitator to 
consolidate rule, can all be found. Official documents also reflect why leaders of the 
pre-democratic period in democratic Confucian societies needed to take soft-line, 
pragmatic and efficient measures to face challenges, rather than taking a hard-line 
attitude to consolidate their rule. Official newspapers, publications or major 
newspapers, as secondary sources, also offer official attitudes or reflect facts around 
an event. While official documents only offer the official tone for an event, official 
publications may offer more discussions and opinions that reflect official thinking on 
decisions and policies.  
 
In China, the sources of these documents, newspapers or publications are the 
Communist Party’s website, and official newspapers and their related websites 
(especially sources from the People Daily or the Xinhuanet), which offer official 
documents, and a theoretical framework for official ideology and leaders’ speeches. 
As for Singapore, the major materials are sourced from the Singapore government’s 
website, Lee Kwan Yew’s talks and his bibliography, and Nanyang Sin-Chew Lianhe 
Zaobao, one of the largest newspapers in Singapore. In Taiwan, major materials are 
from the Sun Yat-sen foundation website, the Chiang Kai-Shek foundation website, 
the Taiwanese government and major newspapers in the country. As for South Korea, 
materials are from the South Korean government’s website.  
 
Tertiary sources, written by scholars and people related to the events, are also used to 
discuss the case studies. Scholars have observed and discussed several pertinent topics 
in China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, and some of them offered valuable 
information and opinions.  
4.2.2 Large-scale survey for statistical analysis 
A survey, in definition, tries to ‘obtain accurate information about a population by 
obtaining a representative sample of that population and using the information from 
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the sample to make generalizations about the whole population’ (Burnham, et al., 
2004, p.81). Thus, a survey can reflect popular opinions on certain issues and 
demonstrate support of traditional legacies, modernisation or the existing political 
culture. The Asian Barometer Survey is the only cross-country large-scale survey that 
can offer standardised questionnaires for these four cases, China, Singapore, Taiwan 
and South Korea. Moreover, the survey can offer two waves survey data, which can 
help to analyse the trend of support for democracy, traditional legacies and existing 
political culture. Until now, no substantial survey has been able to offer 
comprehensive survey data like the Asian Barometer Survey for these countries. Thus, 
this thesis will use two waves data from the Asian Barometer Survey for statistical 
analysis, which will be demonstrated in two parts.  
 
In this statistical section, there are three major variables: democratic values, 
traditional legacies and modernisation factors. Regarding traditional legacies, in 
previous empirical studies, scholars’ indicators of Confucian values or traditional 
values were similar to those of this thesis; the focus is on harmony, group-orientation, 
guanxi and the authoritarian concepts (Nathan, 2007, p.13-14;42 Shin, 2007, p. 27; 
Chang & Chu, 2007, p.17;43 Park, & Shin, 2004, pp.17-19;44 Nathan & Chen, 2004, 
pp.2-3; Chang & Chu, 2002, pp.20-2945). Traditional legacies mentioned in this thesis 
are divided into four categories as Chapter Three indicates: hierarchical politics, 
harmony, group-orientation and guanxi. This thesis will use the Asian Barometer 
Survey to demonstrate support of traditional legacies and democratic values in four 
cases through two waves data. Based on the previous research and the analytical 
framework, traditional legacies relate to questions from two waves questionnaires (see 
Appendix 1). 
 
Concerning modernisation factors, this thesis will use actual age, educational level 
(divided into three levels: lower education level, where people do not finish their high 
school education; high school education, where people do not go on to obtain any 
degree, and degree level, which people have at least a degree), subjective social class 
(divided into lower, middle and upper classes) and economic performance. The 
chosen questions and recoding information are demonstrated in Appendix 1. 
                                                     
42 His research indicates that the three Confucian societies, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong have the 
lowest percentage of people committed to democracy, followed by Korea and Japan, and then followed 
by the non-Confucian societies of Mongolia, Thailand and Philippines. 
43 They used four indexes as the traditional values.  
44 They used four indexes as social values and three indexes as political values to exam whether these 
values would be obstacles in South Korea and found that people who supported these values were more 
likely to support antiauthoritarianism and be against democracy. 
45 Their research indicates that Confucian values hinder the development of democracy; the more 
Confucian values a person has, the fewer demands for political rights he/she has in mind. 
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As for democratic values, the category is inclusive of democracy, political freedom 
and autonomy, equality, representation, majority rule and citizenship (Blaug & 
Schwarzmantel, 2006; Sartori, 1987; Held, 1995; Dahl, 1989). A discussion of 
democratic values should begin by addressing freedom and individual autonomy, 
where people have an equal right to choose without any intervention (Held, 1995, 
pp.145-153; Held, 1996, pp.299-304; Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2006, p.4; Sartori, 
1987, pp.301-305; Dahl, 1989, p.85). Some authors have insisted that, ‘in the absence 
of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best 
judge of his or her own good or interest’ (Dahl, 1989, p.100; see also Sartori, 1987, 
pp.344-356, who argues that everyone should be equally treated before the law). In 
addition, people should be aware of their rights in public affairs (Held, 1995, 
pp.145-153; 1996, pp.299-304; Dahl, 1989, p.105), otherwise people would never 
outgrow their childhood in terms of public affairs (Dahl, 1989, p.105). And finally, as 
Held noted, since only qualified citizens would share political rights, democratic 
legitimacy would be established on the basis of the largest number of votes in the 
election (1996, p.337). 
 
After deciding who can participate in a democratic regime, Dahl (1989, pp.108-114) 
suggests four essential elements for a democratic regime: effective participation in 
which citizens have equal opportunity to express their preference to final outcome 
(Dahl, 1989, p.109); voting equality at the decisive stage, where citizens should have 
equal opportunity to make collective decisions, to ensure that each person has only 
one vote; enlightened understanding, which argues that people should be given proper 
information to ensure they have full ability to decide; and control of the agenda, in 
which ‘the demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be 
placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of the democratic 
process’ (Dahl, 1989, p.113). This, in essence, indicates the importance of vertical 
accountability. Aside from vertical accountability, horizontal accountability is also 
important because, if accountability does not exist, then the democratic regime will 
fail because of the expansion of executive power. Therefore, effective state 
institutions must exist to enhance horizontal accountability and limit executive power 
(O'Donnell, 1998, pp.113-114, pp.117-122; Huntington, 1997, pp.58-59). 
 
Based on these concepts, scholars offered several conditions for a democratic regime. 
For instance, Schumpeter (2003, p.269) indicated that democracy is a mechanism to 
decide government officers, and election and competiveness are two important factors 
for democracy. Furthermore, the ruler must govern the state democratically and free 
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election of executive and parliamentary positions should be constitutionally 
guaranteed. There should not be violations of individual and minority rights, nor 
should there be a lack of legislative function that would lead to failure of the rule of 
law. Otherwise, the regime should be considered to be a non-democratic regime (Linz 
& Stepan, 1998, pp.48-49; 1996, p.15). Linz also offers a clearer definition that 
requires an open, free and fair election for electing executive and legislative branch 
members; an equal right to vote for citizens; political and civil rights, such as the 
freedoms of assembly, of publishing or of speech. Moreover, the government power 
belongs to elected officers and should not be affected by military or religious power 
(Linz, 2000, p.34). Sorensen (2008, pp.26-27) also indicates that democracy refers to 
rule of the people, and three major dimensions should be considered in a democratic 
regime: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. Held offers a 
broader definition: a constitution ensures that the government should be controlled by 
elected officers, mechanisms for fair and free election to elect or recall elected officers; 
equal rights to elect or be elected; substantial freedom of speech, freedom of assembly 
and association, and freedom of gathering information (1995, p.51). As for a globally 
accepted definition, member states of the United Nations (UN) declare democracy to 
be a ‘universally recognised ideal’, and that UN forces can protect human rights, civil 
liberties and political rights in ‘meaningful democracies’ (United Nations, 2011, 
October 27). The UN definition, in effect, summarises scholars’ conditions for a 
democratic regime, ‘democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will 
of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their 
full participation in all aspects of their lives’” (United Nations, 2011, October 27). In 
general, political equality, popular sovereignty, rule of law, checks and balances, 
political liberty and political pluralism are essential concepts to form a democratic 
regime. This thesis adopts this UN definition of a democratic regime. 
 
Based on these ideas, democratic values in this essay adopt Hu Fu’s ‘five dimensions 
of democratic value-orientation’ that are used in the Asian Barometer Survey (Hu, 
1998, pp.19-23; Chu, Chang, & Hu, 2003, p.37; Chang, Chu, & Tsai, 2005, pp.15-18). 
Hu uses four relationships of power: power from status, source of political power, 
range of rule (including protection of people’s liberty and social liberty), and checks 
and balances, to develop five value-orientations: 1. Political equality, 2. Popular 
accountability, 3. Political liberty, 4. Political pluralism, and 5. Separation of power 
(horizontal accountability). This thesis adds ‘rule of law’ as the sixth dimension 
because, as Chapter 2 demonstrates, the ‘rule of man’ rather than the ‘rule of law’ is 
the key element that led to the acceptance of traditional legacies. The chosen 
questions for democratic values are noted in Appendix 1. 
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The condition on whether or not to choose these questions was made by requiring that 
the question exist in four cases and the two waves of data. However, the question for 
group orientation was not the same, because of the wording on the different 
questionnaires; therefore, group orientation will only be compared between countries 
rather than comparing between the two waves. 
 
This thesis will use these variables to demonstrate the statistical findings through 
descriptive statistics and multi regression models. 
4.2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics is a basic tool to describe data and also offers a powerful and 
direct way to measure, analyse and demonstrate data (Burnham, et al., 2004, p.114). 
The descriptive statistics in this thesis will serve the following purposes: 
 
Percentage analysis: in each case, this thesis will demonstrate the support and reject 
percentages for four traditional legacies and six democratic values orientation. 
Recoded chosen questions (mentioned in Appendix 1) will be used for this 
demonstration. Through these percentage analyses, the general attitude for traditional 
legacies and democratic values will be illustrated. 
 
Strength analysis: this thesis will also use recoded chosen questions (mentioned in 
Appendix 1) to demonstrate the strength of four traditional legacies and six 
democratic values orientation. This analysis will demonstrate how people are attached 
to traditional legacies and democratic values. 
4.2.4 Multiple regression models 
Four multiple regression models will be operated for responding to hypothesis 2 and 
3. 
 
Model 1: Satisfaction with democracy in China, Singapore, Taiwan or South Korea 
 
The purpose of this model is to determine whether traditional legacies or 
modernisation factors would affect the people’s attitude to the existing democracy in 
the four cases. In China and Singapore, this model would test whether traditional 
legacies and modernisation factors that are manipulated by the leaders would help to 
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consolidate their rule or not. As for Taiwan and South Korea, this model will examine 
the factors that support the existing democracy. The dependent variable is ‘On the 
whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our 
country. Are you …’. The original answer ‘Very Dissatisfied’ is recoded to ‘-2’, 
‘Somewhat Dissatisfied’ to ‘-1’, ‘Somewhat Satisfied’ to ‘1’, ‘Very Satisfied’ to ‘2’, 
and others to ‘0’. The independent variables – traditional legacies and modernisation 
factors – are listed in Appendix 1. Age, gender and democratic variables, also in 
Appendix 1, are the control factors in this model.  
 
Model 2: Relations between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation 
factors 
 
The purpose of this model is to determine whether traditional legacies or 
modernisation factors would hinder or help the development of democratic values in 
all societies. The dependent variable is democratic variables (Appendix 1). The 
independent variables are traditional legacies and modernisation factors. Age and 
gender are the social-economic background factors in this model.  
 
Model 3: Whether modernisation factors can diminish traditional legacies in China 
and Singapore 
 
The purpose of this model is to figure out whether modernisation factors can diminish 
traditional legacies in China and Singapore. The dependent variable is traditional 
legacies (anti-) (mentioned in Appendix 1); all legacies are combined and form the 
‘traditional legacies dependent variable’, and, because of the recoding process, the 
variable is ‘anti-traditional-legacies-oriented’. The independent variable is 
modernisation factors. Age and gender are control variables.  
 
Model 4: The factors that will affect traditional legacies in Taiwan and South Korea 
 
Whether this model should be operated in Taiwan and South Korea is dependent on 
the result of Model 2 in Taiwan and South Korea. If traditional legacies are confirmed 
to hinder the development of democratic values, this model will be operated to test 
which factor would help to diminish traditional legacies. The dependent variable is 
traditional legacies (anti-) (mentioned in Appendix 1); all legacies are combined and 
form the ‘traditional legacies dependent variable’, and, because of the recoding 
process, the variable is ‘anti-traditional-legacies-oriented’. The independent variable 
is modernisation factors. Democratic variables, age and gender are control variables.  
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Chapter 5: China 
 
China is the birthplace of Confucianism, and the first Confucian society to practise 
democracy during the 1910s and 1920s. Now China is the largest non-democratic 
country in the world. The Communist Party of China (CPC) authority proclaims itself 
as a democratic regime, but the CPC’s version of democracy has its own 
characteristics for satisfying its own situation in response to external and internal 
pressure. The CPC authority now is a dynamic regime; it can adjust its official 
ideology to confront the changing environment, using both traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors as tools for consolidating rule.  
 
This chapter will focus on three points. In the beginning, this chapter will discuss 
the leadership’s attitude to democracy and how Chinese democracy is constructed. 
This thesis will demonstrate that Chinese democracy is based on an original 
ideology and adjustments to openness and reform. This thesis will then discuss how 
traditional legacies are adopted to construct its official ideology, and how 
modernisation factors are manipulated to benefit the rule of the CPC. Finally, 
statistical analysis will demonstrate quantitatively that the Chinese popularly 
support Chinese democracy. In the statistical section, this thesis will show that the 
values of traditional legacies encouraged by the CPC have increasing support, 
while support for democratic values is comparatively low. Meanwhile, interactions 
between traditional legacies and modernisation factors, and their relationship to 
democratic values, will also be analysed to determine the factors that could hinder 
the development of democracy in China. 
 
5.1 Democracy with Chinese characteristics 
 
A Report from the House of Lords, United Kingdom, notes: 
 
China has never known democracy as the West understands it. The Communist 
Party, in power since 1949, continues to run China at all levels and remains the 
dominant force. The formation of alternative political movements or parties is 
forbidden. This is unlikely to change in the near future. 
                              (House of Lords, 2010, Key Issues point 3).  
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This description indicates that in China, democracy is different from the form of 
democracy known universally. Similarly, the Chinese government claims that China 
has also adopted a democratic system, albeit a democracy with Chinese characteristics. 
In China, western democracy is at an impasse, and Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), the 
chairman of the National People's Congress, argued that the separation of powers, the 
multi-party system and bicameral Congress will never be established in China (Gao, 
2009, March 11).  
 
Chu, Chang, and Hu (2003, p.38) distinguish two types of ‘democracy’ in modern 
authoritarian regimes: the Desirability Argument and the Feasibility Argument. The 
first one is similar to Chinese democracy, socialist democracy or guided democracy, 
wherein the government creates a different definition of democracy and declares that 
this new democracy is better than the western one. The second Argument indicates 
that the country in question is not ready for western democracy, and that a high price 
would be paid if it adopted western democracy immediately. The CPC fits into the 
first model, and official documents have demonstrated that the CPC had prepared for 
its own form of democracy before it won the civil war. 
 
This section will firstly indicate that in fact, the CPC originally supported a 
democracy similar to that of the West. However, party leaders changed their minds 
after taking power from the KMT. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, 
China turned to a totalitarian regime controlled by Mao Zedong. After that, the CPC 
began economic reform and gradually revised its ideology to construct a Chinese 
democracy.  
5.1.1 Before the end of the Cultural Revolution 
After military and KMT dictatorial rule from 1912 to 1949, the CPC won the civil war 
by claiming and establishing a democratic regime in China (see the CPC leadership’s 
speeches in Shantou University Press, 1999; Pepper, 1986). However, regimes in 
China still maintained a series of top-down political systems from the totalitarian 
regime, post-totalitarian regime, and ‘Party as a Supervisor of the State’.  
 
The CPC’s claim for establishing a democratic government was in response to the 
trend from the May Fourth movements; the historical evidence suggests that the CPC 
did not support one-party rule before the party gained state power. Lishi de xiansheng: 
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ban ge shiji qian de zhuangyan chengnuo (历史的先声─半个世纪前的庄严承诺),46 
the book celebrating the 50th anniversary of the battle of the democratic CPC that 
ended KMT dictatorship, was a collection of the official documents from the CPC 
leadership and the CPC official newspapers before 1949. In this book, nearly all of the 
CPC official documents claimed that democracy, even the American or British 
versions, were welcomed. Furthermore, the book collected records of the argument 
for political equality, freedom of assembly and speech, accountability and rule of law 
– the characteristics for a democratic regime. Most importantly, in the book the CPC 
claimed to end KMT one-party rule in 'Jiefang Daily' (解放日报, the official 
newspaper of the CPC propaganda, used to publicise the CPC’s policies and opinions) 
on 28th October 1941. The newspaper article argued that the key to the 
implementation of democratic politics at the time was to end KMT one-party rule 
(Shantou University Press, 1999, p.304). If one-party rule was not resolved, then the 
affairs of state were bound to be in the hands of one party; therefore, intellectuals 
could not be involved in government, and good suggestions could not be implemented. 
Although KMT argued that there was a democratic government, the so-called 
democratic government existed only in name. Nonetheless, only after the end of 
one-party rule, and the separation of party and government had been put into practice, 
would intellectuals contribute their best to public life. As a result, people in different 
parties could learn and watch each other in order to seek the greatest progress in 
politics. The CPC also clearly asked to end one-party rule and carry out democratic 
politics; this implied that all parties would gather in the democratic regime and work 
towards democratic politics (Shantou University Press, 1999). Meanwhile, Liu, 
Shaoqi (刘少奇), the former president of China, indicated that ‘It is a malicious 
rumour-mongering and slander to argue that the CPC moves against KMT’s one party 
dictatorship only to establish instead the CPC’s own one-party dictatorship. The 
purpose for the CPC to go against the KMT dictatorship is to establish a democratic 
government rather than establishing the CPC one-party dictatorship’ (Shantou 
University Press, 1999, p.292). 
 
The official position on a democratic coalition government can also be seen in Mao 
Zedong’s speeches to the National Congress of the Communist Party of China, such 
as the speech he delivered named ‘On Coalition Government on the 7th National 
Congress in 1945’. His speeches mentioned the establishment of an interim central 
government formed by the representatives from the KMT, the CPC, the CDL and 
non-partisan people. This interim government would issue a democratic policy agenda 
and hold free elections to elect the representatives to the National Assembly and 
                                                     
46 The book has been banned by the CPC authority. 
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create the formal democratic government (Mao, 1945). In order to carry out its 
promise, the CPC assembled ‘The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference’ 
(CPPCC), with other parties, not long before they won the civil war. This conference 
delivered the first constitution in 1954, which kept several democratic values, such as 
the rule of law and the parliamentary system. Furthermore, this constitution did not 
mention one-party rule in China. From 1949 to 1957, the promise of a democratic 
coalition government was used in slogans and strategies to attract support from 
anti-KMT parties. This stage continued until 1957, when the CPC won the civil war; it 
established a coalition government and shared partial power with other parties, such 
as the CDL and the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (民革, one 
of the founders was Sun, Yat-Sen’s wife, Soong Ching-ling). 
 
The newly born ‘democracy’ ended after the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 and the 
regime in China transformed from a ‘democracy’ to a totalitarian regime. Any party or 
leader who did not agree with the CPC’s policy was outside the government and 
related institutions. From 1957 to the end of the Cultural Revolution, Mao started to 
eliminate his potential and actual political competitors to ensure his political status. 
During the Anti-Rightist Movement, Red Guards, most of whom were young students, 
became Mao’s personal guards; they only followed Mao’s orders, and were loyal to 
Mao himself. Mao, at that time, tried to establish himself as the only great leader (see 
Li Zhisui, 1994) and China raised a cult dedicated to Mao himself. Most of his 
comrades who were loyal, but did not follow his opinion, , such as Peng Dehuai (彭德
怀), Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao (林彪)47,were, sooner or later, killed in this movement. 
Thousands of scholars, teachers, CPC party leaders or anyone else, who, it was 
claimed, failed to follow Mao’s ideas, were cited as anti-revolution or anti CPC (8th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1966; 8th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China, 1968). Also in this period, a new constitution was 
established, which limited most civil rights and party organisations; the Cultural 
Revolution suggestions and the quotations from Chairman Mao became the only 
guide for the state. After the Cultural Revolution, the Resolution on Certain Questions 
in the History of CPC criticised Mao’s errors and clearly indicated that the class 
struggle and revolutionary mobilisation of the people was not necessary. The party 
was urged to emphasise the construction of a democratic system and the security of 
the democratic system under the rule of the CPC (11th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, 1981).  
                                                     
47 Lin Biao was one of the most loyalty supporters of Mao; he even said, ‘Chairman Mao is a genius, 
every sentence from him is the truth’. 
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5.1.2 Construction of Chinese Democracy 
Mao constructed Chinese democracy in the 1940s (his suggestion of the New 
Democracy of China, can be found, for the first time, in his speech ‘New democracy’ 
(新民主主义论) in 1940). He understood that China is a rural state, and, like the 
successful revolutions in Chinese history that overthrew a previous dynasty, a 
successful revolutionary movement must be joined by people from rural areas. He 
combined the word democracy with the ‘bourgeois-democratic revolution’, arguing 
that class struggle is needed in China to fight against capitalists, and foreign powers 
are exploiters who seize power over members of the proletariat, such as farmers and 
labourers. Therefore, a bourgeois-democratic revolution in which farmers, workers or 
intellectuals could participate was needed to overthrow the feudal society manipulated 
by capitalists and landlords.  
 
However, the situation changed after economic openness began, when the regime 
faced social, economic and political challenges following economic reform. Scholars 
argue that China now is more like a post-totalitarian state (Wu, 2007, pp.309-311; Lin 
& Hsu, 2004, pp.14-26; Nathan, 2003, pp.7-16).48 During this period, the original 
socialist ideology has been gradually weakened, or even, some scholars indicate, has 
‘died’ during the economic reform period (Bell, 2009, May 11). In order to 
re-construct the official ideology, traditional values – as constituted in Confucianism – 
were suggested to replace it (Thompson, 2001, pp.162-163; Bell, 2009, May 11; 
Huntington, 1996, p.106; Hahm 2004, pp. 99-100).  
 
                                                     
48 Wu (2007) indicates that the CPC still guards people and the society and controls every important 
aspect to prevent any possibility that would endanger their regime. On the other hand, the CPC tries to 
transform China to follow the East Asian economic development model to seek a high-growth 
economic development for consolidating their ruling legitimacy. Lin and Hsu (2004, pp.14-26) also 
indicate that China now is a degenerative totalitarianism state, and argue that because of the rapid 
economic development, China now faces economic challenges, such as unequal distribution of wealth, 
a developmental gap between regions, and even problems from farmers and workers. The coalition of 
ruling elites and enterprises may provide a short-term stable environment. China now tries to promote a 
‘limited political reform’ to increase government efficiency, and also tries to maintain rapid economic 
development to ease pressure for social, economic and political challenges. Meanwhile, China also tries 
to maintain a peaceful and friendly international environment. However, Lin and Hsu suspect that the 
CPC may still need to face regime transition eventually, because a degenerative totalitarianism may not 
be able to maintain rapid economic development. Nathan (2003, pp.7-16) also indicates that two 
important institutional changes happened in China. ‘Norm-Bound Succession Politics’, from Jiang 
Zemin to Hu Jintao, and ‘Meritocracy Modifies Factionalism’, which focuses more on a regularised 
process, rather than factions, now exist in China. In order to overcome the crisis of legitimacy, more 
input, such as the ‘three representatives’ and expansion of local elections theory was introduced. 
Economic growth, which leads to the rise in living standards, was also effective. Meanwhile, no 
substantial opponents and the chaotic conditions from former Soviet Union states also provide the CPC 
with sources to help convince people of the cost of reform. 
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The communist party learned from the lessons of the Cultural Revolution and started 
to abandon the original farmer-workers alliances route. Instead, leaders of the 
Communist party began to revise its ideology to expand its mass support. This party 
takes a pragmatic attitude to revision of its official ideology. In order to expand its 
mass base, the party announced that China now stood at the primary stage of 
socialism; thus, openness and economic development become important factors in 
raising general living standards (Wen, 2007). Because of economic development, the 
middle class and upper class emerged. In order to confront this situation, the CPC 
amended its original ideology, which now offers ‘three representatives’ to open 
political space for these newly emerged social classes. Most importantly, according to 
the argument of the Chinese government, China now is a democratic country that 
adapts to national conditions specific to China.  
 
Three elements can now be identified in Chinese democracy: People’s Democracy, 
Democratic Centralism and Minben (People-Orientation). The first two elements are 
from the original CPC thinking, and the third one, Minben, was suggested by Hu and 
Wen in the past decade. ‘Three Representatives’ expand the mass base of the CPC, 
and Minben asks CPC officials to take care of the needs of the population in a 
dynamic and flexible way. Through these methods, the CPC eases pressure from the 
people’s claim for democracy and further consolidates its ruling base. 
5.1.3 People’s Democracy 
According to the government’s white book of ‘The construction of Chinese 
democratic politics’ (中国的民主政治建设), one of the important characteristics for 
Chinese democracy is a people’s democracy under the CPC’s leadership (Information 
Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2005, October 19). The 
Chinese people can enjoy democracy because of the CPC’s efforts and the facts that a 
democratic system has been established by the CPC; nevertheless, the development of 
Chinese democracy still needs to be supervised by the CPC. Under the CPC’s 
leadership, the society can be stable to ensure both social and economic development; 
China can maintain unity to fight for a better future. 
 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao gave a speech at the Royal Society of Britain that 
mentioned several pertinent points: the goal for China is to achieve a society with full 
democracy, the rule of law, fairness and justice. In essence, the Chinese accept the 
concepts of democracy, and the rule of law, freedom, equality and human rights are 
the result of the struggles against feudal autocracy. However, these concepts would be 
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achieved in different ways by different states. His speech also mentioned that 
‘People's democracy is the soul of socialism. Without democracy, there is no 
socialism. Without freedom, there is no real democracy. Without guarantee of 
economic and political rights, there is no real freedom’ (Wen, 2011, June 27). Hu also 
argued that the people’s democracy means that the CPC is a party to serve people 
full-heartedly because, in China, the government’s power is from the people 
(News.xinhuanet.com, 2007, October 19). However, a people’s democracy does not 
mean that everyone can enjoy the democracy in this system. According to Mao’s 
speech in 1949, he indicated that only some qualified people could enjoy this 
democracy (Cpc.people.com.cn, 1949, June 30). The Constitution of the PRC also 
notes ‘The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements, both at home 
and abroad, that are hostile to China’s socialist system and try to undermine it’ (NPC, 
2004). Likewise: 
 
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all 
nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship. 
   (National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China, 2004).  
 
The CPC controls the power for deciding who can participate in politics.  
 
In order to introduce a people’s democracy, the system of people’s congresses was 
established (News.xinhuanet.com, 2007, October 19). This system confirms a 
non-professional congress system in China where congressional representatives are 
not committed full time. Professional congressional representatives for these positions 
in the national people’s congress only gather once for several days each year to listen 
to the government’s report and make important decisions. This situation results in 
easy control by the government that facilitates the consolidation of the CPC’s ruling 
status. According to the Chinese Constitution: 
 
Article 57-The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China is 
the highest organ of state power. Its permanent body is the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress. 
  
Article 58-The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercise 
the legislative power of the State. 
 
Article 61-The National People’s Congress meets in session once a year and is 
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convened by its Standing Committee.                        (NPC, 2004) 
 
The National People’s Congress only meets once a year and its representatives are not 
full-time professional members of the congress; most of them have other jobs. The 
institution that actually acts as a congress is the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, which acts on the NPC's behalf when the NPC is not in session. 
Most members of this committee are professional politicians from the CPC and its 
affiliated parties. Nevertheless, this system can actually support the CPC authority 
rather than checking the CPC government.  
5.1.4 Democratic Centralism 
From the Mao period, CPC leaders have indicated that democratic centralism should 
be the political principle, both in the CPC and in New China. According to the party 
constitution of the CPC, democratic centralism should be practised as follows: 
 
Democratic centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy 
and democracy under centralised guidance. It is the fundamental organisational 
principle of the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political 
activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, safeguard the 
democratic rights of its members, and give play to the initiative and creativity of 
Party organisations at all levels as well as its members. Correct centralism must 
be practised so as to ensure the solidarity, unity and concerted action in the whole 
Party and prompt and effective implementation of its decisions. The sense of 
organisation and discipline must be strengthened, and all members are equal 
before Party discipline. Oversight of leading Party organs and of Party members 
holding leading positions must be strengthened and the system of intra-Party 
oversight constantly improved. In its internal political activities, the Party 
conducts criticism and self-criticism in the correct way, waging ideological 
struggles over matters of principle, upholding truth and rectifying mistakes. 
Diligent efforts must be made to create a political situation in which there are 
both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will 
and personal ease of mind and liveliness.  
(CPC, 2007, General Program at Constitution of The Communist Party of China, 
see also People.com.cn, 2011, November 6; Encyclopaedia of CPC History, 2011 
and article 10 of CPC constitution) 
 
For the CPC, democracy does exist in China, yet this democracy must be under the 
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guidance of the CPC. The CPC is responsible for centralising and passing orders to 
state organisations that then follow these orders using a democratic method to make 
decisions (Ying, 2005). The CPC collects opinions, and then analyses these opinions 
and makes them into systematic policies. After that, the CPC publicises the policy to 
the people, and lets them examine whether this policy is suitable (see 
Cpc.people.com.cn, 1943, June 4). The CPC also only centralises correct ideas; 
people provide opinions, and leaders decide the correct ideas. However, democracy is 
essential because, without democracy, people cannot provide opinions, and there 
would be no correct opinion to centralise (Cpc.people.com.cn, 2012). Deng Xiaoping 
even argued that China’s democracy is based on a ‘democratic centralism system’. 
The CPC is responsible for guiding this democracy. In this system, ‘personal interests 
must be subordinated to collective ones, the interests of the part to those of the whole, 
and immediate to long-term interests. In other words, limited interests must be 
subordinated to overall interests and minor interests to major ones’ (Deng, 1979, 
March 30). However, what constitutes the collective interests is decided by the CPC. 
5.1.5 Minben: People-Orientation 
One of the representatives of the ‘Three Representatives’ theory is ‘Represents the 
fundamental interests of the majority’; this part tasks the CPC with representing the 
people’s interests. In the preceding paragraph, this thesis mentioned that the CPC 
leadership now promotes people’s democracy, which indicates that the government’s 
power is from the people. In order to promote this idea, during the Hu-Wen period, Hu 
and Wen emphasised that CPC officials should understand the CPC and the 
government should prioritise public welfare. According to Hu: 
 
We must always place the people’s interests before everything else, and make 
sure that the aim and outcome of all our work is to realise, uphold and expand the 
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. We must 
exercise power for the people, identify ourselves with them and work for their 
interests. This will win us the most extensive, reliable, and solid popular support, 
which will serve as the source of strength for our work. 
 
All Party members must put the people foremost in their minds, respect the 
people as masters of the house and their creativity, and treat them as teachers. We 
must ensure that in their growth, our political vision and governance capacity 
draw inspiration from the creative practices of the people. We should attach great 
importance to work relating to the people under new conditions and do the job 
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well. We must consult the people on policies, learn about their needs, and seek 
suggestions from them. We must listen to their views, truthfully reflect their 
wishes, help alleviate their hardships, and protect their economic, political, 
cultural, and social rights and interests in accordance with the law. The people 
will care about and feel close to the Party only when the Party feels the same 
toward them.                                  (Hu, 2007b; 2011, July 1) 
 
Wen also clearly mentioned ‘it is the people who feed you’ when he asked that the 
PLA implement the rescue mission during the Sichuan disaster earthquake period. The 
Building of Political Democracy in China (中国的民主政治建设), the white paper 
published by the Chinese government, also declared that the essence of Chinese 
democracy is that people are the real masters of their own country; it is the nature of 
socialist democracy in China. Under the CPC’s leadership, this characteristic can be 
ensured by four measures: the system of people's congresses; abiding by the 
Constitution and Law; local self-government; and the principle that all people are 
equal before the law (Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic 
of China, 2005, October 19). Wen also noted that the government should insist on 
‘Minben’, which can be found in Confucian teachings, to ensure a better life for the 
people under the leadership of the CPC government (Wen, Jiabao, 2009). This 
Minben reform and ideas are also mentioned in the report of the 17th National 
Congress of the CPC and in speeches to members of the CPC by Hu Jintao (Hu, 2006; 
2007a, p.6).  
 
However, Minben in classic Confucianism is not a democratic concept, as was 
mentioned in Chapter 2. Although Minben asks the ruler to view the people as the 
source of legitimacy of the regime, in the classic Confucian political system, most 
people are not allowed to participate in politics because only the qualified persons can 
rule; thus the ruler should fulfil his duty to take care of the needs of the populace. For 
CPC leaders, Minben offers them a democratic image for the people and for foreign 
countries, showing that the CPC leaders tend to stand on the side of the people and 
wish to practise democracy. 
 
Regarding these three characteristics, the CPC constructs a CPC rule-based 
democracy. In this system, the fundamental principle is that the CPC agrees that 
governmental power is from the people, yet this political system must be under the 
control of the CPC. Considering the relationship between the government and the 
people, government leaders should become flexible in dealing with public 
requirements and public opinion. The welfare of the people should be paramount and 
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leaders should take care of people’s basic needs. As for popular opinions, not every 
opinion needs to be regarded; only those selected should be considered. The populace 
can follow the existing mechanism, the People’s Congress, to participate in politics, 
yet because of the limitations of this system, representatives of the People’s Congress 
at the central and local level may only accept the CPC’s decisions and policies. Thus, 
this Chinese democracy becomes the essential theoretical framework for facilitating 
the CPC’s ruling status.  
 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates popular opinions of Chinese Democracy. This thesis uses ‘In 
your opinion how much of a democracy is China?’ to examine the result. Figure 6.1 
demonstrate how successfully the CPC convinces the Chinese to believe in this form 
of Chinese democracy. In this figure, 74% of Chinese people argue that the Chinese 
political system belongs to a democracy, 20% of 74% argue that this system is a full 
democracy. On the other hand, only 1% of people indicate that this is not a 
democracy.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Chinese opinions on Chinese democracy (Wave 2). 
          Source: 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
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Figure 5.2: Chinese opinions for satisfaction with Chinese democracy (Wave 1). 
      Source: 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
           Note: ‘Decline answer’ and ‘Can’t Choose’ have been eliminated from the data. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Chinese opinions for satisfaction with Chinese democracy (Wave 2). 
          Source: 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
  Note: ‘Decline answer’ and ‘Can’t choose’ have been eliminated from the data. 
 
This thesis uses the question ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 
the way democracy works in China. Are you …?’ to demonstrate Chinese opinion in 
relation to satisfaction with Chinese democracy. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate a high 
percentage of satisfaction with Chinese democracy in the past ten years: 88% of 
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demonstrates that the Chinese nowadays are pleased with the ‘Democracy with 
Chinese characteristics’, which is actually a one-party dictatorship ‘democracy’.  
5.1.6 Summary 
This section introduced Chinese leaders’ attitude to democracy and the kind of 
democracy that now exists in China. After the Qing Empire collapsed, a series of 
social and political movements asked for democracy, and the CPC leadership at that 
time answered the call and committed themselves to practise democracy. Their slogan 
was to end KMT one-party rule and they finally won the civil war. However, the facts 
demonstrate that ‘democracy’ existed for less than ten years, and then China was ruled 
by Mao’s personal dictatorship regime. After the Cultural Revolution, the CPC 
leadership initiated openness and reform, and the Party became the supervisor to the 
state. The original official ideology was revised to expand its popular base. The 
democracy with Chinese characteristics was constructed of two original elements: 
people’s democracy and democratic centralism – and one new element, Minben, 
which is from Confucianism.  
 
According to the ideas of people’s democracy, government power comes from the 
people, and who constitutes ‘the people’ is decided by the CPC. There is only a 
limited mechanism – the people’s congress system – for public participation in 
politics; democratic centralism asks the CPC to collect public opinion, but in the 
meantime, it also provides the CPC with the power to select and control opinion 
because the CPC is the highest judge of opinion. Minben requires the CPC officers to 
take the people to their heart and to take care of them, and also creates a ‘love-people’ 
and democratic image; yet it is a lever to end public dissatisfaction because people 
will feel the party stands with them. However, the overall principle is that the system 
is under the leadership of the CPC.  
 
Empirical evidence from Asian Barometer demonstrates, in fact, that a very large 
majority of Chinese are satisfied with this democracy. Only a few respondents 
indicated that the democracy is a problematic one. In the next section, this thesis will 
demonstrate how the CPC uses traditional legacies to help to strengthen Chinese 
democracy in the public consciousness, and discusses whether modernisation in China 
would diminish or help to strengthen the influence of traditional legacies. 
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5.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation 
In the preceding section, this thesis mentioned that the CPC constructs a 
CPC-dominant democracy. In this democracy, some Confucian ideas have been used 
to create a people-orientation image. In order to establish this Chinese form of 
democracy, the CPC also strongly emphasises people’s spiritual civilization building 
(精神文明建设) – the mechanism for instilling official ideology. Three traditional 
legacies have been adopted, more or less, to serve this purpose. Regarding 
hierarchical politics, as mentioned in the last section, Democratic Centralism is the 
element for managing political issues therefore, a hierarchical politics under the 
leadership of the CPC is created, and most political organisations are bound into the 
CPC-created system. In order to prevent potential conflict between the people and the 
government, harmonious society becomes the core policy for the CPC authority to 
promote. It can be found that these policies with traditional legacies are also closely 
related to the Chinese democracy elements mentioned in the preceding section.  
 
Guanxi in China is not promoted officially. Even the CPC authority indicates that it is 
a core problem that would lead to corruption, and corruption should be strictly 
forbidden. Hu indicates that in order to prevent erosion of legitimacy, anti-corruption 
will be a priority for CPC to prevent the party losing trust and support (Hu, 2011, July 
1, p.6; 2011, June 29). Nonetheless, guanxi broadly exists in Chinese politics. The US 
congress report also indicates there are three major factions in China: Jiang Zemin and 
the ‘Shanghai Clique’, Hu Jintao and the ‘CCYL Faction’, and Xi Jinping and the 
‘Princelings’ (Dotson, Zhuo, & Taffer, 2012). Although factions of the CPC dominate 
Chinese politics and they attack each other, these factions are not mentioned officially 
by the CPC authority, in order to create an appearance of unity (Guthrie, 2012, March 
16; Wasserstrom, 2012).  
5.2.1 Traditional legacies 
Hierarchical politics 
 
China encourages a strong hierarchical politics system that can be viewed as having 
three aspects: the relationship between state and party, the relationship between the 
CPC and other democratic parties, and the inner party. 
 
Regarding the state-party relationship, the CPC decided to separate the party 
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organisations from the state, which means that party organisations will only be party 
organisations, and state institutions will only be state institutions. Zhao Ziyang’s 
speech at the 13th National Congress in 1987 indicated that the government should 
only act as a supervisor of the state rather than become part of government 
organisations, and secretaries of the Party committees supervise government 
institutions. His report clearly indicated that the party’s mission is to become the 
political leader that decides political principles and political direction makes the 
important decisions, and recommends staff for state institutions. At the central 
government level, the party leads state affairs by implementing the party’s policies 
through the government. He indicates that the objectives for state institutions and 
party organisations are different. The party organisation is responsible for mobilising 
the public to put into practice the party’s policies and directions. The state institution 
is responsible for carrying out and legitimising those policies (Zhao, 1987). 
 
In the local authority, the local party leadership should follow the central party 
leadership, and also supervise local authorities to ensure that the policies of the central 
party and central government can be fulfilled in practice. In the state enterprises, the 
party also acts as a supervisor, and managers should take the actual responsibilities. 
Professional intellectuals should establish the state bureaucratic system, and the state 
enterprises should hire professional managers. The standard to select people is based 
on profession rather than seniority (Zhao, 1987, p.2). With these mechanisms, the 
CPC is responsible for policies guidance, and the government is responsible for 
implementing and promoting them. This can be found in the Chinese Constitution: 
 
The basic task of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernisation 
along the road of Chinese-style socialism. Under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism… 
 
Both the victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its 
socialist cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. 
 
In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed under the 
leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front which 
is composed of the democratic parties and people’s organisations and which 
embraces all socialist working people, all builders of socialism, all patriots who 
support socialism, and all patriots who stand for the reunification of the 
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motherland. This united front will continue to be consolidated and developed. 
                                                      (NPC, 2004) 
 
Hu Jintao indicated that ‘Taking the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics 
means we will, under the leadership of the CPC and in light of China's basic 
conditions, take economic development as the central task …(2007a, p.2), and Jiang 
Zemin (2001) also expressed the views of the CPC leadership in relation to the state. 
The Chinese constitution and leaders’ speeches confirm the status of the CPC as the 
actual supervisor of the state.  
 
As for the relationship of the CPC with other democratic parties, China moved from a 
‘one-big-several-small parties’ system to a ‘one-party dictatorship several-satellite 
parties’. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is used to maintain 
this system.  
 
The common programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领), established in 1949, was the first constitutional 
document for the PRC. The government, based on this programme, was organised by 
leaders from the Communist party and democratic parties that supported the CPC in 
the civil war. In the Political Consultative Conference, democratic parties were the 
actors and negotiators; nonetheless, these parties held nearly one-third of the seats in 
the government. During this period, a ‘one-big-several-small parties’ system was 
formed, in which every party had a right to be involved in state affairs. This 
‘democratic coalition government’ ended after the 1954 Chinese Constitution was 
implemented. The system of people’s congresses replaced the Political Consultative 
system, which allowed effective participation for most parties. The democratic parties 
become the ‘satellite parties’ which are affiliated with the CPC (see Information 
Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2007, November 15. 
This official document clearly indicates that the CPC is the leadership and other 
democratic parties are participants of the political system. The CPC is the only party 
that can rule the state, and others participate in politics by the Chinese Constitution. 
These democratic parties can discuss policies at the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference).  
 
A multi-party cooperation and political consultation system exists under the 
leadership of the CPC, and the constitutions of eight democratic parties have an article 
of ‘under leadership of the CPC’; this is also, in practice, democratic centralism. 
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As for inner party organisations, the CPC constitution states: 
 
Article 10 (1) Individual Party members are subordinate to the Party organisation, 
the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organisations are 
subordinate to the higher Party organisations, and all the constituent 
organisations and members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress 
and the Central Committee of the Party.                      (CPC, 2007) 
 
The party adopts democratic centralism to guide the party, and obviously party 
members should obey the orders of the leadership. Party members can offer their 
opinions, yet as this thesis has discussed in the previous section, party leaders have 
the right to decide what is the correct view that should be adopted by the party. 
 
Overall, in China, government leaders are from the CPC and only a few are from its 
affiliated parties.  
 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the political structure of Communist China: the ruling class is 
attached to the Communist Party, and a democracy with Chinese characteristics 
becomes the new theoretical framework to rule the country. In this model, most civil 
servants need to be CPC members; central and local government, and related 
institutions, even companies, are under the leadership of the CPC. Moreover, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) belongs to both the CPC and the state. Outside the 
CPC are the people, who should be led by the CPC. 
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Figure 5.4: Political structure of Communist China. 
 
 
Recently Hu, Jintao made a speech for the 90th birthday of the CPC, in which he said 
that China would expand political participation for the people and the CPC’s satellite 
parties. Several improvements are needed, regarding, for example, legal procedure, 
the efficiency of government, wider political participation, more ‘democratic’ 
elections, supervision, management and decision-making processes, but the 
fundamental principle – that the government must be ruled and led by CPC – is not 
changed (Hu, 2011, July 1, p.8). In order to prevent the erosion of legitimacy, 
anti-corruption will be the priority for the CPC, so that it will not lose the trust and 
support of the people (Hu, 2011, July 1, p.6; 2011, June 29).   
 
Harmony and group-orientation 
 
After the Cultural Revolution, a Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of 
CPC made clear that the CPC authority must build a spiritual socialist civilisation to 
reduce incorrect thoughts and strengthen nationalist education (11th Central 
Committee of the CPC, 1981). 
 
Article 24 The State strengthens the building of a socialist society with an 
advanced culture and ideology by promoting education in high ideals, ethics, 
general knowledge, discipline and the legal system, and by promoting the 
formulation and observance of rules of conduct and common pledges by various 
sections of the people in urban and rural areas.  
 
The State advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of 
labour, of science and of socialism. It conducts education among the people in 
patriotism and collectivism, in internationalism and communism and in 
dialectical and historical materialism, to combat capitalist, feudal and other 
decadent ideas.                                          (NPC, 2004) 
 
Social stability and unity is one of the most important issues for the CPC authority. As 
Chapter 2 mentioned, from the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang has pointed out that the CPC 
authority should deal correctly with the contradictions among the people. The Fourth 
Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of CPC formally indicated that 
China should construct a socialist harmonious society. The Hu-Wen administration 
found that social conflicts are rising in Chinese society after openness and reform; 
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corruption, social injustice, employment issues, social security, income distribution, 
education, health care, housing, and problems of farmers and workers have all raised 
the level of opposition in society. Since openness and reform cannot be stopped, social 
dissension is increasing, and values are changing because of the material life. It is said 
that the CPC should act to build up a socialist harmonious society to deal with these 
issues (Hu, 2005, February 19; Xinhuanet, 2005, March 23; 2006, September 26; 
News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16).  
 
An official document from the Central committee of the CPC “Zhonggong zhongyang 
guanyu goujian shehuizhuyi he hexie shehui ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding” (中共
中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定 ), asserts that 
people-orientation, scientific development, openness and reform, and a socialist legal 
system, would all correctly deal with reform and stability, under the CPC’s leadership 
(News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16). In order to reach these objectives, CPC 
commits to building its political and social care system, but the most important of all 
is the need to construct a harmonious culture, and maintain social stability and unity. 
The party should take responsibility for ensuring that these objectives are achieved. 
 
For a harmonious culture, both law and morality should rule the state. Therefore, the 
CPC should prioritise turning the thoughts of the people towards patriotism, 
collectivism and socialism. A common consensus should be built by these ideas. 
Meanwhile, the party should work to keep control of the internet and public opinion, 
deal correct with public feeling, and spread the propaganda of the party’s official 
ideology (News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16).  
 
Social stability and unity should be maintained through community organisations and 
government organisations. Community organisations should offer services and 
encourage residents to have friendly interactions. The party and government should 
actively find the conflict among people and create information collection channels. 
The party and government should follow the law and policies to deal with conflicts, 
and also prevent and properly treat conflicts, to maintain social stability 
(News.xinhuanet.com, 2006, October 16). 
 
The Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC further 
declared four strategies for modern socialist China: firstly, act under the guidance of 
Marxism, Mao’s thoughts, Deng’s theories, and ‘three representatives’ theories. 
Secondly, press for socialism with Chinese characteristics. Thirdly, patriotism is the 
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core of the national spirit, and fourthly, eight honours and eight disgraces49 (Shanghai 
Academy of Social Science, 2007).  
 
The official theorists of the CPC also mention the core concept of constructing a 
harmonious society – political ethics (Ku, 2008, April 1). A harmonious society 
should be established on a human-based principle, which emphasises decreasing the 
uncomfortable and negative atmosphere in society. However, the facts may not 
necessary conform to the party theory. 
 
It can be seen that, through these official documents, in which democratic centralism 
and Minben are so deeply involved, the CPC authority follows its principles of 
Chinese democracy to construct the new core values. This authority has foreseen the 
potential conflicts among the people, and that their values would change during 
openness and reform. In order to prevent possible change and end conflict, th party 
emphasises, in its theories, morality and patriotism to manage the direction of value 
changes. Harmony and group-orientation are included in these concepts and combine 
with Confucian morality to avert potential changes in values. As Hu’s 2008 speech 
mentioned: ‘We need to learn all the cream of political civilization of the human 
society, but will never copy the mode of the Western political institutions … We 
firmly uphold the idea that Chinese affairs must be handled by Chinese people in a 
Chinese way, and oppose any foreign forces to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs’ 
(Hu, 2008, December 18). The CPC authority does not want to see people support 
non-official, or even western values, because this could cause instability for the CPC 
authority. For the CPC, the revival of traditional values would teach children harmony 
and compassion, and lead the Chinese to maintain a conservative political attitude in a 
high economic growth environment (Bell, 2009, May 11). 
5.2.2 Modernisation 
In a speech for the 90th birthday of the CPC, Hu Jintao argued that economic 
construction is the core for the development and prosperity of China (Hu, 2011, July 1, 
p.7). Economic development is now the priority issue for the Chinese government, 
because failure of economic development could lead to the collapse of the existing 
non-democratic regime (Huntington, 1991). For China, Deng Xiaoping has admitted 
                                                     
49 They are: ‘1.Love the country; do it no harm. 2. Serve the people; do no disservice. 3. Follow 
science; discard ignorance. 4. Be diligent; not indolent. 5. Be united, help each other; make no gains at 
other's expense. 6. Be honest and trustworthy; do not spend ethics for profits. 7. Be disciplined and 
law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless. 8. Live plainly, struggle hard; do not wallow in luxuries and 
pleasures.’ 
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this problem and decided to practise openness and reform. The first thing is to explain 
how a socialist country should adopt capitalism. China’s official ideology is 
‘socialism’, but in order to put into practice openness and reform, the market economy 
should be established in China. Thus, socialism has to be renamed ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’. Currently China is in the ‘primary stage of socialism, and 
will remain so for a long time to come’ (CPC, 2007; Information Office of the State 
Council, The People's Republic of China, 2011, October 28, p.7).  Therefore, 
economic reform and the market economy are the methods for China to reach 
socialism (see Wen, Jiabao, 2007; Xinhuanet, 2011, November 6, and, in fact, it is a 
long-term Chinese official argument). The Chinese constitution further expounds the 
guidelines and how modernisation should be  implemented in China: 
 
….Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of 
Three Representatives, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to 
adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, persevere in 
reform and opening to the outside world, steadily improve socialist institutions, 
develop the socialist market economy, develop socialist democracy, improve the 
socialist legal system…., to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, 
powerful, democratic and culturally advanced.                 (NPC, 2004) 
 
China’s modernisation triumph can be traced to the Mao period. The Great Leap 
Forward, intended to surpass Great Britain and catch up with the United States, was 
the first attempt at modernisation by the CPC authority, which tried to mobilise the 
people to devote themselves to producing steel. The failure of this movement led to a 
serious famine, especially in rural areas, and millions of refugees starved to death. 
After this movement, and several other political movements, Mao’s position as ruler 
was threatened by other party leaders. In order to consolidate Mao’s ruling status, the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution was introduced.  
 
Deng Xiaoping ended this revolution during late 1970. Open door policies and four 
modernisations, 50  which were first mentioned by Zhuo Enlai in 1963, were 
implemented to prevent the CPC’s crisis of legitimacy. Deng argued: ‘Development is 
the absolute principle’ (发展才是硬道理) and formally ended the revolutionary years 
in China. The objective of the CPC authority was clarified: the government supports 
economic development and maintains high economic growth in China. However, the 
government must control these economic achievements, and people could not 
                                                     
50 The four modernisations are Agriculture, Industry, National Defence, and Science and Technology 
modernisation.  
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challenge the government’s authority. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping noted Deng’s 
decision and the framework for CPC’s modernisation. According to Deng’s speech 
‘Insist on four fundamental principles’, he argued that the prerequisites for Chinese 
modernisation are: ‘keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic 
dictatorship, upholding leadership by the Communist Party and upholding 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought’ (see the Chinese Constitution). These 
four principles are also written into the preamble of the Chinese Constitution. Deng 
explained that the Chinese should to handle the country’s affairs in the way that 
accords with Chinese characteristics and that would meet the particular conditions in 
China. Based on these prerequisites:  
 
Domestically, the post-Mao Chinese state has arguably been based on an 
unwritten social contract between the party and the people, where (by) the people 
do not compete with the party for political power as long as the party looks after 
their economic fortunes. 
              (Taylor, 2008, pp.3-4, p.69, cited from Breslin, 2005, p.749), 
 
Taylor also indicates that ‘foreign policy that sustains an international environment 
supportive of economic growth and stability in China serves these objectives’ (2008, 
p.4). This situation developed further in the post-Deng period. Tsang (2009, p. 878) 
indicates that a consultative Leninism political system now exists in China. This 
system, according to Tsang’s argument, is a system to respond to quick growth in 
China. The Communist Party gained experience from the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and also learned how to 
deal with internal opponents. The current CPC authority, in Tsang’s argument, is a 
regime that can change with internal environments and responds to the challenges to 
the regime. Order, stability and economic growth are the priorities for this authority; 
therefore, the ruling class will use any possible means to achieve these objectives. He 
also indicates that Mao’s thought and amended Confucian values would be adopted to 
increase this authority’s governing abilities and moral authority. The bottom line is 
clear: the CPC must hold the dominant position in the state; if the ruling class faces a 
crisis that they cannot control, then strict suppression would be the choice for them to 
protect their regime. In order to prevent the legitimacy crisis from failure of policies 
or economic growth, nationalism becomes the safety valve for this regime. This valve 
would be the channel to transfer their depression and anger to any other possible 
outside states rather than to the CPC authority inside China (Tsang, 2009, pp.879-890; 
see also Alagappa, 1995, pp.32-33, who suggests that the Chinese government tries to 
use nationalism and the rise of China to consolidate its ruling legitimacy). Bell (2008, 
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p.16) also indicates that the liberalised economic system with tight political control is 
a temporary, but necessary, method to maintain social order. Hu’s speech in 2008 
provided evidence for these opinions: 
 
Without democracy, neither socialism nor socialist modernisation could be 
realised…. Don’t sway back and forth, relax our efforts or get side tracked, but 
firmly push forward the reform and opening-up as well as adhere to socialism 
with Chinese characteristics. In that way, we will definitely achieve our grand 
blueprint and ambitious objectives…. The country that develops asserts itself, 
and to keep stability is an overriding task. We will achieve nothing without 
stability.                                (Hu Jintao, 2008, December 18)  
 
His speech confirmed the idea that modernisation in China should not affect stability 
or the CPC’s ruling status. 
 
Economic growth cannot really bring democratisation to China because the CPC 
position must be taken into account.51 Economic growth in China helped the party by 
creating a number of supporters who have become rich, and importantly, there are no 
effective opponents to compete with the CPC. Consequently, people are forced to 
consider that, if the CPC should collapse, then China may find itself in a chaotic 
situation, and even separated into several parts, and this situation could not be 
tolerated by the Chinese. This perceived threat convinced people that going against 
the party means going against the state, social stability and existing economic 
achievements (Dickson, 2003, pp.32-33). Thus, the situation brings not 
democratisation but regime stability – people will tend to support the CPC. 
Meanwhile, economic development also prevents a legitimacy crisis for the 
authoritarian regime. To summarise, high economic growth in China will lead to 
satisfaction with this regime. However, when the state suffers low economic growth, 
people will complain to the government rather than overthrow the regime. 
 
Another modernisation factor, education, is also important to help the CPC to 
strengthen its rule, especially patriotic education. The CPC authority faced the first 
legitimacy crisis in 1989, and they suppressed the democratic movement. After that, 
although the legitimacy of the Chinese communist government depends on economic 
growth (Taylor, 2008, p.15; Hahm, 2004, p.100), the CPC authority and the people 
reached a balance. As Taylor and Tsang’s analysis shows: this authority only allows 
                                                     
51 Dickson (2003, pp.32-33) points out that those who argue that China will transfer to a strong and 
wealthy state, or it will collapse, miss an essential point: who leads the democratisation? 
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economic development, and will not tolerate any political challenge which may lead 
to an unstable society and decrease economic growth, and then lead to a legitimacy 
crisis. Furthermore, this authority is trying to avert any possible challenge from the 
people. As has been argued in this chapter, the inculcation of ‘love China’ education 
and the CPC historical view, from elementary school onwards provides a safety valve. 
 
The preceding section, which discussed traditional legacies, mentioned that one of the 
most important elements for constructing socialist harmonious society is 
strengthening patriotic education. The CPC emphasises patriotic education, especially 
educating people to ‘love China’, and the contents of this education, includes many of 
the CPC policies and principles (Huang, K.-Y, 2007). This education may set up a 
connection between ‘love China’ and love of the CPC government (under the 
leadership of the CPC), to facilitate the party’s ruling status.  
 
Nationalism is used as the safety valve to prevent low economic growth (Alagappa, 
1995, pp.32-33). Nationalism covers three aspects. First, it connects China and the 
Communist Party as a whole. The Communist Party noticed that, in the late Qing 
dynasty, the choices of the populace were first, follow the Qing government’s 
measures to save China; when the Qing government failed, people chose to overthrow 
the Qing government. A stable and united China is a priority, and, if the Chinese 
people want to keep this, the Communist Party must lead China. Currently, there is no 
other political group or party that can challenge the Communist Party. Second, 
education in terms of ‘love China’ and ‘this state needs the leadership of the 
Communist party’ is common. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Communist Party used 
an historical view of the party to teach the younger generation in China to become 
attached to this idea. Third, Chinese authority is used to argue that any conflict or 
political movements in China are the result of interference by foreign powers in 
Chinese internal affairs. For instance, the CPC authority took three measures to deal 
with conflicts in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region: 1. it sent troops, who were 
responsible for suppressing democratic movements on 4th June 1989, to suppress 
conflict (Chinesedaily, 2011, June 1); 2. China claimed that these conflicts were 
encouraged by foreign powers, although Spokesperson Jiang Yu did not mention 
which foreign powers were responsible (Ceng, 2011, June 1; News.Sina.com, 2011, 
May 31); 3. China minimised this conflict as a small, regional issue, saying that the 
CPC and government would deal with it appropriately. 
 
As for the middle class, China has faced challenges from rapid economic growth, and 
one of the important challenges was how to deal with the growth of the middle class. 
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As the preceding section indicates, in the original CPC ideology, Mao indicated that 
the Chinese revolution was led by a farmer-workers alliance against capitalists, 
landlords and enterprises (11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
1981; Mao, 1945). However, after openness and reform in the 1980s, this ideology 
could not meet the needs of the time and has since been revised. In order to expand 
the popular base, the Three Representatives theories, suggested by Jiang, Zemin, 
which allows the middle class to participate in politics, was soon written into the 
Constitution of the PRC and the Constitution of the CPC. For the middle class, Xueyi 
Lu (2002) indicated that most are from private or public enterprises (family or 
individual), and newly-developed technology companies. Most are the result of 
openness and reform policies; thus, they benefited from the CPC. Meanwhile, the 
CPC has also opened political spaces for the middle class for bribing them. Therefore, 
the middle class would hold a positive attitude to Chinese democracy to ensure their 
benefits would not disappear.  
 
Table 5.1 demonstrates middle class support for Chinese democracy. In this table of 
the two waves data, the indicators for the satisfaction for Chinese democracy are 
extremely high, reaching 81.02% in Wave 1 and 87.21% in Wave 2. According to this 
result, it can be concluded that the middle class in China is loyal to the CPC authority. 
As Huntington argued, the attitude of the middle class is ambiguous (Huntington, 
1968), and the middle class in China (like the middle class in other East Asian 
countries) are seeking economic development and social stability (Hsiao & Koo, 1997; 
Ma, 2008). 
 
Table 5.1: Middle Class satisfaction with Chinese Democracy. 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
 N % N % 
Dissatisfaction 305 18.98% 319 12.79% 
Satisfaction 1302 81.02% 2176 87.21% 
Total 1607 100% 2495 100% 
Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
       2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
5.2.3 Satisfaction with Chinese Democracy  
In order to examine the sources for supporting Chinese democracy, this thesis uses 
‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
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China. Are you …?’ (from the two waves survey) as dependent variable52 in the 
model of satisfaction with Chinese democracy. Then gender (male and female) is set 
as control variables in this model. Four traditional legacies and four modernisation 
factors (education: high school level and degree level; subjective social status: middle 
and upper class; economic factor; age) and democratic values are set as independent 
variables in this model. Dummy variables are produced for nominal variables: gender 
(male and female), education level (divided into three levels), and subjective social 
class (divided into three levels). 
 
Regarding the four traditional legacies, in Wave 1, all traditional legacies demonstrate 
positive beta to satisfaction with Chinese democracy, which means that people who 
hold the values of these legacies will be satisfied with Chinese democracy. However, 
none of these legacies show a significant result, which means that none has 
explanatory power to the dependent variable. In Wave 2, the situation has slightly 
changed. With the exception of guanxi, beta of the other three legacies is positive to 
Chinese democracy, which means people who have these values support Chinese 
democracy, and harmony and group-orientation have explanatory power to the 
dependent variable. Meanwhile, people who are against guanxi also support Chinese 
democracy. This result in Wave 2 is not surprising. As this thesis has mentioned, the 
CPC authority has highly promoted a socialist harmonious society that includes 
harmony and group-orientation, but is against guanxi. This result reflects the fact that 
the government’s political movement is effectively instilled in the public 
consciousness, and this policy successfully helped to consolidate their rule.  
 
As for modernisation factors, in Wave 1, all modernisation factors have explanatory 
power to explain the dependent variable. Social class and people who feel that there 
has been good economic performance support Chinese democracy, but educated 
people are detached from the democracy. Regarding social class, the upper class is the 
solid supporter of this democracy, followed by the middle class. As for people who 
feel that there is good economic performance in China, they choose to support the 
government. In the second wave, education loses explanatory power to the dependent 
variable, and only people who have a degree are against the democracy. Results for 
social class and economic performance are the same as the results of Wave 1: these 
people continue to support Chinese democracy. 
 
People with democratic values in the two waves, as expected, have a negative attitude 
                                                     
52 ‘Very satisfied’ recoded as 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer). Then ‘not 
very satisfied’ was recoded as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2. 
~ 155 ~ 
 
to Chinese democracy, because they consider this democracy is a pseudo-democracy. 
Age in the two waves does not have explanatory power, and males tend to support this 
democracy in Wave 2. 
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Table 5.2: Satisfaction with Chinese democracy: multiple regression analysis. 
 CHINA 
Dependent Variable：Satisfaction with ‘Chinese democracy’ 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male 0.019 （0.031） 0.034 （0.022）* 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
-0.014 （0.016） -0.015 （0.011） 
 Anti-harmony -0.015 （0.018） -0.039 （0.012）** 
 Anti-group orientation -0.023 （0.016） -0.105 （0.010）*** 
 Anti-guanxi -0.006 （0.018） 0.028 （0.011）* 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level -0.063 （0.039）*** 0.006 （0.025） 
 Degree level -0.047 （0.070）** -0.026 （0.062） 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.040 （0.037）* 0.067 （0.028）*** 
 Upper class 0.056 （0.055）** 0.088 （0.037）*** 
Economic factor 0.297 （0.004）*** 0.235 （0.004）*** 
Age 0.003 （0.028） 0.016 （0.001） 
     
Democratic values -0.212 （0.004）*** -0.118 （0.003）*** 
(Constant) ── （0.076）* ── （0.051） 
Adjusted R-square 0.172 0.125 
R-square 0.175 0.127 
N 3183 5076 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
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negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
5.2.4 Summary 
This section has demonstrated how traditional legacies have facilitated the 
construction of official policies to consolidate the CPC’s rule. The CPC constructs a 
top-down political system that is controlled by the CPC. Harmony and 
group-orientation are manipulated to construct a harmonious society in response to 
side effects from openness and reform. The core concepts are under the rule of the 
CPC and their official theories that enforce patriotic education; the party is 
responsible for dealing with social conflict. Modernisation in China should not go 
against the CPC’s rule. Economic development helps the CPC to decrease its 
legitimacy failings and asks people to follow the CPC strictly, because, in China, the 
CPC is the only political power that can maintain existing economic achievements. 
Patriotic education is taught at every educational level in China, which helps China to 
set up a safety valve in case of a failure in economic performance. As for the middle 
class, this class has benefited from the CPC and has been offered political space; 
statistical data also prove that they choose to support the CPC authority. Finally, this 
thesis also found that the government’s policy is effective, and people who have 
traditional values support Chinese democracy; modernisation factors (except 
education) also benefit the CPC’s rule.  
 
The next section will demonstrate popular support for traditional legacies and 
democratic values, clarify whether modernisation will end traditional legacies as 
modernisation theories argue, and will also examine the relationship between 
traditional legacies and modernisation factors.  
 
5.3 Statistical Analysis 
In the preceding sections, this thesis has demonstrated that the CPC authority 
constructed a Chinese democracy. The basic concepts for this democracy are that 
people can offer their public opinion, and participate in politics through the people’s 
congress system, yet party leaders have the right to decide the correct opinion and the 
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congress system serves as a rubber stamp to approve CPC’s policies. Selected 
traditional legacies are adopted to be a part of official ideology. The CPC authority 
needs these legacies to convince people that their policies are positive. Modernisation 
factors, as this thesis demonstrated, are manipulated to support the CPC’s rule.  
 
This section will use the Asian Barometer Survey for the following purposes: to 
demonstrate popular support and strength for traditional legacies. The data will 
demonstrate that the people in China have values of traditional legacies that are 
promoted by the CPC, yet democratic values are very low. This thesis will explore 
whether modernisation can diminish the influence of traditional legacies or not in 
China. Then this thesis will analyse the relationship between democratic values, 
traditional legacies and modernisation factors to discuss how traditional legacies and 
officially controlled modernisation factors affect democratic values among the 
population. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate popular support and strength for 
democratic values. 
5.3.1 Percentage and strength analysis for traditional legacies 
The percentage for values of traditional legacies in China is illustrated in Table 5.3. 
This thesis assesses the percentage, which is over 60%, as representing a solid attitude 
to this legacy. The data of Wave 1 demonstrates a polar result: 65.8% of people 
rejected hierarchical politics, and 64.4% of people refused guanxi in China. However, 
71.2% of and 91.78% support harmony and group-orientation, respectively, as a result 
of the Communist Party’s long-term propaganda. As to the data of Wave 2, 
hierarchical politics has demonstrated a reversal, in which supporters have surpassed 
the opponents. Harmony and group orientation still illustrate high percentages, which 
are 63.8% and 89.4%. People in China still maintain a ‘reject’ attitude to satisfaction 
with guanxi.  
 
The trend for values of traditional legacies is increasing. Although the questions from 
questionnaires for the two waves are slightly different, the meanings of the two waves’ 
questions are the same. Other questions from the questionnaire are the same; therefore, 
hierarchical politics, harmony and group-orientation are comparable. If this thesis 
only considers three comparable aspects, the percentage of support for traditional 
legacies increases by 2.77%. If this thesis considers all aspects, then the increase rate 
is 2.93%. Both of the two waves’ general support to values of traditional legacies is 
over 65%, which illustrates a solid support to these values. Regarding the individual 
aspect, support of harmony and group-orientation demonstrate a slight decrease. On 
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the other hand, support for hierarchical politics decreases dramatically.  
 
Table 5.3: Percentage for values of traditional legacies in China. 
Wave1 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 34.2%  
(1067) 
71.2%  
(2149) 
91.78%  
(5463) 
35.6%  
(972) 
65.11% 
(9651) 
Reject 65.8%  
(2051) 
28.8%  
(871) 
8.22%  
(489) 
64.4% 
(1761) 
34.89% 
(5172) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Wave2 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 52.3%  
(2493) 
63.8%  
(2981) 
89.4%  
(8060) 
44.8% 
(1885) 
68.04% 
(15419) 
Reject 47.7%  
(2272) 
36.2%  
(1691) 
10.6%  
(953) 
55.2% 
(2326) 
31.96% 
(7242) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
These results also reflect the idea that the Chinese follow official propaganda; 
harmony and group-orientation are highly supported. However, the important message 
here is that harmony decreases significantly, which means that, although the 
government’s policies can make people support the government, the support for these 
policies may decrease. The overall results demonstrate that most people still follow 
these legacies, and the last section has demonstrated that people who support these 
legacies also support the existing political system. If the trend is increasing, then the 
support to the existing regime will also increase. 
 
The percentage analysis reflects the percentage of support or rejection for traditional 
legacies and democratic values. This section will demonstrate the strength of Chinese 
attachment to these values. This thesis recoded questions that were introduced in the 
methodology section as following, in order to examine the strength of traditional 
legacies: ‘strongly disagree’ as 2, ‘somewhat disagree’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a 
neutral answer); recoded ‘somewhat agree’ as -1, and ‘strongly agree’ as -2. 
Descriptions of questions of anti-connection of the two waves are slightly different, 
although they refer to the value; this thesis will not compare them in this section. 
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Table 5.4 presents the results of the strength of these values. The major finding of 
Table 5.4, in terms of traditional legacies, is that the trend of strength is similar to the 
difference of percentage for traditional legacies. Anti-harmony and 
anti-group-orientation rise slightly, which refers to the decrease in strength of the 
support for harmony and group orientation. Results also show a strong attachment to 
group orientation, followed by harmony. As the last section argued, these concepts are 
strongly emphasised by the CPC authority. The reversal in the results for hierarchical 
politics would also facilitate the CPC’s one-party dictatorship system and Chinese 
democracy. Generally speaking, these results demonstrate a positive strength for the 
CPC authority. The positive strength of anti-guanxi reflects Chinese dislike of the 
corruption and nepotism in China. 
 
Table 5.4: Strength of traditional legacies in China. 
CHINA 
 
Wave1 
Mean 
Wave2 
Mean 
PDI 
Traditional legacies 
    
 
Anti-hierarchical politics 0.32 -0.06 -0.38 
 
Anti-harmony -0.42 -0.26 0.16 
 
Anti-group-orientation -0.8547 -0.7988 0.0559 
 
Anti-guanxi 0.26 0.11 -0.15 
PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.  
Note:  1. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the 
factor, 0 means no preference. 
2. Because of the different question of the Anti- guanxi aspect, to compare for this 
aspect may not meaningful. 
Source: 1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
       2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
5.3.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
In order to examine whether modernisation factors would diminish the influence of 
traditional legacies, which could facilitate non-democratic rule in China, 
‘anti-traditional legacies’ is used as a dependent variable, and gender and age are 
control variables; three modernisation factors (education, subjective social class, and 
economic factor) and democratic values are set as independent variables into the 
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model.53  
 
The two waves’ results are demonstrated in Table 5.5. Regarding modernisation 
factors in Wave 1, education and economic performance demonstrate positive beta to 
the dependent variable, which means that respondents choose to reject traditional 
legacies. However, only education has explanatory power for the dependent variable: 
people who receive education disagree with traditional legacies. On the other hand, 
subjective social class supports traditional legacies; the upper class in Wave 1 is 
significantly in support of traditional legacies. As for the result of Wave 2, only 
education shows positive beta to the dependent variable, and two other factors (beta of 
social class and economic performance) are negative. This result means that people 
who accept education oppose traditional legacies, but education loses explanatory 
power in Wave 2, that is, in Wave 2, levels of education do not have different support 
to the dependent variable. The middle class in Wave 2 becomes a supporter for 
traditional legacies, and people who feel that economic performance is good also 
support traditional legacies. These results show that modernisation factors in China do 
not help to diminish the influence of traditional legacies, but even facilitate their 
development.  
 
Age is another factor against traditional legacies: results show that the younger 
generation is against traditional legacies in both waves, and this result reflects how, 
when people’s lives improve, their values will also change gradually.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
53 Dummy variables: gender, education level (divided into three levels), subjective social class (divided 
into three levels). 
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Table 5.5: Anti-traditional legacies in China: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
CHINA 
Dependent Variable：Anti-traditional legacies 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male 0.000 （0.074） -0.022 （0.067） 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level 0.196 （0.090）*** 0.034 （0.074）* 
 Degree level 0.185 （0.160）*** 0.064 （0.183）*** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class -0.013 （0.088） -0.051 （0.083）** 
 Upper class -0.043 （0.131）* -0.014 （0.110） 
Economic factor -0.032 （0.010） -0.091 （0.011）*** 
Age -0.105 （0.066）*** -0.086 （0.002）*** 
     
(Constant) ── （0.163）*** ── （0.152）*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.084 0.024 
R-square 0.086 0.025 
N 3183 5076 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
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5.3.3 Democratic Values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
In order to explore relationships between democratic values, traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors, this thesis set democratic values as the dependent variable, and 
set traditional legacies and modernisation factors as independent variables in the 
regression model. As for gender, it is set as control variables into the model. The 
results are illustrated in Table 5.6. Male for gender, high school level and degree level 
for education level and middle class and upper class for subjective social class are 
produced as dummy variables for this model.  
 
Regarding traditional legacies, the results in the two waves are the same. In both 
waves, figures of beta are positive to the dependent variable for all legacies, and all of 
them also have explanatory power to explain the dependent variable. Thus, these 
results mean four traditional legacies are not favoured in the development of 
democratic values. If traditional legacies are developing, they would be an obstacle to 
the development of democratic values.  
 
As for modernisation factors, in both waves, education factors all have power for the 
dependent variable, and the beta is positive. Thus, education would help to develop 
democratic values. Moreover, the data also illustrate that people who accept higher 
education would be more likely to adhere to democratic values. In contrast to people 
who feel that economic performance is good and would support traditional legacies, 
people who feel that economic performance is poor would support democratic values. 
Table 5.6 illustrates that, in both waves, people who feel that economic performance 
is poor would be likely to be more attached to democratic values, yet only Wave 1 
data have the power to explain the dependent variable. Regarding subjective social 
class, the upper class (compared with the lower class) support democratic values more 
in Wave 1, but reject these values in Wave 2. Middle class attitudes demonstrate no 
significant difference from those of the lower class, and previous data show that the 
middle class are not attached to democratic values. 
 
The younger generation are more attached to democratic values in both waves, and 
data in both Wave 1 and 2 have power to explain the dependent variable. Males also 
demonstrate the same results: males, compared with females, adhere more to 
democratic values. 
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Table 5.6: Democratic values in China: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
CHINA 
Dependent variable：Democratic values 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male 0.051 （0.127）** 0.046 （0.103）*** 
      
Traditional legacies      
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
0.133 （0.064）*** 0.190 （0.051）*** 
 Anti-harmony 0.156 （0.071）*** 0.228 （0.054）*** 
 Anti-group-orientation 0.092 （0.065）*** 0.117 （0.046）*** 
 Anti-guanxi 0.229 （0.071）*** 0.131 （0.051）*** 
      
Modernisation factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level 0.140 （0.159）*** 0.064 （0.115）*** 
 Degree level 0.203 （0.280）*** 0.103 （0.283）*** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.016 （0.146） 0.020 （0.128） 
 Upper class 0.054 （0.216）** -0.034 （0.170）* 
Economic factor -0.114 （0.028）*** -0.008 （0.017） 
Age -0.065 （0.005）*** -0.073 （0.004）*** 
     
Democratic values ── ── ── ── 
(Constant) ── （0.307） ── （0.237）* 
Adjusted R-square 0.258 0.201 
R-square 0.260 0.202 
N 3183 5076 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
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negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
5.3.4 Percentage and strength analysis for democratic values 
Table 5.7: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in China. 
CHINA 
Wave1 
Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 92.3% 
(2697) 
34.3% 
(2916) 
37.7% 
(1910) 
24.3% 
(617) 
50.4% 
(2335) 
69.9% 
(1566) 
46.5% 
(12041) 
Reject 7.7% 
(225) 
65.7% 
(5575) 
62.3% 
(3159) 
75.7% 
(1927) 
49.6% 
(2294) 
30.1% 
(673) 
53.5% 
(13853) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
CHINA 
Wave2 
Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 94.5% 
(4012) 
37.5% 
(4647) 
33.8% 
(2658) 
22.8% 
(829) 
41.9% 
(2618) 
58.7% 
(1755) 
44.21% 
(16519) 
Reject 5.5% 
(232) 
62.5% 
(7731) 
66.2% 
(5211) 
77.2% 
(2800) 
58.1% 
(3635) 
41.3% 
(1234) 
55.79% 
(20843) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2) 
 
Table 5.7 demonstrates the percentage for democratic values in China. In this table, all 
questions from the questionnaire are the same, both in Wave 1 and Wave 2; therefore, 
six dimensions in this table are comparable. Dimensions that are over 60% are also 
marked in this table to demonstrate that respondents solidly support the dimension.  
 
Findings of Wave 1 are: approximately 92.3% of Chinese people support the concept 
of political equality. Rule of law, which argues that the government’s activities should 
obey the legal procedures, is another advantage in Wave 1, where 69.9% of people 
support the dimension. Nonetheless, 65.7%, 62.3% and even 75.3% of Chinese reject 
dimensions of popular sovereignty, political liberty and political pluralism – the core 
concepts of democratic values. A minimum advantage is illustrated on the dimension 
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of separation of powers, where the difference between supporter and opponents is 
only 0.8%. The total result rejects the democratic values, which indicates that only 
approximately 46.5% people would support values of democracy. In contrast, a small 
majority, 53.5%, reject these values.  
 
As regards data of Wave 2, political equality is still highly supported by the Chinese, 
at 94.5%. Chinese also continue to demonstrate a solid expectation that government 
activities will follow legal procedures. Three core dimensions of democratic values 
are still firmly rejected: the percentages of rejections are 62.5%, 66.2% and 77.2%. As 
for the dimension of separation of powers, it demonstrates a reversed situation where 
the percentage of rejection has overtaken support by 16.2%. 55.79% reject democratic 
values as a whole in Wave 2, and only 44.21% people continue to support these 
values.  
 
The difference between Wave 1 and Wave 2 is slight, except in the case of separation 
of powers. Chinese continue to support political equality: the percentage of support 
increased 2.2%, which means that this concept has been deeply rooted in the Chinese 
consciousness. As to core concepts, the percentage for rejection of popular 
sovereignty slightly decreases by 3.2%, but political liberty and political pluralism 
increase by 3.9% and 1.5%. These results indicate that Chinese still hold firm 
attitudes against democratic values. Support for the concept of separation of powers in 
China is decreasing, and the figure between Wave 1 and Wave 2 can be found 
decreasing by 8.5%. These values are not tolerated by the CPC authority, which 
argues for the establishment of a democratic institution with Chinese characteristics – 
a de facto one-party dictatorship.   
 
In China, elections have existed for some time, and elections should make people feel 
they are equal in respect of politics. Although the political system in China is 
non-democratic, and elections are not equal (even officially-controlled), local 
elections have existed for decades, which encourages the concept of political equality, 
because people believe that they have the right to vote.54 
 
The CPC has also promoted the establishment of a socialist legal system. The CPC 
authority argues that rule of law is one of the measures they have taken to ensure that 
‘people are the real masters of their own country’ (Xinhuanet, 2005a). However, the 
Chinese government argues that the ‘The Socialist System of Laws with Chinese 
                                                     
54 Editorial of Apple Daily (2011, November 11) indicates that PRC has fair elections, but this only 
appears to be the case on the surface. Actually, any independent candidate would soon face political 
persecution.  
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Characteristics’ has been constructed, yet the legal system cannot challenge the 
leadership status of the CPC.55 
 
Table 5.8: Strength of democratic values in China. 
CHINA 
 
Wave1 
Mean 
Wave2 
Mean 
PDI 
Democratic values 
    
 
Political Equality 0.87 0.95 0.08 
 
Popular Sovereignty -0.2935 -0.22 0.0735 
 
Political Liberty -0.2034 -0.27 -0.0666 
 
Political Pluralism -0.4452 -0.4386 0.0066 
 
Separation of Powers 0.0113 -0.11 -0.1213 
 
Rule of Law 0.3 0.12 -0.18 
PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.  
Note: The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the 
factor, 0 means no preference. 
Source:  1. 2002 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2007, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
Table 5.8 presents the strength of democratic values. The questions relating to 
democratic values (introduced in the methodology section) were recoded to examine 
the strength of traditional legacies, as follows: ‘strongly disagree’ as 2, ‘somewhat 
disagree’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded ‘somewhat agree’ as -1, 
and ‘strongly agree’ as 2. Three dimensions of Wave 1 and four dimensions of Wave 2 
show negative strength, which means the Chinese stand on the opposite side of these 
concepts. Figures of political pluralism of Wave 1 and Wave 2 reflect the concept that 
the Chinese are least attached to; these figures show that more Chinese stand on a 
strong opposing side to the concept. Negative attitudes to popular sovereignty, 
political liberty, political pluralism, and separation of powers would facilitate the CPC 
authority, and these attitudes still increase in general. Political equality and rule of law, 
like the percentage analysis in the last section, demonstrate positive strength. 
However, rule of law has demonstrated a downward trend. As for political equality, 
the concept continues to exist in the public consciousness because elections have been 
held for decades, and officials are calling for more open and broad local general 
elections in the county and township stages of the People's Congresses.56  
                                                     
55 See Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China. (2011, October 28: 
either Foreword or III. Features of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics confirm 
the ruling status of the CPC. 
56 See CNA (2011, October 22); the official media in Taiwan reports Chinese Official: the vote rate is 
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5.3.5 Discussion 
Through these statistical demonstrations and models, three observations can be made: 
 
Firstly, officially promoted traditional legacies are more highly supported than others, 
which proves that the CPC’s policies that include traditional legacies are effective. 
The analyses of percentages have demonstrated that support for harmony and 
group-orientation is extremely high, and it has already been demonstrated in section 
6.2 that these two legacies are strongly promoted by the CPC authority. In contrast, 
democratic values, especially the core concepts of democracy, are rejected by over 
60% of people. This section has shown that if Chinese have higher values of 
traditional legacies, the democratic values will be low. Secondly, modernisation in 
China cannot diminish the influence of traditional legacies; some of them even 
strengthen with modernisation (except for education). Meanwhile, the younger 
generation is also the key to the decrease in traditional legacies. These phenomena 
reflect Inglehart’s argument: the values will shift between generations (1990; 1997). 
Thirdly, the environment for democracy cannot be established because traditional 
legacies and some modernisation factors, such as economic performance and social 
class, operate against the building of democratic values. The younger generation and 
education may help to strengthen democratic values in China. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The one-party system, as in the revolutionary communist states, where it was 
developed indigenously, can have more solid legitimacy because both ideology and 
nationalism can facilitate the party’s rule (Huntington, 1991, pp.47-48),57 and the CPC 
authority could be the classic example of using both ideology and nationalism to 
facilitate their rule. In China, as this chapter demonstrated, rulers’ attitudes to 
democracy are clear: build up a democracy with Chinese characteristics to both 
facilitate rule and end demands for democracy. The CPC authority creates an illusion 
that this country also has democracy, yet China cannot only follow in the steps of the 
Western countries: a democracy with Chinese characteristics is required.  
                                                                                                                                                        
over 90% in county and township stages of People's Congresses. China now is holding the latest 
general election for the county and township stages of the People's Congresses, and the latest election 
law would ensure three equalities: equality for everyone, regional equality, and ethnic equality. The 
general election will be finished in all provinces and municipalities no later than the end of 2012.  
57 Although Huntington used the case of ROC, Taiwan, this thesis does not agree. The KMT authority 
in Taiwan is not indigenously developed.  
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In order to consolidate this democracy, the CPC authority promoted a socialist 
harmonious society that includes harmony, for ending social conflict, and 
group-orientation, for encouraging nationalism. The party is dominates politics in 
order to decide what ideas are right and wrong. Statistical analysis also proves that 
traditional legacies will hinder development of democratic values, and official 
promotion for selected traditional legacies is useful for the CPC. 
 
Economic development becomes the facilitator for the CPC because rapid economic 
growth offers a good reason for the CPC to convince people that it is the only party 
with the ability to lead China. The middle class that emerged from economic 
development has accepted inducements from the CPC in many ways. Statistical 
evidence shows that these two factors facilitate the CPC’s ruling status, and help to 
consolidate traditional legacies rather than diminish them, as modernisation theories 
would expect. However, education and the younger generation are key elements for 
diminishing the influence of traditional legacies, and these elements are key to 
developing democratic values and for creating a friendly environment for democracy. 
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Chapter 6: Singapore 
 
Can Singapore survive after its independence? It is an unanswered question. Lee 
argues that ‘what is absolutely essential is to survive’ (Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 
2007, August 29, p.1). After considering this question for more than 40 years:  
 
In a joint-statement, Mr Lee and Mr Goh said the current prime minister and his 
team ‘should have a fresh clean slate’… The time has come for a younger 
generation to carry Singapore forward in a more difficult and complex 
situation… After a watershed general election, we have decided to leave the 
cabinet and have a completely younger team of ministers to connect to and 
engage with this young generation. …The Patriarch's retirement is, 
unquestionably, a key moment in Singapore’s political history. But the dynasty is 
secure.                                        (Harvey, 2011, May 14) 
 
The founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, and his colleague and successor, 
Goh Chok Tong, resigned their positions in government after a competitive general 
election in 2011. The People Action’s Party (PAP) lost seats in Group Representation 
Constituencies (GRCs) for the first time. The results of the election may reflect that 
the people of Singapore are not satisfied with Singapore’s patriarchal politics, which 
had continued for more than forty-five years (The Associated Press, 2011, May 14; 
Holmes, 2011, May 16).  
 
Singapore’s founding leaders tried to make Singapore a success, and these 
politicians from the founding period have a high sense of mission. The ethos still 
exists in the Singapore government, which is used to guide what people should do 
and what they should not do, and what is good for people or what is bad. 
Singapore’s success also attracts the attention of other Confucian societies to learn 
from them. Deng Xiaoping in China and Ma, Ying-Jeou in Taiwan expressed their 
desire to learn from the Singapore model. Ma especially wants to learn how the 
Singapore government managed the country and to transfer the experience to 
Taiwan.58  
                                                     
58 Ms Chee Siok Chin, Central Executive Member of the Singapore Democratic Party sent a formal 
letter to Ma to respond to this issue. The letter indicated that the Singapore government maintains an 
authoritarian regime that uses official power against opponents and ignores human rights. Most 
countries that tend to use Singapore as a model to follow are non-democratic countries; she is surprised 
that the leader of a democratic country would wish to follow in the Singapore government’s steps.  
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The reason for discussing the Singapore case in this thesis is not to discover how 
this country gains success to survive or its economic achievements. In this chapter, 
this thesis will use Singapore as a case to demonstrate how this country creates its 
own ‘democracy’, and how the government uses selected traditional legacies to 
form its shared values for union, nation building and to end conflicts. Meanwhile, 
modernisation factors in Singapore may not diminish the influence of traditional 
legacies as modernisation theories expect. Instead, modernisation factors are even 
used to strengthen traditional legacies and its ‘democracy’, and further hinder the 
possibility of putting democracy into practice.  
 
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: first, there will be a discussion of 
the leadership’s attitude to democracy. This thesis will indicate that Singapore 
leaders have a specific view of democracy, and this view is similar to the classic 
Confucian political system. Then this thesis will discuss how traditional legacies 
are used in the official ideology and how modernisation factors are manipulated to 
benefit the leadership. After that, statistical analysis will demonstrate how people in 
Singapore will support traditional legacies that are promoted by the government, 
interactions between traditional legacies and modernisation factors, and how 
traditional legacies and some modernisation factors are obstacles to democracy. 
Finally, in Singapore, democratic values are low, and cannot support a democratic 
political culture for democracy.  
 
6.1 Trustee democracy 
Singapore leaderships’ attitude to democracy is different from the form of democracy 
in democratic countries. The core difference between them is the purpose for 
democracy. In democratic countries, individual autonomy in which everyone has the 
right to make choices without intervention is highly valued (Held, 1995, 1996; Sartori, 
1987; Dahl, 1989); however, for the leaders of Singapore, their duty is to offer people 
in Singapore a prosperous life, organise long-term objectives for the country and 
maintain social justice. This idea is more similar to ideas in classic Confucianism that 
indicates that a ruler’s responsibility is to ensure that the daily needs of the people can 
be fulfilled. Furthermore, Singapore leaders also believe in a meritocratic government 
similar to the classic Confucian government type. However, people do not have right 
to revolt; instead, regular elections become the tool for people to check the 
government. Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong called this hybrid democracy 
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‘the trustee model of democracy’ (Kausikan, 1997, pp. 27-28). This section will first 
introduce the background to clarify the reason that Singapore leaders have adopted 
this type of democracy, how a meritocratic government operates, and discuss the 
relationship between people and government. Finally, a pie chart demonstrating the 
popular support for this democracy and a summary of this section will be made. 
6.1.1 Background 
Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles landed in Singapore on 28 January, 1819, which began 
the commercial port history of Singapore. From 1867 to 1942, Singapore became part 
of a Crown Colony; the British Empire established a legal system, naval base, 
commercial ports, colonial administration of the Straits Settlements, and 
infrastructures. From 1948, the Legislative Council of Singapore, which held a 
partially public vote, was established as a legislative authority of the Singapore 
government. The Legislative Assembly of Singapore was established in 1955; most 
seats were directly elected. After 1958, all seats were elected and a parliamentary 
self-government was established to replace the colonial government until Singapore 
was independent.  
 
Stability of the state and how to survive after independence are two core issues for 
leaders of Singapore. Lee Kwan Yew more than once described his worries after he 
realised that separation between Malaysia and Singapore was unavoidable.59 In his 
memoirs, he argues that Singapore is a man-made international transport and trade 
hub. This small island does not have any resources and is surrounded by millions of 
Muslims, but the major race in Singapore is Chinese. The surrounding environment 
was not friendly (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.11-48; Kuo, 1998, pp.29-30).  
 
If Singapore became an independent state, this state would be like a person who has a 
heart without a body. Therefore, in Lee’s argument, Singapore needed to merge with 
Malaysia; it could not survive by itself. When the separation of Malaysia and 
Singapore occurred, in the view of Lee and his colleagues, Singapore would not be 
able to survive after suddenly becoming independent. In the meantime, foreign 
commentators also held a pessimistic view of the independence of Singapore (see Lee, 
KY, 2011, pp.3-9: Lee describes the challenges and negative comments from major 
                                                     
59 Lee said ’we have to be very different from our neighbours. That was the first shock we had. 
Because we thought by joining Malaysia, we’d go back to the old Singapore. We would have a 
hinterland, a common market, and can develop import substitution industries like other countries. Now, 
we're off on our own with not the most sympathetic of neighbours. How do we live?’ to express his 
worry at that time (see Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August, 29, p.1).  
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press and countries. Lee himself also felt upset during that time).  
 
Singapore needed to prove that it had the ability to prevent the growth of the local 
communist party because its surrounding countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, 
had suffered negative experiences with communists. If Singapore failed to 
demonstrate its ability to control the development of communism internally, these 
surrounding countries would take any necessary step to interfere in Singaporean 
affairs (Kuo, 1998, p.30). Lee also indicates that Singapore did not have its own 
military force and police; the army in Singapore included the British Army and the 
Malaysian Force of Singapore. The British Army was planning to withdraw in 1971, 
and the Malaysian Force threatened security and was a factor in racial conflicts in 
Singapore. An important description reflects the Singapore leadership’s view to the 
construction of a Singapore political system: 
 
Our community lacks in-built reflexes – loyalty, patriotism, history or tradition…. 
[O]ur society and its education system was never designed to produce a people 
capable of cohesive action, identifying their collective interests and then acting 
in furtherance of them…. The reflexes of group thinking must be built to ensure 
the survival of the community, not the survival of the individual; this means a 
reorientation of emphasis and a reshuffling of values…. We must have qualities 
of leadership at the top, and qualities of cohesion on the ground. 
                                                 (Bell, 2000, p.258) 
 
In this situation, Lee and his colleagues had to ensure that Singapore could survive 
independence (Lee, KY, 1980, January 5, pp.150-152), and the objective in Lee’s 
and his colleagues’ mind for Singapore was clear: Singapore must be stronger than 
any other surrounding states, and the government had to be efficient (Lee, KY, 2011, 
p.58;60 Kuo, 1998, p.31 cited Lee’s speech in Strait Times, 1987.11.14). Therefore, 
the trustee democracy, which is a meritocratic government with elections, was 
created. 
6.1.2 Meritocratic government 
Purpose of government and selection of talent 
 
The background of Singapore forced the founding leaders of Singapore to consider 
                                                     
60 He said ‘We had one simple guiding principle for survival, that Singapore had to be more rugged, 
better organised, and more efficient than others in the region’. 
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how to manage this state to success. Lee states that ‘I was convinced our people must 
never have an aid-dependent mentality’ (Lee, KY, 2011, p.52), to encourage people in 
Singapore to be confident and enthusiastic to work for Singapore’s future. In the 
meantime, the government should also demonstrate its ability to guide and lead the 
people to success. In these circumstances, the Singapore government was designed to 
establish a clean and efficient political institution for achieving the country’s survival 
and success. According to the speeches of Lee and his colleagues, because of their 
Chinese background, the Singapore leadership tend to establish a government where: 
 
1. the government can meet the needs of the people  
2. social order and justice under rule of law are maintained 
3. people have individual freedom but cannot offend others’ freedom   
4. there is economic growth and social progress 
5. a good education system is maintained and improved 
6. both ruler and people have a high moral standard 
7. a good infrastructure is maintained with leisure, musical, cultural and art facilities, 
and the people have freedom of religion and have the ability to have a 
knowledgeable life 
              (translated from Lee, KY, 1992, November 20, p.570)  
 
The government that can reach these goals would be considered a good government. 
Although democracy and protection of human rights are worthy values, they may not 
apply to developing countries at present. He also indicated that even western powers 
would sacrifice democracy or human rights for maintaining stable situations; for 
example, the US attitude to Iraq during the Persian Gulf War from 1990 to 1991. The 
US chose to keep Saddam Hussein in power, not only for Iraq, but also for the sake of 
regional stability. In the meantime, the original culture of the society should be 
considered; otherwise, the democracy may not really succeed and human rights might 
be not protected (Lee, KY, 1992, November 20, pp.569-575). This government type 
includes characteristics that will be further explained below. 
 
Meritocratic government is committed to review the leaders’ morality and ability. 
Kishore Mahbubani, the Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National 
University of Singapore, describes three standards for Singapore to choose their 
officers: meritocracy, practice and honesty (MPH) (Mahbubani, 2009, April 13). Lee 
also argues that the standard for Singapore to select officers is not based on race, skin 
colour or relationships but on his or her ability and formal educational background. 
After that, his or her abilities should be examined and evaluated in actual practice. 
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The moral character is the most important part of the evaluation, because the more 
intelligent a person is, the more dangerous the person could be for society (Bell, 2000, 
p.208). ‘Once we veer away from the meritocratic system, our standards will drop’ 
(Wong, 2011, September 6), Lee argues that in order to maintain Singapore to be a 
‘great’ country, this system is necessary.  
 
These standards ensure that officers in Singapore can satisfy two categories: moral 
leadership and anti-private relationship. Regarding moral leadership, ‘When a 
government leader’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without 
the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but 
they will not be followed (其身正, 不令而行, 其身不正, 雖令不從)’ (Legge, 1861b, 
p.130). These words describe how leaders should discipline themselves and set 
themselves as an example for people to follow. Lee said ‘we decide what is right 
never mind what the people think – that’s another problem’ (Economist, 1986, 
November 22). 
 
The PAP establishes a strict process to choose members of Singapore’s Parliament and 
cabinet ministers. A report called Let the best people run for Congress, from the 
Chinese official news agency, describes at least six procedures for PAP to select their 
members of Parliament (Ceng, 2007, March 9 in CPC’s theory). This report indicates 
that the candidate should be interviewed by the leader of a committee to select the 
parliamentary candidate, and then examined by the committee. The candidate who 
passes the examination will be able to work in the local party branches. After that, 
another interview and examination will be arranged by government members to 
decide whether this person should be a parliamentary candidate. Then ministers will 
examine the successful candidate; after that, other examination and debates will be 
arranged to understand which position is suitable. Government leaders will hold one 
more interview, related to actual policies, to make the final decision. This selection 
process is to ensure the best person will be chosen, even if that person is better than 
leaders of the PAP (Lee, KY, 1988, August 22; 1989, March 23). Lee’s memoir also 
indicates that only the best people in Singapore would have a chance to be an MP. 
They choose candidates from best universities and offer them opportunities to prove 
they are qualified to be MPs or even ministers (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.121-123, 
pp.157-171, pp.135-144, pp.663-665).  
 
In order to ensure these talented people would have high moral standards and would 
not be corrupt, an anti-private relationship ethos is promoted. Chapter 2 has argued 
that Confucian classical writings indicate that leadership should be virtuous, and they 
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should only have social relationships rather than establish private relations. The 
Singapore government made a series of laws to prevent corruption. According to the 
information from the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), a wide-ranging 
regulation is established to restrict government officers from accepting benefits from 
other people (Government of Singapore, 2006). The achievement in Singapore is 
striking. The CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) from Transparency International 
indicates that Singapore is the least corrupt country in the world (Transparency 
International, 2011).  
 
Government-people relations and elections 
 
The founding leaders viewed themselves in the role of a strict father in the family; the 
father serves the people in Singapore (Lee, KY, 1988, August 22). Lee himself is not 
in favour of universal suffrage. He said: 
 
I am not intellectually convinced that one-man, one-vote is the best. We practise 
it because that is what the British bequeathed us and we haven’t really found a 
need to challenge that…it may well be that a voting procedure giving two votes 
to persons between the ages of 35 and 60, married and with families … A plural 
voting scheme may be a rough procedure to distinguish the competent from the 
foolish, or the public-spirited from the selfish, but it may still lead to good 
government with greater probability than a one-person, one-vote procedure. 
                                             (Bell, 2000, pp.187-190) 
 
This idea can also be seen in Lee’s speech in 1984 (1984, December 23, p.201), and in 
Zakaria (1994, p.119). Lee said ‘And whether you have one-man, one-vote or 
some-men, one vote or other men, two votes, those are forms which should be worked 
out.’ However, Singapore’s trustee democracy still offers everyone a one-vote system, 
and in this trustee democracy, regular elections offer the chance for people to check 
the performance of these ‘fathers’. The election is a trustee form of voting where 
people choose the PAP and the leadership. It means people trust and are willing to 
give power to the ministers, members of parliament of PAP, to serve Singapore. In 
return for this trust, the government would offer a prosperous and just society for the 
enjoyment of the people.  
 
Because every citizen in Singapore has one vote, the Singapore leadership need to 
negotiate public policies with the public to gain their support. In order to put into 
practice long-term public policies, the PAP administration also tries to convince 
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people that what the government does them is for their own good. If the people cannot 
accept the policy, then the government should force them to, and the people would 
eventually understand (see Lee, KY, 1981, December 24, pp.171-177; 2011; Bell, 
2000, p.185). Singapore leaders believe that, although some policies cannot gain full 
support from the people, the government should ensure that people will benefit from 
these policies, and people will then believe that this government takes care of their 
welfare. Through this process, the Singapore government can maintain long-term 
strategies for development rather than buying people off for short-term support.  
 
In order to protect the existing political system, opponents are not welcomed because 
these opponents are considered to care only for their own short-term interests in 
politics, rather than looking to the long-term development of Singapore (Bell, 2000, 
chap. 3 & 4). Interference in election campaigns that may hinder opponents’ activities, 
and taking legal action against opponents who criticise government leaders, still 
happens in Singapore. Leaders of PAP do not trust that opponents have the ability to 
ensure the long-term development of Singapore. Lee Kwan Yew said that if the PAP 
loses the power to rule, Singapore would lose its achievements and stability of 
development; thus, he claimed that the people should be aware and continue to 
support the PAP in elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~ 178 ~ 
 
Public opinion on Singapore‘s Trustee Democracy 
 
Figure 6.1: Singaporean opinions on Singapore democracy. 
           Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
This thesis asks ‘In your opinion how much of a democracy is Singapore?’ to explore 
public opinion of Singapore democracy. Figure 6.1 illustrates the result of mass 
opinion of democracy in Singapore. This figure demonstrates that a solid majority, 
91%, of people agree that Singapore is a democratic country, 71% of them argue there 
are minor problems in the system, 5% of them indicate that the system has major 
problems, yet 15% of them consider this system is perfect for democracy. Although 
criticisms from scholars indicate that Singapore is not a democracy (see Emmerson, 
1995, pp.99-105, who indicates that Singapore is more like a dynastic political system; 
and Bell, 2000, pp.185-219, who describes that the way in which Singapore’s leaders 
perceive its political system, it is more like a patriarchy than a democracy), most 
people in Singapore take the opposite view. This phenomenon can also be considered 
in relation to recent elections. People may not be satisfied with the long-term rule of 
the People's Action Party; however, it does not necessarily mean that the Singapore 
people want to overthrow the existing political system. 
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6.1.3 Summary  
The philosophy of democracy for Singapore leaders is clear: they need to ensure that 
Singapore survives, and this is the highest goal; any other ideas, such as democracy, 
human rights, or civil rights cannot be set against this goal. Until now, Singapore still 
works under this philosophy. This essay has explained how the political leaders of 
Singapore operate their government and how they view the populace, in order to reach 
the goal of survival. With regard to government leaders, a clean and meritocratic 
government is maintained to ensure the best ministers will always lead Singapore. 
Regular elections provide a way to check this government and also to nominate the 
government as the trustee to ensure the interests of the people are safeguarded. 
Meanwhile, government leaders have to convince the populace that the government’s 
policies are for their own good – for the collective good – and if there is a conflict 
between the individual’s rights and collective rights, individuals should yield.  
 
It can be suggested that the government is a revised classic Confucian political system, 
although the government is not overthrown through revolution, but by election. 
Nevertheless, with the strong guidance of public life, especially by Lee himself, 
Singapore cannot reach the standard of a western style democratic regime. To 
Singapore, democracy is no doubt to be a mechanism for government type; the point 
being that one should ‘focus on democracy as a mechanism of government rather than 
as a political theory of the legitimation of government’ (Ng, 1997, p.20).61 Singapore 
leaders focus on a good government, which stresses ‘democratic accountability 
(government as a trustee of the people), and social justice’; it would be a ‘trustee 
model of democracy’ (Ng, 1997, p.21). 
 
The achievement now – that Singapore surpasses surrounding countries in 
economic performance and living standards – are creditable to Lee and his 
colleagues (Lee, KY, 2011, p.664). However, this situation may change in the future, 
because people may grow tired of this style of administration. Recent elections 
demonstrate that the PAP cannot win so many seats in Parliament and can only win 
a presidential election by a small majority.62 Moreover, the Singapore government 
                                                     
61 She discusses Kausikan’s (1997, p.32) opinion: ‘The real debate is not about the values of any 
particular geographic area, but about values per se: it is about which values, in what degree and in what 
proportion, are necessary for sustained development, the maintenance of social cohesion, and the 
avoidance of serious problems. This is now a matter of grave concern to many Westerners as well as to 
Asians’. 
62 A report from the Elections Department of Singapore shows that a candidate who was supported by 
the PAP only won 7382 votes. Please see Republic of Singapore Government Gazette. (2011, August 
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also needs to take notice of the fact that the major salary earners and workers also 
demonstrate a negative attitude to this system. Social problems, the wealth gap 
between rich and poor and inflation could push people at this time to oppose the 
incumbent system (Leyl, 2011, May 6). 
 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted, ‘Many [Singaporeans] wish for the 
government to adopt a different style and approach …. Many desire to see more 
opposition voices in parliament to check the PAP government’ ('Singapore 
opposition ,' 2011). Although most Singaporeans may not really want to overthrow the 
PAP government, yet they have sent a message to the government: everyone has a 
vote in the election; therefore, the government may have to change their attitude, act 
as a father and treat people like their sons and daughters to rule this country.  
 
6.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
In the last section, the Singapore leadership’s attitude to democracy has been 
introduced. The Singapore leadership indicate that democracy in Singapore should be 
democracy in the trustee model, and a meritocratic government should take 
responsibility to ensure that the interests of the people are served. And guanxi, which 
could lead to cronyism, is prohibited in this political system. 
 
Because Singapore is a multi-racial society that has suffered racial conflicts, and the 
PAP has also faced challenges from the communists, before its independence, as 
‘fathers’ of the people, leaders enforce a strict legal system and encourage shared 
values to ensure that the people of Singapore could unite under the rule of the 
government. Shared values contain parts of traditional legacies and are employed to 
construct Singapore’s official ideology for national union. In the meantime, the legal 
system also provides judicial power against any person who could threaten national 
security.  
 
Modernisation factors, mentioned in Chapter 3, also help to strengthen this ideology. 
Planned economic policies lead to rapid economic growth, which makes Singapore 
become an example for other countries to follow. Housing policies and the related 
community committees not only satisfy the middle classes’ basic requirements, but 
also make families and committees become a publicity pipeline for government 
policies’. Education also serves for helping the government to promote the official 
                                                                                                                                                        
31). 
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ideology. These measures lead to the selected traditional legacies being firmly 
embedded in the Singaporean’s mind.  
 
In this section, this thesis will demonstrate a good combination for traditional legacies 
and modernisation factors in Singapore, which can promote traditional legacies and 
separate the need for democracy from modernisation. Singapore’s constitution will 
first be discussed, where the government’s duty is just like that of a father when it 
comes to supervising moral standards. The government can punish people who do not 
follow the government’s moral standards. After that, shared values, which contain 
traditional legacies of harmony and group-orientation, will be discussed. Family is the 
basic unit for the Singapore government to instil these values, because the family 
originally is the basic unit in Confucian society. As in other traditional societies, the 
family has responsibilities to educate and pass important values to the next generation. 
Regarding modernisation factors, this thesis will demonstrate the economic 
achievements of the Singapore government, and it will be explained that Singapore 
leaders are adamant that only under their rule will Singapore have the ability to 
compete with other states. Aside from high economic growth, the Singapore 
government also uses school education and control of the media to educate people 
about the existing political system. Meanwhile, Singapore’s middle class was created 
by the Singapore government, and also receives advantages, and channels to 
participate in public affairs, such as housing policy and community committees. The 
middle class will tend to support the existing government.  
6.2.1 Traditional legacies 
As was mentioned in the previous section, the Singapore government tries to act as a 
father, and treat people as children, and this thought is also reflected in the 
Constitution. Article 14 in the Constitution of Republic of Singapore notes Freedom 
of speech, assembly and association, and the second section of the article is  
 
(2) Parliament may by law impose — 
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and 
restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide 
against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence. 
                          (Singapore Attorney-General's Chambers, 2012) 
 
~ 182 ~ 
 
This article clearly indicates the limitations of Singaporean democracy: expedient in 
the interest of the security of Singapore, public order or morality cannot be offended. 
Meanwhile, Article 9 of this constitution also authorises the Singapore government to 
enforce internal security law, which commenced before its independence, to arrest any 
person without formal judicial procedure, if that person is considered a threat to 
national security. This constitutional rule again ensures the Singapore government’s 
status as father of the state, and hierarchical politics is implied in this rule. 
 
Group-orientation and harmony are promoted for constructing Singaporean 
nationhood and ending racial conflicts through highlighting shared values.. The 
family is used as the unit for delivering government policies and preventing potential 
conflicts (Hill and Kwen, 1995). Lee Kwan Yew pointed out the ethnic pluralism: 
 
To begin with we don’t have the ingredients of a nation, the elementary factors, a 
homogenous population, common language, common culture and common 
destiny. 
We are migrants from southern China, southern India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
before it was divided, Ceylon and the archipelago. So, the problem was, can we 
keep these peoples together? 
                        (Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.1)  
 
In order to unite Singaporean society, ‘We must have qualities of leadership at the top, 
and qualities of cohesion on the ground’ (Bell, 2000, p.258). Singapore’s policies to 
prevent conflicts between races and ensure the society can be united do not rely on a 
democratic system or individual rights; several non-democratic mechanisms are 
implemented to maintain social cohesion.63 
 
Five ‘shared values’ established by the Singapore government can be viewed as the 
fundamental elements of Singapore political values:  
 
Nation before community and society above self: Putting the interests of 
society ahead of the individual. 
Family as the basic unit of society: The family is identified as the most stable 
fundamental building block of the nation.  
Community support and respect for the individual: Recognises that the 
                                                     
63 Bell (2000, p.202-205) cites Lee’s speeches to demonstrate Lee’s wish to prevent racial conflicts 
from the 1950s to early 1960s through policies made to create a common national identity. See also 
Lee’s bibliography (2011), where he describes how he prevented the severe racial gap in Singapore; 
and see also Lee’s speech in Lee (1986, August 17, pp.223-226). 
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individual has rights, which should be respected and not lightly encroached upon. 
Encourages the community to support and have compassion for the 
disadvantaged individual who may have been left behind by the free market 
system. 
Consensus, not conflict: Resolving issues through consensus and not conflict 
stresses the importance of compromise and national unity. 
Racial and religious harmony: Recognises the need for different communities 
to live harmoniously with one another in order for all to prosper. 
                                           (Tan, 2001, September 21) 
 
Inoguchi and Newman also mention a framework suggested by the Singapore 
leadership that includes the idea that individuals are not isolated, so everyone is a part 
of society; therefore, it is important to ‘strike a balance between civil liberties and 
social stability’ (1997, p.4). They also note that ‘[g]roup orientation is also associated 
with values such as self-effacement, self-discipline and personal sacrifice to the 
greater good, respect for family ties and the elderly, frugality, filial piety, hard work 
and teamwork are further elements of this matrix’. 
 
In these official values, the Singapore government especially stresses the 
family-centred values.  According to historical experience, family-centred values 
have been shown to protect individuals to survive wars or invasions. In the meantime, 
the family structure can help a family to raise and teach younger members by informal 
education (see Bell, 2000, p.236; Lee’s speech in Lee, KY, 1982, February 7, 
pp.407-408). The basic core of this framework is that an individual does not exist 
alone in the society, nation and state, but is a member of these units. In this situation, 
individuals should try to balance the interests of individuals and groups, even giving 
up individual rights for the group interest. Therefore, the sacrifice of the individual 
becomes possible when government leaders consider the country’s welfare and 
common good in Singapore. An early paragraph of this chapter demonstrated that the 
stability of Singapore is the priority of the Singaporean leadership. Therefore, they 
choose to establish a well-ordered society and sacrifice individual rights. In this 
society, limitation of individual’s rights is applied to reach the objective of collective 
good. Cohesion, harmony and group orientation, which facilitate the establishment of 
a well-ordered society, are strongly emphasised. As this chapter demonstrated, in 
order to build this political system, an uncorrupted elite leadership64 train the people 
                                                     
64 Guanxi is strictly prohibited in Singapore. Bell (2000, pp.207-209) and Lee’s speeches (1962, 
December 6, pp435-445) have demonstrated what kind of elite is needed by the Singapore government. 
They would accept the elite from their selection procedure, rather than guanxi, to ensure the quality of 
the civil service. Uncorrupted leadership is always mentioned by Lee; this point can also be found in 
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to adopt shared values that are suggested by the Singapore government. 
Family-centred values would help the Singapore government to teach children about 
what is good or what is bad (especially the values) in the home. Because most of these 
values are from traditional culture, it would be more effective for family members to 
teach their younger generation than for schools or government to promote the values.  
6.2.2 Modernisation factors 
Section 7.1 has described several important characteristics of the Singapore political 
system. For the continued existence of Singapore, the country needs the best and most 
honest people to lead the country; a series of shared values needs to be adopted to 
maintain a united society, and these values are not the favoured practices of a 
democratic regime. Regarding modernisation factors, the Singapore government uses 
its achievements of high economic growth, education and policies that benefit the 
middle class to lessen demands for democracy and seek support of the existing 
political system.  
 
Regarding economic growth, Lee and his colleagues believe ‘More important is the 
economic prospect’ (Apcar, Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.1). Lee argues 
that Singapore cannot fail; otherwise, it will go back to a small fishing village (Apcar, 
Arnold, & Mydans, 2007, August 29, p.2, p.7). For this reason, the Singapore 
government dominates Singapore’s economic strategies (Quah, 1994, pp.23-24).  
 
The Singapore government’s strategy is to open its market to the world, and combine 
this with policies to attract foreign investments. The Singapore government is the 
director to guide and adjust the policies. Economic development can be divided into 
several stages (see Wong, 1990, pp.58-62; Quah, 1994, pp.6-14; Peebles & Wilson, 
2002, pp.4-7). 
 
During the 1970s, the industrialisation period and because of the separation between 
Singapore and Malaysia, the Singapore government used its natural harbours, 
decreased wages and encouraged foreign investors in order to develop its economy. 
Labour skills and technology were the major assets in modern industries, which 
included petrochemicals or electronics companies, at that time. The government could 
invest in these industries directly or in cooperation with foreign investors (see Lee, 
2011, pp.49-70: he describes how he and his colleagues develop, and invest in, local 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lee’s bibliography (Lee, KY, 2011, pp.157-171). He does not protect or help corrupt civil servants or 
leaders, because this is the essential point for the PAP government to win the people’s support. 
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industries and assist foreign companies). 
 
Later in the 1970s, the Singapore government offered the second industrialisation 
reform. This included increasing wages, increasing productivity, increasing 
investment in education and vocational training for increasing productivity, and 
expanding foreign investment incentives to attract high-technology industries. 
However, Singapore faced a recession from 1984 to 1986 (see Figure 6.1). Expanding 
the international financial centre and decreasing the costs of production became the 
strategies to resolve the recession. By the early 1990s, the Singapore government 
offered other strategic objectives. 65  Now this authority focuses on 
innovation-intensive industries. These strategies can be considered successful, 
according to achievements in economic growth. Recently the BBC reported that ‘At 
14.7%, Singapore is the fastest growing Asian economy in 2010’ ('Singapore 
economy,' 2011). In figure 6.2, data from the Department of Statistics, Singapore, also 
demonstrates that it does in fact maintain high economic growth, and Singapore was 
awarded a high score by the World Competitiveness Yearbook from IMD (IMD, 
2011). 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Real Economic Growth of Singapore. 
      Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore 
         http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/hist/gdp1.html 
 
Drawing on the experience of successful economic development, Lee argued that 
what foreign investors need is ‘political continuity, to assure foreign investors that 
present and future governments will stay committed to reforms’ (Bell, 2000, p.228: he 
                                                     
65 See Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp.6-7). 
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cites from the Straits Times (weekly edition), 28 February 1998, 14). The Singapore 
government offered this investment environment through its political system. 
 
The administration works to construct Singapore as a modern commercial city to 
ensure its competitiveness, and, from the 1950s until the present, ‘the prosperity of 
Singapore, where people lead lives that even many Japanese would envy, is shared 
widely’ (Bell, 2000, p.231).  
 
Economic development has been successful in Singapore and it is recognised as a 
guided and state-controlled process. Although economic development will slightly 
change public opinion, nonetheless, as this thesis has mentioned, the Singapore 
government enforces shared values to educate people. In the meantime, school 
education also instils these official values to prevent change.  
 
Considering the educational aspect, as Chapter 3 and this chapter mentioned, the 
Singapore government uses education to encourage the people to serve Singapore’s 
official ideology: moral education strengthens social cohesion for uniting the state, 
helps construct the Singapore nation, and propagates successful stories and 
experiences of Singapore (Ministry of Education, Singapore, 2011; Guanyinmiao, 
2011, May 13; Nichol & Sim, 2007; Tan Tai Weia, 1994).  
 
For Singapore’s leaders, western values are not suitable to prevent incoherent and 
unstable conditions among the Singaporean people. Leaders favour traditional values, 
especially the values that originally existed in East Asia, to help to create national 
identity and maintain social coherence and stability (Tan Tai Weia, 1994, pp.64-65). 
Singapore commenced this moral education from its independence, and even now, the 
contents of education offer students moral standards to follow. Singapore leaders 
indicate that this education can not only unite Singapore, help people to avoid the 
shortcomings of western societies and develop personal moral standards, but can also 
help to establish a coherent society and help economic development (Tan Tai Weia, 
1994; Nichol & Sim, 2007; Lee, 2011). National education and related educational 
programmes are responsible for promoting this moral education. The Singapore 
government released a clear message: this government welcomes foreigners, but these 
foreigners cannot challenge the values of Singapore. The government practises a strict 
method of control to forbid any information that is considered to have a negative 
effect on Singapore’s values.66  
                                                     
66 This can be seen in Lee, KY (2011); Emmerson (1995); Kuo (1998, p.297-304). These sources show 
that the Internal Security Law of Singapore, limitation of media reports, the proscription of normal 
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The government also publish stories of success, and of the leaderships’ attitudes and 
methods to manage the nation. For instance, Lee Kwan Yew himself has quotations 
from his experiences of managing Singapore, a bibliography and interviews to 
publicise the idea that Singapore’s success is due to the existing political system and 
strict control. National education also serves to educate the younger generation on the 
success of Singapore: the meritocratic government relies on a series of well-organised 
policies and claims that Singapore needs to keep this government to ensure future 
success.  
 
As for the middle class, as this thesis demonstrates, the Singapore government 
establishes an official ideology that is based on some of the traditional legacies. High 
economic growth also convinces people in Singapore that the existing political system 
is helpful for its development.. Meanwhile, school education, as well as the media, 
propagates official ideology and stories of success. The government’s work for 
economic development creates a middle class; Table 6.1 demonstrates that 
approximately 72.6% of Singaporeans consider themselves middle class. Therefore, 
how to gain support from the middle class is essential for the Singapore government.  
 
Table 6.1: Subjective middle class in Singapore. 
 N Percentage 
Middle Class 735 72.60% 
Other Class 277 27.40% 
Total 1012 100% 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
Chapter 3 mentioned that the attitude of the middle class to democracy is ambiguous, 
and the key element to influence the middle class is whether the government can 
create benefits for the middle class and offer channels for them to be involved in the 
political arena (Huntington, 1968).  
 
The Singapore government, as a ‘father’, offers public housing; this can help to gain 
support (especially from the middle class) for the government’s official ideology and 
consolidate the people. The government promoted housing policy from the 1960s. It 
controls the land and dominates the strategies to build public housing. In order to 
                                                                                                                                                        
clubs or associations from participation or involvement in politics, suing people or media who criticise 
government leaders, and interfering in industry, union movement and social life are the elements that 
the Singapore government uses to limit political participation by the populace.  
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ensure that the people can afford the cost, , the government offers lower prices and 
uses government funds to subside the loss. The government funds are based on the 
compulsory saving system, which asks everyone to submit a certain percentage of 
salary in his/her account to The Central Provident Fund. Nowadays, approximately 
85% of Singaporeans live in public housing (Liu, 2012, p.2). This policy not only 
solves housing problems, but also affords the opportunity to gain support for 
Singapore’s political system. Firstly, the policy promotes its official values, such as 
encouraging large families, reducing conflicts between races and minimising the gap 
between the rich and the poor (Liu, 2012, p.9). Along with the public housing, 
community centres, citizens' consultative committees (responsible for delivering the 
government’s policies), residents' committees (responsible for government-people 
mutual communication) and town councils are new community organisations 
established to deal with community affairs and help the government to promote 
official ideology and policies. These organisations also cause the collapse of 
traditional organisations (Hill & Kwen, 1995; Ooi & Soh, 1993, pp.46-48; Wong & 
Yeh, 1985, pp.283-285). Meanwhile, since these community committees are guided 
by the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, they can transfer 
residents’ opinions to the government, and this offers mutual communication channels 
for the government and people. Furthermore, the middle class would stand to defend 
their property and present standard of living. 
 
The fundamental aim of the present government from the inception of its public 
housing programme has been the creation of a nation whose people have homes 
they are proud to call their own. The underlying philosophy is that if one owns 
an asset in the country, one would stand to defend it.  
               (Hill & Kwen, 1995, p.120, citing Wong & Yeh, 1985, p.231) 
 
Therefore, public housing policy in Singapore not only offers channels for the 
government to promote official policies, but also makes people more committed to the 
country. 
 
Furthermore, the nominated member of parliament system also provides the middle 
class with various opportunities to participate in politics. The fourth schedule – 
appointment of nominated members of parliament in the Constitution of Singapore – 
notes: 
 
3 (2) The persons to be nominated shall be persons who have rendered 
distinguished public service, or who have brought honour to the Republic, or 
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who have distinguished themselves in the field of arts and letters, culture, the 
sciences, business, industry, the professions, social or community service or 
the labour movement; and in making any nomination, the Special Select 
Committee shall have regard to the need for nominated Members to reflect as 
wide a range of independent and non-partisan views as possible. 
                          (Singapore Attorney-General’s Chambers, 2012) 
 
These government measures successfully gain the support of the middle class. Table 
6.2 demonstrates that 83.90% of the middle class support Singaporean democracy. 
This result indicates that the middle class in Singapore does not act as a power to 
promote democracy, but as a solid power to maintain the existing political system. 
 
Table 6.2: Middle class Satisfaction with Singapore Democracy. 
 N Percentage 
Satisfied 617 83.90% 
Not Satisfied 118 16.10% 
Total 735 100% 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
This thesis asks ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in [country]?’, to explore the support of Singaporean democracy as 
a whole. Table 6.3 demonstrates the satisfaction rate. The result demonstrates that 
most people in Singapore have a positive attitude to this democracy.  
 
Table 6.3: Satisfaction with Singaporean Democracy. 
 N Percentage 
Not Satisfied 178 17.6 
Satisfied 834 82.4 
Total 1012 100 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
This thesis uses ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in Singapore. Are you …?’67 as the dependent variable in the model 
to examine who is satisfied with Singapore democracy. As for independent variables, 
one control variables: gender (male and female), four tradition legacies, three 
                                                     
67 This thesis recoded ‘very satisfied’ as 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); 
then recoded ‘not very satisfied’ as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2. 
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modernisation factors (education, social class, economic factor and age) and 
democratic values are adopted in the regression model.68  
 
The results are illustrated in Table 6.4. Regarding traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors, although most legacies and factors do not demonstrate 
significant results for Singapore democracy, it can be found that people who hold 
traditional values (except guanxi) and all modernisation factors are favourable to 
Singapore democracy. This result reflects the analysis in the last two sections.  
 
Overall, this model demonstrates that the Singapore government’s strategy to seek 
support is successful. In this regression model, older people support Singaporean 
democracy more than younger people. Those who have a group-orientation 
significantly support this political system; the upper class (compared with the lower 
class), and people who indicate there is good economic performance in Singapore also 
support the existing system. Nonetheless, people who have democratic values oppose 
the system because it cannot be considered democratic. 
 
The result again reflects that the Singapore government’s work is successful. 
Group-orientation is the most important value in their official ideology, and people 
with this concept become core supporters of the existing system. The upper class may 
be people who enjoy the benefits of the existing political system because the policies 
of Singapore government are clear: the government encourages and offers good pay 
for skilled people to serve Singapore society (see Lee’s speeches in Lee, 1980, 
January 5, pp.452-461). Therefore, this could explain why the upper class would be 
satisfied the Singaporean democracy. Economic growth is one of the major 
achievements for the existing political system, and people who see the benefits of 
good economic performance will tend to enjoy this achievement. On the other hand, 
younger people and people who have democratic values will stand against the existing 
system, and this result reflects the de facto situation in Singapore. During the last 
parliamentary election, democratic parties and the younger generation stood against 
the PAP government and demanded an end to its rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
68 Dummy variables for nominal variables: gender, age (divided into three levels), education level 
(divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels) 
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Table 6.4: Satisfaction of Singaporean democracy: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
SINGAPORE 
Dependent Variable：Satisfaction with ‘Singaporean democracy’ 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male ── ── -0.024 （0.053） 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
── ── -0.037 （0.021） 
 Anti-harmony ── ── -0.026 （0.023） 
 Anti-group orientation ── ── -0.094 （0.018）** 
 Anti-guanxi ── ── 0.040 （0.022） 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level ── ── 0.054 （0.089） 
 Degree level ── ── 0.057 （0.109） 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class ── ── 0.044 （0.079） 
 Upper class ── ── 0.071 （0.105）** 
Economic performance ── ── 0.206 （0.008）*** 
Age ── ── 0.071 （0.002）* 
     
Democratic values ── ── -0.183 （0.005）*** 
(Constant) ── ── ── （0.144）* 
Adjusted R-square ── 0.112 
R-square ── 0.123 
N ── 1012 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2) 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who against these legacies and negative 
beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor means 
people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
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economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
6.2.3 Summary  
To summarise, the Singapore leaders’ attitude to democracy is clear. They tend to 
practise a trustee democracy, in which the government should act as a father and take 
care of the people’s needs; in the meantime, the government should also instil correct 
values.. The government uses modernisation factors as the tool to promote the shared 
values that contain traditional legacies. People in Singapore will have become used to 
the official shared values, economic achievements, government measures that take 
care of their needs and the official propaganda in the education system that both 
promotes these values and shows that the existing Singaporean democracy is suitable 
for its people. Statistical evidence from the Asian Barometer demonstrates that most 
Singaporean people are satisfied with this political system. These results comply with 
the hypothesis 2 & 3 of this thesis. In the next section, this thesis will use descriptive 
statistics and regression models to examine attitudes to traditional legacies, 
democratic values, whether modernisation factors would diminish the influence of 
traditional legacies, and who would support democratic values, in order to test other 
hypotheses. 
 
6.3 Statistical findings for Singapore 
In the preceding sections, this thesis demonstrated the attitude of Singapore’s leaders 
to democracy, and how the government uses traditional legacies and modernisation 
factors to facilitate their rule. For them, the government’s purpose is to act as a father 
for taking care of people. Apart from guanxi, three other traditional legacies are 
encouraged by the government for constructing common values and nationhood. The 
Singapore government commits itself to building a modern country. However, the 
achievement of economic development is their best propaganda, education contents 
favour official ideology, and the middle class becomes a solid supporter of 
Singaporean democracy because of the government’s policies. This section will use 
the Asian Barometer Survey data to serve the following purposes:  
• to demonstrate support for traditional legacies and democratic values; the data 
will demonstrate that people in Singapore tend to have values of traditional 
legacies that are encouraged by the government 
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• to explore whether modernisation in Singapore can diminish the influence of 
traditional legacies 
• to examine the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies 
and modernisation factors to discuss how traditional legacies and official 
controlled modernisation factors affect democratic values, using multiple 
regressions 
• to demonstrate the democratic values of Singapore 
6.3.1 Percentage and Strength for traditional legacies 
The previous section demonstrated that the Singapore government promotes shared 
values (sometimes they also use the phrase ‘Asian Values’ instead), and these shared 
values cover traditional legacies, especially harmony and group-orientation (Tan Tai 
Weia, 1994; Emmerson, 1995, pp.95-99).  
 
Table 6.5 demonstrates the percentage for traditional legacies in Singapore. In this 
table, the results satisfy the hypotheses of this thesis: people have high support to 
legacies that are promoted by the government. According to Table 7.5, we can find 
that a majority in Singapore approves harmony and group-orientation; the percentages 
for supporting these two concepts are 75.3% and 83.6%. A small majority, 51.6%, 
reject hierarchical politics. As for guanxi, 61.5% of Singaporeans reject the concept. 
Incorrupt politics has a broad consensus in Singapore. Overall, approximately 
two-thirds of people support traditional legacies; 66.09% of Singaporeans view these 
traditional legacies positively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~ 194 ~ 
 
Table 6.5: Percentage for values of traditional legacies in Singapore. 
Singapore 
Wave1 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support ── ── ── ── ── 
Reject ── ── ── ── ── 
Total ── ── ── ── ── 
Wave2 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 48.4%  
(486) 
75.3%  
(754) 
83.6%  
(1662) 
38.5% 
(366) 
66.09% 
(3268) 
Reject 51.6%  
(518) 
24.6%  
(248) 
16.4%  
(325) 
61.5% 
(586) 
33.91% 
(1677) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Singapore joined the survey from Wave2. 
 
Harmony and group orientation are two important elements highly promoted by the 
government from official ideology-shared values. It is not surprising that most people 
would support these concepts. As for hierarchical politics, the figure indicates that 
half of Singaporeans, 51.6%, reject the concept. This result shows that attitudes to 
patriarchy politics are ambiguous.69 However, the ban on guanxi in Singapore is 
successful: three-fifths of respondents reject guanxi.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
69 Lee’s policy is to choose the best people to serve Singapore, and try to convince Singaporeans that 
government’s policies are good for the people. Lee said ‘Singaporeans should unite for the existence of 
Singapore and better life. Communication, patience, explanations with people and force to implement 
government’s policies when necessary are good for the government (see Lee, 1981, December 24, 
pp.167-177). 
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Table 6.6: Strength of traditional legacies in Singapore. 
SINGAPORE 
 
Wave1 
Mean 
Wave2 
Mean 
PDI 
Traditional legacies 
  
 
  
 
Anti-hierarchical politics 
 
── 0.1 ── 
 
Anti-harmony 
 
── -0.49 ── 
 
Anti-group orientation 
 
── -0.8444 ── 
 
Anti-guanxi 
 
── 0.36 ── 
PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1. 
Note: 1. Singapore joined the survey from Wave 2. 
2. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the 
factor, 0 means no preference.. 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
The findings on the strength of traditional legacies in Singapore can more precisely 
reflect the opinion of Singaporeans for these values. With regard to the traditional 
legacies in Table 6.6, figures are similar to the percentage analysis: people choose to 
reject hierarchical politics and guanxi, but support harmony and group-orientation. 
These figures reconfirm that the shared values and Singaporean democracy are deeply 
internalised. Although there is an attitude opposed to hierarchical politics, it is not 
strong.  
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6.3.2 Traditional Legacies and Modernisation Factors 
Table 6.7: Anti-traditional legacies in Singapore: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
SINGAPORE 
Dependent Variable：Anti-traditional legacies 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male ── ── -0.055 （0.172） 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level ── ── 0.071 （0.205） 
 Degree level ── ── 0.146 （0.285）*** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class ── ── -0.014 （0.293） 
 Upper class ── ──  0.020 （0.355） 
Economic factor ── ── -0.123 （0.026）*** 
Age ── ── -0.046 （0.007） 
     
(Constant) ── ── ── （0.466）** 
Adjusted R-square ── 0.026 
R-square ── 0.032 
N ── 1012 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
 
~ 197 ~ 
 
In order to examine whether modernisation factors can diminish the influence of 
traditional legacies, which are a tool for the ruler, in Singapore, this thesis uses 
anti-traditional legacies as dependent variable, and then sets gender, age as control 
variable, modernisation factors as the independent variable, and democratic values 
into the model.70  
 
The results of the model are demonstrated in Table 6.7. Modernisation factors 
demonstrate different effects from traditional legacies. Education is the only factor 
that may diminish the influence of traditional legacies, but none has explanatory 
power in Singapore. Subjective social class and economic performance demonstrate a 
positive result for support for traditional legacies, and people who indicate good 
economic development are supportive of traditional legacies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
70 Dummy variables: Gender, education level (divided into three levels), subjective social class 
(divided into three levels). 
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6.3.3 Democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
Table 6.8: Democratic values in Singapore: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
SINGAPORE 
Dependent variable: Democratic values 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male ── ── 0.117 （0.355）*** 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
── ── 0.090 （0.142）** 
 Anti-harmony ── ── 0.135 （0.153）*** 
 Anti-group orientation ── ── 0.117 （0.123）*** 
 Anti-guanxi ── ── 0.087 （0.148）** 
      
Modernisation factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level ── ── 0.113 （0.424）** 
 Degree level ── ── 0.248 （0.593）*** 
Subjective Social Class (Lower)     
 Middle class ── ── 0.001 （0.606） 
 Upper class ── ── 0.102 （0.736）* 
Economic factor ── ── -0.195 （0.055）*** 
Age ── ── -0.074 （0.014）* 
     
Democratic values ── ── ── ── 
(Constant) ── ── ── （0.973） 
Adjusted R-square ── 0.179 
R-square ── 0.187 
N ── 1012 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
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Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
 
In order to examine relationships between democratic values, traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors, this thesis set democratic values as the dependent variable, set 
other elements such as traditional legacies and modernisation factors as independent 
variables, and gender as control variables in the regression model. Table 6.8 illustrates 
the result of the regression. 
 
Regarding the relationship between democratic values and traditional legacies, the 
result proves that people who have values of traditional legacies do not have 
democratic values. According to the result in Table 6.8, four traditional legacies, 
hierarchical politics, harmony, group-orientation and guanxi, demonstrate opposite 
results to those relating to democracy, and all of the results are significant. This means 
that, in Singapore, if a person supports any one of the traditional legacies, then they 
do not favour democratic values. 
 
As for modernisation factors, people who believe that there is good economic 
development in Singapore do not favour democratic values. Subjective social class 
also demonstrates positive attitudes to democratic values. The results suggest that 
compared with the lower class, the upper class will have democratic values. Yet the 
result relating to the middle class is not significant in this model. Education is the 
most effective modernisation factor to help people in Singapore to develop democratic 
values. Results in Table 6.8 demonstrate that people who have middle or higher 
education have higher democratic values than people who only have lower education. 
The result for higher education is greater than for middle education, which means that 
graduates measure highest for democratic values. Younger people in Singapore will 
have higher democratic values than their elders, which could lead to substantial 
democratic political change in the long-run. 
 
Male attitudes are ambiguous; males in Singapore have both values of traditional 
legacies and democratic values.  
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6.3.4 Percentage and Strength for democratic values 
Table 6.9: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in Singapore. 
Singapore 
Wave1 Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 
Reject ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 
Total ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 
Singapore 
Wave2 
Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 72.4% 
(715) 
33.0% 
(975) 
29.1% 
(568) 
48.9% 
(477) 
50.5% 
(960) 
47.4% 
(447) 
42.63% 
(4142) 
Reject 27.6% 
(273) 
67.0% 
(1982) 
70.9% 
(1384) 
51.1% 
(499) 
49.5% 
(941) 
52.6% 
(496) 
57.37% 
(5575) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Singapore joined the survey from Wave 2. 
 
Democratic values of Singaporeans are shown in Table 6.9. Findings in the table show 
that most Singaporeans, 72.4%, support political equality. Three rejections follow – to 
popular sovereignty, political liberty, and political pluralism. Percentages of rejection 
for the first two exceed two-thirds – 67.0% and 70.9%. As for political pluralism, a 
small majority rejects it. Rule of law is the most surprising dimension; 52.6% of 
Singaporeans disagree with it. Finally, more than half of the people support separation 
of powers. Overall, 57.37% people disapprove of democratic values.  
 
Regarding their nation’s history, Singaporeans do not have the environment or 
resources to know about democratic values. Although Singapore was colonised by the 
British Empire, the British colonial era did not help Singaporeans to establish 
democratic values. The legacy, in terms of politics, is the parliamentary system.71 A 
democratic regime needs a strong democratic political culture to support it (Gunther, 
                                                     
71 Lee argues that ‘Why should I be against democracy? The British came here, never gave me 
democracy, except when they were about to leave. But I cannot run my system based on their rules. I 
have to amend it to fit my people's position,’ then interviewers asked him, ‘During your career, you 
have kept your distance from Western style democracy. Are you still convinced that an authoritarian 
system is the future for Asia?’ (Der Spiegel, 2005). 
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Puhle & Diamandouros, 1995, pp.17-18; Pridham, 2000, p.20; Inglehart, 1990; 
1997).72 The existing parliamentary system from the British colonial period may help 
Singapore to establish a modern state and election system, but this system does not 
guarantee that Singaporeans would develop democratic values automatically because 
an environment has been created to support the establishment of a democratic regime. 
(See Shin, 1994, p.154: he argues ‘democracy can still be created without the demand 
of masses, yet cannot be consolidated without their commitment’).  
 
Table 6.10: Strength of democratic values in Singapore. 
SINGAPORE 
 
Wave1 
Mean 
Wave2 
Mean 
PDI 
Democratic values 
  
 
  
 
Political Equality 
 
── 0.45 ── 
 
Popular Sovereignty 
 
── -0.3528 ── 
 
Political Liberty 
 
── -0.4131 ── 
 
Political Pluralism 
 
── 0.09 ── 
 
Separation of Powers 
 
── 0.1739 ── 
 
Rule of Law 
 
── 0.06 ── 
PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1. 
Note: 1. Singapore joined the survey from Wave 2. 
 2. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the 
factor, 0 means no preference. 
Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
Percentage analysis demonstrates how many Singaporeans would support or reject 
democratic values, and strength analysis can illustrate to what extent Singaporeans 
support or reject democratic values. The findings on strength of democratic values are 
shown in Table 6.10. 
 
The results of strength analysis are slightly different from the percentage analysis. 
Although the percentage analysis shows more than two-thirds of people support 
political equality, and are against popular sovereignty and political liberty, the strength 
analysis indicates that the strength of support for or rejection of these concepts is not 
                                                     
72 This point can be seen in Gunther, Puhleand Diamandouros, who argue that if people’s attitude 
cannot solidly support a democratic regime, then the regime can be seen as not being consolidated. 
People need to be re-political-socialised to establish democratic values. If this procedure cannot be 
completed, then people’s attitude (mass attitude) can easily be changed due to ‘political circumstances’. 
Geoffrey Pridham also argues that democratic consolidation is much wider and deeper than the 
transition stage. Not only do democratic institutions need to be constructed, but also people (mass) 
need to develop democratic values. 
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strong. The strength of support for political pluralism and separation of powers is 
weak. Rule of law, rejected in the percentage analysis by Singaporeans, demonstrates 
a different phenomenon here: it is positive, yet the strength is weak. This result 
demonstrates that the people who support rule of law demonstrate a stronger attitude 
to this concept; therefore, the positive strength can overcome the negative one. 
6.3.5 Discussion 
Statistical results demonstrate the following findings: Firstly, people tend to stand 
with traditional legacies that are encouraged by the Singapore government. Harmony 
and group-orientation are extremely highly supported by people, and both of the 
percentages are over 75%. Guanxi, which is forbidden by government, lacks support 
by the people. The traditional legacies are supported by two-thirds of the overall 
population. Secondly, modernisation factors cannot effectively diminish the influence 
of traditional legacies; the result shows that economic development even helps to 
increase traditional values. Thirdly, statistical regression proves that traditional 
legacies are an obstacle to democratic values; nonetheless, economic performance in 
Singapore demonstrates a negative effect to democratic values. Although moral 
education takes place in Singapore, education will still be the key element to develop 
democratic values.  
 
Through these results, it can be said that in Singapore, an environment that could 
support the establishment of a democratic regime is unlikely to emerge for now. This 
is because people are used to following the officially promoted values, and these 
values are opposed to democratic values. Therefore, a democratic culture for 
supporting a democratic regime is not possible. Modernisation would also encourage 
official values rather than decrease traditional legacies.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
After the end of the monarchy period in all Confucian societies, the emergence of a 
democratic regime becomes the choice of political leaders. In Singapore, because of 
the crisis during its independent period, leaders chose to create a trustee democracy 
for the survival of the state. The government is committed to maintaining a 
meritocratic government that recruits the best people to serve in the public service. 
The goal of the government is to provide a prosperous and hopeful life for the 
populace. The government treats people as children, and people have the opportunity 
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to take part in a regular ‘vote of confidence’ to the government. However, the 
government will not tolerate opposition movements, and government leaders may 
consider those who tend to attack current achievements as opponents.  
 
In order to construct a Singaporean nation, unite all races, and prevent public opinion 
from favouring western values, shared values are offered and encouraged by the 
government. These values contain harmony and group-orientation, part of the 
traditional legacies. In the meantime, the achievement of economic development 
becomes official propaganda, the education system helps to promote official values 
and the middle class is bought off by government.  
 
Statistical results prove that people will follow in the ruler’s steps to support legacies 
that are promoted by leaders in Singapore. Modernisation cannot successfully 
diminish the influence of traditional legacies in the public consciousness; economic 
development even helps to strengthen them. Statistical analysis results that show in 
favour of democratic values (which are key elements to create a pro-democracy 
environment) are very low.  
 
These results satisfy the hypotheses, that pseudo-democracy, the encouragement of 
selected traditional legacies for official ideology and modernisation as the tool to 
serve pseudo-democracy and official ideology make a political culture that does not 
favour democracy. However, education will be the transforming factor, and the 
younger generation may also help to support democracy in Singapore. 
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Chapter 7: Taiwan 
 
Taiwan has been democratised for more than 20 years. Data from Freedom House 
(Table 7.1) clearly finds that from 1972 to 1986, the overall status of political rights 
and civil liberties improved from ‘Not Free’ to ‘Partly Free’, and the scores remain on 
5. The later years of the rule of Chiang Ching-Kuo (CCK) saw the liberalisation of 
politics (Lin, 1998, pp.47-48); this was followed by democratisation in Lee Teng-hui’s 
presidency. The ratings of political rights and civil liberties then increased gradually. 
From 1996, there was a direct presidential election, and Taiwan, in Freedom House’s 
record, became a free country. After that, the ratings of political rights and civil 
liberties dropped to 1 or 2.  
 
This chapter will focus on three points, in order to respond to the hypothesis. First, 
the leadership’s attitude to democracy will be discussed. It will be shown that the 
KMT authority, an outsider to Taiwan, originally tried to establish Taiwan as a base 
to expel communists and restore the ROC. Nonetheless, this authority faced 
international pressure (especially restrictions by the US that limited KMT’s 
methods to fight against opponents), and confronted internal challenges by 
indigenous people. The KMT authority finally chose to democratise in order to 
protect their interests.  
 
This thesis will discuss how traditional legacies served to shape the KMT 
administration and how modernisation factors were in favour of democracy. 
Although the KMT built up a democratic centralised top-down political system to 
control most organs of the state and society, it maintained guanxi with local factions 
for local elections and encouraged group-orientation for building up Chinese 
identity. Yet some of these political structures were dissolved during the 
democratisation period. Harmony, which was not encouraged officially, will not be 
discussed. As for modernisation factors for democracy, economic development 
weakened the ruling power of KMT, because this authority shared power with 
enterprise leaders. The middle class tended to support the opposition and political 
reform during the democratisation period. Although education for developing 
Chinese identity was emphasised, democratic education could not be avoided, 
because not only did the KMT need to maintain democratic China’s image, but also 
the ‘Three Principles of the People’, KMT’s official ideology, also includes 
democracy. 
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This thesis will demonstrate the trends for traditional legacies and democratic 
values in Taiwan. The relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies, 
and modernisation factors will be examined to analyse which factors would help or 
hinder the development of a democratic environment in Taiwan. 
 
Table 7.1: Status for Political rights and Civil liberties ratings in Taiwan, 1972-2010. 
Year covered 
Political 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
ratings 
Overall 
status 
Year 
Political 
rights 
Civil 
liberties 
ratings 
Overall 
status 
1972 6 5 Not Free 1992 3 3 PF 
1973 6 5 Not Free 1993 4 4 PF 
1974 6 5 Not Free 1994 3 3 PF 
1975 6 5 Not Free 1995 3 3 PF 
1976 5 5 PF 1996 2 2 Free 
1977 5 4 PF  1997 2 2 Free 
1978 5 5 PF 1998 2 2 Free 
1979 5 5 PF 1999 2 2 Free 
1980 5 5 PF  2000 1 3 Free 
1981.01-1982.08 5 5 PF 2001 1 2 Free 
1982.08-1983.11 5 5 PF 2002 2 2 Free 
1983.11-1984.11 5 5 PF  2003 2 2 Free 
1984.11-1985.11 5 5 PF 2004 2 1 Free 
1985.11-1986.11 5 5 PF  2005 1 1 Free 
1986.11-1987.11 5 4 PF 2006 2 1 Free 
1987.11-1988.11 5 3 PF 2007 2 1 Free 
1988.11-1989.12 4 3 PF 2008 2 1 Free 
1990 3 3 PF 2009 1 2 Free 
1991 3 3 PF 2010 1 2 Free 
Ratings process of Freedom House: 
Political rights（1-7）/ Civil liberties ratings（1-7） 
Free 1－2.5; Partly Free (PF) 3－5.0; Not Free 5.5－7 
Source: Freedom House.73 
 
                                                     
73 For this rating information, please see Freedom House (2005).  
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7.1 Party state to democracy 
Before democratisation, the approach of the non-democratic leadership in Taiwan can 
be seen as falling into two stages: firstly, to restore the Republic of China to mainland 
China, and secondly, to choose to stay in Taiwan and soon face the challenges of 
democratisation.  
 
Huntington indicates five possible routes that authoritarian leaders would choose 
when facing the challenges of democratisation: 
1. imagine that they still control the state and refuse to admit there is any issue 
eroding their legitimacy;  
2. increase repression to force opponents to obey the regime;  
3. provoke foreign conflicts to restore legitimacy by nationalism;  
4. establish some semblance of democratic legitimacy for the regime, such as an 
election;  
5. choose to end the authoritarian regime and transfer to a democratic regime. 
                 (1991, pp.55-57) 
 
However, none of these routes guarantees that the original leaders of the authoritarian 
regime would stay in power. How to choose these steps is a puzzle for the leaders. 
The KMT authoritarian authority took the last four steps for maintaining its regime. In 
the first stage, the KMT authority asked people to be a part of the ‘Restore Republic 
of China’ plan to oppose communist China, in order to demonstrate the differences 
between communists, who have a totalitarian government, and the KMT authority, 
which is democratic. This authority used routes 2, 3, and 4 mentioned by Huntington 
above, to open local and then national elections, to pretend there were competitive 
elections and a multi-party system in Taiwan, and to enforce the Chinese 
nation-building in Taiwan. In the meantime, the clear enemy – communist China – 
and the unfavourable dramatic changes of the international environment offered the 
KMT government a chance to claim state union. In the second stage, the KMT 
authority gave up the mission to restore ROC in mainland China and included 
indigenous Taiwanese elites in the government. Finally, the KMT leaders chose to 
democratise the political system of their own accord to ensure that the government 
could continue to exist in Taiwan.  
~ 207 ~ 
 
7.1.1 Restoring the Republic of China  
The KMT authority first controlled Taiwan from October 1945. Before that, Taiwan 
was not under the ROC or the KMT’s control. The KMT authority, to Taiwanese, is an 
external power rather than the native one. After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, 
the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. Although, in early 1949, Chiang 
Kai-shek (CKS) had declared the resignation of his position of president, he was still 
the underground leader. Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁) became the acting President at that 
time. However, Li went to the United States for medical treatment and refused to 
return to the temporary capital city Taipei. CKS returned to power on March 1950 and 
clearly declared the purpose of his return. He indicated that the Republic of China 
would end with the fall of mainland China. Therefore, he argued that the mission for 
him and everyone in Taiwan would be to restore the Republic of China – democratic 
China – and save the people in mainland China from the Communist Party. The final 
goal for the people in Taiwan was to eliminate the Communist International. He also 
pointed out that the reasons for the failures in mainland China were not that the 
communist enemies were too strong, but because the people in KMT did not hold 
solid values to combat the Communist Party. Furthermore, the organisation of the 
KMT was too loose for communists to incite defection in the KMT (see Chiang’s 
speeches ‘The missions and purposes of reinstatement’ Chiang, KS, 1950, March 13). 
These speeches clearly identify the early direction of the KMT authority: expel 
communists from mainland China and restore the Republic of China. During this 
period, the KMT authority consolidated its power in several ways.  
 
Firstly, the KMT put into practice the Constitution of ROC, martial law and accepted 
US aid. The formal Constitution of ROC had been passed and implemented in 1947, 
and it holds legal evidence for KMT to claim the right to rule mainland China. In 
order to maintain a Chinese government in exile, the KMT authority insisted on 
holding to this constitution. CKS also said: ‘I brought this constitution to Taiwan, and 
I will bring it back to the mainland in the future’ (National Repository of Cultural 
Heritage, 2011). From 1948, in order to deal with the civil war with communists, 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion was 
established to suspend some articles in the constitution.74 This temporary constitution 
offered legal justification to the CKS authority. In the meantime, martial law was 
                                                     
74 The major articles in the temporary constitution were 1. Exempt the term limit for President and 
Vice President (from 1960); 2. Allow supplemental elections to fill the empty seats in the National 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan (the actual Parliament in Taiwan) (from 1966).  
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declared and enforced by the Taiwan Garrison Command (台灣警備總司令部) in 
Taiwan Province, in May 1949, for maintaining social order and suppress 
Taiwanese.75 These martial laws limited freedom of assembly and association, and 
civil rights (Content of Martial Law and how to implement it can be found in Hsueh, 
Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, chaps 1 & 2). US aid was also another important resource for the 
KMT authority to control Taiwan. After the Korean War, the US moved to consolidate 
the joint defence relationship between the US and Taiwan (Stueck, 1995, p.53), which 
helped the CKS authority to maintain stability. In return, the KMT authority declared 
itself as a democratic government in the civil war, saying that the government should 
maintain its democratic China image, and took a soft approach to opponents. 
 
Secondly, the KMT authority built up a clear enemy – the communists – to unite the 
Taiwanese, and reconstructed KMT to consolidate its regime by using democratic 
centralism to build the party state. Lin (1998, p.22) cites Huntington’s opinion to 
show that the one-party authoritarian regime needs ‘the existence of a clear enemy, 
and the strength of a one-party system depends upon the duration and intensity of the 
struggle to acquire power and/or to consolidate power after taking over the 
government’ (see also Huntington 1970, p.14). Every year during CKS’ presidency, 
the KMT government declared their objective or blueprint to recover mainland China 
from the communists (see Chao, 1996, pp.45-46); although the preparation year for 
this aim changed every year, it could not be questioned at that time. This intention to 
fight against the communists, offered the KMT administration a reason to demand aid 
from the US, since the US government, from the Korean War to the Nixon presidency, 
tried to prevent the communists’ expansion in East Asia. Furthermore, consolidating 
power in Taiwan was successful in two respects: to those who came with CKS from 
mainland China, this goal offered them a hope of returning to their homeland; and the 
existence of an enemy could encourage the original people of Taiwan to support the 
regime, to prevent invasion from the Communist Party.  
 
Thirdly, the KMT authority opened local elections to incorporate local factions and 
make them become a part of the KMT authority. Three local elections were held 
during the CKS period: elections for representatives of town, township and district, 
and the head of neighbourhood or village in 1946; elections for representatives and 
county governors and mayors of provincial cities in 1950; and elections for 
representatives of the provincial assembly in 1954. After reviewing the reason for 
failure in mainland China, the KMT authority decided to cooperate with the local 
                                                     
75 As for Kinmen and Matsu, a previous Martial Law for the mainland had be declared and 
implemented in 1948. 
~ 209 ~ 
 
factions to consolidate their strength in Taiwanese society (see Chao, 1996, pp.44-45; 
Lin, 1998, pp.161-162). The KMT authority used state resources and media to help 
the factions who stood with the KMT and boycotted persons or organisations that 
opposed the KMT (see Lin, 1998, p.162; Gobel, 2001, August p.5;76 Chao, 1996, 
p.51;77 Chu & Lin, 2001, p.115; Chu, 1999, p.15278). The functions of local factions 
affiliated to the KMT were to be as clients between the KMT leadership, the local 
populace and elites; to help the KMT to deepen its local strength and mobilise local 
people to consolidate its ruling legitimacy; and also to decrease the opposition power 
from the root (see Lin, 1998, pp.177-185; Gobel, 2001, August pp.4-6; Chen, 1996, 
p.175, p.182; Chu & Lin, 2001, pp.115-117; Chu, 1999, pp.152-153).  
 
According to Chen Ming-Tung’s data (see Chen, 1996, p.178, Table 7.1), the average 
percentage for candidate nomination of the Provincial Assembly for local factions was 
62.93%.79 The average rate of election (candidate won the election) was 92.60%.80 
Lin’s data for local factions and the KMT’s share of seats in country magistrate/ city 
mayor elections (1990-1993) also demonstrates that the average percentage for KMT 
to nominate local factions as the candidate in these elections is 74.4% (see Lin, 1998, 
p.145, Table 6.3). The average seat share of magistrates/ mayors in KMT factions is 
61.134% (This thesis uses the KMT local factions’ share of seats/ total seats from 
Lin’s table to calculate the average percentage; see Lin, 1998, p.145). These figures 
obviously show the close relationship between local factions and the KMT authority. 
Lin (1998, pp.187-194) further indicates that the KMT would make a check and 
balance between factions. At first, these factions were expected to remain at the local 
level, rather than the national level; the KMT authority would assign them to be the 
candidate in different elections. In the meantime, the amendments for election law 
also accelerated the replacement of faction elites. 
 
Fourth, the KMT authority enforced the ideology that contained Chinese culture and 
the ‘Three Principles of the People’. From the time that KMT won the civil war 
during 1927 to 1931, Dr Sun Yat-Sen’s ‘Three Principles of the People’ became the 
central ideology for the KMT authority (Johnson, 1987, p.144). After CKS’ 
                                                     
76 He describes the aid clearly: the KMT uses trade money to help affiliated local faction candidates. 
77 He also suggests that the political trade off and payoff created a patron-client system, to ask for local 
elites; and factions’ loyalty and cooperation. 
78 He argues that the KMT local officers ‘provide the legal shield for illegal vote-buying’ from local 
factions. 
79 Percentages were 75% in 1954, 60% in 1957, 63.79% in 1960, 64.86% in 1963, 63.33% in 1968, 
50% in 1973, 60.87% in 1977, 71.05% in 1981, 68.33% in 1985, and 58.06% in 1989. 
80 The elected rates were extremely high: 90.91% in 1954, 93.94% in 1957, 100.00% in 1960, 87.50% 
in 1963, 94.74% in 1968, 96.67% in 1973, 92.86% in 1977, 92.59% in 1981, 90.24% in 1985%, 
88.89% in 1989.  
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reinstatement, the principle becomes the doctrine for the authority to challenge the 
Soviet Union and expel the communists from mainland China. CKS argued that the 
failure in mainland China was because of culture and education. Regarding education, 
the government should focus on the idea of state, ideas of nationality and traditional 
moral spirits (Chiang, KS, 1951, September 3). The major failure of education was 
that the state education failed to teach the ‘Three Principles of the People’ well. 
Therefore, these principles should be learned by students, and the government should 
use it to ‘wake fellow countrymen up’, to unite people under the flag of the principles, 
and then to eliminate communists and reconstruct a new China with the principles 
(Chiang, KS, 1959, May). 
 
The ‘Three Principles of the People’ covers three parts: nationalism (Principle of 
Mínzú), democracy (Principle of Mínquán), and social welfare (Principle of Mínshēng, 
or people's livelihood). These principles, it is argued, combine Confucian values and 
western ideas and institutions (see Centre for Information & Communications, PCCU, 
1983; Dr Sun, Yat-Sen Academic Research Website, 2011; Tsang, 1999, p.481). 
Confucian values are the essential element in nationalism. Lin indicates that the 
‘Three Principles of the People’ is not a coherent doctrine; some of the concepts are 
even from socialism (1998, pp.25-27). The part that the KMT authority focused on is 
nationalism, which could unite the mainlanders from China to support the government, 
but also build up Chinese nationality in Taiwan, especially since most of the ancestors 
of the Taiwanese were from mainland China.82 The infrastructure, built by the 
Japanese colonial government, and the administrative system, education system, 
military force and police service also facilitated the implementation of the Chinese 
nation-building policies of the KMT (Lin, 1998, pp.131-134). Nonetheless, Lin also 
argues that the Three Principles’ doctrine limited the KMT authority towards 
becoming a ‘totalitarian regime’, because this authority needed to satisfy its 
‘democratic China’ slogan (see also Tsang, 1999, p.783).  
 
During the 1960s, the CKS authority started the Chinese Cultural Renaissance 
Movement in response to the Chinese Cultural Revolution by the Communist Party. 
The Chinese culture, according to CKS, was founded on Confucian values and the 
                                                     
81 Tsang indicates that Confucianism was rebuilt in Taiwan and became an ethos of KMT, but 
Confucianism may not really apply to the ‘Three Principles of the People’ However, he argues, CKS 
indicated that the purposes of the ‘Three Principles’ and of Confucianism are similar.  
82  Huntington (1991, p.48) also indicated that nationalism can benefit the one-party system 
authoritarian regime, if the regime uses it as a ‘product of indigenous political development’.  
83 He suggests that the emphasis on propriety in Confucianism and KMT’s ideology of the ‘Three 
Principles of the People’, which included democracy, made the KMT authority protect the constitution 
of ROC, the evidence for Chinese orthodoxy, which offers this authority the legitimacy to oppose the 
communist party, but it also needed to tolerate a ‘certain democratic process’. 
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‘Three Principles of the People’ (Chiang, KS, 1969, November 12a; 1969, November 
12b). His speeches also indicate that the ROC, the state founded by Sun and that 
succeeded the traditional Chinese culture, is the orthodox version of China, and that 
he was the successor of Sun. In order to implement the policy, Confucian classics 
became part of the textbooks in schools and universities. However, Confucian 
classical texts ask the ruler to practise ‘benevolence and reverence’, which called for 
the KMT authority to practise a gentler authoritarianism (Tsang, 1999, p.7) 
 
From official documents of CKS’ speeches and Sun’s doctrine, it is evident that the 
government promoted Chinese culture as a means to oppose the communists and 
created the connection to prove the government to be the successor of Chinese 
orthodoxy. Similarly, Confucian values are part of the culture to shape the doctrine of 
nationalism and to be the evidence that the government is part of Chinese orthodoxy; 
this helps the government to consolidate the idea of Chinese nationality in the 
populace. The KMT authority used this ideology to argue that, in order to restore the 
ROC’s ruling status in mainland China, it was necessary for the government to 
practise martial law and have a temporary constitution, which should ‘temporarily’ 
suspend democracy in Taiwan. Although this course of action offered an explanation 
for KMT’s authoritarian ruling status, it also eroded the legitimacy of the KMT 
authority in Taiwan (Rigger, 2004, p.286). 
 
The central level of the KMT authority focused on practical matters rather than 
ideology (Hood, 1996, p.471). The CKS and the CCK authority learned from the 
failures of the mainland era. During their presidency, they first eliminated the various 
factions who did not follow their orders on the mainland and took full control of the 
military forces and security units. Then they used the communist enemy to establish 
the goal of expelling the communists from the mainland, of uniting the mainlanders 
who followed them to retreat in Taiwan (giving them hope of returning to the 
homeland) and asking the Taiwanese to obey the government (with martial law and 
the communist enemy just next to Taiwan, only the KMT could offer protection). In 
order to control Taiwanese society at its roots, KMT organisations involved in social 
sectors also opened local elections to establish a patron-client system and manipulate 
local elites and factions. Regarding ideology, Sun’s ‘Three Principles of the People’ is 
the central ideology for this regime, and the Confucian values relating to nationalism 
in the doctrine provided the element to prove that the government is the successor to 
Chinese orthodoxy, rather than Communist China. Meanwhile, asking the people to 
learn Confucian classics also helped the populace to consider themselves as a Chinese 
nation.  
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7.1.2 Republic of China on Taiwan 
From the 1970s, the international environment and internal situation dramatically 
changed, which forced the KMT authority to consider a more pragmatic way to 
maintain their rule.  
  
When discussing the international environment change from 1970 to the 1980s in 
Taiwan, one must consider the change in the relationship between the US and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), which led to the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan 
and the PRC’s reform(see Hu, 2005, pp.29-36; Nathan & Ho, 1993 pp.35-39; Lin, 
1998, pp.272-276). After the Korean War, the KMT authority and the US government 
signed the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty, which formally ensured that the 
KMT authority would be under US protection, and, in exchange, the KMT authority 
should give up the islands off the coast of mainland China.84 In the meantime, US aid 
also helped the KMT authority to maintain its ruling status in Taiwan. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, PRC under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership started a series of 
economic reforms and open door policies. CCK considered that the ROC model in 
Taiwan should be a model for Communist China to follow. This change also 
encouraged him to adopt a less rigid policy towards his opponents. Nathan & Ho 
(1993, p.38) also argue that CCK needed to respond not only to Communist China’s 
diplomatic offensive, but also needed to confront Deng Xiaoping’s political reform in 
China. Rigger suggests that in order to continue to gain international support from the 
democratic camp, especially US support, it was essential for CCK to maintain the 
image of a democratic China (2004, p.288).  
 
Internal challenges also grew in strength, which forced the KMT authority to take a 
softer approach to internal anti-government issues. The Kaohsiung Incident, in 
December 1979, was the notable issue during this period. Opponents tried to organise 
a large-scale outdoor gathering on International Human Rights Day without the 
government’s permission.85 Tangwai opponents underestimated KMT’s bottom line 
because of past tolerance by the CCK government. According to the data from Liu 
(1984, pp.470-473) and Taylor (2000, pp.322-327), an agreement was reached by both 
government and Tangwai: flammable chemicals, torches or sticks were not allowed 
during the parade and the Garrison Command would only maintain order rather than 
stopping the speeches and parade. However after speeches about overthrowing the 
                                                     
84 See AIT (2011). Please note the ARTICLE VI, the definition of territory for mutual defense.  
85 They applied for permission, but the request was rejected. 
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KMT authoritarian regime, leaders of Tangwai asked the officers of Garrison 
Command to withdraw, and the agreement was broken. Because several people 
brought torches and sticks, a violent conflict occurred between military police, 
officers of the Garrison Command and people who participated in the meeting. The 
KMT authority decided to suppress the conflict, and made a series of arrests. CCK 
declared that this incident was a judicial case and the government would punish the 
culprits, yet it would not affect the policies for political openness (see Liu, 1984, 
p.473; and Taylor, 2000, pp.323-327, who also argues that CCK decided to ban 
magazines and arrested leaders of the incident, because he was worried that the 
violence would affect his reform process). CCK agreed to open the media to report the 
trial, and the US government and congress ‘promptly urged the KMT government to 
restrain its repression after the Kaohsiung Incident’ (Kan, 2010, p.4).  
 
In the later years of the CKS presidency, CCK succeeded to the actual ruling power of 
CKS, in his ruling period: he needed to consider how to face these international and 
internal challenges. Robert Dahl uses two dimensions – public contestation and right 
to participation in elections and office – to discuss what kind of path an authoritarian 
regime is able to choose during a democratisation period. The authoritarian 
leadership’s attitude to public opposition is related to liberalisation, and the attitude to 
the right to participation shows the extent of inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971, pp.5-6). When 
the authoritarian regime faces external or internal challenges, the leadership needs to 
estimate the situation to take the next step. Dahl (1971, pp.14-16) further indicates 
that the cost of toleration and the cost of suppression are two key elements for 
authoritarian leadership when considering what steps to take. Dahl expresses the 
relationship between the incumbent government and its opponents by three 
assumptions. He focuses on the possibility for the government to tolerate the 
opponents by these two costs. This thesis would use these costs to argue: If the 
suppression cost is larger than the toleration cost, then the opponents would be safe; 
on the other hand, if the toleration cost is high but the suppression cost is low, the 
opponents would suffer the suppression. Four possibilities could occur: 
 
Table 7.2: Cost to opponents 
 Tolerance Cost 
  Low High 
Suppression 
Cost 
Low 1 2 
High 4 3 
 
In situation 1, the authority would definitely suppress opponents because both costs 
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are low; it is easy to suppress the opponents; 2. is similar to the first axiom of Dahl 
(1971, p.15), but the government here would also consider suppressing the opponents; 
3. is similar to Dahl’s third axiom (Dahl, 1971, p.15); it is possible to form a 
competitive regime; and 4. is similar to the second axiom of Dahl (1971, p.15); the 
government would tolerate the opponents because the suppression cost is higher than 
the tolerance cost. Due to international changes, the KMT government was losing 
support from allies, but the government still needed to consider the attitude of the US 
towards the communists; thus, the suppression cost was rising. The rise of internal 
opposition led to an increase in the cost of tolerance; opponents actively participated 
in elections and won seats, and also publicly challenged the KMT government.  
 
CCK became the Prime Minister in Executive Yuan from May 1972. Soon, because of 
CKS’ heart disease, in July 1972, CCK gained actual control of the government 
(Taylor, 2000, pp.275-280). Because of the changes in the international environment 
and the challenges from the Taiwanese elites of Tangwai, CCK started the process of 
liberalisation to ease the pressure on the regime.  
 
CCK found that the foundation of the KMT regime – the orthodoxy of China – might 
be at risk after the frustration of the negative international environment. He tried to 
re-consolidate the ruling legitimacy of the KMT authority by ‘installing’ the KMT 
authority from mainland China in Taiwan. CCK chose to take the following measures: 
 
Firstly, in order to solidify the power in the government, he started to promote the 
younger generation in KMT against the elder leaders (Liu 1984, p.440); for example, 
he appointed Kwoh-Ting Li and Sun Yun-Suan as Minister of Finance and Minister of 
Economic Affairs. He also appointed Taiwanese, especially the younger members of 
the Taiwanese elite, rather than mainlanders (particularly mainlanders who occupied 
important positions in the KMT) to hold high office in the government (see Taylor 
2000, pp.274-280; for example, Hsu Ching-Chung as Vice Prime Minister, Chang 
Feng-Hsu as minister, and Hsieh Tung-min as the first ‘Taiwanese’ Governor of 
Taiwan Province). CCK appointed these new bloods to consolidate his ruling status 
against the conservative factions in the KMT. More Taiwanese also were elected as 
members of the Central Standing Committee of the KMT (see Taylor, 2000, 
pp.285-290).  
 
Second, CCK expanded the ruling legitimacy of the KMT administration in Taiwan. 
Although CCK declared that expelling the Communist Party from the mainland was 
the priority of the KMT authority, he implemented several policies for expansion in 
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Taiwan, such as the Ten Major Construction Projects in 1973 and changed the slogan 
from ‘expel Communists’ to ‘unite China by the Three Principles of the People’. Lin 
(1998, pp.287-289) argues that this change means that the KMT authority established 
the preconditions for giving up communism and implementing a democratic 
constitution, in order for the Communist Party to discuss the possibility of unification. 
The KMT authority also opened the supplemental election of National Representative 
Bodies from 1969 to start political reform for meeting the requirements of the 
Taiwanese for political rights and satisfying the concerns of the US government (see 
talks between Fredric Chien and Jay Taylor in Hsu, 2009). Lin  also indicates that the 
expansion of the supplemental election of National Representative Bodies also offered 
more legitimacy and minimised negative effects for the KMT authority (1998, 
pp.283-285) .  
 
Liberalisation in Taiwan had a decisive effect in CCK’s period. CCK had a positive 
and optimistic view of democratisation, and considered it to be popular in Taiwan 
(Hsu, 2009, p.110). CCK insisted on moderate policies to Tangwai magazines or 
activities. He continued to promote Taiwanese elites to be KMT cadres, ‘ignored’ 
several magazines and deployed limited military and police force when facing violent 
incidents, such as the Chungli incident. He also allowed the KMT and Tangwai to 
discuss democratic reform (Taylor, 2000, pp.320-325; Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, 
pp.435-440). CCK opened more seats for election of legislators and used economic 
and social welfare policies as the slogan to help KMT candidates win the election in 
1980. He adopted the following measures: release of political prisoners and allowing 
gradual concessions to Tangwai leaders, holding fairer elections, decreasing the 
restrictions on speech and publishing, opening immigration restrictions, expelling 
radical officials who did not support the open policies,86 and acquiescing in Tangwai’s 
political associations (Liu, 1984, pp.478-480; Taylor, 2000, chaps 23-24; Nathan & 
Ho, 1993, p.41). During this period, ‘The representative at AIT in Taipei, from 1982 
to 1984, stressed U.S. support while prodding President Chiang to pursue his goal of 
democratizing Taiwan’ (Kan, 2010, p.4), to ensure that CCK’s reform was 
implemented. 
 
CCK chose Lee Teng-hui (LTH) as his successor in 1984, although he faced 
challenges in the KMT and clearly announced that there was no possibility that his 
successor would be from Chiang’s family. Although CCK faced heavy challenges 
from the KMT against political reform, and stronger opponents from Tangwai asking 
                                                     
86 Especially Wang Sheng (王昇) and Wang Shiling (汪希苓), and even his son Chiang, Hsiao-Wu (蔣
孝武). 
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for political reform at this time, CCK decided to continue his reform (Taylor, 2000, 
chap. 24; see also Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, pp.435-437). He accepted the 
foundation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986.87 He also 
formally announced the decision to abolish martial law and the prospect of offering 
legal routes for opponents to establish a new party, when he agreed to an interview 
with Katherine Graham from Washington Post (Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, 
pp.437-440). CCK made a hard decision at that time because, to some people, to 
abolish martial law meant to lose defensive power against Communist China. (Hsueh, 
Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, chap. 5 for details of the abolition martial law). The CCK 
authority abolished martial law from 15 July 1987 and allowed new parties from 
January 1, 1988 (Hsueh, Tseng, & Hsu, 2000, pp.442-445; this issue had been 
discussed on October 15, 1986). The KMT’s policy was to unite mainland China and 
Taiwan under the conditions of political reform, freedom of speech and liberalisation 
of the economy, rather than to expel communists from mainland China.88 
 
LTH succeeded to CCK’s position after the death of CCK, but Lee did not consolidate 
his power until 1990. From 1988 to 1990, Lee tried to overcome the conservative 
factions in KMT. After that, he ended the ‘Period of mobilisation for the suppression 
of Communist rebellion’, abolished the Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
Period of Communist Rebellion in 1991 and then dominated the revision of the 
Constitution in 1991 and 1992, which legitimised the election of the new round of 
representatives of National Representative Bodies (National Assembly, Control Yuan 
and Legislative Yuan),89 and finally passed the direct presidential election article in 
1994. Democratisation primarily emerged in LTH’s presidency.90 
 
LTH continues to work to construct a new theory so that the KMT can survive in 
                                                     
87 Tsang (1999, p.13) indicates that CCK refused the elders’ suggestions to forbid the creation of the 
new party, and this decision offered the best start for democratisation, Tsang then argues that CCK’s 
decision to start the democratisation process is a record in Chinese history. However, there are many 
debates in Taiwan concerning the role of CCK: the reason why he decided to start the process is 
disputable. But his contribution to the beginning of liberalisation, which led to democratisation, cannot 
be ignored.  
88 Hsueh, Tseng, and Hsu (2000, p.439) indicate that CCK also asked the Communist authority to 
return to Chinese tradition and give up communism. 
89 Lin (1998, pp.303-366) analysed the strategies which LTH used to reach these goals. 
90  Liberalisation and democratisation are different. Linz and Stepan (1996b, p.3) argue that 
liberalisation is more open to political, economic and labour activities, and that tolerance is the most 
essential part of it. Democratisation is open to free elections to allow political organisations to have an 
equal right to compete for government positions. Przeworski (1988, p.61) also indicates that 
liberalisation is an institutional process of civil liberties, which would allow the right of associations 
and create some political organisations. It is an opening of political space, which would have an open 
process to deal with political issues, but the authoritarian regime is still not transformed. CCK adopted 
many measures for liberalisation, to tolerate the opposition party, but LTH opened the presidential, and 
fully parliamentary, elections in Taiwan. 
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Taiwan. He led Taiwan to democratise. This decision also meant that the KMT could 
enjoy the legacies of authoritarianism, such as party assets and party-owned 
enterprises that had been captured from the state, for gathering funding to win 
elections and maintain connections with local factions. These legacies were able to 
facilitate the KMT’s dominant status in the new democratic regime. From now on, in 
the executive branch, it has had a reversal once, yet the legislative branch is still 
controlled by the KMT and its party allies. Nonetheless, as the Freedom House data 
(shown at the beginning of this chapter) makes clear, the political system in Taiwan 
has become a democratic one, although there may be several shortcomings.  
 
This thesis uses the question ‘In your opinion how much of a democracy is Taiwan?’ 
to estimate mass opinion to democracy in Taiwan. The attitude of the Taiwanese to 
Taiwanese democracy is ambiguous. Figure 7.1 demonstrates that 87% of Taiwanese 
indicate that Taiwan is now a democratic state. However, the notable information 
from this figure is that 44% of Taiwanese argue that democracy in Taiwan has minor 
problems, and 37% people indicate that there are major problems in Taiwan’s 
democracy. These results might suggest that people in Taiwan may have deeper 
democratic values; hence, people would have higher expectations for democracy in 
Taiwan.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Taiwanese opinions on Taiwan democracy. 
           Source: 2006, 2008 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
7.1.3 Summary 
When CKS retreated to Taiwan after the civil war, what he planned to do was to expel 
6% 
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communists and restore his authority in mainland China. Thus, all policies and 
ideologies were intended to serve this purpose. In order to control Taiwan, the KMT 
authority controlled most organs of the state and organisations in society, and tried to 
establish the Chinese nation among the Taiwanese, yet these efforts still could not 
overcome the dramatic changes in the international environment. Meanwhile, because 
of US pressure and commitment to protect Taiwan, the KMT authority could not take 
severe methods to deal with opponents. CCK and his successor LTH chose the 
pragmatic route – political liberalisation and democratisation for protecting the 
KMT’s interests and entrenching the KMT in Taiwan, yet these measures also 
weakened the controlling power of the KMT. However, these efforts eventually ended 
non-democratic rule and left authoritarian legacies for facilitating the continuation of 
the KMT. 
 
7.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
7.2.1 Traditional legacies 
The preceding section has mentioned that although the KMT authority practised 
constitutional government and identified itself as ‘democratic China’, nonetheless, the 
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion had 
affected basic political rights. For instance, the president had power to use emergency 
decrees without the permission of the legislative branch; the government had the 
power to use martial law to limit civil rights; and the president did not have 
restrictions on re-election. The mission for the government was to expel communists 
and restore power in mainland China. Chinese nation-building education was taught 
from elementary school onwards and propagated in all media in order to convince the 
people of Taiwan that the KMT authority was the orthodox version of Chinese 
government, and people in Taiwan (the only free men in China) should unite together 
to serve this purpose. The ‘Three Principles of the People’ was selected for use in 
nationalist education (see speeches from historical documents from Chungcheng 
Cultural and Educational Foundation, KMT). The US gave solid economic and 
diplomatic support to the KMT administration..  
 
The KMT party state, as has been mentioned, used democratic centralism, learned 
from the communists, as their structure for KMT to control the state and social organs 
(Tsang, 1999, p.5; Rigger, 1999, p.64). The KMT rulers were the central command to 
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control and guide these organs and organisations. At the same time, the original KMT 
factions, which retreated with CKS from mainland China, were cleared from the 
military and security agencies, and party organisations manipulated or were involved 
in all social sectors, such as labour unions, youth groups, religious groups, 
professional associations, business associations, farmer and fishers’ associations, 
women’s associations, schools and mass media (Chu & Lin, 2001, p.114; see also Chu, 
1994, pp.115-116; Rigger, 1999, p.70). During this period, a strong hierarchical 
politics was constructed, and people were asked to unite under the KMT authority’s 
leadership to expel communists. The KMT also controlled most local factions and 
eliminated factions that did not obey it (Lin, 1998). The KMT and local factions 
maintained a patron-client relationship in politics (Chao, 1996; Lin, 1998, pp.161-162; 
Chen, 1996; Chu, 1999).  
 
After 1949, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the PRC weakened from 
the period of Nikita Khrushchev. From 1963 to 1964, the nine criticisms (CPC, 1964), 
which were published in People’s Daily and Red flag magazine, were against the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and showed the public conflict between the 
Soviet Union and the CPC. From 1968 to 1969, a series of regional military conflicts 
occurred on the northeast border of PRC and the Soviet Union. The Nixon presidency 
decided to cooperate with PRC against the Soviet Union. In July 1971 President 
Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, made a secret trip to the PRC 
and met Zhou Enlai (周恩來) to discuss formally normalising the relationship 
between the US and the PRC. In late February 1972, the US president Richard Nixon 
visited China,91 and then The Three Joint Communiqués followed in 1972, 1979 and 
1982. 
 
According to the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the Joint Communiqué on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in 1979, and the Joint Communiqué on United 
States Arms Sales to Taiwan in 1982, the KMT authority lost its main support 
regarding the orthodoxy of China, the promise to defend Taiwan, and the sources of 
military equipment: 
 
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on 
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is 
a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. 
It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
                                                     
91 Hu (2005) indicates that Nixon argued that, in order to maintain the world peace, the US must 
change China’s attitude.  
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Chinese themselves (see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
Volume xvii, China, 1969–1972, Document 203, Joint Statement Following 
Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of 
China http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203). 
 
The United States of America recognises the Government of the People's 
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, 
the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other 
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. 
 
The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese 
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. (see Joint 
Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the 
People's Republic of China and the United States of 
America http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26243.htm) 
 
6. Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States 
Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms 
sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative 
or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and 
that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a 
period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges 
China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue. (see 
United States-China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to 
Taiwan  http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/81782a.htm) 
 
These three communiqués clearly demonstrate that the US government had turned to 
support the PRC as representing the whole of China in the world. In the meantime, the 
security issue became the priority for the KMT. 
 
In addition to losing the major alliance, the ROC was forced to withdraw from the 
United Nations in 1971, and lost nearly 40 alliances from 1970 to 1980. These former 
alliances also signed familiar communiqués with the PRC acknowledging that PRC is 
the ‘the sole legal Government of China’. As PRC gained ‘international recognition’, 
KMT’s wish to expel CPC from China and restore KMT’s ruling status in mainland 
China became unreasonable (Rigger, 2004, p.286). These international changes made 
the KMT authority lose its long-term official belief ,instilled in the minds of the 
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people, and also forced the KMT authority to change its slogans ‘expel communists 
from mainland China’ and the ‘orthodoxy of China’, to encourage the populace to 
support the government.  
 
Although the KMT authority could still maintain a top-down political system, the 
effects of the loss were huge. From that time, as previously mentioned, the KMT 
authority could only choose to survive in Taiwan and needed to take a softer approach 
towards political opponents. Some of the local factions that felt they would not be 
treated fairly by the KMT chose to cut guanxi to the KMT and joined their opponents, 
and powerful factions asked for more resources from the KMT (Chu, 1999): the 
original top-down system was changing. Furthermore, political opponents did not 
favour the concept of Chinese nation building, but tended to want to establish a 
Taiwanese state. With the political liberalisation and democratisation process in 
Taiwan, the KMT party state and its ideas about the Chinese nation  gradually 
dissolved. Instead, a democratic regime, with a Taiwan orientation was established.  
 
Figure 7.2, data from Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, 
demonstrates that the sense of Chinese identity decreased and Taiwanese identity 
increased from 1992, and sharply moved from 1996 to 2000. During this period, LTH 
offered the Neo-Taiwanese concept. Although Chen, Sui-Bien (CSB) tried to establish 
a Taiwanese identity from 2000 to 2008, the Taiwanese identity only increased 
gradually. From 2008 to June, 2011, during Ma Ying-jeou (MYJ)’s presidency, 
Taiwanese identity increases sharply again, although Ma’s government tends to 
support Chinese identity. 
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Figure 7.2: Percentage of Taiwanese identity/ Chinese identity. 
          Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. 
         http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm 
          Note: 1. Green: Taiwanese; Purple: Both Taiwanese and Chinese;  
    Blue: Chinese; Black: No Response. 
               2. 1992-2000: LTH Presidency; 2000-2008: CBS Presidency;  
         after 2008: MYJ presidency. 
 
After democratisation, the effects of traditional legacies decreased; hierarchical 
politics was weakened because there was no strong government that could control 
most of the social and political organisations in the state. Group-orientation in Taiwan 
remained ambiguous, because of the identity issues that arose, regarding nationality 
and state (Chinese or Taiwanese). Guanxi still existed in politics, yet local factions in 
the democratic period might not only serve the KMT; they might change their support 
to other parties to stand against KMT candidates in elections. In Taiwan, harmony is 
not promoted; diversity has taken a firm hold as a public idea, because of fundamental 
differences, the identity issues, and the development of democratic values.  
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7.2.2 Modernisation 
Education 
 
Initially, the KMT authority in Taiwan had popularised the education system. 
However, the KMT authority established a series of guidelines for schools to promote 
the expulsion of communists and Chinese nation-building education. CKS indicated 
that he felt the failure on the mainland was because of the failure of education. He 
asserted that if the government had emphasised the concept of state, nationalism, and 
traditional moral and spiritual values, then mainland China would have not been 
occupied by the communists (Chiang, KS, 1951, September 3). Therefore, in order to 
achieve the goal to expel the communists to restore the ROC, the government should 
adopt education to unite people to eliminate communists and establish a democratic 
new China based on the ‘Three Principle of the People’ (Chiang, KS, 1959, May). 
Therefore, CKS asked all levels of schools to open the subject of ‘Three Principles of 
the People’ to teach nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood.  
 
In these circumstances, the ministry of education established ‘Essentials of the 
Implementation of Nation-Building Education in the Period of Rebellion’, ‘Essentials 
of the Implementation of National-Restoring Education’ and ‘Essentials of the 
Implementation of Recovering the Mainland Education’ as guidelines for action to 
expel communists and promote Chinese national-building education (Council for 
Cultural Affairs, ROC, 2011; Ministry of Education, ROC, 2012). The educational 
system in this period had a mission to educate people to be part of the recovery plan. 
In the meantime, democratic education was also provided because the KMT’s official 
ideology, the ‘Three Principle of the People’, includes democracy. This was an 
essential subject for examinations and focused on nationalism, yet students would still 
learn democratic values. 
 
Education changed during the process of the democratisation period. In order to give 
the ROC-KMT institution a new legitimacy, LTH created a ‘ROC on Taiwan’ concept 
in 1991, which argues that the ROC government now only governed Taiwan and its 
affiliated islands. This concept is included in the additional articles of the ROC 
constitution, which distinguishes the two areas – the Chinese mainland area and the 
free area.92 The democratisation process should be carried out in the free area. The 
                                                     
92 Lin (1998, p.350-352) indicates that this concept is to solve the conflict of unification and 
independence during the early 1990s, and the concept is a two-China concept, or even considers 
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ROC, with Taiwan’s democratic experience, could help mainland China’s 
democratisation and the liberalisation of the economy (see Lee’s speech in Connell 
University, see Lee T.-H, 1996, June 10). LTH also used ‘life community’ to create a 
‘Neo-Taiwanese’ concept, which indicates that no matter whether a person is a 
mainlander or Taiwanese, the people who fight for this land and love this land are the 
owner of the land (Lee T.-H, 1992, July 23). However, he also argued that 
reunification is the goal for cross-strait governments in his presidential inaugural 
addresses in 1996. Although he still mentioned that the government should follow the 
‘Three Principles of the People’ and Confucianism, the attention had turned from 
Nationalism to Democracy (Principle of Minquan) (Lee T.-H, 1995; 1996, May 20). 
During this time, education for democratic values was broadly introduced in 
textbooks, and these values would become questions on university or senior high 
school entrance examinations.  
 
CSB was elected as the president in 2000; as an anti-Chinese identity supporter, he 
tried to dissolve the Chinese orthodox education policies in favour of 
Taiwanese-based policies. This represents a total change from Chinese identity to 
Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese and other dialects in Taiwan became core courses in 
primary and middle schools, courses of the ‘Three Principles of the People’ were 
abolished, and replaced by civil education to develop democratic values. Most 
textbooks that served to build up Chinese identity were abolished, the DPP 
government effected gradual desinicisation in the education system, and even 
pan-KMT party legislators did not oppose it (Liu, 2005). However, Chen’s successor, 
MYJ is a ROC nationalist;93 thus, the education policies changed to favour Chinese 
traditional culture, but his government could not build up the Chinese identity by 
official policies as in the authoritarian period. Yet democratic education still exists. 
 
Middle class 
 
The attitude of the middle class towards democracy is ambiguous in Taiwan; some 
members would support the KMT’s opponents, the Tangwai (黨外, outside KMT) 
elites, yet some of them tended to support the KMT authoritarian regime.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Taiwan an independent state. People would have rights to decide whether the state should unify with 
China or separate from China permanently. Nonetheless, this thesis does not totally agree with that.  
The additional article still notes that ‘To meet the requisites of national unification, the following 
additional articles are added to the ROC Constitution in accordance with...’. Therefore, it may not be 
considered as an implicit recognition that Taiwan is an independent state at that time. 
93 Please see Wikileaks, 08TAIPEI1093. ‘Ma was raised and educated in a wholly KMT environment, 
he is a "nationalist" who identifies with the Republic of China (ROC), not Taiwan…’ (Wikileaks, 
2011). 
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Elites of mainlanders have dominated the KMT authority, in the long term. Because of 
the 228 Incident, which eliminated most Taiwanese elites, and the mistrust of the 
indigenous people, elites of mainlanders who retreated with the CKS authority 
became the core elements of the government and the KMT-controlled national 
organisations (Wu, 1987).  
 
From the 1950s, several opponents of Taiwanese elites from outside the KMT united 
against the KMT authoritarian regime in local elections. Da Xue Za Zhi (大學雜誌) 
was re-organised in 1971 by several Taiwanese and mainlander elites to criticise the 
government’s policies and ask for political reform. These elites also challenged the 
orthodoxy of the KMT authority (Liu, 1984, p.439). From the 1950s, candidates from 
Tangwai started to win positions in the local elections, such as county governors and 
mayors of provincial cities. They also won elections for representatives of the 
provincial assembly, and legislators’ elections or elections for representatives of the 
National Assembly.94  
 
With the economic development in Taiwan, a middle class gradually developed, and 
became supporters of the Tangwai elites in elections, seeking political openness 
(Chang, 2011; Chu, 2011; Hsiao & Hsiao, 2010). Tangwai used the death of CKS to 
organised new magazines in 1975. The KMT authority eventually suppressed these, 
because some articles ask Taiwanese to stand up to overthrow the KMT’s autocracy 
by armed rebellion and unite with mainland China. The chief editor and authors were 
arrested and accused of the crime of armed rebellion (Liu, 1984, pp.449-452). From 
1977, candidates from Tangwai would win at least four seats in elections of county 
governors and mayors of provincial cities. They won more than 20 seats in the 
Province Assembly in 1977.95 In the Chongli Incident, the KMT authority tried to 
cheat in the election of a Taoyuan county magistrate, but this was discovered and 
violent action resulted in 1977 (see Chen & Chang, 2001, p.VIII-IX).96 This also 
seriously affected the KMT’s image. From 1978 to 1979, the power of Tangwai 
continued to grow, and several magazines to promote democratic movements were 
                                                     
94 People like Lee Wan-Ju, Guo Guoji Guo Yu-Hsin, Wu San-Lien, Lee Wan-Ju, and Li Yuen-Chan 
became Representatives of the Provincial Assembly from the 1950s. Wu San-lien was elected as Taipei 
City Mayor in 1951, Kao Yu-Shu was elected as Taipei City Mayor in 1964; Kang Ning-Hsiang 
became the councillor of Taipei City Council in 1969; Huang Shin-chieh was elected as the councillor 
of Taipei City Council in 1964 and won the supplemental Legislators election of in 1969; Huang 
Tien-Fu won the election for Representatives of National Assembly.  
95 See news from Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council (formerly: Taiwan Provincial Council ) 
http://www.tpa.gov.tw/big5/News/News_view.asp?id=282&cid=2&urlID=3 
96 People in Chungli city protested against the KMT’s vote-buying, and finally a candidate from 
Tangwai, Hsu Hsin-liang, won the election. 
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published (Chen & Chang, 2001, pp.581-740).97 In the meantime, the KMT authority 
started to supress these movements and arrested several leaders of Tangwai (Chen & 
Chang, 2001, chaps 5& 6). For instance, the Formosa Magazine incident is the 
highest point of the suppression.98 During this period, the middle class commenced a 
series of social movements to cooperate with KMT opponents, but they did not 
publicly move against KMT authority, and, although their political attitude was still 
conservative, they supported gradual political reform (Chang, 2000; Chu, 2011; Hsiao 
& Hsiao, 2010). 
 
The power of Tangwai continued to increase, especially since their candidates won 
several seats from the first Supplemental Election of Legislative Yuan.99  The social 
movements also started to rise in the meantime. During the mid-1980s, Tangwai had 
become the powerful political force to oppose the KMT authority (see Chou & Chen, 
2000, especially chaps 3–5). A central election committee was formed by Tangwai, 
Research Association on Public Policy and the Editors’ and Writers’ Association were 
established in 1985, and some of these organisations helped to found the DPP (Nathan 
& Ho, 1993, p.41; Chou & Chen, 2000, chaps 4 &5). A newly developed and 
indigenous middle class from the cities became its major supporters at that time. 
During this late CCK period, because of the start of political liberalisation, a liberal 
middle class and some from the lower class joined together to support political 
democratisation and the newly-established DPP (Hsiao & Hsiao, 2010; Lin, 1998).  
 
However, other groups from the middle class, such as mainlanders, people who 
accepted benefits and cooperated with the KMT and ‘state employees (civil servants, 
military personnel, and school teachers)’ gave solid support to the KMT’s 
authoritarian regime (Chu, 2011). Up to the present, these people are still the solid 
voters for the KMT in elections.  
 
The middle class in Taiwan also acted as a promoter for political liberalisation and 
democratisation, although the middle class itself also showed the discrepancy between 
                                                     
97 For instance, the Formosa Magazine, which planned to form a party without a name to push for total 
parliamentary election and elections for all local authorities. During that time, the legislative Yuan still 
included legislators from the mainland, representatives of the National Assembly also included 
members from the mainland; and the mayors of municipalities were appointed by the Executive Yuan. 
98 Major leaders of Tangwai, such as Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh, Lin Yi-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, 
Chen Chu, Annette Lu, Chang Chun-hung, and Lin Hongxuan, were arrested and sentenced for the 
crime of armed rebellion by martial court. Fifteen lawyers stood to defend these leaders in the court; 
some of them become leaders in the DPP, such as Chiang Peng-Chien, You Ching, Hsieh, Chen, Chang, 
Su Tseng-Chang. 
99 Some members from the mainland died; therefore, several seats were allowed to be supplemented 
after the supplemental law passed.  
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the liberal and newly-created middle class, and the KMT-raised middle class. After the 
democratisation period, two major parties, KMT and DPP, both adjusted their 
strategies to claim support from the middle class in elections. 
 
Economic development  
 
The government dominates economic development in Taiwan,100 and it creates a 
middle class, as has been discussed previously. This section will focus more on how 
the Taiwanese government dominated economic development during the 1950s to 
1980s, and the authoritarian regime itself became the provider of a stable environment 
and the elites from the regime guided economic and industrial development. 
Economic and industrial policies were controlled by economic elites; their objective 
was to ensure economic success in the global market rather than the regime’s stability. 
Their policies eventually created stronger enterprises that could influence the state’s 
economic policies and even drive government policies (Chu, 1994, pp.125-128).101 
 
At first, Liu Ming-Chuan, the first Taiwan governor, implemented several measures 
for modernisation, as part of the self-strengthening movement. The Japanese colonial 
government had already started to build infrastructure, such as commercial and 
military ports in Keelung and Kaohsiung, the railway from Keelung to Kaohsiung and 
several forest railways for the government to trade goods, such as sugar, minerals and 
crops from Taiwan to Japan or other Japanese trade partners (Wade, 2004, p.74). The 
Japanese had also established several trade companies, such as the Taiwan Sugar 
Company, Taiwan Power (Electricity) Company, Bank of Taiwan, Chunghwa Bank, 
Huanan Bank, Taiwan Commercial and Industrial bank, for these goods and 
commercial activities. After WWII, the Japanese colonial government left nearly all 
these institutions, companies and the infrastructure (Cumings, 1987, p.65),102 and they 
                                                     
100 See Wade (2004); the author uses nearly two-thirds of the content of the book to explain how the 
government produced the environment for economic development and upgrade of industries. Riedel 
(1990) and Wade (1990) also explain the role of the government in the process of economic 
development and industrialization in terms of modernisation. MacIntyre (1994, p.7) also indicates that 
when discussing development in Taiwan and South Korea, ‘state strength, and the nature of state 
involvement in the economy’ should be emphasised. Chu (1994, pp.115-121) also described how the 
KMT authority used state enterprises to shape the development of industry from 1960s to the 1980s.  
101 He points out that, after the late 1980s, the competition of elections gave enterprises opportunities 
to support and influence legislators and the government. Because of the sponsorship of candidates 
during elections, candidates would return favours when they came to power. Moreover, LTH’s 
mainstream faction also established relationships with business elites, and these elites entered the 
Central Standing Committee at that time. This thesis argues that interactions between political 
liberalisation and modernisation, and political liberalisation and democratisation, offer the chance for 
the business sector to participate in politics; not withstanding that the candidates also need funds for 
elections.  
102 The Japanese colonial government trained their Taiwanese replacements until 1946, and saw that 
~ 228 ~ 
 
were taken over by the KMT authority. The Japanese colonial government also 
introduced the western education system, to train professional elites in medicine and 
agriculture. 
 
The KMT authority took over all resources and institutions from the Japanese colonial 
government and started land reform, to redistribute the lands to farmers to raise 
agricultural productivity (Cumings, 1987, p.65; Haggard & Cheng, 1987, 
pp.114-115).103 
 
From the 1950s, US aid and military protection offered the KMT authority the 
opportunity to consider its economic policies, and both the US and the CKS 
government wanted a stable and developed non-communist base to oppose communist 
mainland China (Wade, 2004, pp.83-84). Therefore, the KMT authority sought to 
follow the US camp from the cold war onwards and insisted on cooperating with 
international society rather than closing its door. Taiwan’s economic development can 
be divided into several eras. Import substitution is the first period. The KMT authority 
controlled all major resources to support and control economic development. The 
authority developed the original agricultural sector and started to develop light 
industry in this period, and the textile industry became the major industry for export 
(Wade, 2004, p.55; Wang, 1997, p.69).104 Plastic and synthetic fibres were also 
supported by government (Wade, 2004, pp.76-81). Export expansion occurred in the 
second period, along with the growth of several important industries, such as fibres, 
plastics, electrical and electronic goods. These industries are labour-intensive 
industries, and Taiwan could offer highly-skilled and well-trained technicians because 
of its education system (Wade, 2004, pp.64-65). Small and medium-sized enterprises 
emerged because of these labour-intensive industries (Wang, 1997, p.70; Campos & 
Root, 1996, p.110).105 Small and medium-sized enterprises offered the government 
space to adjust the economic development policies so that they were more flexible. 
During this time, the KMT authority decreased the size of the agricultural sector and 
increased the industrial sector to ensure beneficial job opportunities, salaries and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Taiwanese bureaucrats who served the colonial government would remain in their positions. 
103 Because leaders of the KMT authority did not have lands or properties in Taiwan, there were no 
landlords or warlords to oppose the KMT authority. Nonetheless, the KMT authority could successfully 
carry out land reform that this authority failed to do in mainland China; Haggard and Cheng argue that 
the KMT authority learned a lesson from the failure in mainland China; the land reform would help the 
KMT to expand its influence in the countryside.  
104 The KMT government controlled the exchange rate for New Taiwan Dollars; it undervalued NTD 
in the market to encourage the export industries.  
105 Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton L, Root, on the other hand, suggest that, because the mainlander 
elites did not trust the Taiwanese elites, the KMT authority adopted the favour-KMT policies, such as 
land reform and limiting a firm’s size to ensure that local companies would not grow large enough to 
challenge the party and the state. 
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living standards (Wang, 1997, p.70). Heavy industry and high-technology industry 
came in the third stage. From the 1970s to the 1980s, Taiwan lost the comparative 
advantages of its cheap labour because the surrounding states, such as mainland China 
and South East Asian countries, could offer cheaper labour than Taiwan. The KMT 
authority constructed several heavy industries in the ‘Ten Major Construction Projects’ 
and also prepared to invest in non-energy industries because of the oil crisis (Wade, 
2004, pp.96-99). The government encouraged and invested in computers, IT, 
semiconductors and related industries. The Science Park and Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ITRI) were established to help industry to develop. Even now, the 
Taiwanese government still offers tax-cuts and incentives to high-tech companies. 
 
The government’s guidance and influence play the most important and decisive role in 
modernisation in Taiwan, especially in economic development and industrial policies. 
However, internal and international changes forced the leadership to make political 
concessions, and then during the liberalisation and democratisation periods, the 
government could not control the agenda for these policies, because the relationship 
between the government and companies had changed (Wade, 1988, pp.154-160; 2004, 
pp.224-227, pp.253-254).106 The strong controlling power of the central government 
was weakening, and, at the same time, the KMT authority needed to cooperate with 
the capitalists for financial support for elections. In return, the KMT needed to open 
seats in the KMT’s central standing committee for officials from important 
state-owned and private enterprises, including the federation of industries, general 
chamber of commerce and the National Association of Industry and Commerce, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3. These measures led the KMT authority and these officials to 
organise a political alliance for upcoming elections that would benefit the KMT and 
the enterprises, but also decreased the influence of professional economic bureaucrats 
(Chu, 1989; 1994). On the other hand, as the last section indicated, the middle class 
that arose because of economic development would choose to seek political reform, 
even if this meant voting for the opposing party.  
 
Therefore, in Taiwan’s experience, the powerful authoritarian regime could control the 
direction and policies of economic development. However, because Taiwan was in the 
                                                     
106 He indicates that a centralised and autonomous regime must exist, and the rational economic 
bureaucrats should find the points for the government to invest in or focus on. Wade (2004) describes 
these points in detail. In his theory, the strong and autonomous state, and rational economic bureaucrats 
who can consider and dominate economic policies are essential. However, after democratisation, these 
characteristics are disappearing, especially as the non-KMT parties would try to cut the link between 
the original bureaucrats and the KMT. Economic affairs also become a controversial issue in 
Legislative Yuan because of the side effect of cross-strait affairs. Economic affairs are not neutral for 
development, but involved in the disputes for or against China issues. 
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US camp, both international and internal pressure made the KMT choose a soft 
approach to opponents and seek help from the developing commercial companies for 
more competitive elections. But this method also helped to weaken the KMT’s control, 
because it was necessary to take into account the opinions of these entrepreneurs. 
Although the KMT authority could not maintain its authoritarian regime, the new 
alliance is workable. During LTH’s and MYJ’s presidency, this commercial-political 
alliance, although there are different party leaders and different enterprises, still exists 
and helps the KMT authority to win elections.  
 
Table 7.3: GDP and average income from 1951 to 2010 in Taiwan. 
Year GDP A.Income Year GDP A.Income Year GDP A.Income 
1951 158 154 1971 447 419 1991 9,016 8,473 
1952 213 207 1972 525 491 1992 10,625 9,843 
1953 181 175 1973 700 649 1993 11,079 10,244 
1954 192 184 1974 927 848 1994 11,982 11,068 
1955 220 210 1975 978 882 1995 12,918 11,882 
1956 153 146 1976 1,151 1,036 1996 13,428 12,330 
1957 173 164 1977 1,323 1,192 1997 13,810 12,652 
1958 187 176 1978 1,599 1,453 1998 12,598 11,419 
1959 142 133 1979 1,943 1,763 1999 13,585 12,279 
1960 164 155 1980 2,385 2,150 2000 14,704 13,299 
1961 162 153 1981 2,730 2,455 2001 13,147 11,821 
1962 172 162 1982 2,703 2,444 2002 13,404 12,077 
1963 189 178 1983 2,902 2,616 2003 13,773 12,549 
1964 213 202 1984 3,219 2,947 2004 15,012 13,602 
1965 229 216 1985 3,290 3,045 2005 16,051 14,412 
1966 248 235 1986 4,007 3,765 2006 16,491 14,724 
1967 279 263 1987 5,265 4,947 2007 17,154 15,192 
1968 317 298 1988 6,146 5,948 2008 17,399 15,194 
1969 354 332 1989 7,558 7,134 2009 16,353 14,271 
1970 393 369 1990 8,124 7,628 2010 18,588 16,413 
Note: 1. A. Income: Average Income. 
     2. Currency: USD. 
Source: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C. 
 
Taiwan has been democratised for more than 20 years. This thesis would discover the 
role of traditional legacies, which are not encouraged by the present democratic 
regime, and modernisation factors, which were favoured in promoting democracy in 
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Taiwan. In order to discuss further what kind of people would be satisfied with 
democracy in Taiwan, this thesis uses ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are 
you with the way democracy works in Taiwan. Are you …?’ as the dependent 
variable,107 and then gender (male and female), age are set as control variables in this 
model, Four traditional legacies and four modernisation factors (education: high 
school level and degree level; subjective social status: middle and upper class; 
economic performance; age) and democratic values are set as independent 
variables.108 
 
Regarding traditional legacies, people who hold the values of traditional legacies have 
an ambiguous attitude to democracy in Taiwan. In the two waves, only harmony in 
Wave 1 and hierarchical politics in Wave 2 demonstrate significant results to the 
dependent variable. In Wave 1, people who support harmony would support 
democracy in Taiwan, and in Wave 2, people who are against hierarchical politics 
would favour Taiwanese democracy. During the survey period, 2001 and 2006, 
Taiwan had just finished the first changeover of parties and the KMT hegemony was 
dissolving. In the meantime, the social movements and conflicts in terms of identity, 
mainland affairs, and pan-blue, pan-green political conflicts were rising. In this period, 
it is not surprising that people who were against hierarchical politics would support 
democracy, because during this time, people in Taiwan did not argue that there should 
be a democratic and diverse government, rather than a strong government. 
Nonetheless, people wanted the long-term serious political conflicts to cease. 
 
As for modernisation factors, education demonstrates significant results to the 
dependent variable in both waves. Education in Taiwan now has become a system to 
develop democratic values, as has been argued in this section. Thus, educated people 
would not be satisfied with the existing democracy and hope the democracy can be 
improved. People who feel there is good economic development in Taiwan also 
support democracy, in both waves. This result could be considered as an instrumental 
support to democracy; because this democratic government can bring good economic 
performance, people would support it. As for social class, only the upper class in the 
second wave has explanatory power to explain the dependent variable.  
 
The younger generation is more supportive of democracy than their elders, perhaps 
                                                     
107 The answers to the question are recoded as follows: ‘very satisfied’ as 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no 
answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); then recoded ‘not very satisfied’ as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2. 
The recoded answer becomes the dependent variable in the model. 
108 Dummy variables are produced for nominal variables: gender (male and female), education level 
(divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels). 
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because of the effect of education and also the younger generation, compared with 
their parents, live in the democratic period, so that their political experiences are also 
from the democratic period. As for males, they also support democracy in Taiwan 
more than females.  
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Table 7.4: Satisfaction with Taiwanese democracy: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
TAIWAN 
Dependent variable：Satisfaction with ‘Taiwanese democracy’ 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male 0.086 （0.057）** 0.053 （0.053）* 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
-0.050 （0.030） 0.065 （0.027）** 
 Anti-harmony -0.069 （0.028）* -0.013 （0.030） 
 Anti-group orientation 0.001 （0.020） -0.030 （0.019） 
 Anti-guanxi -0.054 （0.030） 0.007 （0.030） 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level -0.140 （0.078）*** -0.069 （0.071）* 
 Degree level -0.125 （0.109）*** -0.025 （0.096） 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.030 （0.063） 0.044 （0.079） 
 Upper class 0.031 （0.113） 0.071 （0.105）** 
Economic factor 0.175 （0.009）*** 0.267 （0.008）*** 
Age -0.072 （0.002）* -0.066 （0.002）* 
     
Democratic values -0.111 （0.007）*** -0.161 （0.006）*** 
(Constant) ── （0.148）*** ── （0.142）** 
Adjusted R-square 0.080 0.109 
R-square 0.088 0.116 
N 1415 1587 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic 
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factors means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta 
means that economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values 
means people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not 
have democratic values. 
7.2.3 Summary 
The KMT authority followed the enemy’s example and also used democratic 
centralism to construct the top-down political system. Group-orientation, which is 
associated with nationalism, was also the core of its ideology to build up Chinese 
identity and to prove that the KMT authority was the orthodoxy of China, but this 
ideal was broken because of changes in the international environment. Guanxi was an 
essential part of this system because the patron-client relationship between KMT and 
local factions was one of the keys to ruling Taiwan (Lin, 1998). Nonetheless, 
hierarchical politics and group-orientation were dissolved during the democratisation 
process. However, guanxi is still an important resource for the KMT to win elections. 
Modernisation also helped to foster democracy. Economic development, which 
created a middle class, led opponents to gain more support to oppose the KMT. On the 
other hand, the KMT’s supporters (enterprises) were also involved in sharing political 
power because the KMT needed them in order to win increasingly competitive 
elections. As for education, although the KMT effected patriotic education to establish 
Chinese identity, democratic education still existed. During the democratisation period, 
democratic education was strengthened, and education for Chinese identity 
disappeared.  
 
7.3 Statistical findings 
In the preceding sections, this thesis has shown Taiwanese leaders’ attitudes to 
democracy and how traditional legacies were used to consolidate their rule, but were 
eventually deconstructed, and how modernisation factors served to help 
democratisation. In this section, this thesis will use basic statistical data and 
regression models to determine trends for democracy and traditional legacies, and 
examine which factors would help or hinder the development of democratic values.  
 
This section will use statistical analyses from the Asian Barometer Survey for the 
following purposes. First, this thesis will demonstrate popular support and strength for 
traditional legacies and democratic values. The data will demonstrate the trend and 
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changes for traditional legacies and democratic values in Taiwan. Then the 
relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
will be analysed, to discuss which factor would hinder development of democratic 
values. Finally, this thesis will examine whether any factor can diminish the influence 
of traditional legacies that are not favoured in the development of democratic values.  
7.3.1 Percentage and strength for traditional legacies and democratic values 
The percentage of values of traditional legacies in Taiwan is shown in Table 7.5. The 
results of Wave 1 indicate that hierarchical politics and guanxi are strongly rejected by 
Taiwanese: the rejection percentages are 77.4% and 74.2%. Taiwanese also reject 
harmony, and the rejection rate is 57.0%. Group orientation is the only legacy 
approved by Taiwanese; however, as Chapter 2 indicates, this might because the 
family-core value is the essential value in the Taiwanese mind.  
 
The rejection rate in Wave 2 increases gradually. Hierarchical politics, harmony and 
guanxi are highly rejected by Taiwanese: the rejection rates are 72.1%, 70.5% and 
82.3%. Group-orientation is still the only one that is approved by Taiwanese; the 
supportive percentage is 75.77%.  
 
Although guanxi is not comparable because questions in the questionnaires are 
slightly different for the two waves, the trend in this table is clear: support for 
traditional legacies is decreasing. The rate of support for harmony reduces sharply, 
dropping from 43.0% to 29.5%, a 13.5% gap between Wave 1 and Wave 2. The 
support rate for group-orientation also decreases slightly, which reflects that the value 
is changing in public opinion. The rejection rate is increasing overall from 51.67% to 
56.02%, and this result indicates that people in Taiwan are removing the influence of 
traditional legacies.  
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Table 7.5: Percentage for values of Traditional legacies in Taiwan. 
Wave1 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 22.6%  
(309) 
43.0%  
(578) 
75.77%  
(1989) 
25.8%  
(341) 
48.33% 
(3217) 
Reject 77.4%  
(1059) 
57.0%  
(765) 
24.23%  
(636) 
74.2%  
(979) 
51.67% 
(3439) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Wave2 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 27.9%  
(429) 
29.5%  
(442) 
72.83%  
(2166) 
17.7% 
(266) 
43.98% 
(3303) 
Reject 72.1%  
(1111) 
70.5%  
(1054) 
27.17%  
(808) 
82.3% 
(1235) 
56.02% 
(4208) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
Table 7.6 illustrates the percentage for democratic values in Taiwan. All questions 
from the questionnaires are the same, for both Wave 1 and Wave 2 in this table, and 
the six dimensions in the table are comparable.  
 
Findings in Wave 1 demonstrate a positive attitude to democratic values. Political 
equality, popular sovereignty and rule of law are highly supported by Taiwanese. 
Political liberty and separation of powers are slightly rejected and political pluralism 
is rejected by 60% of respondents.  
 
As for Wave 2, political equality, popular sovereignty and rule of law continue to be 
supported solidly and support has even slightly increased. Political liberty and 
separation of powers change to support from rejection; the supporting rates increases 
4.1% and 0.9%. As for political pluralism, it decreases 0.1% in Wave 2. The total rates 
for supporting democratic values in both waves exceed 60%, reaching 63.26% and 
64.34%.  
 
These findings suggest that democratic values held by Taiwanese do not only remain 
at the initial stage, but also, over time, reach most of the values. However, Taiwanese 
dislike the conflicts between the Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition, 
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which seriously hinder the state’s affairs. Therefore, people would tend to reject 
political pluralism.  
 
Table 7.6: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in Taiwan. 
Taiwan 
Wave1 
Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 89.5% 
(1191) 
71.6% 
(2786) 
49.8% 
(1272) 
39.7% 
(506) 
49.8% 
(1178) 
85.7% 
(1096) 
63.26% 
(8029) 
Reject 10.5% 
(139) 
28.4% 
(1103) 
50.2% 
(1283) 
60.3% 
(768) 
50.2% 
(1188) 
14.3% 
(183) 
36.74% 
(4664) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Taiwan 
Wave2 
Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 89.3% 
(1369) 
71.8% 
(3247) 
53.9% 
(1614) 
39.6% 
(597) 
50.7% 
(1448) 
88.2% 
(1308) 
64.34% 
(9583) 
Reject 10.7% 
(164) 
28.2% 
(1273) 
46.1% 
(1380) 
60.4% 
(911) 
49.3% 
(1409) 
11.8% 
(175) 
35.66% 
(5312) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Dimensions that are over 60% are also marked in this table to demonstrate that 
respondents have solid support of the dimension. 
 
Strength analysis would be more precise than percentage analysis because the 
questionnaire of ABS gives the respondents a range of answers for questions. The 
answers of selected questions are recoded as following: ‘strongly disagree’ as 2, 
‘somewhat disagree’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded ‘somewhat 
agree’ as -1, and ‘strongly agree’ as -2. Questions of anti-connection in the two waves 
are slightly different, and it will not be compared in Table 8.7. 
 
Results of Table 7.7 show the strength in four elements of Confucian values and six 
dimensions of democratic values. The result is similar to the percentage analysis. 
Regarding Confucian values, anti-hierarchical politics and anti-harmony are strong, 
and people still tend to support group orientation, which is explained in Table 8.7. The 
trend also rejects the traditional legacies in both waves.  
 
Findings of democratic values show a strong tendency towards democratic values 
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from Taiwanese. The table demonstrates that there is no negative figure in PDI, which 
means democratic support in all dimensions is increasing or equal in the two waves. 
Political equality, the basic concept of democratic values, is particularly strong, which 
reflects that local and national elections, over a long period, have brought Taiwanese 
to believe that everyone should share equal political rights in the state. Rule of law is 
another strong concept for Taiwanese, which nearly reaches the rate of political 
equality. In contrast with the percentage analysis, strength of separation of powers in 
both waves is positive, which implies that people actually have a positive attitude to 
the concept in both waves. As for political liberty, although there is only a slight 
increase in this concept, yet the strength increases significantly. Political liberty 
maintains a moderate strength in both waves. Table 8.7, in general, shows Taiwanese 
have strong democratic values.  
 
Table 7.7: Strength of traditional legacies and democratic values in Taiwan. 
TAIWAN 
 
Wave1 
Mean 
Wave2 
Mean 
PDI 
Confucian values 
  
 
  
 
Anti-hierarchical politics 
 
0.6 0.47 -0.13 
 
Anti-harmony 
 
0.15 0.42 0.27 
 
Anti-group orientation 
 
-0.5569 -0.4925 0.0644 
 
Anti-guanxi 
 
0.54 0.72 0.18 
Democratic values 
  
 
  
 
Political Equality 
 
0.91 0.93 0.02 
 
Popular Sovereignty 
 
0.461 0.4724 0.0114 
 
Political Liberty 
 
-0.0191 0.0813 0.1004 
 
Political Pluralism 
 
-0.23 -0.23 0 
 
Separation of Powers 
 
0.0223 0.0309 0.0086 
 
Rule of Law 
 
0.78 0.9 0.12 
PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1.  
Note：1. The range is -2 to 2. -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally support the 
factor, 0 means no preference. 
2. Because of the different question of the Anti- guanxi aspect, to compare for this 
aspect may not meaningful. 
Source:  1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
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7.3.2 Democratic values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
In order to examine relationships among democratic values, traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors in Taiwan, democratic values is set as the dependent variable, 
the other elements such as traditional legacies, modernisation factors as independent 
variables, and gender as the control variable in the regression model. Table 7.8 
demonstrates the results of the regression. 
 
Regarding traditional legacies, all legacies have explanatory power to explain the 
dependent variable in both waves. Thus, all traditional legacies are unfavourable to 
democratic values in Taiwan. People who are against traditional legacies would 
support democratic values.  
 
As for modernisation factors, education still has explanatory power in both waves, 
and people who accept higher education would be more likely to support democratic 
values. On the other hand, results for economic performance demonstrate that in both 
waves, people who judge that there is poor economic development would have 
democratic values.  
 
The younger generation still supports democratic values more than their elders. As 
this thesis argued, the younger generation has accepted democratic education and live 
in a democratic period; they would likewise have deeper democratic values than older 
respondents.   
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Table 7.8: Democratic values in Taiwan: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
TAIWAN 
Dependent variable：Democratic values 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male 0.046 （0.227） 0.086 （0.211）*** 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
0.103 （0.121）*** 0.070 （0.108）** 
 Anti-harmony 0.079 （0.113）** 0.131 （0.118）*** 
 Anti-group orientation 0.102 （0.079）*** 0.134 （0.076）*** 
 Anti-guanxi 0.135 （0.119）*** 0.170 （0.120）*** 
      
Modernisation factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level 0.107 （0.314）** 0.110 （0.284）*** 
 Degree level 0.284 （0.426）*** 0.306 （0.369）*** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.007 （0.253） 0.043 （0.317） 
 Upper class 0.015 （0.455） 0.025 （0.422） 
Economic factor -0.059 （0.034）* -0.122 （0.031）*** 
Age -0.122 （0.009）*** -0.106 （0.008）*** 
     
Democratic values ── ── ── ── 
(Constant) ── （0.592）*** ── （0.261）** 
Adjusted R-square 0.210 0.276 
R-square 0.216 0.281 
N 1415 1587 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
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negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
7.3.3 Factors to diminish the influence of traditional legacies 
The last model has proved that traditional legacies will be obstacles to the 
development of democratic values in Taiwan. In order to examine which factor could 
diminish the influence of traditional legacies in Taiwan, this thesis uses 
anti-traditional legacies as the dependent variable, and then sets modernisation factors 
as independent variables into the model.  
 
The results of this model are illustrated in Table 7.9. The results show that the 
younger generation, education and democratic values do not favour traditional 
legacies, and these variables also have explanatory power for the dependent variable. 
This result reflects the gradual development of democratic values, and schools are the 
institutions for this purpose. Furthermore, the younger generation have just left school 
and live in a democratic period; thus, they would be unlikely to support traditional 
legacies.  
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Table 7.9: Anti-traditional legacies in Taiwan: Multiple Regression Analysis. 
 
TAIWAN 
Dependent Variable：Anti-traditional legacies 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male -0.065 （0.132）** -0.063 （0.120）** 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level 0.083 （0.179）* 0.127 （0.160）*** 
 Degree level 0.160 （0.241）*** 0.193 （0.206）*** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.030 （0.147） -0.002 （0.181） 
 Upper class 0.014 （0.265） 0.009 （0.241） 
Economic factor 0.026 （0.020） -0.073 （0.018）** 
Age -0.266 （0.005）*** -0.274 （0.004）*** 
     
(Constant) ── （0.336）*** ── （0.318）*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.129 0.143 
R-square 0.133 0.147 
N 1415 1587 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2001 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
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7.3.4 Summary 
In this section, traditional legacies are hazards for democratic values. However, the 
data show that, in democratic Taiwan, popular support of traditional legacies is 
decreasing, and comparing the two waves, the trend for rejecting these legacies is 
clear. In contrast, democratic values are increasing in both waves, and the data show 
these values are still deepening. Thus, an environment for a democratic regime is 
consolidating in Taiwan. 
 
Modernisation factors may not help to strengthen democracy. Education is the only 
modernisation factor that demonstrates a significant effect to diminish the influence of 
traditional legacies and helps to strengthen democratic values. Age is also a decisive 
factor. Results from Table 7.8 and 7.9 show that the younger generation will help to 
diminish the influence of traditional legacies and deepen democratic values. Most of 
the younger generation in Taiwan was born in the democratic period and also receive 
education for developing democratic values; thus it is not surprising that this 
generation will support democracy more than their elders. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Democratisation in Taiwan did not happen automatically. Just as Inglehart (1990; 
1997) indicates, it needed interaction between rulers and people. In Taiwan, it was 
also dependent on the international situation and the US factor. For KMT rulers, they 
were defeated by the communists and retreated to Taiwan. Although they tried to 
construct Taiwan to become its anti-communist base, this regime was also dependent 
on the military and financial support from the US. At the same time, they needed to 
confront internal challenges from the indigenous elites.  
 
Traditional legacies served to consolidate the power of the KMT in various ways.. 
Nonetheless, the nature of this regime and the international situation meant that the 
KMT authority could not sustain its non-democratic rule and dissolved the influence 
of traditional legacies for serving their non-democratic rule.  
 
With regard to the nature of this regime, as an anti-communist base, it was necessary 
to maintain a democratic image of China, so democratic ideas and publications could 
not be banned. In order to establish itself firmly in Taiwan, this authority needed to 
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open local elections and cooperate with local factions. Promotion of the ‘Three 
Principles of the People’ also led the regime to spread democratic values in schools. 
As for the international situation, as an ally in the democratic camp in the cold war 
period, it was in need of assistance from the US. The regime needed, therefore, to 
pretend it was democratic, which meant that the cost of eliminating political 
opponents was high. Furthermore, modernisation in Taiwan also helped to dissolve its 
regime. Finally, change in the international environment destroyed the KMT’s claim 
to Chinese orthodoxy and threatened the survival of the regime, so that it had to 
respond to support from the US and the Taiwanese. The cost to maintain the 
non-democratic regime increased dramatically and the KMT rulers chose to 
democratise for survival.  
 
Statistical data demonstrates that support for the values of traditional legacies in 
Taiwan is decreasing, and democratic values are increasing. Regression models also 
prove that a decrease of traditional legacies will help to develop democratic values. 
Through this trend, democratic political culture, which is in favour of maintaining the 
democratic regime, is consolidating. Data also show that education and the younger 
generation are supporters of democratic values, which will also sustain the democratic 
regime.  
 
In summary, in the case of Taiwan, the regime’s nature, the US factor and 
modernisation helped to force the non-democratic rulers to end non-democratic rule 
for survival. After the democratisation period, how to strengthen democratic values 
became important, and education was the key for diminishing the influence of 
traditional legacies and strengthening democratic values.  
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Chapter 8: South Korea 
 
Scholars would agree that South Korea was a Confucian society during the Choson 
Dynasty period (Oh, 1999, p.22; Lee, J.K., 2001). Even now, Confucianism still exists 
in daily life. However, South Korea maintains an active democratic regime and it was 
the first democratic regime of all Confucian societies after the Second World War. 
South Korea is the classic case for expectation of modernisation theories among 
Confucian societies. A military junta modernised the country and brought rapid 
economic development, yet a middle class emerged and strengthened with this 
process and finally formed a strong force to push for democratisation. During this 
period, democratic education encouraged students initially to oppose the 
non-democratic regime. The nature of the regime led to some traditional legacies 
becoming helpful to the expansion of democracy and this is also different from other 
Confucian societies. 
 
In order to examine hypotheses, this chapter will focus on three points. South Korea 
was founded to be a democratic country, yet personal dictatorship and a military 
junta suspended democracy. However, non-democratic rulers could not gain 
legitimacy to rule, even if they performed well economically. Finally, the military 
junta chose to democratise and cooperated with opponents. 
 
Traditional legacies are not absolute obstacles to the implementation of democracy 
in South Korea. Hierarchical politics, which existed in the non-democratic period, 
could not be continued because both personal dictatorship and the military junta did 
not offer a clear ideology to claim popular support. They could only suppress 
opponents; yet when the cost for suppression increased, this political system could 
not be sustained. Guanxi, which existed in the political and economic aspects of 
society, is not opposed to democracy; it may even be pro-democracy. 
Group-orientation, which facilitates nationalism, is also helpful against 
non-democratic regimes, because group-orientation made people in South Korea 
seek the country’s common good for democracy and stand against the 
non-democratic regime’s ally – the US. Harmony, which is not promoted in politics, 
but demonstrated its effects in the economic sphere, will not be discussed. As for 
modernisation factors, economic development led to the emergence of a middle 
class, which became the major opponent of the military junta. In the meantime, in 
order to seek support from the middle class, non-democratic rulers were forced to 
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change their relationship with their supporter – large enterprises. Education for 
developing democratic values was practised very early, which encourages students 
to stand against non-democratic rulers and develops democratic values. 
 
In the statistical section, this thesis will demonstrate the trends for traditional legacies 
and democratic values in South Korea, and then show the relationship between 
democratic values, tradition legacies, and modernisation factors.  
 
8.1 Korean democracy 
South Korean politics is driven by political elites. The political agenda, such as 
modernisation and democratisation, was also dominated by rulers (Kihl, 2005, 
pp.49-50, pp.104-105). In contrast with the other three cases, South Korea was 
originally created as a democratic regime by the US military forces and several South 
Korean politicians; thus, non-democratic rulers could not gain legitimacy to rule. This 
democratic regime soon faced the Korean War and then transformed into a personal 
dictatorship for reasons of national security. Although popular protest ended the 
personal dictatorship regime, soon the military coup established a military 
authoritarian regime that lasted until the late 1980s. During this period, these 
authoritarian leaders would face the problems of legitimacy and pressure from the 
people. Although the leaders tried to rely on US support to maintain their rule, they 
still needed to take steps to open more political spaces, and finally chose to 
democratise by themselves to ensure that their advantages could be maintained. In this 
section, this thesis will demonstrate leaders’ attitudes to democracy and why, finally, 
they chose to democratise. 
8.1.1 Personal dictatorship - Syngman Rhee presidency 
After three years of military occupation by the US from 1945 to 1948, under the 
guidance of the US military forces in Korea, the national assembly was elected and 
gathered to deliberate on the Korean constitution in the South Korean peninsula, 
because the Soviet Union rejected the UN’s proposal for a national election in the 
north (Lee, 1975, p.19). The Republic of Korea was established under the supervision 
of the United Nations and the US. Syngman Rhee, an exiled politician who spent 
more than one third of his life in the US, was elected as the first president for this new 
republic. The purpose of the new republic was  
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[to] establish a democratic system of government eliminating evil social customs 
of all kinds, to afford equal opportunities to every person and to provide for the 
fullest development of the capacity of each individual in all the fields of political, 
economic, social and cultural life (Oh, 1999, pp.28-29).  
 
The purpose for establishing South Korea was to create a democratic alliance in the 
democratic camp, with the US acting as its ‘foster parent’ (Lee, 1975, p.19; Oh, 1999). 
To South Koreans, this democratic regime was installed by the US, although the 
country might not satisfy the conditions for democracy; not only was the public 
control of the leaders weak, but also social-economic conditions, and cultural and 
historical backgrounds lacked experience of democracy (Lee, 1975, p.21). 
 
Rhee was educated at several famous American universities, such as George 
Washington, Harvard, and Princeton, participated in independence movements, joined 
the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, and argued against Japanese 
occupation. It might be this background that led to his winning support from the US to 
be the leader of the new republic.109 Rhee’s government soon faced internal and 
external challenges. He lost the parliamentary election that the US had insisted be 
held, in 1950, he only won 22 of 210 seats in the National Assembly (Gupta, 1972, 
p.701), and his government lacked broad public support (Stueck, 1995, pp.27-28).110 
Furthermore, there was a a threat to unification in the form of Kim Il-sung, the leader 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), who also came into 
power at that time (Gupta, 1972, pp.701-702).111 
 
The Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, made the US turn to Japan for support. South 
Korea and Taiwan both prevented invasions from communists and the Soviet Union, 
and ensured that the western pacific defensive line would not be broken (Stueck, 1995, 
pp.52-55; Hong, 2000, pp.57-58).112 They also made a stable environment for the 
authoritarian regime that existed in South Korea and Taiwan. These regimes were able 
to survive because of US aid and military protection. Leaders in South Korea and 
                                                     
109 The leader of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was not Rhee. Rhee’s 
competitor, Kim Gu, who was assassinated by Ahn Doo-hee, was more famous than he was at that 
time. 
110 William Stueck describes how Rhee’s government could not contain the internal situation and how 
his government lacked public support. But the US still supported him because of considerations of 
balance between North Korea and South Korea, and the prestige of the US. 
111 He indicates that North Korea not only refused to allow Rhee and his colleagues to join the meeting 
suggested by North Korea in June, 1950, but also rejected the interference of the UN for unification 
discussions. However, Stueck (1995) noted that North Korea sent three representatives to South Korea 
to discuss unification directly, but they were arrested. 
112 Hong, Yong-Pyo mentioned that the US could not give up South Korea because the US needed to 
maintain balance in the area, and to lose South Korea would damage the prestige of the US.  
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Taiwan had the opportunity to encourage ‘anti-Communist’ nationalism to support 
their legitimacy to rule.113  
 
Rhee gained credit from the war to expand his power; because of the war, he regained 
popular support. In order to stay in power, he declared martial law temporarily in 
1952, to force members of the National Assembly to amend the Constitution, 
changing the rule for electing the president to a direct popular vote. Therefore, he 
could continue to be elected as President. (Hong, 2000, p.85). In 1954, he suggested 
another revision of the Constitution to resolve the two-terms limitation. His draft of 
revision won 135 of 203 votes in the National Assembly, yet according to the 
constitution, the revision must have two-thirds support from members of the National 
Assembly, and his draft lacked one vote. Some members of the National Assembly 
argued that the threshold should adopt the rounding number 135; the Assembly 
eventually passed the draft without the opposition parties’ support. This revision 
meant that Rhee qualified for the 1956 presidential election. In the meantime, Rhee’s 
government also used government power to limit press reports and freedom of speech; 
other civil rights were also violated (Lee, 1975, p.21). Rhee employed secret 
institutions and national security law against his opponents. In 1960, Rhee used state 
power to ensure that he and his vice presidential candidate would be elected (Oh, 
1999, pp.40-41; Robinson, 2007, p.125). This election rigging led to the 419 Student 
Uprising,114 which in turn led to the loss of internal support from his own party in 
parliament and from civil associations – and even the US government criticised him 
publicly. Finally, these pressures forced him to resign and he went into exile in the US 
(Lee, 1975; Oh, 1999; Robinson, 2007).  
8.1.2 Military authoritarianism - Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan 
After Rhee’s resignation, a short democratic government appeared, but it was soon be 
replaced because of the military coup on 16 May 1961 (Robinson, 2007, pp.125-129). 
Soon Park and his military junta organised the Democratic Republican Party for the 
forthcoming elections and won the presidential and parliamentary elections. The 
strategies of Park’s military government were clear: clarify the facts of separation 
between South and North; seek unification; the government should dominate 
economic development, anti-corruption measures, and should form alliances with 
                                                     
113 See Huntington (1991, p.46). He argued that nationalism is also a popular force that can legitimise 
both democratic and authoritarian regimes.  
114 There were other reasons, see Kim, C.I and Kim, K, S (1964); they argue that corruption in Rhee’s 
government was the greatest concern of people in the movement, followed by election riggings and 
economic depression.  
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western powers. He also encouraged party politics in the beginning as a semblance of 
democratic legitimacy. Just like the KMT authority in Taiwan, Park also built up a 
clear enemy (North Korea) to acquire and consolidate his regime’s legitimacy; as 
Huntington argued: a clear enemy would help the authoritarian regime to acquire and 
consolidate power (Huntington, 1970, p.14).  
 
During Park’s presidency, economic development received a sharp boost, and Korea 
changed from an agricultural society to an industrial society. In essence, Park 
established a ‘paternalistic Korean Inc’, which transferred South Korea into a 
‘mobilised workplace’ (Oh, 1999, p.55). Park wanted to establish Korea as a wealthy 
nation with a strong army, via a self-reliant and independent spirit of nation-building 
(Kihl, 2005, p.71).115 Democracy was not so important when he decided to carry out 
his plan for modernisation and rapid economic development.116 GDP in South Korea 
increased from 106 USD to 1745 USD in 1979. This successful economic 
performance, which is called ‘Miracle on the Han’, offered Park the confidence to 
establish a personal military dictatorship. He won the presidential election in 1971 by 
a very small margin of victory over the opponent candidate Kim Dae-Jung. When 
Richard Nixon declared that the US could decrease the numbers of United States 
Forces in Korea (Nixon, 1969; Oh, 1999, p.59; Robinson, 2007, pp.135-136),117 a 
National Emergency Decree was issued. Park argued that, because of changes in the 
international and internal environment, South Korea needed to be ruled under martial 
law, and the new constitution (Yushin constitution) was put into place. He dissolved 
the National Assembly, political movements and parties. A new institution, the 
National Conference for Unification, was established as the highest institution in the 
state to elect the president, and Park was the chairman of the conference. He also 
controlled the power of nomination for one third of new parliament members and the 
head of the Supreme Court. There was now no limitation for Park to rule the country 
(Oh, 1999, p.60; Robinson, 2007, p. 136).  
 
Park was assassinated by his close subordinate, director of the KCIA, Kim Jaegyu, on 
26 October 1979. His successor, Chun Doo-hwan, soon took power from 1979 to 
1980 (Robinson, 2007, p.139, p.167; Oh, 1999, pp.73-80). During this period, the 
                                                     
115 He cites Park Chung Hee ‘Kukka wa hyongmyong kwa na’ (The Nation, Revolution and I) (In 
Korean) (Seoul: Hyangmunsa, 1963), p.292. 
116 Park suppressed political movements and opponents during this time. He also established the 
Anti-Communist Law and strictly enforced National security law against any suspect, and controlled  
the media; see Robinson (2007, p.135). 
117 Nixon said ‘Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to 
the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defence. (1969)’. 
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claim for democratisation was rising in South Korea. Gwangju is an education centre 
in South Korea, and had a stronger ethos of opposition to the military authoritarian 
regime than in other places (Oh, 1999, p.81; Kihl, 2005, p.77). Chun suppressed the 
Gwangju Democratisation Movement and arrested important democratic politicians, 
such as Kim Dae-Jong, Kim Jong Pil and Kim Young Sam. The US was found to hold 
a pro-Chun position, which led to both anti-authoritarianism and anti-American 
movements (Oh, 1999, pp.83-89).  
 
Chun Doo-hwan continued Park’s policy; he also focused on rapid economic 
performance and was actively bidding for the right to host the Olympic Games in 
1988. He also tried to suppress the movements for democracy that arose by university 
students, the middle class, especially skilled workers, and Christian and Catholic 
churches (Huntington, 1991, pp.67-68; Oh, 1999, p.90; Kihl, 2005, p.73; Kim S, 2002, 
pp.95-96; Koo, 2002, pp.112-116).118 
8.1.3 Democratisation 
In the last chapter, this thesis used Huntington and Dahl’s theories to discuss the 
possible route for Taiwan’s democratisation. In South Korea’s case, the military junta 
also considered how they should face the challenges developing from the middle class. 
For the military junta, the suppression cost increased because of the internal and 
international changes. Regarding the international changes, the coming event – the 
Olympic Games – limited strict action against the opposition: if the military 
government chose to suppress opponents, then it was very likely that South Korea 
would lose the right to host the games in Seoul. As for the internal situation, economic 
development had brought with it a new middle class, and as has been demonstrated, 
this middle class would stand to support democratisation rather than the military 
authoritarian government. Thus, a series of protests against the military government 
                                                     
118 Oh indicated that South Korea was a Confucian society, but major opponents, such as Kim Dae 
Jung and Kim Young Sam were Christian. The spirit of Christians against the authoritarian regime 
replaced Confucian authoritarianism. He argued that Christians and Catholic churches started to oppose 
Park’s government from 1974, and acted in an essential role in the late 1980s. Church organisations 
offered a platform for people who were anti-authoritarian to gather and share ideas. Also see Kihl 
(2005), who argues that labourers, radical students and progressive Christians joined the democratic 
movements. Kim Sunhyuk indicates that Protestant ministers and Catholic Cardinals, professors from 
Korea University, opposition parties, ‘students, workers, peasants, urban service industry employees 
stood for “down with the military authoritarian regime and up with a democratic government”’. Hagen 
Koo also suggests that Christian associations had the international network to protect them from 
suppression, and they provided guidance for workers in 1970s-1980s. Labour movements in the 1980s 
also played an important role in democratisation, because the wageworkers were the largest number in 
South Korea at that time. Their commitment to participation in the democratic movements led to the 
leader of authoritarian regime declaring the democratic plan earlier, to prevent large scale workers’ 
protests in the streets.  
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began, which also increased the cost of tolerance. These situations forced the leaders 
in the military government to consider how to face these challenges.  
 
Huntington (1991, pp.161-163) suggested that it is easier to end the non-democratic 
rule of a military authoritarian regime, because these rulers do not view themselves as 
holding long-term control of the state.119 These military rulers would tend to give 
power back to a civilian government or to negotiate with opponents to leave power. 
Huntington especially indicated two ‘exit guarantees’ that military rulers would ask. 
Firstly, the succeeding government will not punish, prosecute, or take revenge for, any 
action of the military junta during the period of military rule. Second, the military 
junta cannot be deprived of military institutions and autonomy. Military government 
in South Korea was composed of the military junta and secret agencies, most of whom 
did not have official ideologies like the non-democratic rulers in China, Taiwan and 
Singapore. These non-democratic rulers would consider how to transfer power 
peacefully, but were also concerned to ensure their safety and positions in the 
democratic era.  
 
The military junta took three steps for democratisation. Firstly, they committed to 
political reform in 1987, to ease the pressure from opponents and civil society. 
Secondly, when their opponents could not unite to select one candidate, they declared 
that they would host a presidential election. Thirdly, after winning the presidential 
election, they chose to cooperate with several opponents to oppose the most 
influential one. These steps confirmed that the military leaders would not be 
prosecuted immediately, and the government gained legitimacy from democratic 
elections.  
 
The protests were increasing in 1987. Students and the middle class expressed their 
desire to restore democracy, which led the military junta to start negotiations with 
opponents (Kihl, 2005, p.83). Chun nominated Roo Taw-woo as his successor in 1987, 
and Roo, the candidate of the ruling party, announced eight measures on 29 June 1987 
in response to the protests for democracy. Several important points were covered: 
restoring direct presidential election (to reply to opponents); protect human rights and 
promote freedom of speech and the press; offer amnesty and restore Kim Dae Jung’s 
civil rights; reform political parties; and offer social reform to establish a clean and 
                                                     
119 In South Korea, even Park, Chun-hee was in office approximately 16 years. Nonetheless, he also 
wanted to resign after his wife’s death by an assassination, rather than to be the president for his 
lifetime. Kihl (2005, pp.87-88) noted that Kim, Young-sam’s memoirs indicate that when Kim 
Youngs-sam met Park in 1975, Park himself had expressed his intention to resign, yet he needed to 
consider the possibility that other members of the military junta would take steps to replace him if his 
intention was observed.  
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honest society (Kihl, 2005, pp.83-84; Oh, 1999, pp.98-102). Chun accepted these, and, 
because of the Olympic Games, Chun’s government could not use martial law against 
opponents. However, the Olympic Games, which raised South Korean’s prestige, 
Chun’s concession to opponents and Roo’s declaration ended the pressure for 
democracy from the masses. A new constitution was put into practice and the 
presidential election took place. However, the opponents could not agree on a 
common candidate, because there were only five months (from June to December 
1987) for opponents to organise their candidate.  
 
This division among his opponents was an advantage for Roo and he won the 
presidential election. After that, he cooperated with Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil 
and formed a majority ruling coalition to oppose Kim Dae Jung (Kihl, 2005, p.89). 
South Korea successfully democratised during this period. Kim Young Sam became 
the first ‘genuinely civilian South Korean President in more than three decades’ (Kim, 
S, 2002, p.98). Data from Freedom House also indicated that political rights and civil 
liberties ratings in South Korea rose from 4.4 to 2.3 in 1987, changed to 2.2 in 1993 
and finally to 1.2 in 2004 (Freedom House, 2011). After Roo, there has been peaceful 
transfer of presidential power in South Korea four times, and the democratic regime in 
South Korea is stable. This thesis will examine both public opinions and popular 
commitment for democracy. 
8.1.4 Public opinion to South Korean democracy 
This thesis uses the question ‘In your opinion how much of a democracy is South 
Korea?’ to understand mass opinion to democracy in South Korea. Figure 9.1 
illustrates the response. The finding shows 95% of respondents indicate that South 
Korea is a democratic regime, but 56% suggest there are minor problems and 34% 
argue there are major problems in their democracy. This result is similar to Taiwan; 
people in a democratic state would consider democracy more deeply, and they would 
have a wider and higher expectation of democracy.  
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Figure 8.1: South Korean opinions on South Korea’s democracy. 
           Source: 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
People’s normative support to democracy (support democracy in principle) is essential 
to a democratic regime (Diamond, 1999, p.169; Geoffrey & Whitefield, 1995, 
pp.488-489). A democratic regime needs public commitment to create a supportive 
environment to maintain it (Shin, 1994, pp.153-154). To examine commitment to 
democracy, this thesis uses ‘Which of the following statements comes closest to your 
own opinion?’, followed by three answers ‘Democracy is always preferable to any 
other kind of government‘, ‘Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government 
can be preferable to a democratic one’, and ‘For people like me, it does not matter 
whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime’. The results are shown in 
Table 8.1.  
 
Table 8.1: Commitment to democracy. 
 Democracy Both Authoritarian 
Wave1 47.9% (518) 11.6% (125) 40.5% (438) 
Wave2 49.4% (741) 17.4% (261) 33.2% (498) 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
Results from Table 8.1 demonstrate that, in South Korea, commitment to democracy 
increased slightly, yet the percentage for supporting democracy in principle is still not 
over 50 %. The results show that people in South Korea still do not fully support the 
democratic regime. It appears that past authoritarian regimes that brought rapid 
economic development could still inspire their desire for an authoritarian regime, if 
5% 
56% 
34% 
2% 3% A full democracy
A democracy, but with minor
problems
A democracy, with major
problems
Not a democracy
Can't choose
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South Korea faced economic crisis. On the other hand, Table 8.2 shows that 
satisfaction with democracy in South Korea is decreasing. These results may not be a 
positive phenomenon for democracy in this country. 
 
Table 8.2: Satisfaction with democracy in South Korea 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
 N % N % 
Satisfy 921 61.80% 583 52.10% 
Not Satisfy 569 38.20% 536 47.90% 
 1490 100% 1119 100% 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1) 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2) 
8.1.5 Summary 
South Korea was created as a democratic regime by the US and the UN. To the people 
in South Korea, a non-democratic government could be considered illegitimate by the 
populace. Thus, all non-democratic leaders faced protests in which at least a hundred 
thousand people participated. Although these rulers tried to unite people in a common 
goal – economic development – their measurements could not convince people that 
they had a legal right to rule. On the other hand, economic development also created a 
middle class who joined the opposition camp to seek political participation (Oh, 1999, 
pp.70-73). During the late 1980s, democracy had become the consensus between 
political elites and the masses in South Korea. Christian and Catholic groups, 
university students and the newly developed middle class produced high pressure on 
the military junta for democracy. This military government could not suppress them 
because of the coming Olympic Games; thus the compromise for democracy was 
achieved.  
 
8.2 Traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
8.2.1 Traditional legacies 
Hierarchical politics 
 
Hierarchical politics before democratisation can be found in Rhee’s period and in the 
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military government period. During Rhee’s era, as this chapter has introduced, he used 
national security and his reputation from the Korean War to limit civil rights and 
amended the constitution so that he could remove re-election limits. His disregard for 
the democratic constitution finally led him to resign, and resulted in a military coup 
within eight months of his resignation. During the military junta period, hierarchical 
politics was strikingly in evidence, yet it also brought economic achievements. 
 
Most of the military junta did not have a firm official ideology or follow other 
international ideologies. Most of them had only unclear commitments to unite the 
country, make the country progress, remove the corrupt civil government, modernise 
the state, defend order or expel foreign influences. In the meantime, these regimes 
lacked ‘ideological justification, ideas attractive to the intellectuals’. Therefore, in 
order to hide this secret of power (Linz uses arcana imperii), they would seek for 
some ideas to satisfy the requirements of the time (Linz, 2000, p.173). The military 
junta in South Korea also met this theoretical expectation. Park Chung-Hee himself 
indicated that 
 
We have been waiting for the civilian government to bring back order to the 
country. The Prime Minister and the Ministers, however, are mired in corruption, 
leading the country to the verge of collapse. We shall rise up against the 
government to save the country. We can accomplish our goals without bloodshed. 
Let us join in this Revolutionary Army to save the country. 
                                      (Kim, Kim, & Vogel, 2011, p.50) 
 
The military junta also declared their reason for uprising in the military coup:  
 
(1) We believe that the fate of the nation and the people cannot be entrusted to 
the corrupt and incompetent regime and its politicians. (2) We believe that the 
time has come [for the armed forces] to give direction to our nation, which has 
gone dangerously astray.                 (Kim, Kim, & Vogel, 2011, p.51) 
 
And the reform objectives of this military junta were:  
 
1. Oppose Communism and reorganise and strengthen anti-Communist readiness, 
which has been so far asserted only rhetorically; 2. Respect the United Nation 
Charter, faithfully carry out international obligations, and strengthen ties with the 
United States and other free-world allies; 3. Root out corruption and the 
accumulated evil in this nation and its society, instil moral principles and national 
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spirit among the people, and encourage a new and fresh outlook; 4. Speedily 
solve the misery of the masses, who are reduced to despair, and concentrate on 
the construction of an independent national economy; 5. Increase the national 
capacity to achieve national unification, the unanimous goal of all Korean people, 
and oppose Communism; 6. Transfer power to new [generations of ] 
conscientious politicians as soon as our mission has been completed, and return 
to our original [military]duties. 
 (Kim, Kim & Vogel, 2011, pp.51-52) 
 
Their purpose was to lead the country to achieve their objectives against communists, 
expel corruption, build up people’s sense of nationalism, unification and give power 
to ‘conscientious politicians’. Park finally resigned his military position, participated 
in presidential elections and became the president. Stability of the state and economic 
development became his major demands to gain popular support. The military junta 
took the following measures to consolidate its top-down rule. Firstly, it claimed that 
stability was the priority for the state. During Park’s period, Park himself twice won 
presidential elections. He claimed that political stability is the priority for the state, 
and then economic growth can be achieved. Meanwhile, to achieve political stability, 
the government should have the ability to control the army; otherwise, the army could 
still overthrow the government (Hahn, 1975, p.99). Secondly, they isolated the 
opposition camp and limited sources of funding for opponents. Finally, the military 
government confirmed the abolition of the original democratic mechanism by the 
Yushin constitution and emergency decrees, and also formally arrested opponents, and 
suppressed opponents and protesters from the 1970s to the early 1980s.  
 
However, the construction of the top-down political system was not popular. With 
regard to traditional Confucian values, in South Korea they would decrease the 
legitimacy of the Korean authoritarian regime because, in Confucian tradition, the 
scholar holds the highest rank among civilians, and soldiers should follow the scholars 
rather than rule them. Confucianism also encourages people to help each other to 
reach the goal of democratisation (Chang, 2003, pp.106-111).120 Furthermore, groups 
from civil society – especially, students and professors, in combination with the 
Catholic Churches and the newly emerged middle class – began a series of protests 
against the top-down military political system; this thesis will discuss the factor of the 
                                                     
120 He indicates that in order to challenge the US military presence in South Korea, and Park and 
Chun’s regime, a democratic ideology – the three min principles (democratic, people-oriented and 
nationalistic) – was suggested by organised student groups, who worked together to create a theoretical 
framework for democratisation. Church organisations (Catholic and Christian) were also committed to 
democratic movements. Students and Churches members would also help each other against political 
persecution and arrest by the authoritarian regime.  
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middle class later. Thus, in South Korea, the solid top-down system could not be 
established, as in China, Singapore and even Taiwan. These military leaders took 
power from a democratic regime, and they only had objectives rather than the clear 
ideology of other Confucian societies. At the same time, these objectives also will 
create a number of opponents claiming democracy.  
 
Group-orientation 
 
In South Korea, group-orientation acts to serve the building of Korean nationalism 
because South Korea, in the long term, does not have its own national identity. Korea 
was occupied by imperial Japan from 1910 to 1945. During that period, the Japanese 
tried to educate people in its colonies to adopt Japanese identity. After the Japanese 
occupation period, the South Korean government started to build up the Korean 
nation’s identity. The policies for serving this purpose include several methods: 
recover Korean traditional culture and remove Japanese colonial culture, 
anti-communist cultural policies (before democratisation) or organise a dialogue with 
North Korea for cultural exchange (after democratisation); encourage traditional 
culture, such as loyalty, patriotism, cooperation, and even an anti-western culture (if it 
serves anti-communism); nationalism and state-led development strategies in the 
authoritarian period (Yim, 2002; Kang, 2002, p.319). Although, at first, the military 
government’s intention was to inspire nationalism and Korean identity, yet scholars 
indicate that the Korean group-orientation for nationalism and Korean identity 
actually facilitated democratisation, especially in anti-American movements. 
 
For people in South Korea, the US has a unique position. Because of the US, South 
Korea was born to be a democratic country, and the US twice asked non-democratic 
rulers to stop the restoration of democracy in 1960s, yet was silent when the military 
junta suppressed the people. With the rising of national identity, people were not 
satisfied with the role of the US in tolerating the military government. The 
commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK) is the highest-ranking commander 
for both the US and Korean army, and Korea had to meet the costs of USFK. Thus, 
from the 1970s, anti-Americanism had commenced (Manyin, 2003, pp.8-9). People in 
South Korea consider this as unequal treatment compared with Japan and West 
Germany (Moon, 2003). However, in the Gwangju Democratisation Movement, Chun 
commanded Korean forces to Gwangju and suppressed the protesters, students and 
civilians. The USFK did not stop this massacre in the very beginning; thus, 
nationalism soon rose in the form of anti-Americanism, to protest how the US first 
divided Korea,, and then supported military governments in the long term (Oh, 1999, 
~ 258 ~ 
 
pp.88-89; Manyin, 2003, pp. 8-9).121 After democratisation, this movement even 
strengthened, yet Moon (2003) indicates that nationalist movements in the democratic 
period would promote participation in public affairs; people could express their 
intention to the USFK and ask the government to consider their views. Meanwhile, 
although the Korean government still needed the military help of the US for defending 
North Korea, yet popular movements would increase the government’s bargaining 
power with the US for better conditions.  
 
Also during Chun’s period, the Koreans demonstrated that group-orientation could 
seek good objectives: they could work together for the nation’s common good, and 
individuals would find that collective political decisions – when democrats help each 
other and work together for democratic movements – are wiser and broader (Chang, 
2003, p.121). Therefore, the military authoritarian regime could not fully alienate 
those seeking democracy and still be legitimised in the Korean Confucian society 
(Kihl, 2005, pp.73-74). 
 
Guanxi 
 
In South Korea, guanxi in politics is a geographical factor (Hahm, 2008). It clearly 
affects the votes for presidential elections (Kang, 2003; Manyin, 2003, p.4-5), and the 
relationship between government and enterprises, which will be discussed in the 
section on economic development. 
 
Most South Korean leaders, such as Roh Tae-woo (Daegu), Chun Doo-hwan 
(Gyeongsangnam-do), Kim Young-sam (Gyeongsangnam-do), Park, Chung-Hee 
(Gyeongsangbuk-do) are from southeast Korea, but Kim Dae-Jung is from 
Jeollanam-do, in the southwest.  
 
During the period of military rule, people in the west of South Korea, especially the 
southwest, felt that the government ignored this region, in the long term. The leader of 
the Democratic Party, Kim Dae-Jung was also from this region, and it became his 
base for democracy; thus, people in this period were more against military rule (Shih, 
2011; Oh, 1999, pp.80-81). During the beginning of the Chun Doo-hwan period, Kim 
Dae Jung led and his followers in this region commenced the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement, and then suffered military suppression. Kim himself, at 
that time, was also sentenced to death, because the military authority prosecuted him 
                                                     
121 His report to the US congress clearly indicates that the nationalists are one of the major 
anti-American groups, because they argue that the US offends their sovereignty.  
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with violations of Gwangju movement (Oh, 1999, p.83). Although the movement 
failed, the people of this region have continued to be firm supporters for 
pan-democratic parties.  
 
In the East, the power-base belongs to the Saenuri Party (previously, the Grand 
National Party). This party is the successor of the Democratic Liberal Party, which 
was founded by Park Chung Hee, and now his daughter, Park Geun-hye, is the party 
head.  
 
Empirical evidence also demonstrates the obvious vote difference between these two 
political groups. Figure 8.2 demonstrates the chart for presidential elections in 1997, 
2002 and 2007. The results clearly indicate that in the west of South Korea, people 
support pan-democratic parties much more. Even in 2007, the Grand National Party 
won a clear victory in the election. Kim’s hometown, in the southwest, still supported 
a pan-democratic candidate. 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Presidential election of South Korea: Percentage of votes obtained (Green: 
Pan Democratic Parties, Blue: Pan Grand National Party). 
          Source: Wikipedia (2012). 
 
Table 8.3 illustrates these results further. In Kim’s hometown Jeolla, the support for 
pan-democratic parties is extremely high: over 90% in the first two elections and 
nearly 80% in the 2007 election. On the other hand, in the Gyeongsang region, 
support for Park’s successor candidate is always higher than that for the 
pan-democratic parties’ candidate. As for people in other regions, they may change 
their support to an opposition party.  
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Table 8.3: Presidential election of South Korea: Percentage of votes obtained 
 
Source: Wikipedia (2012). 
 
However, this phenomenon would not affect democracy in South Korea. David Kang 
(2003) indicates that, in South Korea, people will still consider their own interests, 
and in the democratic regime, political parties need to expand their popular vote to 
win the election. Although the regional vote may not change, the democratic 
mechanism will still work, due to the party’s and the people’s rational considerations 
in the democratic regime. 
8.2.2 Modernisation factors 
Economic development 
 
Industrialisation in South Korea began in the Japanese colonial period, The Japanese 
colonial government introduced modern schools, a modern bureaucratic system, 
industries and infrastructures (Oh, 1999, p.23; Haggard, 1988, p.267), but most 
industries and resources were controlled by the Japanese (Haggard, 1988, p.267). 
During that time, the Korean economy changed to some degree from an agricultural 
economy to an industrial economy. The Japanese colonial government improved the 
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farming system, constructed infrastructures and developed light industries (Oh, 1999, 
p.23). In the beginning of the military rule period, South Korea’s economy changed 
from an import-led economy to an export-led economy and entered the capitalists’ 
world economy (Kihl, 2005, p.50).  
 
From Park’s presidency onwards, industrialisation and export expansion policies 
dominated South Korea’s economic development (Seong, 1997, pp.53-54).122 Park’s 
government maintained the dominant role in economic development and industrialism 
after the Japanese Occupation period; the government controlled resources and the 
power to redistribute the Japanese legacies and the US aid. Park’s government formed 
a strong institution to guide economic development and maintain its authoritarian 
regime (Moon, 1994, pp.143-144). In contrast with the KMT authority, which had 
many large-scale state-owned enterprises with which it could control and dominate 
resources, Park’s authority acted as a planner. Few large-scale enterprises (whether 
family based or established from the colonial period) became cooperative partners of 
Park’s government (Robinson, 2007, p.132). Park’s policies for economic 
development and the strong state formed a coalition for government and large 
enterprises to maintain a patron-client relationship. Because the military government 
dominated economic policies, and these large-scale enterprises also followed and 
benefited from this process, the government and enterprises could achieve a symbiotic 
structure. However, the condition here was that the government should have enough 
power and autonomy to dominate economic policies.  
 
Nonetheless, the power to control would decrease during this process. Enterprises, 
especially the larger ones, would also expand their influence in the government, 
playing a major role in economic growth, and in supporting the political system 
(Moon, 1994, p.144). Meanwhile, the middle class also created pressure on the 
military government, which made leaders consider dissolving the links with these 
enterprises and making a deal with the workers. Thus, the coalition was gradually 
dissolved during the Chun and Roo era (Moon, 1994, p.146, p.160). Chun tried to 
cooperate with the middle class because of international and internal pressure. Roo in 
effect followed Chun’s method to maintain a negative attitude towards large 
enterprises (Moon, 1994, pp.152-160). Tsai (2001) indicates that from 1987, the Roo 
government tried to downgrade the dominant status of the government as in relation to 
the economy. However, as a result, large-scale enterprises were able to affect 
                                                     
122 He suggests that, from 1961 to 1980, industrial policies can be divided into two periods; in the first, 
the government focused on export-oriented industries, and in the second period from 1973, heavy 
industries were introduced, but the government still focused on exports. After 1980, these policies 
continued.  
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government policies. Kim Young-sam adopted a hostile attitude towards these 
enterprises and strengthened the government’s influence on them. Kim Dae-Jung 
reconstructed the government-enterprise relationship with new economic bureaucrats 
and finally ended the big family’s effect on these enterprises and dissolved the 
symbiotic structure between government and enterprises. 
 
The government acted in a leading role concerning economic development in South 
Korea and established a tie with business for a political-commercial alliance. However, 
with advances in economic development, the big enterprises would start to affect 
government policies, and the middle class urged democracy, which forced the rulers to 
consider their requirements. Finally, it became necessary for the government to break 
the tie with business and seek help from the middle class that had emerged with 
modernisation – even if they had to attack big business as a way of gaining support 
from the middle and lower classes (Moon, 1994, p.158). Because of this, economic 
development brought a positive effect to South Korea, not only creating an ‘economic 
miracle’ with industrialisation, and cutting the relationship between government and 
large enterprises, but also creating a middle class, which held a major role in 
democratisation and economic development.  
 
Education 
 
Chapter 3 mentioned that in South Korea, the concepts of democracy existed in 
education from the very beginning. Just as in Taiwan, since South Korea was an ally 
of the democratic camp and a model for opposition to a clear communist enemy 
(North Korea), democratic education could not be removed from the education system. 
With the expansion of the education system, students and teachers in schools also 
became major actors for democracy.  
 
During the non-democratic period, there was support for democracy, recognised as 
pro-American and anti-communist, before the military rule of the 1970s (Kang, 2002, 
pp.319-320). Opponents from other parties, students and more than two hundred 
professors from the universities, and over 100,000 citizens came out to protest against 
Rhee’s personal dictatorship in the 416 Movements in 1960 (Lee, 1975, p.24; Kim, S, 
2003, p.82, Oh, 1999, p.41). From the 1970s, when Park’s government took more 
strict measures for military rule, education for democracy was suspended. Instead, a 
group-orientation approach that promoted unity was introduced (Kang, 2002). 
However, the democratic values were still circulated in the universities by student and 
professorial organisations and they continued to demand democracy (Shin, Chang, 
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Lee, & Kim, 2007). During the 1980s, students and professors joined the protests for 
democracy; and in the late 1980s, democratic education was restored.  
 
In order to promote democratic education, the South Korea Assembly also passed a 
law to establish the Korea Democracy Foundation to educate people about democratic 
values and to explore how South Korea could democratise (Korea Democracy 
Foundation, 2012). Through this officially-supported democratic education, 
democratic values could be developed and democratic culture could also become 
more deep-rooted in Korean society.  
 
Middle class 
 
This thesis has indicated that South Korea is a classic case for the argument of 
modernisation theories that economic development brings about a middle class, and 
that this middle class claims political space and finally overthrows the non-democratic 
government and establishes a democratic regime. 
 
Korean civil society demonstrated their power to stand against the non-democratic 
regime in three periods: Rhee’s personal dictatorship, Park’s military authoritarianism 
and Chun’s era (Kim S, 2003); and the middle class participated in the last two 
periods. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the middle class becomes the majority in South 
Korean society, because of the modernisation process and the transformation of 
industries (Oh, 1999, pp.66-73), and they became the major power against the 
authoritarian regime and made claims for democracy (Huntington, 1991, pp.67-68).123 
Particularly in the 1980s, the working class, church servants, managerial and 
professional persons, students and the well-off came out to protest military rule and 
call for democracy (Huntington, 1991; Oh, 1999; Kim, 2003). According to data from 
Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim (2007, pp.9-11), in the 1970s, each year there were 
100,000 individuals who participated in political protests, especially when Park 
Chung-Hee declared the dissolution of the National Assembly and imposed strict 
military rule from 1973-75. As for the 1980s, especially from 1986–1988, over 2-6 
million individuals participated in political protests. In South Korea, just as 
modernisation theory would predict, rapid economic development emerged that 
stimulated the middle class’ interest in politics (Huntington, 1991, pp. 68-70). 
Nonetheless, the military junta itself was a small ruling group, and, just as Linz (2000) 
indicates, the military junta did not have an official ideology and ideas for attracting 
                                                     
123 He also argued that ‘the managerial and professional classes of Seoul were perhaps of greater 
moment than any other’. 
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broad support. Furthermore, the military junta was the group that abolished the 
democratic regime, so they could not have legitimacy to maintain military rule by 
expanding political participation for the middle class in order to end its protests. 
Eventually, the military junta in South Korea could not deal with the increasing 
demand for democracy from the middle class and they chose to introduce 
democratisation of their own accord, to ensure the retention of their privileges and 
their ruler’s personal survival. 
 
South Korea has been democratised more than 20 years. In order to examine the 
sources for supporting democracy in South Korea, this thesis uses ‘On the whole, how 
satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Taiwan. Are you …?’ 
as the dependent variable;124 gender (male and female) and age are set as control 
variables; and then four traditional legacies and three modernisation factors 
(education: high school level and degree level; subjective social status: middle and 
upper class; and economic performance) and democratic values are used as 
independent variables in this model.125 The results are illustrated in Table 8.4. 
 
In democratised South Korea, people who have values of traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors demonstrate ambiguous results in support of democracy. In 
Wave 1, people who support hierarchical politics and guanxi are satisfied with 
democracy in South Korea; and in Wave 2, there are no legacies with explanatory 
power for the dependent variable. As for modernisation factors, in regards to 
education, comparison shows no difference between those with a lower level of 
education and those with high school and degree levels. Yet in Wave 1, people who 
received higher education are not satisfied with democracy. On the other hand, in 
Wave 2, educated people are satisfied with democracy. As for social class, the middle 
class is more satisfied with democracy than the other two classes in Wave 1; yet in 
Wave 2, there is no difference between classes. As table 8.4 demonstrates, support 
rates in all classes are evenly balanced. People who feel that there is good economic 
development significantly support democracy. This could be because people feel that 
democratic governments can maintain satisfactory economic development.  
 
As for democratic values, just as in Taiwan, people who have democratic values will 
be dissatisfied; because they consider that the existing democracy does not reach their 
                                                     
124 The answers of the question are recoded as follows: ‘very satisfied’ as 2,’ fairly satisfied’ as 1, ‘no 
answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); then, ‘not very satisfied’ as -1, and ‘not at all satisfied’ as -2. The 
recoded answer becomes the dependent variable in the model. 
125 Dummy variables are produced for nominal variables: gender (male and female), education level 
(divided into three levels), and subjective social class (divided into three levels). 
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standard of democracy. 
 
Table 8.4: Satisfaction with democracy in South Korea：multiple regression analysis. 
 
SOUTH KOREA 
Dependent Variable：Satisfaction with ‘Korean democracy’ 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male -0.009 （0.052） 0.044 （0.061） 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
-0.084 （0.021）** -0.042 （0.028） 
 Anti-harmony -0.030 （0.023） 0.000 （0.029） 
 Anti-group orientation 0.003 （0.015） 0.021 （0.020） 
 Anti-guanxi -0.063 （0.022）* 0.038 （0.029） 
      
Modernisation factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level -0.015 （0.090） 0.032 （0.096） 
 Degree level -0.073 （0.107） 0.008 （0.118） 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.117 （0.053）*** 0.038 （0.081） 
 Upper class 0.022 （0.131） 0.030 （0.200） 
Economic factor 0.147 （0.008）*** 0.159 （0.009）*** 
Age 0.024 （0.002） 0.045 （0.003） 
     
Democratic values -0.148 （0.005）*** -0.027 （0.006） 
(Constant) ── （0.151） ── （0.172） 
Adjusted R-square 0.097 0.023 
R-square 0.104 0.033 
N 1500 1212 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
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Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
8.2.3 Summary  
In South Korea, people believe that the democratic regime would offer them a better 
life; thus, traditional legacies could not stop their wish to seek democracy (Kihl, 2005, 
p.61).126 The non-democratic government in South Korea also tried to construct their 
regime by adopting some values of traditional legacies, yet these legacies did not 
serve non-democratic rulers as they expected. In contrast, modernisation factors have 
an active role foster democratisation in South Korea as the theories suggest. Economic 
development brought the middle class to force non-democratic rulers to dissolve the 
existing political-commercial alliance and make concessions towards democracy. 
Education is one of the most important factors that drove South Korea to democratise; 
education for developing democratic values made students become the most 
committed actors who stood against non-democratic rulers from the 1960s to the 
1980s.  
 
8.3 Statistical findings 
In the previous sections, this thesis demonstrated South Korea leaders’ attitude to 
democracy and roles of traditional legacies and modernisation factors for democracy. 
In this section, basic statistical data and regression models will be adopted to 
determine the trend for democracy and traditional legacies, and examine which factors 
would help or hinder the development of democratic values.  
 
This section will use statistical analyses for the following purposes: 
• to demonstrate support and the strength of support for traditional legacies and 
democratic values 
• to demonstrate the trend and changes for traditional legacies and democratic 
                                                     
126 He also uses instrumental and intrinsic legitimacy to explain why South Koreans asked for 
democracy. 
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values in South Korea 
• to demonstrate the relationship between democratic values, traditional legacies 
and modernisation factors, in order to discuss which factor is an obstacle for 
the development of democratic values  
• to examine whether any factor can diminish the influence of traditional 
legacies that are not favoured in the development of democratic values  
8.3.1 Percentage and Strength for traditional legacies and democratic values 
Table 8.5 illustrates the results of the percentage of values of traditional legacies in 
South Korea. The results in both waves are similar: people strongly reject guanxi 
(connections): the rejection rate in Wave 1 is 73.7% and 75.6% in Wave 2.127 
Hierarchical politics, in both waves, is also rejected: the percentage of rejection in 
Wave 1 is 52.5% and rises to 59.3% in Wave 2. Support for harmony is the highest 
among the traditional legacies, but the percentage of support is decreasing from 
71.4% to 62.0%. South Koreans also support group-orientation, but the rate decreases 
slightly from 62.4% to 61.7%. Overall, the support rates in both waves are greater 
than the rejection rate, but the gap is very small. In Wave 1, the gap is 7.96%, but it 
drops to 0.1% in Wave 2. 
 
Kihl (2005, pp.45-47) lists several cultural mores and legacies in Korea, and harmony 
and group-orientation can be viewed as legacies of hierarchy in status, family-centred 
values, group norms and authoritarianism. According to the list, it is not surprising 
that South Korean would have higher support for harmony and group-orientation. It 
also reflects that Confucianism still affects South Koreans’ daily life, but not in 
political aspects. Yun-Shik Chang (2003, p.121) also indicates that group orientation 
may not necessarily hinder democracy in South Korea; it may sometimes help the 
development of democracy, and this chapter has also demonstrated this point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
127 As the questions for guanxi are slightly different in the two waves, they are not comparable.  
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Table 8.5: Percentage for values of traditional legacies in South Korea. 
Wave1 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 47.5%  
(712) 
71.4%  
(1067) 
62.4%  
(1867) 
26.3%  
(394) 
53.98% 
(4040) 
Reject 52.5%  
(786) 
28.6%  
(428) 
37.6%  
(1127) 
73.7% 
(1103) 
46.02% 
(3444) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Wave2 hierarchical 
politics 
harmony group-orientation guanxi Total 
Support 40.7%  
(483) 
62.0%  
(726) 
61.7%  
(1431) 
24.4% 
(285) 
50.05% 
(2925) 
Reject 59.3%  
(703) 
38.0%  
(445) 
38.3%  
(890) 
75.6% 
(881) 
49.95% 
(2919) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
 
 
Table 8.6 illustrates the percentage of support or rejection of democratic values. 
Questions in all dimensions are the same, so the six dimensions are comparable. 
Findings in Wave 1 demonstrate that support rates in all dimensions are greater than 
rejection rates. Rule of law, with a 77.2% support rate, is the highest in Wave 1, 
followed by political equality, political pluralism, separation of powers, political 
liberty, and popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is the weakest of the six 
dimensions, at 2 %. In Wave 2, political equality is ranked the highest, followed by 
rule of law, separation of powers, political pluralism, political liberty, and popular 
sovereignty.  
 
Results in the two waves have various strengths of change. Except for political 
pluralism, trends in the other four dimensions are clear: there is an obvious increase. 
Regarding political equality, there is a 17.2% rate of increase in the dimension. 
Popular sovereignty and separation of powers also increase by more than 7%. Rule of 
law and political liberty increase slightly. Yet political pluralism, on the other hand, 
decreases by 4.2%. The slight decrease may because of political scandals and 
conflicts during the interview period in September 2006.128 
                                                     
128 During that time, President Roh Moo-hyun’s colleagues were involved in several scandals. Roh 
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Table 8.6: Percentage for six dimensions of democratic value in South Korea. 
Wave1 Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 72.2% 
(1083) 
51.0% 
(2293) 
56.4% 
(1692) 
64.8% 
(971) 
61.4% 
(1842) 
77.2% 
(1156) 
60.29% 
(9037) 
Reject 27.8% 
(416) 
49.0% 
(2204) 
43.6% 
(1306) 
35.2% 
(527) 
38.6% 
(1157) 
22.8% 
(341) 
39.71% 
(5951) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
S. Korea 
Wave2 
Political 
Equality 
Popular 
Sovereignty 
Political 
Liberty 
Political 
Pluralism 
Separation 
of Powers 
Rule of 
Law 
Total 
Support 89.4% 
(1056) 
58.4% 
(2025) 
58.7% 
(1336) 
60.6% 
(660) 
69.3% 
(1151) 
79.1% 
(906) 
64.87% 
(7134) 
Reject 10.6% 
(125) 
41.6% 
(1440) 
41.3% 
(942) 
39.4% 
(430) 
30.7% 
(687) 
20.9% 
(239) 
35.13% 
(3863) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: 1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
8.3.2 Strength for traditional legacies and democratic values 
Table 8.7 demonstrates percentage analysis of the strength of South Koreans’ 
attachment to traditional legacies and democratic values.  
 
Regarding traditional legacies, the PDI shows that South Koreans are now more 
detached from traditional legacies (anti-guanxi is not comparable because the 
description of questions in the questionnaires of the two waves slightly different). As 
in the percentage analysis, results show that people in South Korea are highly against 
guanxi in both waves. Harmony and group-orientation are supported by more than 
60% of South Koreans, yet the strength decreases sharply in harmony and slightly in 
group-orientation. Although the strength of anti-hierarchical politics doubles in Wave 
2, the strength is still not significant.  
 
As for democratic values, the strengths of these values are slightly different from the 
percentage analysis. Although political equality increases by more than 17%, the 
increase in the strength analysis is larger. Compared with Wave 1, strength in Wave 2 
                                                                                                                                                        
himself was impeached in 2004, and party conflicts continued. 
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increases by nearly a quarter. Strength of popular sovereignty is tripled in Wave 2, 
although there is only a 7.4% support increase in the percentage analysis. Although 
support for political liberty increases in the percentage analysis, the strength, on the 
other hand, decreases in this table. Strength for political pluralism is nearly halved in 
Wave 2. The trend of separation of powers is similar in both the strength and 
percentage analyses. Rule of law, which increases slightly in percentage, decreases a 
little in the table.  
 
Table 8.7: Strength of traditional legacies and democratic values in South Korea. 
SOUTH KOREA 
 
Wave1 
Mean 
Wave2 
Mean 
PDI 
Traditional legacies 
  
 
  
 
Anti-hierarchical politics 
 
0.11 0.22 0.11 
 
Anti-harmony 
 
-0.53 -0.26 0.27 
 
Anti-group orientation 
 
-0.2854 -0.269 0.0164 
 
Anti-guanxi 
 
0.72 0.65 -0.07 
Democratic values 
  
 
  
 
Political Equality 
 
0.5573 0.9711 0.4138 
 
Popular Sovereignty 
 
0.0571 0.2189 0.1618 
 
Political Liberty 
 
0.2204 0.2174 -0.003 
 
Political Pluralism 
 
0.42 0.24 -0.18 
 
Separation of Powers 
 
0.3614 0.4563 0.0949 
 
Rule of Law 
 
0.79 0.76 -0.03 
PDI: The percentage differential index in this table is Wave2-Wave1. 
Note: 1. The range is -2 to 2: -2 means totally against the factor, 2 means totally 
support the factor, 0 means no preference. 
2. Because of the different questions for the anti-guanxi aspect, the 
comparison for this may not meaningful. 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
8.3.3 Democratic Values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors 
In order to examine relationships between democratic values, traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors, democratic values129 is set as the dependent variable, and 
                                                     
129 Questions of democratic values are recoded as following: ‘strongly disagree’ as 2, ‘somewhat 
disagree’ as 1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded ‘somewhat agree’ as -1, and ‘strongly agree’ 
as-2. The political equality question ‘People with little or no education should have as much say in 
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traditional legacies and modernisation factors are set as independent variables in the 
regression model. As for gender, it is set as control variables into the model. The 
results are demonstrated in Table 8.8. Male for gender, high school level and degree 
level for education level and middle class and upper class for subjective social class 
are produced as dummy variables for this model.  
 
Regarding traditional legacies, Table 8.8 shows that all legacies in both waves are 
negative for democratic values. According to the results of Wave 1, all legacies 
demonstrate significant results to the dependent variable, which means that all 
legacies can be found to oppose democratic values effectively. Nonetheless, in Wave 2, 
hierarchical politics and harmony lose explanatory power, which means these two 
legacies may not stand effectively against democratic values.  
 
Education, one of the modernisation factors, as this thesis has discussed, plays an 
essential role in the development of democratic values. Especially in Wave 2, those 
with higher education levels have stronger democratic values than those with lower 
levels of education. As to social class, supports for classes do not demonstrate a 
difference, and, according to Table 8.6, support for democratic values is high. People 
who see economic development as poor have stronger democratic values. Although 
these people do not benefit from economic development, they would still support 
democracy. 
 
The younger generation, just as in other Confucian societies, have stronger democratic 
values than their elders. As this thesis has indicated, South Korea has promoted 
democratic education after democratisation; it is not surprising that younger people 
would have stronger democratic values because they have received a democratic 
education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
politics as highly-educated people.’ is recoded as following, due to the design of questionnaire: 
‘strongly disagree’ as -2, ‘somewhat disagree’ as -1, ‘no answer’ as 0 (a neutral answer); recoded 
‘somewhat agree’ as 1, and’ strongly agree’ as 2. After recoding, questions are added together as 
dependent variable. 
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Table 8.8: Democratic values in South Korea: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
SOUTH KOREA 
Dependent Variable：Democratic Values 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male 0.009 （0.270） 0.054 （0.280）* 
      
Traditional legacies     
 Anti-hierarchical 
politics 
0.094 （0.109）*** 0.006 （0.127） 
 Anti-harmony 0.063 （0.120）* 0.012 （0.135） 
 Anti-group orientation 0.225 （0.077）*** 0.245 （0.091）*** 
 Anti-guanxi 0.183 （0.115）*** 0.125 （0.131）*** 
      
Modernisation factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level 0.038 （0.470） 0.108 （0.442）** 
 Degree level 0.058 （0.560） 0.190 （0.539）*** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class -0.010 （0.277） 0.024 （0.371） 
 Upper class 0.017 （0.683） 0.014 （0.923） 
Economic factor -0.055 （0.044）* -0.111 （0.042）*** 
Age -0.070 （0.011）* -0.088 （0.012）** 
     
Democratic values ── ── ── ── 
(Constant) ── （0.787）*** ── （0.788）*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.157 0.142 
R-square 0.163 0.150 
N 1500 1212 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
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negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
8.3.4 Factors to diminish the influence of traditional legacies 
The last model has indicated that traditional legacies have negative influence for 
developing democratic values in South Korea. In order to examine which factor could 
diminish the influence of traditional legacies in South Korea, in this model, a 
collective ‘anti-traditional legacies’ is put as the dependent variable, and 
modernisation factors, gender, age and democratic values are independent variables in 
the model.130 The results of this model are illustrated in Table 8.9. 
 
Regarding modernisation factors, the results are different in Wave 1 and Wave 2. In 
Wave 1, the table shows that beta of education and all classes are positive, which 
mean that people stand on the anti-traditional legacies side, although compared with 
lower education and lower class, there is no significant difference. As for economic 
development, people who see economic development as poor would oppose 
traditional legacies. Regarding the results in Wave 2, compared with lower educated 
people, higher educated people are still against traditional legacies, especially those 
with a degree. As for social class and economic performance, both demonstrate 
support of traditional legacies, but economic factors do not have explanatory power to 
the dependent variable. However, the middle class support traditional legacies more 
than other classes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
130 Dummy variables: gender, education level (divided into three levels), subjective social class 
(divided into three levels). 
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Table 8.9: Anti-traditional legacies in South Korea: Multiple regression analysis. 
 
SOUTH KOREA 
Dependent Variable：Anti-traditional legacies 
 
multiple regression in 
Wave 1 
multiple regression in 
Wave 2 
Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
Gender (Female)     
 Male -0.031 （0.179） -0.178 （0.120）** 
      
Modernisation Factors     
Education (under high school)     
 High school level 0.068 （0.312） 0.110 （0.282）** 
 Degree level 0.085 （0.372）* 0.141 （0.344）** 
Subjective social class (Lower)     
 Middle class 0.019 （0.182） -0.063 （0.237）* 
 Upper class 0.018 （0.452） -0.039 （0.591） 
Economic factor -0.111 （0.029）*** -0.050 （0.027） 
Age -0.203 （0.007）*** -0.274 （0.004）*** 
     
(Constant) ── （0.517）** ── （0.501）*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.061 0.087 
R-square 0.066 0.081 
N 1500 1212 
*Signif: * <.05, ** <.01,*** <.001 
Source:  1. 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 1). 
        2. 2006 East Asia Barometer Survey (Wave 2). 
Note: Positive Beta of age means older people, and negative means younger people. Positive 
beta of four traditional legacies means people who are against these legacies and 
negative beta mean people who support these legacies. Positive beta of economic factor 
means people who indicate good economic development, and negative beta means that 
economic development is seen as poor. Positive beta of democratic values means 
people who have democratic values, and negative beta means people who do not have 
democratic values. 
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8.3.5 Summary 
In democratic South Korea, people’s support for democratic values in all orientations 
is higher than the rejection rate, and the trend still slightly increases from Wave 1 to 
Wave 2. The results show that people in South Korea have developed strong 
democratic values to support its democratic regime. However, the effects of traditional 
legacies do not significantly disappear from the public consciousness. Although this 
thesis has also indicated that traditional legacies may not hinder the democratisation 
process, statistical data show that except for harmony and hierarchical politics in 
Wave 2, other legacies could still be an obstacle for developing democratic values. 
Education may continue to deepen democratic values and will be a key element to 
diminish the influence of traditional legacies. The younger generation, as in Taiwan, 
acts as an essential element for democracy and the decrease in the values of traditional 
legacies. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
South Korea is a unique case: this country was born as a model in the democratic 
camp to oppose the communists. Thus, non-democratic rulers could not legitimise 
their rule. They did not construct a consistent official ideology to consolidate their 
rule, and even they could not decide whether they should continue to maintain their 
non-democratic rule – like Park Chung-Hee, who once considered giving up military 
rule.  
 
The major method they could use to claim support was through rapid economic 
development. This situation meant that the non-democratic regime in South Korea 
could not be sustained when the modernisation factors developed. As previous 
sections have demonstrated, economic development, the middle class and education 
were not favoured in consolidating non-democratic rule, but helped to strengthen the 
power of the opposition. Further, because the non-democratic regime in South Korea 
could not gain broad support from the people, traditional legacies also could not 
facilitate their rule. Group-orientation, used by non-democratic rulers to construct 
nationalism for national unity, also made people unite to oppose the non-democratic 
government and its ally, the US. Guanxi was another factor that helped opponents to 
unite their supporters in their own areas. These characteristics did not exist in other 
Confucian societies.  
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In democratic South Korea, democratic values in all orientations have gained support 
from more than half of the people. This demonstrates that the people in South Korea 
have internalised democratic values, and the regression analysis also indicates that, 
although traditional legacies may hinder development of democratic values, yet 
education, the younger generation and continuously developed democratic values will 
end the influence of these legacies and build up a democratic political culture in order 
to maintain the democratic regime. 
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Part 2 Conclusions 
 
In Part 1, the theoretical part of this thesis, it was argued that the classic Confucian 
political system is a limited and conditional government design; although the ruler 
dominates the government, the ruler should still acknowledge that the legitimacy to 
rule is people-based. Nonetheless, the imperial political system revised the classic 
system to be ruler-based, and asked the people to follow the rulers for stability and 
continuity of the empire. After the imperial era, the New Confucian scholars clearly 
indicate that, in Confucian societies, a democratic regime is essential for solving 
problems. The status of the populace changed from the source of legitimacy to be 
merely the element to support the empire in the Confucian political system. Yet, the 
choice for democracy lies with the political leader – that is, in the ruler’s hand. 
Moreover, traditional legacies from the imperial period, which affect the political 
culture, continue to exist in modern Confucian societies. Modernisation is expected to 
dissolve these traditional legacies and facilitate openness in societies, awaking the 
wish of the people to stand against non-democratic regimes, and training people to be 
more skilful in seeking democracy. Yet the facts demonstrate that modernisation does 
not bring democracy to all Confucian societies; some of non-democratic ones even 
become more rigid during the modernisation process. According to these discussions 
in the theoretical part, there are three hypotheses to be addressed:  
 
1. As the dominant force in the political sphere, the leadership’s attitude is decisive 
at the initial stage for an emerging democracy. The US factor, the nature of the 
regime, and internal and international factors also needed to be considered to 
explain the cases of Taiwan and South Korea. 
2. In non-democratic societies, traditional legacies are selectively adopted to 
construct their official ideology for facilitating their rule. These selected 
traditional legacies would be strongly supported by the populace. In democratic 
societies, traditional legacies might not be an obstacle for democracy, and support 
for traditional legacies is decreasing. 
3. Modernisation factors in non-democratic societies are deliberately used to serve to 
consolidate non-democratic regimes. However, in democratic societies, the 
previous non-democratic rulers did not have the ability to continue their power to 
dominate the modernisation process. 
 
The case studies are expected to find the following results in response to the 
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hypotheses, as the conclusion to Part One indicated. 
 
With regard to the ruler, case studies are expected to find that the rulers’ attitude to 
democracy is decisive. There are two different attitudes for non-democratic rulers 
among the four Confucian societies that faced democracy. In China and Singapore, 
they create a pseudo-democracy, yet the rulers dominate this democracy. In Taiwan 
and South Korea, their background forced previous non-democratic rulers to pretend 
they were democratic; they had to be tolerant to opponents and made political 
concessions to gain foreign support and cease internal pressure. 
 
As for traditional legacies, rulers in non-democratic societies selectively used these 
legacies to decorate their official ideology to make people believe these official ideas. 
In democratic societies, although some of these legacies existed or helped to facilitate 
the previous non-democratic leaders’ rule, the rulers eventually gave up power of their 
own accord, or the effects of using traditional legacies did not help to consolidate their 
power as was expected.  
 
Concerning modernisation factors, leaders in non-democratic societies deliberately 
took the modernisation process under their control and ensured that modernisation 
factors could serve their rule. Yet in democratic societies, the power of control was 
decreasing and dissolving during the modernisation process, and these modernisation 
factors eventually were in opposition to the non-democratic rulers.  
 
Finally, cases studies are expected to find that in China and Singapore, measures taken 
by non-democratic rulers were successful, and that is the reason why they were able to 
continue in power: because these societies could not build up a political culture in 
favour of democracy, people in those societies were more attached to 
officially-promoted traditional legacies, and did not support democratic values. 
However, in democratic societies, democratic values are increasing, and traditional 
legacies are decreasing.  
 
In order to testify to these expected results for the hypotheses, each case is divided 
into three sections in the case study chapters. In the first section, the ruler’s attitude to 
democracy is considered, to demonstrate the differences between non-democratic and 
democratic Confucian societies. In the second section, traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors are discussed to demonstrate the dissimilar points between 
non-democratic and democratic societies. The third section is to demonstrate the trend 
of political culture through the relationships between traditional legacies, 
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modernisation factors and democratic values. The results of the case studies are 
summarised as following: 
 
Ruler’s Attitude to Democracy 
 
In this section, the attitudes of the rulers in each case are demonstrated to discuss why 
some societies can begin a democratisation process and finally become democratised, 
yet some of them cannot.  
 
Rulers in non-democratic societies are aware that democracy is a source to gain 
legitimacy for their regime. Thus, rulers in China and Singapore made a 
pseudo-democracy to respond to demands for democracy. They claim that East Asian 
societies are not suitable for the western style of democracy, which would erode their 
culture and lead to unstable societies. Thus, they create a democracy that contains a 
mechanism to respond to claims by the people: offer them a channel to express their 
opinions, yet the ruler will decide what is right and what is wrong. Rulers are just like 
a head of family, or the priest of the Church. They are responsible for taking care of 
the needs of the people, and for offering them a better life; the people are not allowed 
to threaten their leadership. These phenomena can be summarised as following: 
 
In Chapter 5, the democracy with Chinese characteristics is conceptualised by the 
CPC as having three major elements: people’s democracy, democratic centralism and 
Minben. Regarding people’s democracy, it means that Chinese democracy should be 
practised under the leadership of the CPC, and not all of the people are citizens: some 
people who are hostile to socialism are the enemies for people to fight against. 
Meanwhile, the People’s Congress system is the practical method for people to 
participate in politics, yet this system offers only limited space and a ‘rubber stamp’ to 
the CPC’s decisions. As for democratic centralism, it encourages people to offer 
public opinions, yet there will be a leader, the CPC, to collect these views and decide 
which should be adopted. Collective interests take priority over the interests of 
individuals, and collective interests are identified by the CPC leadership. In order to 
create a democratic image, the CPC leaders introduced Minben, the concept from 
Confucianism, to be an element of Chinese democracy. The CPC rulers ask the 
government and party officers to consider the people’s needs, yet Minben itself is a 
concept which encourages hierarchical politics. Minben urges the ruler to treat the 
people as their children; it also urges the people to follow rulers unless the rulers fail 
to meet their basic needs. This concept in China can combine with its bottom line of 
Chinese democracy under the leadership of the CPC. Thus, Minben for the CPC rulers 
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is a facilitator that both creates an appearance of democracy and consolidates CPC’s 
rule. 
 
Chapter 6 demonstrates that in order to ensure Singapore’s survival, the Singapore 
leadership promote a trustee democracy that contains two characteristics: meritocratic 
government and elections to gain authorisation to act as trustee. The meritocratic 
government is to ensure the best people will always manage the government and serve 
the following purposes: fulfilling people’s needs, maintaining social order and justice, 
promoting economic growth and social progress, maintaining a good education 
system, keeping moral standards for both ruler and ruled, and maintaining standards 
of living. In this system, the PAP authority is the unit to ensure that only the best and 
moral people will be government officers, and the PAP rulers treat people as their 
children. They use the legal system and official values to educate the populace to 
follow the government’s guidance to achieve these goals. Meanwhile, it is the 
government officers’ responsibility to convince people that what the government does 
to people is always for their own good. People have the right to vote regularly to 
check this government. If the public choose to allow this government to continue in 
power, the government will take the view that they have been authorised to maintain 
the existing political system and government –people relations.  
 
On the other hand, in the other two democratic societies, rulers were forced to make a 
concession to opponents within the democratisation process. The US influence and 
nature of the regimes in Taiwan and South Korea meant that non-democratic rulers in 
these societies could not gain legitimacy nor did they have enough power to stand 
against opponents. When these non-democratic rulers considered that the tolerance 
and suppression costs were high, they started to choose to democratise the 
non-democratic regimes for their survival. 
 
In Chapter 7, the ‘Three Principles of the People’, which contained elements of 
democracy, were adopted to restore the democratic ROC. Internal pressure forced the 
KMT ruler, CCK, to make concessions to opponents and start the process of political 
liberalisation; his successor, LTH, completed democratisation in Taiwan. Democratic 
China’s image was important for the KMT to distinguish between communist China 
and the KMT’s China. In order to restore this democratic ROC, the KMT authority 
controlled most social organs and local factions to establish Taiwan as the base for its 
plan for restoration. However, international environment changes led the KMT to lose 
the legal cause to restore a democratic China. The ‘Three Principles of the People’ 
was KMT’s official ideology, and the authority promoted the principle of education, 
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especially the part concerning nationalism, to build up the sense of Chinese identity in 
Taiwan. Yet the ‘Three Principles of the People’ also urges the government to be 
democratic; thus this education also developed people’s democratic values. 
Meanwhile, the KMT authority was an outsider to the Taiwanese. This regime came to 
Taiwan after WWII, and soon raised the 228 Incidents in which the KMT authority 
massacred most of the indigenous elites and created a strong mistrust between the 
KMT and indigenous people. Thus, the indigenous elites stood against the KMT 
regime through local elections and political movements from time to time, and the 
power of this opposition increased with time. These negative factors made the KMT 
rulers consider how to survive in Taiwan and eventually CCK implemented a gradual 
political liberalisation, because he found the KMT was not able to suppress its 
opponents. This was because the regime could not afford to lose support from the US. 
The tolerance cost was also too high, because the opposition was strong enough to 
challenge the KMT publicly. After CCK, his successor democratised the regime and 
ensured the KMT’s special rights.  
 
South Korea (Chapter 8) was established as a democratic regime to be the part of the 
democratic camp by the US and the UN. Thus, in spite of Syngman Rhee’s personal 
dictatorship, the military government faced a legitimacy crisis and protests from the 
people. Syngman Rhee expanded his power after the Korean War, using national 
security as an excuse. Like the KMT in Taiwan, he used the existence of a clear 
enemy, North Korea, as his tool to establish national security law and build agencies 
against his political opponents. He also cheated in the presidential election in 1960, 
which directly resulted in his resignation. The military leadership raised a coup to 
recover state order, to be anti-communist, end corruption and develop the national 
economy. Although the military junta successfully developed the economy in South 
Korea, their actions also created a middle class who sought to expand their political 
power. The rising middle class and opponents who demanded democracy placed 
strong pressure on the military junta, which dramatically raised the tolerance cost. 
Furthermore, the forthcoming Olympic Games in 1988 were related to Korea’s 
national prestige and limited the rulers’ choice to suppress opponents. Eventually 
these rulers chose to democratise the regime, isolated their opponents and cooperated 
with some opposition parties to maintain their influence during the process of 
democratisation.  
 
Traditional legacies and modernisation 
 
In the second section of each case, the role of traditional legacies and modernisation 
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factors are demonstrated. Not all of these states had successfully practised democracy 
before, and the values of traditional legacies generally existed in the political culture 
of these societies. However, differences between democratic societies and 
non-democratic societies made Taiwan and South Korea democratised, yet China and 
Singapore maintain stable non-democratic regimes.  
 
In the non-democratic societies, traditional legacies are selected to facilitate the 
regime and official ideology. Hierarchical politics is the demonstration of these 
non-democratic regimes; harmony and group-orientation are used to serve 
non-democratic rulers’ official ideologies. Guanxi is not promoted officially in these 
two societies; factions in China may support or undermine its regime, whereas for 
Singapore, only those chosen by the PAP are permitted to be ministers or members of 
parliament.  
 
In Chapter 5, the CPC authority created a CPC-dominated top-down political system. 
In this system, the CPC’s highest rulers are the highest authority, and they have the 
right to guide the party and the state. As was mentioned in the last section, the CPC 
authority adopted democratic centralism and offered limited political rights, and the 
ruler was the decision maker deciding which public opinions are correct and which 
are wrong. All of the other party members, parties or army should follow these people. 
The whole structure of this political system was illustrated in Chapter 4. In order to 
consolidate the CPC rule and deal with problems resulting from openness and reform, 
the authority wanted to establish a socialist harmonious society. The fundamental 
concept for this society was that the state must be under the leadership of the CPC, 
and the objectives for include group-orientation, such as patriotic education and the 
maintenance of social unity, and harmony, which asks the party to take responsibility 
to cease social conflict and seek social stability.  
 
In Chapter 6, the PAP rulers identify themselves as a father who should both guide the 
people to the correct way and require them to hold to moral standards. In this 
top-down system, the PAP authority provides the shared values for the people to 
follow. These values include two traditional legacies: group-orientation and harmony. 
Firstly, the shared values ask people to consider national and community interests 
above personal interests. Secondly, the government discourages conflicts yet 
encourages national unity, racial harmony and consensus. Family is the unit to 
promote these values; through the family, values can be transferred from elders to the 
younger generation.  
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On the other hand, in democratic regimes, traditional legacies might not serve to 
consolidate non-democratic rulers. Although non-democratic rulers in Taiwan and 
South Korea also tried to establish hierarchical politics, the internal pressure and 
international realities forced them to make political concessions to their opponents. 
Guanxi also existed in the non-democratic period, but it may not serve to consolidate 
the ruler’s power. Group-orientation demonstrates ambiguous results in Taiwan and 
South Korea.  
 
In Chapter 7, the KMT authority tried to establish a base for restoring the ROC. This 
authority also practised democratic centralism to control state organs and most social 
organisations. The KMT ruler was the commander to guide them, yet this power of 
control decreased gradually when the KMT authority faced internal and international 
challenges. Guanxi between the KMT central and local factions was the method for 
the KMT ruler to control most regions of Taiwan; nonetheless, this relationship was 
dissolved during the period of political liberalisation and democratisation. Local 
factions now choose their allies according to their own interests. As the alien regime, 
the KMT tried to build up the Chinese national identity among Taiwanese, but this 
effort could not totally replace the Taiwanese identity. Even now, identity becomes a 
political issue as Taiwanese demonstrate different perceptions of national identity.  
 
In Chapter 8, the military junta could not gain legitimacy for their regime. Although 
military rulers tried to construct their top-down political system, this system was 
seriously challenged, and eventually led these rulers to yield to the political power of 
the populace. Guanxi in South Korea is demonstrated geographically. Most 
non-democratic rulers were from the east of South Korea, and they took especial care 
to develop that region. This resulted in the west region following a member of the 
opposition, Kim Dae-jung, to stand against the non-democratic rulers. Even now, the 
voting behaviour between the east and the west is clearly different. The west region 
tends to support Kim’s democratic parties; and the eastern people offer more support 
to the previous non-democratic rulers’ party. Non-democratic Korean rulers 
encouraged the building up of the Korean nation. However, this effort also made the 
people unite to make a demand for the good of the state – restore democracy in South 
Korea.  
 
As for modernisation factors, they performed differently among non-democratic and 
democratic societies. In non-democratic societies, although economic development 
could help to promote democratisation, it could also be the source of regime stability. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, because of traditional ideas, the people would be 
~ 284 ~ 
 
satisfied with the regime if the ruler could meet their basic needs. In China and 
Singapore, rulers tried to make economic development become the source of their 
regime stability. Popularised education made people become more willing to stand 
against a non-democratic ruler, yet patriotic education was promoted at all education 
levels to change public opinion to support the regime. As for the middle class, they 
were accepted inducements to support the regime.  
 
In Chapter 5, Deng Xiaoping allowed the openness and reform policies to prevent the 
CPC authority’s collapse following the Cultural Revolution. The rapid economic 
development in the past two decades persuaded the CPC authority to claim that only 
this regime could maintain economic success, and the whole party was committed to 
reaching this goal. Meanwhile, the CPC also convinced the people that if they tried to 
overthrow the regime, they would overthrow existing achievements and stability. Thus, 
people would tend to support the regime, which confirms economic development as a 
strong element in support for the CPC. The CPC authority also firmly asked all 
education institutions to put into practice ‘love China’ and ‘love party’ education. This 
move was an attempt to change public opinion to support the CPC authority. In order 
to ensure that the newly developed middle class in China would not go against the 
authority, the CPC revised their official ideology to open political space for the middle 
class.  
 
In Chapter 6, economic development also became the most effective official 
propaganda to persuade the people of Singapore to believe that this authority is the 
optimal choice to continue this achievement. In the meantime, the PAP authority also 
promoted moral education to prevent people from following the western values. 
Rulers of the PAP indicated that western values would be hazardous to Singapore’s 
good traditional values; therefore, the government should guide people to avoid these 
incorrect values. The Singapore government also operated a public housing policy to 
create a communication channel and open political space for the middle class, which 
would make the PAP rulers be more dynamic in response to public opinion.  
 
As for democratic societies, modernisation factors were more in accordance with the 
expectations of modernisation theories, which facilitated political opponents in 
seeking democracy. 
 
In Chapter 7, economic development both led to the emergence of the middle class 
and weakened the KMT’s power of control in the state. Although the KMT authority 
was the dominant force in the process of economic development and achieved 
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economic success, development of large state-owned and private enterprises led to the 
leaders of these enterprises becoming decision makers, sharing power with the KMT. 
The emergent middle class sought for political reform, and they also chose to 
cooperate with the indigenous opponents to stand against the KMT during the 
non-democratic period. Meanwhile, although the KMT continued to encourage 
Chinese nation building education, in order to sustain the image of a democratic 
China, a democratic education was also provided. These modernisation factors helped 
to limit the non-democratic rulers’ power and increased the people’s ability to seek 
democracy.  
 
In Chapter 8, economic development led by the military junta in South Korea also 
created a middle class and forced the military junta to give up the 
political-commercial alliance with big family-based enterprises. These enterprises 
were firm allies of the military junta, yet the military rulers chose to keep distance 
from them from the mid-1980s when facing political challenges. The middle class that 
emerged as a result of economic development became opponents who claimed 
democracy from the military junta. Education for democracy also existed in South 
Korea for decades, which developed democratic values. Thus, these modernisation 
factors, as in Taiwan, also provided more power for opponents seeking democracy to 
stand against non-democratic rulers. 
 
Statistical findings 
 
The statistical findings further prove the following facts:  
 
Regarding satisfaction with the existing regime, in non-democratic societies, the 
results show that the CPC and PAP’s efforts on traditional legacies and modernisation 
factors are feasible. In China, people who support officially promoted legacies were 
satisfied with Chinese democracy. In the meantime, most social classes and people 
who note good economic development also support this democracy. In Singapore, the 
results are similar to China. However, these phenomena are different from results in 
Taiwan and South Korea. Most traditional legacies do not have significant 
explanatory power to affect people’s satisfaction with the existing democracy. As for 
modernisation factors, people who feel that economic development is good are 
satisfied with the existing democracy, perhaps because they are satisfied that the 
democratic system promotes economic development; educated people would have 
more expectations of the existing democracy and are therefore not currently satisfied 
with democracy. 
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As for the percentage and strength analysis for traditional legacies among 
non-democratic and democratic societies, the results clearly reflect that the traditional 
legacies that are strongly promoted by the CPC or the PAP are highly supported by 
the populace. In the other two societies, they are not. The manipulation of these 
legacies – to strengthen elements that are obstacles to democracy – is successful. 
However, in democratic societies, the influence of these legacies is decreasing. 
 
In the regression model for the relationship between traditional legacies and 
modernisation factors, in China and Singapore modernisation factors cannot diminish 
the influence of traditional legacies; if education is excepted, the other two factors 
even help to strengthen traditional legacies. Nonetheless, education is also not reliable 
because in the results shown from Wave 2, education is not always effective against 
traditional legacies. Thus, these results again respond to arguments in the case studies: 
the CPC and the PAP manipulate modernisation factors to facilitate their rule. 
However, education and the younger generation are two major elements that are 
diminishing the influence of traditional values in all Confucian societies. This reflects 
the fact that generational differences and education are feasible in these societies. 
 
In the model for democratic values, in all cases, most traditional legacies are obstacles 
to democratic values: if traditional legacies continue to grow, democratic values 
cannot develop. As for modernisation factors, only education is a reliable factor to 
support the development of democratic values. Economic development in 
non-democratic societies hinders the development of democratic values. On the other 
hand, the younger generation in all societies support democratic values more than 
their elders do. The results also reflect that, although economic development might 
not foster the development of democracy, just as Inglehart indicated, there will be a 
value change between generations (1990; 1997). 
 
In regards to the percentage and strength analysis for democratic values, it is not 
surprising that in non-democratic societies, democratic values are very low. That is 
because the forms of ‘democracy’ of the CPC and the PAP and the values of 
pseudo-democracy which come from traditional legacies, are not compatible with 
democracy. According to the above analysis, modernisation factors are not reliable; 
there is only one strong factor to stand against the effects of traditional legacies: the 
younger generation. Thus, the democratic political culture for the development of a 
democratic regime is not likely to form shortly in China and Singapore, unless the 
leaderships are willing to change their attitude and accept democracy. On the other 
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hand, democratic values in Taiwan and South Korea are high, and they are still 
developing. 
 
Summary 
 
To summarise the case studies, the hypotheses can be answered as following: 
 
Rulers’ attitude is decisive for democracy to emerge. Democracy will not be reached 
automatically, just as Huntington (1991, p.108), Inglehart (1990; 1997) and Schmitter 
(2010) indicated. To establish a democratic regime there must be interactions between 
the leaders and the people. The appearance of the prerequisites for democracy, such as 
social, economic or other factors, are not enough to create democracy. To reach 
democracy one still needs the activities of political leaders for democracy to be 
possible. In democratic Confucian societies, rulers were forced to accept the fact that 
they could not continue to maintain their regime, because of international conditions 
and the nature of their regime: in Taiwan, it is as an outsider, and in South Korea, it 
was intended to be a democratic regime. Thus they chose to democratise to maintain 
their legacies, and this was also the safest way, as Huntington (1991) argued. Their 
choices also promoted, or directly led to, democratisation in Taiwan and South Korea. 
On the other hand, rulers in non-democratic societies choose another way – to form a 
pseudo-democracy. They claim that, although they also believe in democracy, every 
country has its own characteristics, and they insist that the form of democracy should 
be compatible with their country’s situation.  
 
As for traditional legacies, in non-democratic regimes, rulers promote a clear and 
feasible official ideology that combines with traditional legacies to protect their 
regime and make this manipulation successful. In China, the idea of the socialist 
harmonious society, which includes most of the traditional legacies, was applied by 
the CPC authority to deal with problems arising from openness and reform policies. 
Meanwhile, this official ideology also demanded social unity and authority for the 
party to be the facilitator to end social conflict. In Singapore, the shared values also 
helped to propagate official ideology to serve the PAP authority’s need to control. As 
for Taiwan and Singapore, the clear and feasible official ideology did not appear. In 
Taiwan, the KMT authority claimed they were the orthodox and democratic China; 
thus, the mission for the authority was to expel the communists and restore the ROC. 
Nonetheless, the official ideology that was established on this illusory purpose was 
not workable, and even the KMT leaders understood that. Although the KMT 
administration spent much time working for this purpose, they eventually abandoned 
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it. In South Korea, the military junta did not in fact construct an official ideology to 
combine traditional legacies and we can find that traditional legacies might not even 
be of service to that regime. 
 
Concerning modernisation factors, in democratic societies, democratic values were 
introduced from the non-democratic period by education, which developed people’s 
democratic values and provided the people with a greater ability to seek democracy. 
In non-democratic regimes, this democratic education did not exist. The regimes 
could educate people towards their particular form of democracy and its related values 
rather than western democracy and western democratic values. This effect also 
occurred in relation to economic development and middle class factors. In Taiwan and 
South Korea, although the non-democratic regimes created economic achievement, 
and gained a legitimacy bonus from economic development, the middle class would 
resist their rule because the middle class considered the KMT authority an alien 
regime, and the military junta in South Korea had forcibly occupied government seats. 
Meanwhile, these non-democratic rulers’ concession to opponents would only 
increase the strengths of opponents. Nonetheless, in China and Singapore, 
governments could more easily convince the people that they were the only route to 
maintain economic success and social stability. They could also make a deal with the 
middle class. For instance, in China, the middle class gained the right to participate in 
politics and this right was offered by the CPC authority. The middle class would be 
appreciative of the CPC because, in the CPC’s original ideology, no middle class 
would exist after the CPC’s farmer-worker revolution in 1949. The new opening 
would be viewed as a creditable political reform by the CPC authority. In Singapore, 
the middle class is taken care of by the government’s policy; thus, they may not 
choose to stand against the PAP government. 
 
The US factor, the regime’s nature and internal and international factors, are important 
to affect rulers’ decisions. Although all non-democratic rulers tried to manipulate 
selected traditional legacies to consolidate their rule, in Taiwan and South Korea the 
international and internal environment changed dramatically, which meant that these 
non-democratic rulers could not put up an effective resistance. Eventually they chose 
to make political concessions to opponents, which led to the collapse of their 
top-down regime, and negated their attempts to use traditional legacies to serve their 
regime. The nature of the regime affected the outcome for non-democratic rulers in 
the management of modernisation factors. The non-democratic regime in Taiwan was 
an alien regime that came from mainland China and claimed to restore democratic 
China; South Korea was originally a democratic regime. Thus, it was hard for 
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non-democratic regimes in these Taiwan and South Korea to legitimise their rule. 
However, the CPC authority in China was a revolutionary regime, which gained 
power from the revolution, and the PAP authority in Singapore was elected to be the 
ruler. They originally had legitimacy to rule and therefore have total autonomy to 
manipulate modernisation factors to serve them own interests. 
 
The statistical results demonstrate that the measures taken by the non-democratic 
leadership in China and Singapore were successful. Firstly, they could legitimise their 
rule by selected traditional legacies-based official ideology and achievements of 
modernisation. Secondly, the officially promoted legacies are strongly supported by 
the public, and, at the same time, support for democratic values is low. Thirdly, 
education and the younger generation can help to reinforce democratic values. The 
result also shows that if there is stronger support for traditional legacies, there would 
be less support for democratic values. Thus, building up a democratic political culture 
cannot be achieved in a short time. In democratic societies, democratic values are 
increasing, which means that democracy can still exist in a Confucian society. 
Nonetheless, in the long-run, education and generational differences will put pressure 
on the rulers of these societies to allow a broader political space. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Restatement of the Topic 
This thesis began with consideration of the unresolved debate as to whether 
Confucian societies can produce or maintain a democratic regime. Having a 
democratic regime has become the consensus position, accepted not only by countries 
that operate open political systems but also by states that do not. The rulers in these 
non-democratic states also argue that their countries are democratic, yet their 
democracy is one with their national characteristics rather than the model of Western 
democracy. The issue of whether a democratic regime can be established or 
maintained in a Confucian society has been discussed for more than a hundred years. 
In the early modern era, Confucian scholars accepted that their society needed to 
modernise and accepted the democratic system as the best political system,131 so they 
advocated the solution of combining the democratic regime with the Confucian 
society. Their view that only the people could be the source of just government was 
consistent with the Confucian classics and they sought to introduce several democratic 
institutions to correct the mistakes of the traditional system that made the rulers the 
basis of just government. This first attempt did not succeed because their formula not 
only offended most Confucian elites’ interests but also contributed to the collapse of 
the imperial system. Thereafter, the influence of modernisation and westernisation led 
most famous scholars and political elites to abandon Confucian culture in support of 
democracy, notably in China and Korea. These scholars and elites argued that the 
Confucian cultures and political system weakened their countries and led their 
countries to fall behind the Western powers. Thus, the solution was to learn from the 
West, including understanding their democratic system and scientific way of thinking.  
 
In more recent decades the debate on whether Confucian societies can have a 
democratic regime has become more pragmatic, focusing on the factors that lead some 
Confucian societies to produce a democratic regime and some of them to practice only 
                                                     
131 The democratic system they imagined might not perfectly satisfy the ideas of a democratic system 
that is practiced now. They indicated that the country should develop civil rights, modernise the national 
defence power, establish parliaments, and practise the parliamentary system (Ichiko, 1980; Gasster, 
1980).  
~ 291 ~ 
 
non-democratic politics even as their societies continue to modernise. Some scholars 
have argued that the Confucian culture will hinder democratic change because this 
culture is intrinsically anti-democratic. So these scholars indicate that if this culture 
persists in the Confucian society, it will be difficult for democracy to emerge, or it 
could develop a hybrid democracy combining liberal and illiberal elements. On the 
other hand, some scholars suggest that the scholars who argue that Confucianism 
should be the primary variable for explaining the failure of some societies to 
democratise do not correctly observe the actual causes for this. These scholars clearly 
indicate that the phenomena that some scholars suggest stand against democracy are 
not the real contents of Confucianism. Most of these phenomena are the legacies from 
the imperial period, and the imperial systems government does not reflect the actual 
Confucian political thought, but are revisions devised by some official intellectuals to 
serve the emperor and consolidate the foundation of the empire. They argue that the 
philosophy of the true Confucian system should be people-oriented, and that classic 
Confucian thought always argued that political legitimacy should be based on the 
people. Thus, a democratic regime should be practised in Confucian society in order 
to fulfil this mission, and Confucianism can also serve as a religion for people’s 
spiritual needs. These scholars clearly that the core problem that emerged from the 
imperial system was with the role given to rulers rather than Confucianism. Some 
non-democratic rulers use the Confucian culture in an unjustified way, using evasive 
words about a national kind of democracy to be practised in Confucian societies due 
to cultural differences between West and East. However, these evasive words look 
false because there have been several successful cases of Confucian societies that now 
have democratic cultures and regimes. Therefore, Confucian societies can have a 
democratic regime, which is required to fulfil the people-oriented political philosophy 
of the true Confucian tradition.  
 
Scholarly arguments about the emergence and maintenance of democratic regimes 
need to consider the level of support among political actors to operate a democratic 
regime and the depth of democratic political culture to sustain it. In line with these 
suggestions and the above debates, this thesis has discussed this topic by comparing 
the non-democratic and democratic Confucian societies in terms of the rulers’ attitude 
to democracy, the role of traditional legacies in shaping democracy emergence, and 
the effect of modernisation. By evaluating these factors it has provided explanations 
as to the compatibility of Confucian cultures and democratic cultures; and why some 
of the Confucian societies succeeded in democratic change but some of them failed.  
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9.2 Summary of the Thesis 
In order to analyse the topic, the main body of this thesis is divided into two parts: a 
theoretical part and case studies part.  
 
The theoretical part contains two chapters. In Chapter 2, this thesis first discussed the 
role of political culture in Confucian societies. It argued political culture is the 
long-term accumulation of political attitudes and values. These are stored in the 
people’s memory, and shape their political activities and decisions. Thus, it is essential 
for a society to develop a democratic political culture for democracy to emerge and be 
maintained. This thesis also demonstrated that a successful democratic regime needs a 
consensus for democracy among political elites, other major actors in society, and the 
people’s support in the stage of democratic emergence. Thereafter there should be a 
strong commitment by the people and a democratic political culture to sustain a 
democratic regime. Then this thesis outlined the contemporary debates as to whether 
Confucianism is an obstacle to democratic change. It was established that it is 
traditional legacies and the way these are used that seem to be the obstacle for 
democracy. When these traditional legacies exist in the modern politics of Confucian 
societies they can be employed to restrict democratic change, when promoted 
officially or as a result of some political activities. If these legacies continue to 
operate in a Confucian society, then it will be harder for that society to develop a 
democratic political culture.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the effect of modernisation. Modernisation theories have 
demonstrated that an open and democratic-oriented society can emerge from a 
traditional society. However, this situation may not operate evenly in Confucian 
societies. This thesis uses three major modernisation factors - economic development, 
the development of a middle class and educational levels - to indicate that the 
democratic system will not emerge automatically by modernisation alone and that it 
needs political interactions between the ruler and the people. Meanwhile, the effect of 
modernisation may be ambiguous in these societies since it can serve the 
non-democratic regime as well as helping to advance the democratisation process. 
This thesis also indicated briefly that in Confucian societies, modernisation factors 
may be operated by the non-democratic rulers to facilitate their rule or conversely 
these can help to dissolve the non-democratic regimes.  
 
Having established this theoretical approach, the second part of the thesis present case 
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studies. In this part, all chapters are discussed in three sections: the rulers’ attitude to 
democracy, the role of traditional legacies and modernisation factors, and the 
statistical findings from surveys of political values.  
 
In Chapter 5, the attitude to democracy of the Communist Party of China is clear: 
what China needs is a ‘unique democracy’ rather than the Western style democracy. 
This unique democracy with Chinese characteristics has three major elements: 
People’s democracy, Democratic centralism and Minben. People’s democracy limits 
the range of political participation and offers the CPC power to control the 
qualifications to participate in politics. Democratic centralism provides the CPC rulers 
the final determination and explanatory power to policies, although the people can 
offer their voices. Minben helps the CPC rulers to create an image that the party 
always puts the people first. Yet the thesis shows that Minben, substantially, is a 
ruler-dominated political system, and combined with the previous two elements, 
ensures the CPC rulers are still the highest authority in the Chinese ‘democratic 
system’. In order to consolidate their rule, the CPC rulers maintain a top-down 
political system to make the party the final judge and coordinator in conflicts, and 
they employ political values of harmony and group-orientation as tools to construct 
their official ideology and repress possible anti-party elements hazardous to their rule. 
Through a tight control of the modernisation process, the party claims the 
achievements of economic development to gain the people’s support for economic 
growth and a stable environment. The middle class, which has been created from this 
growth, has been permitted a more open political space by the party to attract their 
support. At the same time the CPC has promoted patriotic education so that love 
China and love the party is also practised through pupils’ education. In the statistical 
analysis, the results demonstrated that the CPC’s effort to promote traditional legacies 
for official ideology has been successful, and the modernisation factors also operate as 
facilitators to non-democratic rule. As result, only education is the firm factor for the 
people to develop democratic values, but the existing democratic values support is low, 
and the trend for democratic values is toward the negative direction. So, democratic 
values may even be retreating from the Chinese people’s minds.  
 
In Chapter 6, the rulers in Singapore created a trustee model of democracy, which is 
similar to the classic Confucian political system. The PAP rulers act as a father figure 
to the society and treat their people as the sons and daughters. They control not only 
the political issues but also the people’s daily life, needs and morality. These rulers 
clearly identify their status as an efficient, honest and strict father, and they promise to 
offer the best bureaucrats and environment to the people of Singapore. The people 
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have the right to re-authorise their trust in the PAP rulers to practice their policies. The 
PAP rulers indicate that this is the democracy that Singapore needs and can make 
Singapore succeed and survive. The Singapore government also maintains a top-down 
political system and promotes harmony and group-orientation in their official shared 
values. As for modernisation factors, it can be found the achievements of economic 
development are the best official propaganda for the government to claim the people’s 
support protecting economic success and a stable environment for investments. The 
education system also helps the government to install the correct ideology and the 
successful stories of Singapore to consolidate the people’s support for the existing 
political system. The middle class is nurtured and protected by the government, so it 
is difficult for them to stand against the government. The statistical findings also 
demonstrate that officially promoted legacies have highly support by the people, and 
only the education system is a firm factor that could help to develop democratic 
values. Yet overall democratic values in Singapore are low, which means the 
democratic political culture is still not constructed in Singapore. 
 
In Chapter 7, it was argued the KMT authority in Taiwan was imported as an alien 
regime from the mainland of China. For this reason, this authority needed to surmount 
the indigenous challenges to their legitimate as Taiwan rulers. At the same time the 
KMT authority opposed communist politics and was eager to prove it was the 
legitimate and democratic government of China. For this reason the KMT could not 
take a strict attitude to the suppression of all opponents. In the 1980s the dramatic 
changes of international environment forced KMT to move closer to democratic 
politics to gain support their continuing rule. Chiang Ching Kuo started the process of 
political liberalisation, and his successor, Lee Teng Hui, implemented a process of 
democratisation making the KMT a Taiwan-based party and ensuring their power to 
rule. Although the KMT authority tried to construct a legitimating ideology by 
promoting several legacies, their efforts failed because they could not sustain a 
non-democratic government by themselves. They needed the cooperation of Taiwan’s 
powerful entrepreneurs which diminished the KMT’s power to dominate society. In 
education, although this authority installed a Chinese identity education to build up a 
new national concept in the Taiwanese mind, yet they also needed to provide 
democratic education in order to stay true to Sun Yat-sen’s Three Peoples Principles. 
Development of a middle class also strengthened the indigenous opponents’ power to 
challenge KMT monopoly; and the KMT found it difficult to claim credit from 
modernisation factors to consolidate their rule. The statistical findings demonstrated 
that the people’s support in Taiwan for traditional legacies is decreasing gradually, and 
this trend and open education have helped Taiwanese to develop the democratic 
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values necessary for constructing a democratic political culture. Overall support for 
democratic values in Taiwan is increasing. 
 
In Chapter 8, this thesis showed that the Republic of Korea was originally established 
as a democratic regime. As a result neither the personal dictatorships nor military 
governments of the post-war period could fully legitimise their non-democratic rule. 
The military junta eventually needed to negotiate with its opponents and made 
concessions to the people’s claim for democracy. Because the military junta did not 
have a specific ideology, they also did not place much emphasis on traditional 
legacies to consolidate their rule. The military junta only tried to develop the people’s 
patriotism for opposing the communists, yet there was no apparent linkage between 
this patriotism and the military junta. In time the people of South Korea considered 
they should overthrow the military junta for the state’s long-term benefit and 
development. Modernisation factors also helped to democratise this country. 
Economic development was the major achievement for military junta, and for a time 
the political-commercial alliance helped to consolidate their rule. Ultimately, the 
military government conceded to democratic change because they needed to meet the 
working class’s demands for democracy. The emergence and development of a middle 
class was a classic case of democracy promotion in Huntington’s book. These middle 
class and educated people protested against non-democratic rule from 1960s to late 
1980s. Their continuous protests formed a firm pressure for change on the military 
junta and forced them to consider concessions. The statistical findings indicate that 
although some traditional legacies are high, yet they are not really harmful to 
democracy as considered by scholarly explanations. Education is still the major 
element to develop people’s democratic values, and some traditional legacies lost their 
effect to hinder the development of democratic values. The overall democratic values 
in South Korea are high, and numbers of people who have a specific democratic value 
are higher than those who do not in each case.  
 
Through these brief summaries of chapters, the hypotheses and research questions 
will be evaluated in the next section. 
 
9.3 Evaluating the Findings for Hypotheses and Research Questions 
This thesis has developed three hypotheses and five research questions for responding 
to the topic, and through the analysis set out in the theoretical and cases studies parts, 
these hypotheses and research questions are evaluated in this section. 
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H1: A democratic regime can be the political system of modern Confucian societies, 
yet rulers’ attitudes towards democratic values and changes are decisive for practicing 
democracy in these ruler-dominated societies. 
 
Q1: How do rulers in contemporary Confucian societies respond to the trend of 
democracy? Why are some non-democratic rulers not able to sustain their rule by 
employing the traditional legacies? How do the nature of the regime, the nature of 
internal or international change (including the US role) affect the ability of rulers to 
control the political process and maintain their non-democratic rule? 
 
Hypotheses 1 and research question 1 are discussed in Chapter 2 and the first section 
of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the hypothesis has been proved in these discussions. 
According to these discussions, it can be found the rulers emerged from the traditional 
society as the political dominator and the people in Confucian societies were largely 
unaware of their political status as the source of legitimacy in the imperial system. 
The rulers continued to control the political agenda and this became decisive after the 
imperial system collapse. The four cases studies also demonstrated that in China and 
Singapore, the ruling party created a pseudo-democracy which was still 
ruler-dominated but responded to the trend of democracy by telling their people that 
this country’s democracy is unique to their circumstance as required by culture or 
level of development. Conversely, the non-democratic rulers in Taiwan and South 
Korea provided some democratic education in their non-democratic period and 
eventually were forced to make political concessions to the opponents that emerged in 
the modernising societies. A combination of concessions by rulers and demands by the 
people finally led to these Confucian societies democratisation. This result also 
confirms that the interactions between the ruler and the people are highly significant 
for the emergence of a democratic regime (Inglehart, 1990; 1997).  
 
Regarding the answer to Q1, rulers in all contemporary Confucian societies will claim 
they are democratic; yet they use quite different ways to define and practise 
democracy. In China and Singapore, two regimes were established by revolution and 
national elections. The rulers of these two systems have never had to face strong 
challenges to their rule because their people did not have much democratic experience 
and commitment to democratic values, so the ruling party created their own 
democratic models based on their own characteristics. However, Chapters 6 and 7 
suggested that in fact these democratic models are not really democratic, but still 
ruler-dominated systems. Through national elections in China and Singapore the 
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people are given an opportunity to endorse the ruling party, their regime still cannot 
be termed a democracy as defined by the United Nations: a meaningful democracy is 
‘based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, 
social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their 
lives’(2011, October 27). In Taiwan and South Korea, the non-democratic rulers 
needed to maintain a democratic image because they were members of the US-led 
democratic camp during the Cold War. In Taiwan, the KMT rulers claimed they were 
the only orthodox government of democratic China, and thus democratic values could 
not be forbidden by the government. In South Korea, non-democratic governments 
also could not totally forbid the spread of democratic values because this regime was 
originally founded as a democratic regime. Thus, the nature of their regime could not 
provide true legitimacy for these non-democratic rulers as Chapter 7 and 9 argued. In 
the non-democratic era, the KMT authority needed to compensate for its imposition as 
an alien regime, and faced challenges from indigenous elites and the people. This 
weakened their ability to dominate the whole system either politically or economically 
was argued in Chapter 7. The US relationship also limited the KMT’s power to 
suppress its opponents, and changes to the international environment finally forced 
the ruling party to democratise the regime. In South Korea, non-democratic rulers 
continuously faced claims for democracy from society, both elites and ordinary people. 
The international environment also limited the power to suppress opponents. 
Therefore, it is clear that, although non-democratic rulers in Taiwan and South Korea 
tried to sustain their rule, problems in the nature of the regime, internal social 
pressures, and change of the international environment undermined their ability to 
sustain their regime. These problems might not happen in China and Singapore or at 
least take a long time to emerge.  
 
H2: The traditional legacies that some scholars see as hindering the development of 
democracy emerged from the political system of the pre-democratic dynasties rather 
than the Confucian political system. These traditional legacies still exist in modern 
Confucian society; but the roles of this traditional value system in shaping democratic 
emergence are variant and uncertain. In non-democratic societies, legacies may be 
selectively chosen to sustain non-democratic regimes; but in democratic societies 
these legacies may still exist but not serve as an obstacle for democracy. This thesis 
discussed these ideas further in the political culture chapter to demonstrate the 
difference between the original meaning of the Confucian classics, the way these 
legacies gradually formed into a ruling system of thought, and how they exist in the 
politics of contemporary Confucian societies. This hypothesis would seek to explore 
the following research questions. 
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Q2: What role do the traditional legacies play in this varied pattern of democratic 
change?  
 
Q3: Can rulers in non-democratic regimes use the traditional legacies to deepen 
support in people’s minds for non-democratic values? Are they successful in hindering 
the development of democratic values in contemporary Confucian societies? 
 
This hypotheses and research questions are discussed in Chapter 2 and the first part of 
the second section and statistical sections of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. These discussions 
also confirmed the hypothesis. Chapter 2 indicated that these legacies developed 
under the imperial system rather than being adopted from the Confucian political 
philosophy. Chapter 2 also further introduced four legacies that still exist in the 
politics of modern Confucian societies, some of which are promoted by rulers, and 
some of which are the result of political activities. In Chapters 5 and 6, this thesis 
indicated that some of traditional legacies, especially harmony and group-orientation, 
are officially promoted by the CPC and the PAP authorities to construct their official 
ideology. In Taiwan and South Korea, non-democratic rulers only promoted 
group-orientation for the strengthening of the national identity as a Chinese nation 
(ROC) or Korean nation. Other legacies, such as the social value of guanxi, did not 
serve the regime as the ruling elite in Taiwan and ROK expected. They also 
abandoned their top-down political system because of the negotiated decision to 
democratise the regime.  
 
Based on this result, Q2 and Q3 can be answered as follows. With regard to Q2, 
traditional legacies have been sustained in some Confucian societies as tools to be 
manipulated by non-democratic rulers, and if legacies are promoted in this way, these 
legacies can be used to damage democratic culture. Since these traditional legacies are 
part of an older political culture that persists in the people’s memory, it is convenient 
for non-democratic rulers to use these legacies to serve their official ideology and 
facilitate their rule. In all case studies, it can be found these legacies are or were 
selectively chosen by non-democratic rulers to serve their rule. For instance, in China, 
the CPC authority employs aspects of these legacies to construct its socialist 
harmonious society, and the PAP authority in Singapore combines them in the official 
shared values. Thus, those legacies that can serve the official ideology will be highly 
emphasised by these rulers. Conversely, other legacies, such as guanxi, that do not 
serve official ideology, may not hinder the development of democracy. In China, the 
CPC authority discourages guanxi because conflicts between political factions reveal 
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that the CPC authority is not as united as claimed, and this affects their ability to 
control the state. Thus the Bo Xilai (薄熙来) case in Chongqing exposed that the 
party itself is not harmonious and not united; and this might lead the people to wonder 
how the party can be the coordinator to solve social conflicts if it cannot agree its own 
affairs. In Taiwan, although the KMT authority controlled local factions to consolidate 
their rule, yet some of these factions turned to support its opponents when the KMT 
authority could not satisfy their political needs or when they lost their dominant power 
over the state. In South Korea, guanxi also led the people in the Western part of South 
Korea to offer more support to the opponents of military governments.  
 
As for Q3, traditional legacies that are officially promoted will influence people’s 
political values and prove a hazard to the development of democratic values. The 
findings in the statistical sections of Chapters 5 and 6 clearly illustrated that the 
officially promoted legacies will have higher support than other legacies. Thus these 
legacies are increasing in influence in people’s mind; and these legacies will hinder 
the development of democratic values based on the following findings in the case 
studies. As Q2 discussed, some legacies will serve non-democratic rulers’ official 
ideology, so these legacies cannot also facilitate the development of democratic values. 
This is supported by the regression results for the relationship between democratic 
values, traditional legacies and modernisation factors in Chapter 5 and 7, which 
demonstrate that the officially promoted legacies are obstacles to the development 
democratic values. Since the official ideology in China and Singapore is employed to 
consolidate non-democratic rule so those legacies that serve to construct the official 
ideology are a hazard to the development of democratic values. If these legacies 
continue to be influential the people will have limited opportunity to develop 
democratic values, and the democratic political culture will be harder to construct. 
However, whether these legacies will continue to serve and be manipulated by 
non-democratic rulers is uncertain in the future because there are two important 
observations that illustrated by the statistical sections: first, the younger generation do 
not have strong traditional legacies in mind and give more support to democratic 
values. Second, people who have democratic values would also help to diminish 
traditional legacies and help to develop a democratic political culture. Thus this part 
should be observed in the future.  
 
H3: Socio-economic modernisation is ambiguous in Confucian societies: it can be a 
tool to serve regime survival in non-democratic regime, yet it advances 
democratisation in democratic regimes. This hypothesis leads to the final research 
question.   
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Q4: What is the role of socio-economic modernisation for advancing or hindering 
democracy? Can it diminish the influence of traditional legacies; or can the ruler’s 
control of the political system be used to limit the effects of modernisation or even 
turn modernisation in to a facilitator of their rule? How does modernisation work to 
help advance democracy during the modernisation process and can political culture be 
controlled during this period? 
 
This hypotheses and the research question are examined in Chapter 3 and the latter 
part of the second section and statistical sections of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. According 
to this research, this thesis found the effects of modernisation for democracy in East 
Asian societies is uncertain. In China and Singapore, economic development and the 
emergence of a middle class can serve as sources of support for their regime, and the 
statistical sections also confirmed this assumption. In Chapters 5 and 6, the regression 
models that tested factor support for the Chinese or Singaporean political systems 
demonstrated that people who experience good economic development and or have 
middle class status are actually firm supporters of these systems. However, in Taiwan 
and South Korea, these modernisation factors actually served to dissolve and weaken 
non-democratic rule in the following ways. Economic development lead to the 
emergence of the middle class and weakened the non-democratic rulers’ power to 
dominate the state; the education system which provided democratic education helped 
the people to develop their democratic values and to resist the non-democratic rule; 
and the emergence of a middle class strengthened the power of opponents challenge 
non-democratic rulers. The situation was totally different from China and Singapore. 
The reason for the difference can be answered in research question 4. 
 
With regard to Q4 the role of modernisation in helping or hindering democratic 
change is ambiguous: it can help non-democratic rulers to consolidate their 
non-democratic rule, yet it could also push the democratisation process in some 
societies. The main factor which drives this different result is how the ruling party 
treats modernisation and the extent of their ability to control the modernisation 
process. In China and Singapore the rulers’ ability to control modernisation and their 
ambition to manipulate modernisation factors is clear. With regard to their ability to 
control modernisation, these non-democratic rulers continue to exert strong control 
over the modernisation process and its contents. Unlike in Taiwan and South Korea, 
they do not need to face challenges of international interference, make political 
concessions to internal opponents or share political power with commercial leaders, 
which could weaken their dominant power in the country. They also treat 
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modernisation as their primary tool for consolidating their rule. They can use the 
achievements of modernisation to claim people’s support for country’s stability and 
unity. On the other hand, modernisation mechanisms are also employed to serve their 
rule and construct their official ideology. The regression model which tested 
satisfaction for Chinese or Singaporean democracy also proved that their measures in 
these areas are effective:  most modernisation factors had lost their ability to advance 
democracy, and could even be turned to serve non-democratic rule. The exception was 
education which could be a factor to develop people’s democratic values. As 
modernisation proceeds in Confucian societies, the younger generations’ values are 
changing. The findings in the statistical sections indicate that younger generations 
have less support for traditional legacies and more support for democratic values. So 
whether non-democratic rulers’ efforts to manipulate modernisation factors will 
continue to work in to the future will need long-term observations.  
 
9.4 Significance of Study for Future Research on East Asian Democratic Change 
This thesis has tried to contribute to the unsolved puzzle that has emerged in East Asia: 
whether Confucian societies can have a democratic regime? This puzzle focuses on 
whether Confucianism should be identified as the primary cultural explanation to 
hinder the development of democracy; and why some Confucian societies can 
democratise yet some of them cannot. This thesis can provide three points for future 
research on East Asian democratic change.  
 
Culture is not Destiny  
 
This thesis has indicated that the leaderships of several non-democratic regimes in 
East Asia have tried to argue that because their society is Confucian in its culture that 
Western-style democracy is not suitable, and that their country should practise their 
own particular democracy instead. However, this thesis has demonstrated two errors 
in this thinking. Firstly, the Confucian culture that they are discussing is not derived 
from the classic system of Confucian thought but from the legacies of imperial system. 
Chapter 2 and 3 demonstrated there are fundamental differences between the classic 
Confucian political system and the imperial system, and even with regards to 
traditional legacies, there are still important differences between the meanings of 
classic Confucianism, the practiced facts of the imperial system and the officially 
promoted concepts in modern non-democratic societies. Thus, it is not the culture 
itself that is the barrier to democratic change because the classic political system has 
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its own meanings and functions, some of which are democratic. In addition, it is not 
only the rulers in history but also non-democratic rulers in contemporary Confucian 
societies that have revised the original meanings to serve and promote their rule. 
These created legacies from history to contemporary Confucian societies actually only 
have the surface of Confucianism and the contents have been revised to serve the 
current rulers. As famous New Confucian masters like Yu, Yingshi and Tu, Wei-Ming 
argue, we need to carefully distinguish between the ruler-served ‘Confucian factors’ 
and the classic Confucianism (Yu, 2000; Yu & Bei, 2012, March 22; Tu,1984; 1989; 
2002a; 2009, December 30). The classic Confucianism system does not operate as a 
barrier to a democratic regime and the democratic regime ought to be practiced in a 
Confucian society. On the other hand, it is not surprising that the ruler-serving 
traditional legacies do not support democratic change because non-democratic rulers 
created these. Therefore, culture is not the real problem; it is ruler-made legacies that 
present obstacles to the practice of democracy in Confucian societies.  
 
Modernisation is unreliable  
 
Several scholars have argued that modernisation will not automatically produce 
democracy. Inglehart (1990; 1997) has argued that modernisation cannot create 
democratic regimes; it only can help the people to be more skilful in seeking 
democratic change. Interactions between the ruler and the people are the key to the 
emergence of democracy. Huntington (1991) also made similar points that argued 
against any presupposition that modernisation could create democracy, and that the 
rulers’ choices and the people’s actions are more important for creating democracy. 
Chapter Four also suggested that modernisation factors may not necessarily be the 
facilitator to create democracy, and in some conditions they could be used to provide 
support for non-democratic regimes. This thesis has proved that in Confucian 
societies, modernisation is unreliable. Although it helped some Confucian societies, 
such as Taiwan and South Korea to democratise, yet it could not resist the control of 
non-democratic rulers if these rulers have the power to dominate the process and 
contents of modernisation.  
 
Rulers’ influence is important for the short-run 
 
It is important to observe the ruler’s status when studying Confucian societies because, 
as this thesis argued, the ruler has been the dominant actor in the political system for 
more than two thousand years. Especially in the imperial period, the ruler could 
dominate the political agenda, and the people were not aware of their right to be the 
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source of legitimacy in politics. When the imperial system collapsed, the rulers still 
dominated choices as to whether they should move toward a democratic regime or not. 
In the meantime, many ruling elites still control the explanatory power of the 
traditional legacies and the contents and process of modernisation. If non-democratic 
rulers can sustain their rule, it is very difficult for that society to be democratic 
because the rulers have dominant power to control the people and shape the political 
culture in ways that favours their rule. In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, the 
non-democratic rulers faced several challenges which dissolved their ability to sustain 
their rule: the nature of the regime that made it difficult for their non-democratic 
regime to achieve legitimacy; internal pressures for recognition of democracy claims 
became stronger during the modernisation process; the changes of international 
environment limited their ability to suppress opponents; they did not particularly 
establish an official ideology (South Korea) or the official ideology was damaged by 
themselves (Taiwan); and they lacked the ability to dominate modernisation contents 
and process because their power was weakened. Thus, to weaken non-democratic 
ruler’s ability to control modernisation and to shape the people’s values is the key to 
accelerate the speed of democratisation in Confucian societies. However, these factors 
did not significantly occur in non-democratic societies, so if rulers in these societies 
cannot sustain their existing promise, such as development and stability for the CPC 
or meritocratic government and a well-structured social welfare system in Singapore, 
their regime may not collapse soon. Otherwise, rulers’ influence still acts as a crucial 
factor in the short-run. Meanwhile, a political crisis could also weaken or dissolve the 
non-democratic leadership and accelerate the process of democratisation. 
 
 
Generational change and education may lead fundamental change in the long-run 
 
Although non-democratic Confucian societies may not change toward democratic 
because of the rulers’ decisions, yet the people may form an increasingly pressure to 
these rulers and even force them to at least liberalise the existing political regime. 
 
Education and younger generation are two factors that can change support for 
democratic values gradually. This finding has also been found by several empirical 
researches in East Asia, such as Chang & Chu (2007), Chang, Chang & Chu (2002) 
and Tan & Wang (2007).  
 
The rise of younger generations and the improvement in education may weaken these 
rulers’ ability to sustain their rule because these younger people will be more attached 
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to democratic values and stand against traditional legacies. In 10 to 20 years these 
younger generations will be more powerful in society and they may have more open 
minds to reject non-democratic rule. Elsewhere, this thesis also found that people who 
have democratic values will challenge both non-democratic rule and traditional 
legacies, so that even if non-democratic regimes can be sustained for now, these 
regimes may also gradually liberalise to accept democratic values as the political 
culture changes in the future. Recent events in China and Singapore also reflect the 
fact that the younger generation and educated people have gradually formed an 
adverse opinion of CPC or PAP one-party rule. In China, officials seem to be 
becoming more tolerant of opposing voices. Improvements in technology also help 
news which is not favourable to the CPC spread quickly and widely; for instance, 
protests against corrupt officers forced a new generation of CPC leaders to focus on a 
new wave of anti-corruption movements. In Singapore, the younger generation 
wanted change and supported opposition party candidates, which forced the PAP 
Prime Minister to face these voices. 
 
Generational differences resulting from the modernisation process will change 
people’s values, yet the speed of this transformation may be slow, and a long-term 
observation may be needed in order to evaluate these effects. However, eventually 
public opinion will put pressure on non-democratic rulers in China and Singapore. 
 
In summary, for future studies, the debate whether culture is the main factor in 
Confucian societies that hinders the development of democracy has been clarified. 
Furthermore, it has been possible to make some arguments that evaluate whether 
non-democratic rulers could be weakened by their choices or for any other reasons, 
suggesting that rulers’ choices may be decisive as long as they command the 
modernisation process and reinforce controls over values. On the other hand, the 
younger generations’ thoughts should be investigated more deeply to assess whether 
they would support democratic change or whether they favour more liberal politics 
but under the existing regime. In the non-democratic societies, rulers have agreed to 
follow the rule of democracy and installed their people-centred concepts of 
democratic regime, but nonetheless it needs to be observed in the long-term whether 
resistance to their rule will grow gradually and may eventually force these 
non-democratic regimes to embrace change.  
 
 
 
~ 305 ~ 
 
Appendices  
Appendix 1: Chosen Questions from Two waves’ Questionnaires 
 
Variables which are operated in statistical sections in each case study chapter are 
divided into traditional legacies, democratic values, modernisation, and 
social-economic background batteries.  
 
 
1. Traditional legacies battery 
 
 
Traditional legacies questions 
Hierarchical politics 
Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what 
they ask. 
Harmony 
When one has a conflict with a neighbour, the best way to deal with it is to 
accommodate the other person. 
Group-orientation  
  For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests 
second. 
  For the sake of the national community/society, the individual should be 
prepared to sacrifice his personal interest. 
Guanxi 
  Wave One 
  When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity 
should still be given to relatives and friends. 
  Wave Two  
When dealing with others, securing one’s immediate interests should be more 
important than developing a long-term relationship. 
 
This thesis recoded these questions as following: ‘strongly disagree’ as 2, somewhat 
disagree as ‘1’, no answer as ‘0’, a neutral answer, recoded somewhat agree as ‘-1’, 
and strongly agree as ‘-2’. Thus, the positive side of these legacies is against these 
legacies, and the negative side is to support them.  
~ 306 ~ 
 
 
2. Democratic values battery 
 
Democratic values questions 
Political Equality 
People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as 
highly-educated people. 
Popular Sovereignty 
You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is 
right. 
Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their 
decisions. 
If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide 
everything. 
Political Liberty 
  The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be 
discussed in society. 
  If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic. 
Political Pluralism 
  Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organise lots of 
groups. 
Separation of Powers 
  When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the 
executive branch. 
  If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by 
the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. 
Rule of Law 
  The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals 
even if he has to ignore the established procedure. 
 
Questions of democratic values are recoded as following: ‘strongly disagree’ as 2, 
somewhat disagree as ‘1’, no answer as ‘0’, a neutral answer, recoded somewhat agree 
as ‘-1’, and strongly agree as ‘-2’, Political equality question ‘People with little or no 
education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.’ Is recoded 
as following due to the design of questionnaire: strongly disagree’ as -2, somewhat 
disagree as ‘-1’, no answer as ‘0’, a neutral answer, recoded somewhat agree as ‘1’, 
and strongly agree as ‘2. After recoding, questions are added together as dependent 
variable. Thus, the positive side of these values is to support these legacies, and the 
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negative side is against them. In the percentage and strength analysis, these six 
orientations are calculated separately. However, this thesis adds all recode questions to 
be a democratic values variable for all multiple regression models.  
 
 
3. Modernisation battery 
 
Economic development factor 
 
Economic development factor 
1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?  
Is it … 
2. How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our 
country over the past five years?  Is it … 
3. What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition five 
years from now? Will it be … 
4. As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?  
Is it … 
5. How would you compare the current economic condition of your family 
with what it was five years ago? Is it … 
6. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be five years 
from now? Will it be … 
 
The original answer ‘Very bad’ or ‘Much worse’ are recoded to ‘-2’, ‘Bad’ or ‘A little 
worse’ to ‘-1’, ‘Good’ or ‘A little better ‘ to ‘1’, ‘Very good’  or ‘Much better ‘to ‘2’, 
and others to ‘0’. And this thesis adds these entire recoded question together to be the 
‘economic development variable’. The positive side is people who hold positive 
attitude to economic development, and the negative side means people who indicate 
the bad economic development. 
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Education factor 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 
Education factor recode 
Type Original New 
No formal education 1 Low 
Incomplete primary/elementary 2 
Complete primary/elementary 3 
Incomplete secondary/high school/ technical/vocational type 4 
Incomplete secondary/high school 6 
Complete secondary/high school/ technical/vocational type 5 High-school 
Complete secondary/high school 7 
Some university/college-level, with diploma 8 
With University/College degree 9 Degree 
level Post-graduate degree 10 
 
 
Subjective social class factor 
 
People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of upper class, 
middle class or lower class. Where would you place your family on the following 
scale? 
 
Subjective social class factor recode 
 Wave One Wave Two 
upper class 1 1,2,3 
middle class 2,3,4 4,5,6,7 
lower class 5 8,9,10 
 
 
Age factor 
 
Age factor question 
 Wave One Wave Two 
Age SE3: Actual Age SE3: Actual Age 
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4. Social-economic background battery 
 
Social-economic battery questions 
 Wave One Wave Two 
Gender SE2: Male, Female SE2: Male, Female 
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Appendix 2: Asian Barometer Survey 
 
Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) is the largest standardised large-scale survey that 
covers most countries and regions of East Asia. It provides two waves data (Singapore 
has only Wave 2 data) for cross-country and cross-time comparison, which satisfied 
the requirements of this thesis. Seven sets of survey data for four countries are used, 
as following: 
 
China: Two sets of survey data – from Wave 1 in 2002 and Wave 2 in late 2007 to 
early 2008. 
 
Singapore: One set of survey data – from Wave 2 in 2006. 
 
Taiwan: Two sets of survey data – from Wave 1 in 2001, and Wave 2 in 2006. 
 
South Korea: Two sets of survey data – from Wave 1 in 2003, and Wave 2 in 2006. 
 
The questionnaires are available at Asian Barometer Survey’s website: 
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/SurveyTopics.htm 
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